Public report — otp, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
1091findings with an exact file:lineof 1104 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
32/96dimensions across the health lenses990812 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
erlang/otp carries serious gaps (53%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Event Sourcing (86%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (46%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (55%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 4 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed… (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Very large (~990,812 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~14.1 person-years (~8–27 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Very large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~14.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,000,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 46% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with key.pem (2), ssl_server.pem, ssl_client.pem.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Very large asset (~14.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 46%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with key.pem (2), ssl_server.pem, ssl_client.pem. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with key.pem (2), ssl_server.pem, ssl_client.pem.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
1020 modules, 2 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
19
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
10
High / Critical
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the four leaked secret findings, prioritizing key.pem, ssl_server.pem, and ssl_client.pem. Establish release hygiene by stamping versions in build manifests or tagging releases with semver to ensure traceability. Strengthen security by integrating gitleaks or trufflehog in CI to block PRs containing committed secrets. Enable purge protection or soft-delete on critical resources to prevent accidental or malicious data loss. Finally, improve page structure by adding proper HTML landmarks, titles, and heading order while removing meta-refresh.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with key.pem (2), ssl_server.pem, ssl_client.pem.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 32 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 32 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 1091 of 1104 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 558 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with wxStyledTextCtrl.erl, erl_syntax.erl, wxGrid.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (558 warning-level).
Resolve the 438 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with erlang.erl, socket.erl, erl_syntax.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (438 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with key.pem (2), ssl_server.pem, ssl_client.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
35 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/stdlib/src/rand.erl.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×4
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for an Erlang/OTP project: the README files alone give a strong overview of Erlang/OTP (its purpose, OTP itself, examples, installation), plus cross-compilation, license headers, and system-level guides. A dedicated 'Vulnerabilities' section explains how Erlang/OTP reports CVEs via OpenVEX statements, with links to release-vex.json files. The tutorial is also present, describing interoperability between Erlang and C. The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for an Erlang interoperability project. It includes a detailed licensing header with SPDX information, a clear overview of the built-in interoperability mechanisms (distributed Erlang, ports, nifs), and four tutorial documents covering each mechanism in depth: distributed Erlang, NIFs, a problem example, and port drivers. The documentation is clipped mid-sentence for several sections but the outline lists every named section present, so truncation does not signal missing content. There are no visible errors or omissions. The system_principles document is a well-written, comprehensive principles guide covering starting the Erlang runtime with erl, halting/restarting via halt/0 and m:init restart functions, boot scripts (with default_boot_scripts and user-defined), and code loading strategy. It begins with an SPDX license header and ends with a clipped Boot Scripts section that carries its full outline; it is clear and complete for the visible content.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.4/10. — The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for an Erlang/OTP project: the README files alone give a strong overview of Erlang/OTP (its purpose, OTP itself, examples, installation), plus cross-compilation, license headers, and system-level guides. A dedicated 'Vulnerabilities' section explains how Erlang/OTP reports CVEs via OpenVEX statements, with links to release-vex.json files. The tutorial is also present, describing interoperability between Erlang and C. The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for an Erlang interoperability project. It includes a detailed licensing header with SPDX information, a clear overview of the built-in interoperability mechanisms (distributed Erlang, ports, nifs), and four tutorial documents covering each mechanism in depth: distributed Erlang, NIFs, a problem example, and port drivers. The documentation is clipped mid-sentence for several sections but the outline lists every named section present, so truncation does not signal missing content. There are no visible errors or omissions. The system_principles document is a well-written, comprehensive principles guide covering starting the Erlang runtime with erl, halting/restarting via halt/0 and m:init restart functions, boot scripts (with default_boot_scripts and user-defined), and code loading strategy. It begins with an SPDX license header and ends with a clipped Boot Scripts section that carries its full outline; it is clear and complete for the visible content.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-key · ×5lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl:123detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 5 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with key.pem (2), public_key.erl, ssl_client.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: secrets-inherit · ×50.github/workflows/main.yaml:145detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with win_erlexec.c (9), cc_wrap.c (6), ld_wrap.c (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5.github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.clangdetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0010 · ×3.github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.64-bitdetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×10.github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.32-bitdetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0014.github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.ubuntu-basedetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 10 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.32-bit (2), Dockerfile.64-bit (2), Dockerfile.clang (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.clang (2), Dockerfile.debian-base (2), Dockerfile.ubuntu-base. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.64-bit, Dockerfile.clang, Dockerfile.ubuntu-base. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
24 of 1324 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/snmp/src/agent/snmpa_trap.erl.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — notes.html:23, package.html:24
