Public report — Mini_Ecommerce_Clean, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-07-2026 @ 21:59 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Eric-Sfwe/Mini_Ecommerce_Clean

no automated testssingle-maintainer
36% At Risk
Architecture 100% Exemplary Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Code Health 85% Strong Security 58% Adequate Maturity 54% Adequate Accessibility 44% Weak Readiness 12% Critical

Small · 7,961 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (12%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

43/45dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
99findings with an exact file:lineof 109 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
45/112dimensions across the health lenses7961 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

eric-sfwe/Mini_Ecommerce_Clean carries serious gaps (36%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (12%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (44%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Small (~7,961 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 85% Strong Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 54% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 12% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, P1, P3, P5 Security 58% Adequate · gated by D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 44% Weak · gated by AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 12% · 46% weightAccessibility 44% · 25% weightMaturity 54% · 14% weightSecurity 58% · 8% weightCode Health 85% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 12 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~54.

New since the last scan (21+)

21 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) internals/product/repository/product.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/order/controller/http/handler.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/order/controller/http/handler.go
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go.mod
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/components/Loader.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/pages/auth/SignIn.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/pages/order/Order.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/redux/slices/auth.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/pages/order/OrderLine.tsx
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark frontend/index.html

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,600–€13,000
Cost to rebuild€2,600–€13,000 (0.1 person-years (43–137 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 36% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code~12 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 12% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml.
+18.0 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+18.0 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
3
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+18.0 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 12%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (7,961 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 12%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 85% · Strong

The Good
D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.7 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.6
The Bad
R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 5.5

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

The Good
D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Bad
D19 · Go Documentation Quality 6.0
The Ugly
D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 2.2 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 12% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, P1, P3, P5

The Good
R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 8.7 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 9.0
The Bad
D13 · Go Secret Scanning 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.6
The Ugly
D8 · Go Code Coverage 0.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D38

The Good
D28 · Go Secrets (history) 10.0 D33 · Go JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Bad
D40 · Go Network Egress Confinement 6.0 D41 · Go Kernel & Syscall Confinement 6.0
The Ugly
D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 4.3 D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 4.3 D38 · Go OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 44% · Weak · gated by AC4

The Good
AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Bad
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 6.1 AC3 · Repo Page structure 6.1
The Ugly
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 4.6 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components23High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection17Medium
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds and tests every change to ensure code quality. Next, integrate automated security scanning into the build process to catch vulnerabilities early. Then, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures to ensure business continuity. Finally, address the single leaked secret and expand test coverage to include all production modules.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml.+18.0 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+18.0 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+18.0 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+20.4 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+20.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+20.4 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+20.4 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+18.0 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 19 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 42% slop · 37% mixed · 21% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
frontend/package-lock.json0.6SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
go.mod0.9SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
k8s/frontend.yaml1.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s/app.yaml1.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s/minio.yaml1.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s/secrets.yaml3.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
k8s/redis.yaml3.1SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s/postgres.yaml3.3SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
frontend/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
internals/product/repository/product.go7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
internals/order/controller/http/handler.go7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
utils/generator.go7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used
k8s/configmap.yaml7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: KSV-01010
k8s/dashboard-admin.yaml7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: KSV-0111
internals/user/usecase/user.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
internals/order/repository/order.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 3)
README.md9.3Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The README is a one-paragraph marketing page that promises clean architecture principles but gives no code or build instructions and does not show how to run the application (e.g. `go run`, `docker compose up`).
nginx/nginx.conf9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: request-host-used

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 43 of 45 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D8D9D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D38D40D41AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 99 of 109 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fafe3-de3e-7808-b892-d267356c0e3a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×4internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:41
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)internals/product/repository/product.go:32
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3)internals/order/repository/order.go:113

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialk8s/secrets.yaml:9

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a one-paragraph marketing page for the Go-Ecommerce-Clean Architecture template that promises project structure and Martin-style clean architecture principles but gives no code or build instructions. It links to an Excalidraw diagram of Clean Module components (User_Module through Cart_Module) and a YouTube demo, then clips mid-sentence at '## Tech Stack' before listing any runnable commands or how to run the app with Docker.

The README is a one-paragraph marketing page that promises clean architecture principles but gives no code or build instructions and does not show how to run the application (e.g. `go run`, `docker compose up`).README.md
The README links only to static Excalidraw diagrams (main.excalidraw.svg, clean.excalidraw.svg) and a YouTube demo; no code or architecture documentation is shown.README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The README is a one-paragraph marketing page that promises clean… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The README links only to static Excalidraw diagrams… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 16 medium, 1 low.

Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×16k8s/app.yaml:17detected by semgrep finding
Low: request-host-usednginx/nginx.conf:22detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with secrets.yaml (10), app.yaml, frontend.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nginx.conf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

60 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 27 medium, 26 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×7Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×27Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×16frontend/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 27 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with frontend.yaml (6), app.yaml (5), minio.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), app.yaml, frontend.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 16 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with app.yaml (5), frontend.yaml (5), minio.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness2.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 of 29 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 finding(s): 3 critical, 10 high, 9 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×10frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×8frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9), go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (6), package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2), package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D40 · Network Egress Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).

No network policy

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d40_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 syscall-confinement controls present (seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux).

No seccomp profile
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — Header.tsx:55

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×4) — CartItem.tsx:25, UpdateStatusModel.tsx:40, SignUp.tsx:83, …
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×14) — ProductModalCreate.tsx:57, ProductModalCreate.tsx:71, ProductModalCreate.tsx:86, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — CardProduct.tsx:76, CartIcon.tsx:34

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • No test surface was found — a `_test.go` file beside the code it tests is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.

What to do

  • Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README omits the frontend project entirely

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the frontend project entirely.
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • frontend/src/pages/auth/SignIn.tsx:120 · frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx:171 — SignIn.tsx:120
  • frontend/src/components/Loader.tsx:6 · frontend/src/components/Loading.tsx:6 — Loader.tsx:6
  • frontend/src/components/OrderLineItem.tsx:5 · frontend/src/components/UserItem.tsx:2 — OrderLineItem.tsx:5
  • frontend/src/components/ProductModalCreate.tsx:64 · frontend/src/components/ProductModalUpdate.tsx:65 — ProductModalCreate.tsx:64
  • frontend/src/pages/auth/SignIn.tsx:48 · frontend/src/pages/auth/SignUp.tsx:61 — SignIn.tsx:48
  • frontend/src/pages/order/Order.tsx:31 · frontend/src/pages/user/User.tsx:30 — Order.tsx:31
  • frontend/src/redux/slices/auth.ts:9 · frontend/src/redux/slices/cart.ts:6 — auth.ts:9
  • frontend/src/pages/order/OrderLine.tsx:47 · frontend/src/pages/user/User.tsx:57 — OrderLine.tsx:47

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — SignUp.tsx, Cart.tsx, SignIn.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓

