Public report — spawn, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
202findings with an exact file:lineof 221 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
27/95dimensions across the health lenses28011 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
eigr/spawn carries serious gaps (42%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (93%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Maturity (77%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (30%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 6 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Medium (~28,011 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (93%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€28,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tls.key (2), test.exs, dev.exs.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tls.key (2), test.exs, dev.exs. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tls.key (2), test.exs, dev.exs.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
125 modules, 22 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
35
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
33
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
27
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
11
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, resolve the six leaked secrets, prioritizing the TLS key and configuration files. Next, codify backups and geo-recovery in your infrastructure as code, explicitly documenting recovery time and procedures to ensure true disaster readiness. Then, integrate a static application security testing step into your CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Additionally, enforce semantic versioning in your build manifests to ensure all releases are traceable. Finally, implement an approval gate before production promotion to secure the deployment process.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tls.key (2), test.exs, dev.exs.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 27 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 27 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 202 of 221 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is read from committed policy files — a Tetragon/Falco/Kyverno stack installed cluster-wide (Helm release, platform add-on) with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a committed policy is declared intent, not proof the engine is running and blocking in the live cluster.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 34 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 12 Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with actor.pb.ex (3), protocol.pb.ex (2), test.pb.ex (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with example.pb.ex (2), spec.pb.ex, actor.pb.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with healthcheck.pb.ex (2), actor.pb.ex, example.pb.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with tls.key (2), test.exs, dev.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
10 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×2
What to do
Resolve the 2 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-key · ×4priv/certs/tls.key:1detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with tls.key (3), ca.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×24.github/dependabot.yaml:3detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×3k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml:30detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 24 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yaml (15), ci.yaml (5), docker-compose.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with agent-daemonset.yaml, server-statefulset.yaml, deployment.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: KSV-0047 · ×8k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-cluster-role.yamldetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: KSV-0041 · ×4spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×21k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 21 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with agent-daemonset.yaml (6), manifest.yaml (5), server-statefulset.yaml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with agent-daemonset.yaml (3), agent-cluster-role.yaml, server-statefulset.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with manifest.yaml (3), namespaced-roles.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
7 of 85 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
Resolve the 10 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with initializer.ex (9), internal_versions.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×26mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] · ×9mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (26). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (8), go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the Kubernetes deployment wires runtime threat enforcement — a detection engine (Tetragon/Falco) and/or an admission-control policy gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Presence of committed policy, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) and an admission-control policy (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Reward-leaning; NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No runtime threat detection finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No admission-control policy finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d42_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 68 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~4872 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .go, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .go, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 15 value object(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 82 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×26
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— bandit 1.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.1. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against bandit 1.5.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.11.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.11.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against bandit 1.5.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— cowboy 2.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.12.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: spawn_monitor/mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock, spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.12.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— cowboy 2.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— cowlib 2.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.13.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: spawn_monitor/mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock, spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.13.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— cowlib 2.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock— gun 2.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.4.0. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against gun 2.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock, spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against gun 2.1.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— gun 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.4.0. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against gun 2.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against gun 2.2.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawnctl/mix.lock— hackney 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against hackney 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.24.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.24.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.20.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_initializer/mix.lock— mint 1.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.5.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.5.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock— mint 1.6.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.6.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.6.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawnctl/mix.lock— mint 1.6.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.6.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.6.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— mint 1.7.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.7.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.7.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— phoenix 1.7.18: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.7.22. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against phoenix 1.7.18, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.7.24 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.7.24 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against phoenix 1.7.18: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock— plug 1.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.4. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.14.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.14.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_initializer/mix.lock— plug 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.4. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.15.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.15.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— plug 1.16.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.3. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.16.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: spawn_monitor/mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.16.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— plug 1.18.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.18.2. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.18.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.18.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— plug_cowboy 2.7.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.8.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/mix.lock— postgrex 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_monitor/mix.lock— postgrex 0.19.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: spawn_monitor/mix.lock, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock, spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— postgrex 0.21.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.21.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.21.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock— protobuf 0.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.16.1 (in 5 dependency files)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock— protobuf 0.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.16.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— protobuf 0.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.16.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] spawnctl/mix.lock— req 0.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.6.1
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yaml:3— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: arduino/setup-protoc@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `arduino/setup-protoc@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/arduino/setup-protoc/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:66— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:71— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:77— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:23— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:28— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: requarks/changelog-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `requarks/changelog-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/requarks/changelog-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: svenstaro/upload-release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `svenstaro/upload-release-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/svenstaro/upload-release-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:63— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:66— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:79— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:89— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:98— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:125— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: svenstaro/upload-release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `svenstaro/upload-release-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/svenstaro/upload-release-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:136— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: svenstaro/upload-release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `svenstaro/upload-release-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/svenstaro/upload-release-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yaml:145— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: BobAnkh/add-contributors@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `BobAnkh/add-contributors@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/BobAnkh/add-contributors/commits/master --jq .sha`.