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — notes.html:23, package.html:24
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — package.html:24
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`tr:hover th[scope=row], tr:hover td` sets color: #fff on background-color: #D1D1D1 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — ct_default.css:199
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no accessibility linting at author time and no automated accessibility check in tests or CI. Add your UI toolkit's own accessibility assertion to the test suite (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in the pipeline.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
`inet_db` has a `handle_call` query clause that reads a store and, on the not-found (cache-miss) branch, WRITES it — a get-or-create that mutates as a side effect of a read. A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the lazy-init write into a command. — inet_db.erl:1010
`megaco_config` has a `handle_call` query clause that reads a store and, on the not-found (cache-miss) branch, WRITES it — a get-or-create that mutates as a side effect of a read. A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the lazy-init write into a command. (×5) — megaco_config.erl:1023, megaco_config.erl:1027, megaco_config.erl:1052, …
`snmpm_config` has a `handle_call` query clause that reads a store and, on the not-found (cache-miss) branch, WRITES it — a get-or-create that mutates as a side effect of a read. A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the lazy-init write into a command. — snmpm_config.erl:2477
`snmpm_server` has a `handle_call` query clause that reads a store and, on the not-found (cache-miss) branch, WRITES it — a get-or-create that mutates as a side effect of a read. A query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica; move the lazy-init write into a command. — snmpm_server.erl:496
What to do
Keep query handlers read-only — move the writes/event-publishes into a command handler so reads stay safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`ct_master` clause `master_loop/1#540` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — ct_master.erl:553
`ct_util` clause `loop/4#331` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — ct_util.erl:478
`test_server_ctrl` clause `handle_call/3#948` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — test_server_ctrl.erl:956
`httpc` clause `handle_request/9#1181` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — httpc.erl:1244
`erl_uds_dist` clause `dist_controller_setup_loop/3#861` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — erl_uds_dist.erl:891
`gen_tcp_dist` clause `dist_cntrlr_setup_loop/3#615` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — gen_tcp_dist.erl:639
`code_server` clause `handle_loader/4#1360` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — code_server.erl:1362
`group` clause `handle_info/3#487` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — group.erl:488
`heart` clause `loop/2#370` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — heart.erl:391
`net_kernel` clause `aux_ticker1/3#2206` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — net_kernel.erl:2210
`mnesia_tm` clause `doit_loop/1#226` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — mnesia_tm.erl:444
`cdv_virtual_list_wx` clause `handle_event/2#280` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — cdv_virtual_list_wx.erl:288
`ttb` clause `loop/2#1215` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — ttb.erl:1448
`ttb` clause `get_first/1#1833` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — ttb.erl:1837
`cpu_sup` clause `handle_call/3#332` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — cpu_sup.erl:339
`ssl_crl_cache` clause `handle_http/3#239` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — ssl_crl_cache.erl:196
`ssl_crl_cache` clause `handle_http/3#246` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — ssl_crl_cache.erl:196
`peer` clause `handle_alternative_data/3#985` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — peer.erl:987
`cover` clause `main_process_loop/1#1232` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — cover.erl:1340
What to do
Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have exactly one owning handler (no hidden fan-out).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
`update` is shaped like a command (one imperative intent) but is handled synchronously by more than one module — a command should have exactly one owning handler. Split the responsibilities, or raise an EVENT after the command and let the others subscribe. (×3) — data_publisher.erl:180, mnesia_controller.erl:692, xref.erl:2012
What to do
Give each command exactly one owning handler; use events for fan-out.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the event-sourcing replay fold reconstructs state purely from the event (no wall clock, UUID or randomness) so replay is reproducible.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
`mnesia`'s event-replay reducer reads a wall clock / randomness / a peer process / persistence while reconstructing aggregate state — replaying the same events would rebuild DIFFERENT state each run. A fold must be a pure function of (state, event); stamp the timestamp/id into the event at raise-time and read it back in the fold. — mnesia.erl:4540
What to do
Keep the event-replay reducer pure — move every clock/UUID/random into the event at raise-time and read it back in the fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events stay immutable (never rewritten in place).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
555 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 64 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1108557 lines of test source are present (.erl, .hrl, .py, .java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.erl, .hrl, .py, .java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (29446 value object(s))
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/main.yaml:145— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/reusable-vendor-vulnerability-scanner.yml:177— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn erts/emulator/beam/erl_init.c:1515— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn erts/emulator/beam/erl_init.c:1517— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn erts/emulator/beam/erl_init.c:1518— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/emulator/beam/sys.h:1202— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/emulator/beam/sys.h:1208— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/emulator/drivers/win32/registry_drv.c:210— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/emulator/drivers/win32/registry_drv.c:233— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/emulator/sys/unix/erl_unix_sys_ddll.c:60— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/epmd/src/epmd_cli.c:82— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/Install.c:153— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:65— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:69— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:111— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:119— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:199— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/cc_wrap.c:223— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:65— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:69— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:119— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:143— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: double-free erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:732— Variable 's' was freed twice. This can lead to undefined behavior.
