Public report — yaws, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 06-08-2026 @ 02:00 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Erlyaws/yaws

37% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 100% Exemplary Event Sourcing 100% Exemplary Security 59% Adequate Maturity 53% Adequate Event-Driven 40% Weak Accessibility 40% Weak Code Health 35% Weak Readiness 32% Weak

Medium · 40,201 LoC · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (32%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

33/35dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
64findings with an exact file:lineof 73 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
35/105dimensions across the health lenses40201 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

erlyaws/yaws carries serious gaps (37%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Event Sourcing (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (35%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Keep the changelog current (Release Hygiene); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning).

For scale: Medium (~40,201 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 35% Weak · gated by R1, R3 Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 53% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 32% Weak · gated by R4, P6 Security 59% Adequate · gated by D29 Event-Driven 40% Weak Event Sourcing 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 40% Weak · gated by AC3, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% · 45% weightCode Health 35% · 25% weightAccessibility 40% · 14% weightEvent-Driven 40% · 8% weightMaturity 53% · 4% weightSecurity 59% · 2% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 37 → ~41.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (21+)

21 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge src/yaws_websockets.erl
  • R1 · Type Safety
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2 locations) applications/mail/www/mail.js
  • R2 · Complex function format (cyclomatic 36, cognitive 84) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R2 · Complex function Class (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 32) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R2 · Complex function sendRequest (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 22) www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js
  • R2 · Complex function setComposeCmd (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 13) applications/mail/www/mail.js
  • R2 · Complex function repr (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 14) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R2 · Complex function __imprt__ (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 16) www/jsolait/jsolait.js
  • R3 · Large Files
  • R4 · Test Coverage
  • AC3 · <html> without a lang www/shoppingcart/source.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark www/shoppingcart/source.html
  • AC3 · <html> without a lang www/static.html

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €14,000–€70,000
Cost to rebuild€14,000–€70,000 (0.1–0.4 person-years (231–733 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 37% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€42,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with yaws-key.pem.
+4.2 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
+4.7 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+4.7 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.3 person-years rebuild (40,201 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 32%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.

At a glance — Code Health · 35% · Weak · gated by R1, R3

The Good
D3 · Erlang God Classes 7.0 D4 · Erlang Code Duplication 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 7.1 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 10.0
The Bad
R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 5.9
The Ugly
R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Erlang Change Coupling 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 53% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D16 · Erlang Bus Factor 9.5 D19 · Erlang Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · Erlang Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
D34 · Erlang Knowledge Freshness 5.2 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 32% · Weak · gated by R4, P6

The Good
P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
D13 · Erlang Secret Scanning 5.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 3.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0

At a glance — Security · 59% · Adequate · gated by D29

The Good
D28 · Erlang Secrets (history) 7.0 D37 · Erlang Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · Erlang Static Analysis (SAST) 0.7

At a glance — Event-Driven · 40% · Weak

The Ugly
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 4.0

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 10.0 ES2 · Repo Immutable events 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 40% · Weak · gated by AC3, AC4

The Good
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Bad
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 5.2
The Ugly
AC3 · Repo Page structure 2.8 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection16High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures5High / Critical

Roadmap

First, maintain release hygiene by ensuring each new version includes a detailed changelog entry. Next, improve reliability by adding tests for all currently unreachable production modules. Then, immediately resolve the single leaked secret in yaws-key.pem to secure the codebase. After securing the repository, adopt TypeScript for the frontend by adding a typecheck step and progressively typing the highest-traffic modules. Finally, improve maintainability by splitting the two largest files into smaller, focused modules.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with yaws-key.pem.+4.2 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.+4.7 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+4.7 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.+3.5 ptsMediumType Safety
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.+3.5 ptsMediumLarge Files
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.+2.9 ptsMediumCyclomatic Complexity
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.+2.6 ptsMediumCode Duplication
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+2.2 ptsMediumPage structure

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 31 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 58% mixed · 39% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
ssl/yaws-key.pem3.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
win32/yaws.c4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: insecure-use-strcat-fn
.github/workflows/main.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
ssl/yaws-cert.pem7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: private-key
c_src/epam.c7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: insecure-use-printf-fn
src/yaws.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws
src/yaws_server.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/yaws_server.erl
src/yaws_api.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_api
src/yaws_config.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/yaws_config.erl
applications/mail/src/mail.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: mail
applications/wiki/src/wiki.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: wiki
src/yaws_cgi.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_cgi
src/yaws_soap12_lib.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_soap12_lib
src/haxe.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: haxe
src/yaws_appmod_dav.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/yaws_appmod_dav.erl
src/yaws_soap_lib.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_soap_lib
src/yaws_websockets.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/yaws_websockets.erl
src/yaws_debug.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_debug
src/json2.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: json2
src/yaws_ctl.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: yaws_ctl