High: privileged-service devops/docker/docker-compose.yaml:7— Service 'otel' is running in privileged mode. This grants the container the equivalent of root capabilities on the host machine. This can lead to container escapes, privilege escalation, and other security concerns. Remove the 'privileged' key to disable this capability.
High: privileged-service devops/docker/docker-compose.yaml:21— Service 'zipkin' is running in privileged mode. This grants the container the equivalent of root capabilities on the host machine. This can lead to container escapes, privilege escalation, and other security concerns. Remove the 'privileged' key to disable this capability.
High: run-as-non-root-unsafe-value spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml:50— When running containers in Kubernetes, it's important to ensure that they are properly secured to prevent privilege escalation attacks. One potential vulnerability is when a container is allowed to run applications as the root user, which could allow an attacker to gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container, with the parameter `runAsNonRoot` set to `true`. This will ensure that the container runs as a non-root user, limiting the damage that could be caused by any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to the container in your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ config.exs spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex— `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/config/config.exs` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 93% of the time (39 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ spawn_operator.ex spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex— `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 93% of the time (39 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ actor_host_handler.ex spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex— `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_host_handler.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 93% of the time (39 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ sidecar_configmap.ex spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex— `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/configmap/sidecar_configmap.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 93% of the time (39 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ actor_host_handler.ex lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex— `lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex` (context actors) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_host_handler.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 87% of the time (39 of the 45 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ spawn_operator.ex lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex— `lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex` (context actors) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 87% of the time (39 of the 45 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ sidecar_configmap.ex lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex— `lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex` (context actors) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/configmap/sidecar_configmap.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 87% of the time (39 of the 45 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ config.exs lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex— `lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex` (context actors) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/config/config.exs` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 87% of the time (39 of the 45 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: internal_versions.exs ↔ initializer.ex priv/internal_versions.exs— `priv/internal_versions.exs` (context priv) and `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 86% of the time (36 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: initializer.ex ↔ deployment.ex spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex— `spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex` (context spawn_initializer) and `spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex` (context spawn_operator) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 86% of the time (36 of the 42 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
High IaC: KSV-0047 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-cluster-role.yaml— Do not allow privilege escalation from node proxy
High IaC: KSV-0009 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Access to host network
High IaC: KSV-0010 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Access to host PID
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: DS-0002 tools/sdk-init/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret spawn_monitor/config/test.exs:7— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret spawn_monitor/config/dev.exs:13— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key priv/certs/tls.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key priv/certs/ca.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key k8s/componentes/certmanager/tls.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential examples/security/authentication/basic/host.yaml:14— hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0023 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— hostPath volumes mounted
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0049 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-cluster-role.yaml— Manage configmaps
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Medium IaC: KSV-0049 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Manage configmaps
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/manifest.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 spawn_operator/spawn_operator/namespaced-roles.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:359— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:359-373 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:295-309 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 79 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:753— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:753-767 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:203-217 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1001— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1001-1015 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1523-1537 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1143— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1143-1157 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:2074-2088 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:307— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:307-321 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:625-639 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 10 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 156 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1775— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1775-1789 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1897-1911 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:319— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:319-333 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:350-364 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:479— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:479-493 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:78-92 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/system/headless_service.ex:21— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/system/headless_service.ex:21-35 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/system/role_binding.ex:17-31 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:58— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:58-72 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:61-75 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:381— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:381-395 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:343-357 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex:181— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex:181-195 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex:207-221 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×9
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— decimal 2.3.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.0 (in 8 dependency files)
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] spawnctl/mix.lock— earmark 1.4.47: EEF-[CVE redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace earmark if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— grpc 0.11.5: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.0. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against grpc 0.11.5: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/mix.lock— grpc 0.8.1: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.0. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against grpc 0.8.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock— grpc 0.9.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.0. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against grpc 0.9.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— hpax 0.1.2: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1ba4bb2dc91e80089cf89c73970ac3ded76f17eb (in 4 dependency files)
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] spawnctl/mix.lock— hpax 1.0.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.4