High: double-free erts/etc/win32/cygwin_tools/vc/ld_wrap.c:762— Variable 's' was freed twice. This can lead to undefined behavior.
High: double-free erts/etc/win32/erlsrv/erlsrv_registry.c:219— Variable 'val_data' was freed twice. This can lead to undefined behavior.
Orphaned knowledge lib/snmp/src/agent/snmpa_trap.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_incremental.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/common_test/src/ct_util.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_cl.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/OtpNode.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/stdlib/src/edlin_context.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_iplt.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/kernel/src/logger_olp.erl— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/OtpConnection.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
High IaC: DS-0002 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.clang— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.clang— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0002 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.debian-base— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.debian-base— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0029 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.ubuntu-base— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
Leaked secret: private-key lib/inets/examples/server_root/ssl/ssl_server.pem:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key lib/inets/examples/server_root/ssl/ssl_client.pem:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key lib/ssl/examples/certs/etc/server/key.pem:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key lib/ssl/examples/certs/etc/client/key.pem:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
TooManyMethods: wxStyledTextCtrl lib/wx/src/gen/wxStyledTextCtrl.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 628 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: erl_syntax lib/syntax_tools/src/erl_syntax.erl:33— TooManyMethods — 427 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxGrid lib/wx/src/gen/wxGrid.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 405 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: erlang erts/preloaded/src/erlang.erl:22— TooManyMethods — 400 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: erl_types lib/dialyzer/src/erl_types.erl:36— TooManyMethods — 369 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: asn1ct_check lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_check.erl:24— TooManyMethods — 368 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: xmerl_xsd lib/xmerl/src/xmerl_xsd.erl:23— TooManyMethods — 321 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: cerl lib/compiler/src/cerl.erl:26— TooManyMethods — 287 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: mnesia lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl:26— TooManyMethods — 271 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxTreeCtrl lib/wx/src/gen/wxTreeCtrl.erl:62— TooManyMethods — 268 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxListCtrl lib/wx/src/gen/wxListCtrl.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 256 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: v3_core lib/compiler/src/v3_core.erl:82— TooManyMethods — 255 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: lists lib/stdlib/src/lists.erl:22— TooManyMethods — 252 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: crashdump_viewer lib/observer/src/crashdump_viewer.erl:22— TooManyMethods — 249 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: sofs lib/stdlib/src/sofs.erl:22— TooManyMethods — 249 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: beam_ssa_opt lib/compiler/src/beam_ssa_opt.erl:39— TooManyMethods — 245 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: crypto lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl:25— TooManyMethods — 243 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxMDIParentFrame lib/wx/src/gen/wxMDIParentFrame.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 240 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: qlc lib/stdlib/src/qlc.erl:22— TooManyMethods — 239 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxTextCtrl lib/wx/src/gen/wxTextCtrl.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 239 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: mnesia_schema lib/mnesia/src/mnesia_schema.erl:31— TooManyMethods — 238 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: beam_core_to_ssa lib/compiler/src/beam_core_to_ssa.erl:62— TooManyMethods — 237 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: wxWebView lib/wx/src/gen/wxWebView.erl:58— TooManyMethods — 237 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: asn1ct_imm lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_imm.erl:23— TooManyMethods — 236 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: snmpm_config lib/snmp/src/manager/snmpm_config.erl:29— TooManyMethods — 235 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
FileTooLong: src/erlang.erl erts/preloaded/src/erlang.erl:0— FileTooLong — 10974 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/socket.erl lib/kernel/src/socket.erl:0— FileTooLong — 6122 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/erl_syntax.erl lib/syntax_tools/src/erl_syntax.erl:0— FileTooLong — 6094 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/mnesia.erl lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl:0— FileTooLong — 5286 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/asn1ct_check.erl lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_check.erl:0— FileTooLong — 4995 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/xmerl_xsd.erl lib/xmerl/src/xmerl_xsd.erl:0— FileTooLong — 4656 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/erl_types.erl lib/dialyzer/src/erl_types.erl:0— FileTooLong — 4527 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/gen_statem.erl lib/stdlib/src/gen_statem.erl:0— FileTooLong — 4283 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: gen/wxStyledTextCtrl.erl lib/wx/src/gen/wxStyledTextCtrl.erl:0— FileTooLong — 4080 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: engine/megaco_messenger.erl lib/megaco/src/engine/megaco_messenger.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3896 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/crypto.erl lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3840 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/qlc.erl lib/stdlib/src/qlc.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3784 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/inet.erl lib/kernel/src/inet.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3739 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/sofs.erl lib/stdlib/src/sofs.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3652 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/v3_core.erl lib/compiler/src/v3_core.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3591 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/lists.erl lib/stdlib/src/lists.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3493 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/xmerl_scan.erl lib/xmerl/src/xmerl_scan.