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 35 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 35 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D16D19D21D28D29D34D35D37AC1AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7AX9ED1ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P6R1R10R2R3R4R7R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 73 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd4cd-383a-7c0f-a1dc-2c4cdc46919a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

39 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: yaws · ×24src/yaws.erl:8
FileTooLong: src/yaws_server.erl · ×15src/yaws_server.erl:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 24 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with yaws.erl, yaws_api.erl, yaws_server.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 15 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with yaws_server.erl, yaws_config.erl, yaws.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-keyssl/yaws-key.pem:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with yaws-key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/yaws_config.erl.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Yaws's documentation is mostly complete but thin: a single README.md (911 words) covers installation, build, autotools setup, test-suite execution, and cross-platform notes for Windows plus the test/README.md (3436 words), which gives an overview of the Common Test framework and how to run tests. The documentation is clipped mid-sentence in several places but the outline lists every visible section present — preparation/build, running tests with SUITES/GROUPS/CASES, and a detailed test-suite skeleton plus dozens of API functions (testsuite:create_dir/1; testsuite:get_yaws_port/2; testsuite:add_yaws_server/2; etc.) — so no section is omitted. The README files are thin but the content is mostly consistent.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — Yaws's documentation is mostly complete but thin: a single README.md (911 words) covers installation, build, autotools setup, test-suite execution, and cross-platform notes for Windows plus the test/README.md (3436 words), which gives an overview of the Common Test framework and how to run tests. The documentation is clipped mid-sentence in several places but the outline lists every visible section present — preparation/build, running tests with SUITES/GROUPS/CASES, and a detailed test-suite skeleton plus dozens of API functions (testsuite:create_dir/1; testsuite:get_yaws_port/2; testsuite:add_yaws_server/2; etc.) — so no section is omitted. The README files are thin but the content is mostly consistent.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×3ssl/yaws-cert.pem:26detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with yaws-key.pem (2), yaws-cert.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×15.github/workflows/main.yml:41detected by semgrep finding
Low: request-host-usedconfigure.ac:13detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with yaws.c (12), main.yml (2), epam.c. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with configure.ac. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

33 of 69 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/yaws_websockets.erl.

Orphaned knowledge · ×5src/yaws_websockets.erl
Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with yaws_websockets.erl, yaws_soap12_lib.erl, haxe.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — json_sample.html:43, json_sample.html:46

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×8) — template.html:1, template2.html:2, template_info.html:1, …
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×7) — template.html:1, template2.html:2, template_info.html:1, …
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). (×7) — template.html:11, template.html:18, template2.html:24, …
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) — template2.html:2, server_sent_events.html:3
  • An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. — server_sent_events.html:16

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×8) — template2.html:62, template2.html:68, template2.html:75, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over your pages. Add an accessibility checker (axe-core, pa11y or Lighthouse) over your HTML in CI and fail the build on new violations.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility over your pages: run an accessibility checker (axe-core, pa11y or Lighthouse) against your HTML in CI and fail the build on new violations — these run as standalone tools without adding a package manifest.
AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `mail` clause `format_attach/3#2353` blocks on a hand-rolled `Pid ! Req, receive Resp` rendezvous awaiting a peer's reply while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, reply asynchronously (send-and-continue), or run the round-trip in a throwaway spawned process. — mail.erl:2390
  • `yaws_ctl` clause `handle_a/3#130` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — yaws_ctl.erl:131
  • `yaws_server` clause `handle_auth/4#2244` blocks the process on a synchronous `timer:sleep` while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, move the delay off the hot path (a `state_timeout`/`send_after` self-message, or do the settle in a spawned worker). — yaws_server.erl:64
  • `yaws_websockets` clause `handle_info/2#275` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — yaws_websockets.erl:936
  • `yaws_websockets` clause `handle_info/2#278` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — yaws_websockets.erl:936
  • `yaws_websockets` clause `handle_frames/2#522` blocks the process on a synchronous outbound I/O client call (a remote HTTP request, a socket receive, or a blocking pool checkout) awaited inline while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, issue the request off the hot path — reply asynchronously and do the I/O in a throwaway spawned worker (or use the async client API), so the process keeps serving its mailbox. — yaws_websockets.erl:936

What to do

  • Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the event-sourcing replay fold reconstructs state purely from the event (no wall clock, UUID or randomness) so replay is reproducible.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

ES2 · Immutable events10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events stay immutable (never rewritten in place).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.

What to do

  • Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are applications/chat/www/chat.js, applications/mail/www/mail.js, www/jsolait/jsolait.js, www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js, www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js.