Medium CVE: GO-2023-1568 tools/sdk-init/go.mod— stdlib 1.18.99 (path/filepath): GO-2023-1568 — fixed in Go 1.19.6; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 82 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.18.99: GO-2023-1568, GO-2023-1569, GO-2023-1570, GO-2023-1571, GO-2023-1621, GO-2023-1702, GO-2023-1703, GO-2023-1704, GO-2023-1705, GO-2023-1751, GO-2023-1752, GO-2023-1753, GO-2023-1840, GO-2023-1878, GO-2023-1987, GO-2023-2041, GO-2023-2043, GO-2023-2102, GO-2023-2185, GO-2023-2186, GO-2023-2375, GO-2023-2382, GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2687, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] spawn_operator/spawn_operator/mix.lock— ymlr 5.1.3: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.6
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:87— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:87-102 | lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:389-404 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:287— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:287-302 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:334-349 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex:26— lib/actors/security/tls/initializer.ex:26-41 | spawn_initializer/lib/spawn_initializer/tls/initializer.ex:27-42 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/actor_invoker_generator.ex:147— lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/actor_invoker_generator.ex:147-162 | lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_generator.ex:68-83 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/plugins/monitor/monitor_plugin.ex:115— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/plugins/monitor/monitor_plugin.ex:115-130 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:164-179 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:6— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:6-21 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:6-21 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 9 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 112 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:93— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:93-108 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:121-136 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_lookup_adapter.ex:46— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_lookup_adapter.ex:46-61 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_lookup_adapter.ex:46-61 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
FileTooLong: actors/protocol.pb.ex lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1843 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: actors/actor.pb.ex lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1263 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: actor/caller_consumer.ex lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:0— FileTooLong — 702 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: entity/invocation.ex lib/actors/actor/entity/invocation.ex:0— FileTooLong — 689 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: actors/healthcheck.pb.ex lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:0— FileTooLong — 651 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: system/spawn_system.ex spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk/lib/system/spawn_system.ex:0— FileTooLong — 548 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1200— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1200-1215 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:627-642 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:778-793 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:162— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:162-177 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:190-205 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1785-1800 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 63 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:195— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:195-210 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:602-617 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:132-147 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 48 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:335— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:335-350 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:439-454 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:495-510 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 9 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 112 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:8— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:8-22 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:8-22 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:8-22 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:784— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:784-798 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:48-62 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:210-224 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 46 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:598— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:598-612 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:100-114 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:128-142 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:35— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:35-49 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:170-184 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:35-49 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 72 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:432— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:432-440 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:464-472 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:495— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:495-503 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:543-551 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:544— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:544-552 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:180-188 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 78 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_system_handler.ex:50— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_system_handler.ex:50-58 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_system_handler.ex:92-100 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/agent-daemonset.yaml:30— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/componentes/spire-spiffe/manifests/server-statefulset.yaml:22— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/mysql/deployment.yaml:55— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/actors/actor/entity/invocation.ex:725— lib/actors/actor/entity/invocation.ex:725-743 | lib/actors/actor/entity/invocation.ex:776-794 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:137— lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:137-155 | lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:165-183 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:195— lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:195-213 | lib/sidecar/grpc/dispatcher.ex:232-250 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:188— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:188-205 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:53-70 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 8 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 102 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:219— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:219-236 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:188-205 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/kind.ex:68— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/kind.ex:68-85 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/kind.ex:106-123 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_generator.ex:66— lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_generator.ex:66-77 | lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_transcoding_generator.ex:67-78 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:62— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:62-73 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:93-104 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 9 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 112 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:118— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:118-129 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:102-113 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/k3d.ex:127— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/k3d.ex:127-151 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/kind.ex:108-132 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/minikube.ex:110— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/minikube.ex:110-134 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/minikube.ex:147-171 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/plugins/monitor/monitor_plugin.ex:173— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/plugins/monitor/monitor_plugin.ex:173-193 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:209-229 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/versions/api/v1/actor_host.ex:295— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/versions/api/v1/actor_host.ex:295-315 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/versions/api/v1/actor_system.ex:87-107 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 11) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:23— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:23-38 | lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:337-352 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:91-106 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:174-189 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:591-606 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:156-171 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:240-255 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1208-1223 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1779-1794 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:159-174 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:558-573 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 64 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 11) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:315— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:315-330 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:152-167 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:602-617 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:773-788 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:251-266 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1219-1234 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1610-1625 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:170-185 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:494-509 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:569-584 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:267-282 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 64 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/activators/api.ex:46— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/activators/api.ex:46-58 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/activators/rabbitmq.ex:22-34 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:522— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:522-534 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:556-568 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:561— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:561-571 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:130-140 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:161-171 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/elixir.ex:168— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/elixir.ex:168-178 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex:152-162 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/node.ex:141-151 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:322— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:322-331 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:370-379 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:362— spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:362-371 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:410-419 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:270— lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:270-278 | lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:341-349 | lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:412-420 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/grpc_with_custom_options.ex:65— lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/grpc_with_custom_options.ex:65-73 | lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_generator.ex:63-71 | lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/handler_transcoding_generator.ex:64-72 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:310— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:310-316 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:224-230 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:339— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:339-345 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:254-260 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1242.
CallerConsumer.invoke_with_span (cognitive 19) lib/actors/actor/caller_consumer.ex:529— CallerConsumer.invoke_with_span has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, match/switch 5, error handling 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 23 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s), 2 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (3 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (26 lines × 3) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/k3d.ex:89— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/k3d.ex:89-114 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/kind.ex:70-95 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/k8s/minikube.ex:72-97 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) lib/spawn/cluster/state_handoff/controllers/crdt_controller.ex:195— lib/spawn/cluster/state_handoff/controllers/crdt_controller.ex:195-216 | lib/spawn/cluster/state_handoff/invocation_scheduler_state.ex:137-158 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:263— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:263-279 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:337-353 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 16) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:527— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:527-542 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:624-639 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:698-713 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:795-810 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:70-85 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:134-149 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:273-288 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:325-340 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1116-1131 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1241-1256 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1409-1424 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1599-1614 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1632-1647 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:259-274 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:591-606 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:643-658 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 15) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:220— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:220-235 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:923-938 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1316-1331 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:210-225 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:23-38 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:142-157 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:571-586 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:792-807 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:978-993 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1047-1062 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1487-1502 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1723-1738 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1845-1860 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:117-132 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:516-531 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 64 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 8) lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:262— lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex:262-277 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1427-1442 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:130-145 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:198-213 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1194-1209 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1317-1332 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1557-1572 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:469-484 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/io/cloudevents/v1/spec.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 64 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 7) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1069— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1069-1084 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1158-1173 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:46-61 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:88-103 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1529-1544 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1585-1600 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:385-400 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 78 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 6) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:901— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:901-916 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1331-1346 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1501-1516 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1751-1766 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1873-1888 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:2010-2025 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 15) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1174— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1174-1188 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1373-1387 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:118-132 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:186-200 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:228-242 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1182-1196 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1305-1319 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1461-1475 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1545-1559 