Public report — CritterSupply, published 29 Jun 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
401findings with an exact file:lineof 495 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
70/98dimensions across the health lenses44680 LoC · 77 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
erikshafer/CritterSupply carries serious risk (51%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Code Health (86%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Maturity (82%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (44%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Accessibility (45%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Strengthen data-at-rest protection (Data Protection); MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing (Web-Security Posture); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics).
For scale: Medium (~44,680 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.3 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~1.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€190,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 44% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — microservices, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~1.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 44%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+4.5 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +4.5 pts/run over 5 runs
Trajectory
Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 51, unchanged across 5 runs.
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
38
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
17
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
Immediately strengthen data protection by encrypting sensitive columns and securing keys, as partial coverage leaves critical gaps. Simultaneously, replace weak hashing algorithms with secure alternatives and ensure all custom controls are fully keyboard-operable. Finally, enforce accessibility standards through automated testing and CI gates, while correcting page structure and semantic markup to ensure a robust, inclusive user experience.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 64 of 70 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 6 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 401 of 495 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (6): D20, D21, D22, D24, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 10 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
Of 39 mechanizable ADRs, 36 are prevented by analyzers, 3 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 192 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AddItemToCart.cs (2), BackorderCreatedHandler.cs (2), ChangeItemQuantity.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (192 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 132 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CarrierHandlers.cs, ListingApprovedHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 110 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CustomerAddress.cs, SLAMonitoring.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1807 test methods: 790 unit, 1017 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Prevented (currently Verified). — Hardens enforcement from Verified toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
136 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Marketplaces/Marketplaces/Adapters/EbayMarketplaceAdapter.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×2
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
Resolve the 2 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
77 projects, 1299 .cs files, 116484 hand-written lines of code (43979 production / 72505 test), plus 1325 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 203 inter-project edges (build failed).
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
Thin analysable surface across projects
Build did not complete in the analyzer
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 60 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 9.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.
ADR lacks an enforcement field · ×59docs/decisions/0062-cross-product-exchange-payments-choreography.md
What to do
Resolve the 59 ADR lacks an enforcement field finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-checkout-migration-to-orders.md, 0002-ef-core-for-customer-identity.md, 0003-value-objects-vs-primitives-queryable-fields.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (59 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
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D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
1 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 130 exposed types.
Duplicate address types with slightly different property sets. Both represent a shipping address but have different property names (e.g., `StateProvince` vs `State`, `AddressLine1` vs `Street`), causing ambiguity about which type to use in the `Orders` vs `Common` namespaces.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.
1 of 77 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Messages.Contracts
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D27 · Navigability8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
98 % of calls cross a namespace and 17 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 8.0/10. — 98 % of calls cross a namespace and 17 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×19src/Backoffice Identity/BackofficeIdentity.Api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×19src/Backoffice Identity/BackofficeIdentity.Api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 19 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (19). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
Resolve the 19 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (19). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure6.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — App.razor:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — index.html:21
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — NavMenu.razor:9
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
"@(_statusFilter == null ?" is not a valid value for aria-pressed — allowed: true, false, mixed, undefined. — ChangeRequests.razor:34
"@(_statusFilter == status ?" is not a valid value for aria-pressed — allowed: true, false, mixed, undefined. — ChangeRequests.razor:42
What to do
Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — app.css:0, NavMenu.razor.css:0, ReconnectModal.razor.css:0
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`TokenRefreshService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_timer; e.g. `_timer` at line 32). — TokenRefreshService.cs:12
`BackofficeHubService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection; e.g. `_connection` at line 118). — BackofficeHubService.cs:16
`StubEmailProvider` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_failureSimulation; e.g. `_failureSimulation` at line 39). — StubEmailProvider.cs:7