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3436 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/ssl_handshake.erl lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3417 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/ets.erl lib/stdlib/src/ets.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3378 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/dialyzer_dataflow.erl lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_dataflow.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3364 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/dets.erl lib/stdlib/src/dets.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3327 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/mnesia_schema.erl lib/mnesia/src/mnesia_schema.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3153 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/ssl.erl lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3149 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/cerl.erl lib/compiler/src/cerl.erl:0— FileTooLong — 3022 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/beam_ssa_opt.erl lib/compiler/src/beam_ssa_opt.erl:0— FileTooLong — 2876 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.32-bit— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0013 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.32-bit— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.64-bit— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0013 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.64-bit— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.clang— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0013 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.clang— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.cross-compile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0013 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.cross-compile— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.ubuntu-base— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0013 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.ubuntu-base— 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Change coupling: tls_client_connection_1_3.erl ↔ tls_server_connection_1_3.erl lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection_1_3.erl— `lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection_1_3.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection_1_3.erl` change together 78% of the time (21 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: dtls_packet_demux.erl ↔ tls_dtls_gen_connection.erl lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl— `lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_gen_connection.erl` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: tls_client_connection.erl ↔ tls_server_connection_1_3.erl lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection.erl— `lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection_1_3.erl` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: tls_client_connection_1_3.erl ↔ tls_server_connection.erl lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection_1_3.erl— `lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection_1_3.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection.erl` change together 57% of the time (8 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ssh_acceptor.erl ↔ ssh_connection_handler.erl lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl— `lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl` and `lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl` change together 56% of the time (9 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: dtls_packet_demux.erl ↔ tls_server_connection_1_3.erl lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl— `lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection_1_3.erl` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: dtls_packet_demux.erl ↔ tls_gen_connection_1_3.erl lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl— `lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection_1_3.erl` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: tls_client_connection.erl ↔ tls_server_connection.erl lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection.erl— `lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection.erl` and `lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection.erl` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): sync-github-releases.yaml: docker login https://ghcr.io -u "${GITHUB_ACTOR}" -p "${GITHUB_TOKEN}". Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl, lib/ssl/src/tls_server_connection_1_3.erl, lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_server_connection.erl, lib/ssl/src/tls_client_connection.erl, lib/ssl/src/tls_server_session_ticket.erl, lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl, lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl, lib/ssl/src/tls_server_session_ticket_sup.erl. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/snmp/src/manager/snmpm.erl, lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl, lib/snmp/src/agent/snmpa_mpd.erl, lib/kernel/src/net.erl, lib/snmp/src/misc/snmp_pdus.erl, lib/megaco/src/udp/megaco_udp.erl, lib/snmp/src/agent/snmp_index.erl. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/stdlib/src/rand.erl, lib/kernel/src/inet_epmd_socket.erl, lib/tftp/src/tftp_file.erl, lib/kernel/src/inet_sctp.erl. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #4 — If anonymized user #4 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/compiler/src/beam_ssa_dead.erl, lib/compiler/src/beam_ssa_bc_size.erl, lib/compiler/src/beam_bounds.erl, lib/compiler/src/beam_ssa_share.erl. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.erl, .hrl, .py, .java) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (54072 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 8 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (35 single-owned of 1324 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #5 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #6 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #7 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #8 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #9 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #10 (1 file(s)) (+2 more) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 8 location(s) do not all need the same action: 4 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 4 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
Low IaC: DS-0014 .github/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.ubuntu-base— RUN using 'wget' and 'curl'
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 15 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (24 orphaned of 1324 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl, .hrl, .py, .java) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML), or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read — No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd4d6-2693-7128-bcb7-ff957292b26b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 76 · Warnings: 1015 · Recommendations: 11 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 02:10 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.