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1711-1725 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1739-1753 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1861-1875 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1903-1917 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1970-1984 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:415-429 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 78 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 10) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1370— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1370-1384 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:183-197 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:183-197 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:448-462 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:502-516 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1302-1316 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1458-1472 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1708-1722 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1967-1981 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/state.pb.ex:47-61 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 47 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 7) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1418— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:1418-1432 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex:121-135 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:189-203 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1185-1199 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1308-1322 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:1548-1562 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/test.pb.ex:446-460 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/extensions.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 78 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:458— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex:458-472 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex:763-777 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:41-55 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/example/example.pb.ex:203-217 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:92-106 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:120-134 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/actor.pb.ex` and `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/protocol.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 15 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 232 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/elixir.ex:144— spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/elixir.ex:144-157 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex:128-141 | spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/node.ex:117-130 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 9) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:322— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:322-334 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:75-87 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:106-118 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:237-249 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:253-265 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:285-297 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:102-114 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:118-130 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:150-162 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:378— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:378-390 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:107-119 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:138-150 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:245-257 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:110-122 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 8) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:345— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:345-356 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:82-93 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:113-124 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:276-287 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:300-311 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:364-375 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:141-152 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:165-176 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:651— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:651-662 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:358-369 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:398-409 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:215-226 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:505— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:505-515 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:553-563 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 9) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:609— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:609-618 | lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:657-666 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:178-187 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:209-218 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:257-266 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:460-469 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:508-517 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:229-238 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:277-286 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 8) lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:632— lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex:632-640 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex:153-161 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:184-192 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex:232-240 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:435-443 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/example.pb.ex:483-491 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:204-212 | spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/spawn_sdk_example/actors/inside_folder/clock.pb.ex:252-260 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/_generated/spawn/actors/healthcheck.pb.ex` and `spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 68 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:495— spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:495-502 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:527-534 | spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/k8s/proxy/deployment.ex:561-568 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_snapshot_adapter.ex:121— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_snapshot_adapter.ex:121-127 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_snapshot_adapter.ex:129-135 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_snapshot_adapter.ex:147-153 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:154— spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex:154-159 | spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex:138-143 — before extracting anything, compare `spawn_statestores/statestores_mariadb/lib/statestores/adapters/mariadb_projection_adapter.ex` and `spawn_statestores/statestores_postgres/lib/statestores/adapters/postgres_projection_adapter.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 7 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 80 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/elixir.ex, spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/playground/new.ex, spawnctl/lib/spawnctl/commands/new/java.ex, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/handler/actor_host_handler.ex, lib/spawn.ex, spawn_operator/spawn_operator/lib/spawn_operator/versions/api/v1/actor_system.ex, lib/spawn/cluster/cluster_supervisor.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 3 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/example.pb.ex, spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk/lib/flow.ex, lib/sidecar/grpc/generators/actor_invoker_generator.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 4 location(s) do not all need the same action: 1 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 3 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 7 of 85 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: spawn_sdk/spawn_sdk_example/lib/_generated/actors/projection_actor.pb.ex, lib/spawn/cluster/state_handoff/controllers/crdt_controller.ex, lib/actors/actor/invocation_scheduler.ex (and 4 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
No runtime threat detection — No runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) is committed. These observe process, file and network activity in-kernel and can alert or kill on malicious behaviour a static scan cannot catch.
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement· No admission-control policy · ×1
No admission-control policy — No policy-enforcement gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity admission) is committed. Admission control keeps workloads that violate your security baseline from ever reaching the cluster.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read — No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
Run 019fce6c-496c-799a-b6b1-4ba193eef62f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 82 · Warnings: 123 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 20:17 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.