`TokenRefreshService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_timer; e.g. `_timer` at line 42). — TokenRefreshService.cs:17
`VendorHubService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection; e.g. `_connection` at line 123). — VendorHubService.cs:16
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
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C1 · Data Protection1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
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C4 · Data Retention5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a TTL / index expiry (TimeToLive / ExpireAfter / TtlIndex), a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: a TTL/index expiry, a scheduled purge/cleanup job, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("customer@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. (×6) — OrderPlacedHandler.cs:18, RefundCompletedHandler.cs:22, ReturnApprovedHandler.cs:18, …
A placeholder string ("We're looking into your shipment — a rep…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ShipmentLostInTransitHandler.cs:23
A placeholder string ("Must be LostInTransit or LostReplacement…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — FileCarrierClaim.cs:37
A placeholder string ("Must be Delivered or LostReplacementShip…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — RaiseRateDispute.cs:36
A placeholder string ("Replacement item currently unavailable. …") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ReplacementReservationOutcomeHandler.cs:39
A placeholder string ("ReplacementOutOfStock") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ReplacementReservationOutcomeHandler.cs:46
A placeholder string ("This return is not an exchange. Only exc…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ShipReplacementItem.cs:44
A placeholder string ("/api/returns/{returnId}/ship-replacement") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ShipReplacementItem.cs:58
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×7) — Login.cs:71, Logout.cs:41, RefreshToken.cs:52, …
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) — Login.cs:45, CalculateDiscount.cs:96, CalculateDiscount.cs:99, …
A test is skipped ("Ignored") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×12) — checkout-flow.feature.cs:186, checkout-flow.feature.cs:322, checkout-flow.feature.cs:365, …
A test is skipped ("Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — saga created via InvokeAsync() is not found by subsequent handlers in multi-host tests. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×4) — FulfillmentToReturnsPipelineTests.cs:16, FulfillmentToReturnsPipelineTests.cs:59, ReturnsToOrdersPipelineTests.cs:17, …
A test is skipped ("Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — cross-BC fixture depends on Order saga creation via InvokeAsync() which fails. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×2) — ReturnsToInventoryPipelineTests.cs:18, ReturnsToInventoryPipelineTests.cs:76
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 68 of 77 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Only 7/77 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether behaviour is captured as executable Gherkin specifications (a plus for shared understanding) — only assessed when a BDD framework is present.
Method: Filesystem scan: BDD framework presence (SpecFlow, Gherkin files) when a project references a BDD tool. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The .NET analyzers are running but not blocking — tighten them (set <AnalysisMode>All</AnalysisMode>, or treat analyzer warnings as errors on CI) so a security/quality regression fails the build rather than scrolling past as a warning.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 12 use(s) across 46,453 production line(s) (~0.3/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
MD5/SHA1 is broken for security purposes (collision-vulnerable). Use SHA-256+ for content integrity; for password storage, use a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt). — SplitOrderIntoShipments.cs:107
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Program.cs:139
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Replace MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing; switch to a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage.
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
`async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` unless this is a top-level event handler. — TokenRefreshService.cs:36
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 359/427 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — BackofficeIdentitySeedData.cs:13, BackofficeIdentityClient.cs:19, BackofficeIdentityClient.cs:32, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 29 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (29 value object(s))
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED2 Event/command shape — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED3 Event naming — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED4 Outbox / dual-write — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 19 projection(s)
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
X8 JS interop contract — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/BackorderCreatedHandler.cs:17— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/DeliveryAttemptFailedHandler.cs:17— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/OrderPlacedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/RefundCompletedHandler.cs:20— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ReturnApprovedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ReturnCompletedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ShipmentDeliveredHandler.cs:20— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ShipmentLostInTransitHandler.cs:20— // TODO: Query Customer Identity BC for customer preferences — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/RefundCompletedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC to get CustomerId for this OrderId — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ReturnToSenderInitiatedHandler.cs:18— // TODO: Query Orders BC to get CustomerId for this OrderId — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ShipmentDeliveredHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC to get CustomerId for this OrderId — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/ShipmentHandedToCarrierHandler.cs:17— // TODO: Query Orders BC to get CustomerId for this OrderId — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Correspondence/Correspondence/Messages/SendMessageHandler.cs:29— // TODO: will be populated from CustomerIdentity query in integration handlers — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Api/Clients/CatalogClient.cs:66— // TODO: Price will come from Pricing BC in future cycle — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Api/Queries/GetCheckoutView.cs:69— // TODO: Track actual step in Orders BC — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Api/Queries/GetCheckoutView.cs:75— // TODO: Implement validation logic — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Api/Queries/GetProductListing.cs:45— // TODO: Query Inventory BC for availability (Phase 2) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/BackorderCreatedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/DeliveryAttemptFailedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/ReturnToSenderInitiatedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/ShipmentDeliveredHandler.cs:15— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/ShipmentHandedToCarrierHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/ShipmentLostInTransitHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/TrackingNumberAssignedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC for the actual CustomerId so SignalR group targeting works. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Customer Experience/Storefront/Notifications/PaymentAuthorizedHandler.cs:16— // TODO: Query Orders BC to get CustomerId for the order — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Off the main sequence: CritterSupply.ServiceDefaults — CritterSupply.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Backoffice.Web — Backoffice.Web: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Messages.Contracts — Messages.Contracts: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: VendorPortal.Web — VendorPortal.Web: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Orders — Orders: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.20, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Fulfillment — Fulfillment: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.20, distance 0.78 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: VendorPortal — VendorPortal: abstractness 0.03, instability 0.20, distance 0.77 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Inventory — Inventory: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Pricing — Pricing: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Returns — Returns: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: VendorIdentity — VendorIdentity: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: BackofficeIdentity — BackofficeIdentity: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.25, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Payments — Payments: abstractness 0.03, instability 0.25, distance 0.72 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Shopping — Shopping: abstractness 0.04, instability 0.25, distance 0.71 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ProductCatalog — ProductCatalog: abstractness 0.04, instability 0.25, distance 0.71 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×13
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.1 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.15.1 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.15.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Hotspot: src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Web/Components/Pages/OrderConfirmation.razor src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Web/Components/Pages/OrderConfirmation.razor— src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Web/Components/Pages/OrderConfirmation.razor changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 16. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: src/Vendor Portal/VendorPortal.Web/Pages/Dashboard.razor src/Vendor Portal/VendorPortal.Web/Pages/Dashboard.razor— src/Vendor Portal/VendorPortal.Web/Pages/Dashboard.razor changed 1 times in last 90 days, max complexity 16.
Hotspot: src/Backoffice/Backoffice.Web/Pages/Products/ProductEdit.razor src/Backoffice/Backoffice.Web/Pages/Products/ProductEdit.razor— src/Backoffice/Backoffice.Web/Pages/Products/ProductEdit.razor changed 1 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15.
Dead code: ExpectedTotals tests/Customer Experience/Storefront.E2ETests/WellKnownTestData.cs:103— NamedType ExpectedTotals — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EbayPublishOfferResponse src/Marketplaces/Marketplaces/Adapters/EbayMarketplaceAdapter.cs:518— NamedType EbayPublishOfferResponse — no references found in solution.
CRAP 132: CarrierWebhookHandler.Handle src/Fulfillment/Fulfillment/Shipments/CarrierHandlers.cs:283— Cyclomatic 11 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 132: ListingApprovedHandler.Handle src/Marketplaces/Marketplaces.Api/Listings/ListingApprovedHandler.cs:31— Cyclomatic 11 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 110: CustomerAddress.Update src/Customer Identity/Customers/AddressBook/CustomerAddress.cs:95— Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 110: CheckWorkOrderSLAHandler.Handle src/Fulfillment/Fulfillment/WorkOrders/SLAMonitoring.cs:22— Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 56: RecallCascadeHandler.Handle src/Listings/Listings/Listing/RecallCascadeHandler.cs:16— Cyclomatic 7 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 56: SweepOrphanedEbayDraftsHandler.Handle src/Marketplaces/Marketplaces.Api/Listings/SweepOrphanedEbayDraftsHandler.cs:34— Cyclomatic 7 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored — This repository contains 2 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `CritterSupply.slnx` — the other 1 (`tests/Customer Identity/CustomerIdentity.Api.IntegrationTests/CritterSupply.slnx`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1138.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Duplicate address types with slightly different property sets. Both represent a shipping address but have different property names (e.g., `StateProvince` vs `State`, `AddressLine1` vs `Street`), causing ambiguity about which type to use in the `Orders` vs `Common` namespaces. · ×1
Duplicate address types with slightly different property sets. Both represent a shipping address but have different property names (e.g., `StateProvince` vs `State`, `AddressLine1` vs `Street`), causing ambiguity about which type to use in the `Orders` vs `Common` namespaces. — Consolidate into a single `ShippingAddress` type or ensure one is an alias/inheritance of the other to avoid duplication. (signatures: Messages.Contracts.Common.SharedShippingAddress | Messages.Contracts.Orders.ShippingAddress)
Low cohesion: Order (LCOM4 4) src/Orders/Orders/Placement/Order.cs:12— Order's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
CRAP 156: OrderDecider.HandleReservationCommitted src/Orders/Orders/Placement/OrderDecider.cs:425— Cyclomatic 12 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 72: VendorRefreshEndpoint.Refresh src/Vendor Identity/VendorIdentity.Api/Auth/VendorRefreshToken.cs:21— Cyclomatic 8 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Recommendation — 91 finding(s)
D20 · ADR Quality· ADR lacks an enforcement field · ×59