What to do

  • Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • www/jsolait/jsolait.js:302 · www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js:66 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — jsolait.js:302
  • www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:149 · www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:285 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — jsonrpc.js:149
  • www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:195 · www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:252 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — jsonrpc.js:195
  • www/jsolait/jsolait.js:82 · www/jsolait/jsolait.js:98 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — jsolait.js:82
  • www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:90 · www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:259 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — jsonrpc.js:90
  • www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:121 · www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js:257 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — jsonrpc.js:121
  • www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js:163 · www/jsolait/lib/urllib.js:170 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — urllib.js:163
  • applications/mail/www/mail.js:106 · applications/mail/www/mail.js:113 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — mail.js:106

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×6) — jsolait.js:459, jsolait.js:2, urllib.js:92, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 2 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: www/jsolait/jsolait.js (616), www/jsolait/lib/jsonrpc.js (416).

What to do

  • Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • 0% of 5 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health35%Weak — gated by R1, R3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity53%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness32%Weak — gated by R4, P6Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security59%Adequate — gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven40%WeakBelow par — needs attention.
Event Sourcing100%ExemplarySolid.
Accessibility40%Weak — gated by AC3, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 70 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~8846 lines of test source are present (.erl) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .hrl, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .hrl, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.erl) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1064 value object(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
  • R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 24 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×15
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: insecure-use-printf-fn c_src/epam.c:364 — Avoid using user-controlled format strings passed into 'sprintf', 'printf' and 'vsprintf'. These functions put you at risk of buffer overflow vulnerabilities through the use of format string exploits. Instead, use 'snprintf' and 'vsnprintf'.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:183 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:212 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:226 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:228 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:234 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:237 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:240 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:242 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:244 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:248 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:251 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: insecure-use-strcat-fn win32/yaws.c:255 — Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×5
  • Orphaned knowledge src/yaws_websockets.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/yaws_soap12_lib.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/haxe.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/yaws_compile.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/yaws_soap_lib.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×3
  • Secret: private-key ssl/yaws-cert.pem:26 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key ssl/yaws-key.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key ssl/yaws-key.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: private-key ssl/yaws-key.pem:1 — private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Warning — 39 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×24
  • TooManyMethods: yaws src/yaws.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 456 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_api src/yaws_api.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 216 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_server src/yaws_server.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 201 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: mail applications/mail/src/mail.erl:11 — TooManyMethods — 175 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: wiki applications/wiki/src/wiki.erl:22 — TooManyMethods — 166 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_config src/yaws_config.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 111 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_cgi src/yaws_cgi.erl:1 — TooManyMethods — 79 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_soap12_lib src/yaws_soap12_lib.erl:12 — TooManyMethods — 76 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: haxe src/haxe.erl:23 — TooManyMethods — 75 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_appmod_dav src/yaws_appmod_dav.erl:29 — TooManyMethods — 66 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_soap_lib src/yaws_soap_lib.erl:10 — TooManyMethods — 66 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_websockets src/yaws_websockets.erl:9 — TooManyMethods — 60 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_debug src/yaws_debug.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 49 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_ctl src/yaws_ctl.erl:11 — TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: wiki_format_txt applications/wiki/src/wiki_format_txt.erl:1 — TooManyMethods — 45 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: json2 src/json2.erl:17 — TooManyMethods — 45 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_rss src/yaws_rss.erl:12 — TooManyMethods — 43 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_session_server src/yaws_session_server.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 42 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_runmod_lock src/yaws_runmod_lock.erl:14 — TooManyMethods — 38 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ymnesia contrib/ymnesia.erl:28 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: smtp applications/mail/src/smtp.erl:7 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_log src/yaws_log.erl:8 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_ls src/yaws_ls.erl:10 — TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: yaws_trace src/yaws_trace.erl:1 — TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×15
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_server.erl src/yaws_server.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 4140 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_config.erl src/yaws_config.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 3315 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws.erl src/yaws.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2892 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/mail.erl applications/mail/src/mail.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2438 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_api.erl src/yaws_api.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2139 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/wiki.erl applications/wiki/src/wiki.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2132 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_appmod_dav.erl src/yaws_appmod_dav.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1126 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_cgi.erl src/yaws_cgi.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1063 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_websockets.erl src/yaws_websockets.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1010 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_soap12_lib.erl src/yaws_soap12_lib.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 671 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_compile.erl src/yaws_compile.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 644 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/haxe.erl src/haxe.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 636 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/json2.erl src/json2.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 562 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_debug.erl src/yaws_debug.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 545 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/yaws_soap_lib.erl src/yaws_soap_lib.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 516 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.erl) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (415 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .erl, .hrl, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/yaws_config.erl. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (2 single-owned of 42 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×1
  • Low: request-host-used configure.ac:13 — '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 28 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (33 orphaned of 69 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .3artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .16artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fd4cd-383a-7c0f-a1dc-2c4cdc46919a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 24 · Warnings: 39 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 02:00 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md