What to do

  • Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 2 application, 4 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 4 tooling, 0 test roots considered) — regex.ts
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×4) — order.ts:60, product.ts:72, user.ts:46, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in frontend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health85%StrongSolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity54%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness12%Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, P1, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security58%Adequate — gated by D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplarySolid.
Accessibility44%Weak — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 22 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×10
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.11 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of flatted 3.3.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — github.com/golang-jwt/jwt 3.2.2+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/golang-jwt/jwt if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of js-yaml 4.1.0 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of minimatch 3.1.2 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). One upgrade of picomatch 2.3.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of postcss 8.5.3 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — react-router 7.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — react-router is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin react-router to 7.12.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 14 advisories this scan raises against react-router 7.4.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of react-router 7.4.1 clears all 14 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — rollup 4.38.0: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 4.59.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — vite 6.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.4.3. This is 1 of 11 advisories this scan raises against vite 6.2.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.4.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.4.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of vite 6.2.3 clears all 11 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×7
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 frontend/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/app.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/frontend.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/minio.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/postgres.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/redis.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/jackc/pgx/v5@v5.9.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.7.4 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5004.
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto 0.36.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.52.0 One upgrade of golang.org/x/crypto 0.36.0 clears all 17 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — swiper 11.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 12.1.2
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential k8s/secrets.yaml:9 — hardcoded-credential detected.
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 59 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×27
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 frontend/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/app.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/app.yaml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/app.yaml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/app.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/app.yaml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
  • Medium IaC: KSV-01010 k8s/configmap.yaml — ConfigMap with sensitive content
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0111 k8s/dashboard-admin.yaml — User with admin access
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/frontend.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/frontend.yaml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/frontend.yaml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/frontend.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0117 k8s/frontend.yaml — Prevent binding to privileged ports
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/frontend.yaml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/minio.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/minio.yaml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/minio.yaml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/minio.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/minio.yaml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/postgres.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/postgres.yaml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/postgres.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/redis.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s/redis.yaml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×16
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/app.yaml:17 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/frontend.yaml:17 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/minio.yaml:17 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/postgres.yaml:18 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/redis.yaml:17 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:8 — Secrets (cG9zdGdyZXM=) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:9 — Secrets (cGFzc3dvcmQxMjM=) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:10 — Secrets (ZWNvbW1lcmNlX2NsZWFu) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:12 — Secrets (cGFzc3dvcmQ=) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:13 — Secrets (bWluaW9hZG1pbg==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:14 — Secrets (bWluaW9hZG1pbjEyMw==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:15 — Secrets (bWluaW9hZG1pbg==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:16 — Secrets (bWluaW9hZG1pbjEyMw==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:17 — Secrets (YW5ocXVvYzE4MDkyMDAzQGdtYWlsLmNvbQ==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: secrets-in-config-file k8s/secrets.yaml:18 — Secrets (Ymtyc29vcXRweGVheXluZQ==) should not be stored in infrastructure as code files. Use an alternative such as Bitnami Sealed Secrets or KSOPS to encrypt Kubernetes Secrets.
  • Medium: math-random-used utils/generator.go:5 — Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×8
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4503 go.mod — filippo.io/edwards25519 1.1.0 (filippo.io/edwards25519): GO-2026-4503 — filippo.io/edwards25519 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get filippo.io/edwards25519@v1.1.1`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2@v2.4.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 2.2.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.37.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of golang.org/x/net 0.37.0 clears all 11 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod — golang.org/x/sys 0.32.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.23.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 go.mod — stdlib 1.24.1 (net/http/internal): GO-2025-3563 — fixed in Go 1.24.2; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. One upgrade of stdlib 1.24.1 clears all 44 advisories it raises: GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3749, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — yaml 2.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:41 — internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:41-52 | internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:84-95 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:123 — internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:123-134 | internals/order/controller/http/handler.go:162-173 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/product/repository/product.go:54 — internals/product/repository/product.go:54-65 | internals/user/repository/user.go:55-66 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internals/user/usecase/user.go:71 — internals/user/usecase/user.go:71-82 | internals/user/usecase/user.go:113-124 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 80 commit(s) sampled).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1
  • Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod — github.com/klauspost/compress 1.17.11 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) internals/product/repository/product.go:32 — internals/product/repository/product.go:32-47 | internals/user/repository/user.go:33-48 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) internals/order/repository/order.go:113 — internals/order/repository/order.go:113-123 | internals/product/repository/product.go:56-66 | internals/user/repository/user.go:57-67 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Recommendation — 26 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×16
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 frontend/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s/app.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s/app.yaml — CPU not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0015 k8s/app.yaml — CPU requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0016 k8s/app.yaml — Memory requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s/app.yaml — Memory not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s/frontend.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s/frontend.yaml — CPU not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0015 k8s/frontend.yaml — CPU requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0016 k8s/frontend.yaml — Memory requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s/frontend.yaml — Memory not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s/minio.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s/minio.yaml — CPU not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0015 k8s/minio.yaml — CPU requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0016 k8s/minio.yaml — Memory requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s/minio.yaml — Memory not limited
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README is a one-paragraph marketing page that promises clean architecture principles but gives no code or build instructions and does not show how to run the application (e.g. `go run`, `docker compose up`). · ×1
  • The README is a one-paragraph marketing page that promises clean architecture principles but gives no code or build instructions and does not show how to run the application (e.g. `go run`, `docker compose up`). README.md — Add a runnable 'How to run this project' section covering building, starting with Docker, and running the frontend/backend.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README links only to static Excalidraw diagrams (main.excalidraw.svg, clean.excalidraw.svg) and a YouTube demo; no code or architecture documentation is shown. · ×1
  • The README links only to static Excalidraw diagrams (main.excalidraw.svg, clean.excalidraw.svg) and a YouTube demo; no code or architecture documentation is shown. README.md — Document each Clean Module component's purpose and its corresponding package/endpoint in the README.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×1
  • Low: request-host-used nginx/nginx.conf:22 — '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 22 of 29 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 22 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low vulnerability · ×1
  • Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json — @eslint/plugin-kit 0.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — @eslint/plugin-kit is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @eslint/plugin-kit to 0.3.4 with an `overrides` entry).
D40 · Network Egress Confinement · No network policy · ×1
  • No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No seccomp profile · ×1
  • No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No AppArmor/SELinux confinement · ×1
  • No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit/NUnit/MSTest, Jest/Vitest, pytest, Go testing, JUnit, …), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .17artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .60artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .23artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.0—

Run 019fafe3-de3e-7808-b892-d267356c0e3a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 22 · Warnings: 59 · Recommendations: 26 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 21:59 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md