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0062-cross-product-exchange-payments-choreography.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0061-cross-product-exchange-replacement-reservation.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0060-inventory-bc-remaster-rationale.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0059-fulfillment-bc-remaster-rationale.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0058-dcb-promotions-coupon-redemption.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0057-walmart-deactivation-identifier-design.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0056-marketplace-adapter-resilience-patterns.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0055-submission-status-polling-architecture.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0054-ebay-sell-api-authentication.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0053-walmart-marketplace-api-authentication.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0052-amazon-spapi-authentication.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0051-vault-implementation-strategy.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0050-marketplaces-product-summary-acl.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0049-category-mapping-ownership.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0048-marketplace-document-entity-design.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0043-storefront-web-technology-options.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0042-catalog-namespace-uuid-v5-convention.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0041-product-catalog-es-migration-decisions.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0040-requested-integration-event-convention.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0039-canonical-validator-placement.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0038-identity-access-management-evaluation.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0037-ordernote-aggregate-ownership.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0036-bff-projections-strategy.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0035-backoffice-signalr-hub-design.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/decisions/0034-backoffice-bff-architecture.md— Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 119 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Marketplaces/Marketplaces/Adapters/EbayMarketplaceAdapter.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 16 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Pricing/Pricing/Products/ProductPrice.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (136 single-owned of 231 analysed files in total).
Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `CritterSupply.AppHost` with 22 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 99 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.1 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 43979 LoC spread over 77 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are warranted. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
redundant comment src/Customer Experience/Storefront.Web/Program.cs:52— "Add HttpClient for Orders API (for checkout steps)" — trim - the builder line already states this; keep only the rationale if it's a design decision
Split Messages.Contracts — A generic 'Contracts' catch-all at 2k LoC and 15 namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: MessageTypes, Validation, Serialization
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· knowledge concentrated in recent work · ×1
knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity — File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 96 commits in the last 90 days, yet 125 of 231 significant files carry no living knowledge. The history shape (bulk moves/imports or broad sweep commits diluting per-file focus) is distorting the recency signal, so freshness is not scored for this run.
Skipped (documented): ShipmentDelivered_Creates_ReturnEligibilityWindow_In_Returns_BC tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/FulfillmentToReturnsPipelineTests.cs:16— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — saga created via InvokeAsync() is not found by subsequent handlers in multi-host tests. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
Skipped (documented): ShipmentDelivered_Is_Idempotent_When_Redelivered tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/FulfillmentToReturnsPipelineTests.cs:59— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — saga created via InvokeAsync() is not found by subsequent handlers in multi-host tests. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
Skipped (documented): ReturnCompleted_Is_Delivered_To_Inventory_BC_Queue tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/ReturnsToInventoryPipelineTests.cs:18— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — cross-BC fixture depends on Order saga creation via InvokeAsync() which fails. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
Skipped (documented): ReturnCompleted_With_Non_Restockable_Items_Still_Routes_To_Inventory tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/ReturnsToInventoryPipelineTests.cs:76— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — cross-BC fixture depends on Order saga creation via InvokeAsync() which fails. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
Skipped (documented): ReturnCompleted_Updates_Order_Saga_And_Emits_RefundRequested tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/ReturnsToOrdersPipelineTests.cs:17— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — saga created via InvokeAsync() is not found by subsequent handlers in multi-host tests. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
Skipped (documented): ReturnCompleted_Closes_Saga_When_Return_Window_Already_Expired tests/Returns/Returns.Api.IntegrationTests/CrossBcSmokeTests/ReturnsToOrdersPipelineTests.cs:96— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Blocked by Wolverine saga persistence issue — saga created via InvokeAsync() is not found by subsequent handlers in multi-host tests. See docs/wolverine-saga-persistence-issue.md
D18 · Solution Shape· Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1
Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 9 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic — an SDK / target-framework / restore mismatch in the analyzer environment, not a code defect (common for an older codebase whose target framework the analyzer's SDK can't build). Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped; the C# semantic analysis loads independently and is unaffected.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
0
—
Run 019f156c-6162-72a1-877d-825f02aecac9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 128 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 35 · Warnings: 314 · Recommendations: 91 · Info: 55 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-06-2026 @ 22:07 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.