Public report — ever-api-starter-kit, published 30 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
126findings with an exact file:lineof 140 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
32/112dimensions across the health lenses1607 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
ever-co/ever-api-starter-kit is sound in substance but carries real gaps (51%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (94%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (34%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (40%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI (Tooling).
For scale: Hobby (~1,607 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
R4 · No test reaches this file src/modules/seeds/seed.ts
R4 · No test reaches this file src/modules/seeds/seed.update.ts
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 51% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 34% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
26
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure-as-code, documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures to ensure true disaster recovery. Next, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports, while demoting type- and test-only packages to devDependencies. Then, add a type-checking script to the build process and enforce it in CI. After that, expand test coverage by adding tests for all unreached production modules. Finally, verify that the deployment pipeline enforces required reviewer approvals before promoting to production.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Resolve the 45 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-build-publish-dev.yml (7), docker-build-publish-prod.yml (7), docker-build-publish-stage.yml (7).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 32 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 32 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 126 of 140 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 6 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The Ever API Starter Kit has strong README coverage: a clear 'What is it' section plus a detailed Technology Stack listing NestJs/CQRS, GraphQL/REST, TypeORM, PostgreSQL/SQLite/SQL.js, Docker/Kubernetes, and Supertokens Auth. Quick Start covers local setup (clone, install packages, create DB, yarn start), serverless-offline, and the Swagger/client SDK generation pipelines. A dedicated Deployment folder adds Kubernetes deployment, rollout, monitoring, and links to DigitalOcean guides for load balancers/ingress/CI/GitHub Actions. The document is clipped mid-deployment section but its outline (What is it; Technology Stack; Quick Start; How to Deploy; Development; Credits; Contact Us) is fully present, so no sections are flagged as missing.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The Ever API Starter Kit has strong README coverage: a clear 'What is it' section plus a detailed Technology Stack listing NestJs/CQRS, GraphQL/REST, TypeORM, PostgreSQL/SQLite/SQL.js, Docker/Kubernetes, and Supertokens Auth. Quick Start covers local setup (clone, install packages, create DB, yarn start), serverless-offline, and the Swagger/client SDK generation pipelines. A dedicated Deployment folder adds Kubernetes deployment, rollout, monitoring, and links to DigitalOcean guides for load balancers/ingress/CI/GitHub Actions. The document is clipped mid-deployment section but its outline (What is it; Technology Stack; Quick Start; How to Deploy; Development; Credits; Contact Us) is fully present, so no sections are flagged as missing.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×45.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:29detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×5.deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml:30detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 45 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-build-publish-dev.yml (7), docker-build-publish-prod.yml (7), docker-build-publish-stage.yml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (45 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with k8s-manifest.dev.yaml (2), k8s-manifest.prod.yaml (2), k8s-manifest.stage.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0025 · ×4.deploy/api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0031.deploy/api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×15.deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×6.deploy/api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with k8s-manifest.dev.yaml (5), k8s-manifest.prod.yaml (5), k8s-manifest.stage.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, k8s-manifest.dev.yaml, k8s-manifest.prod.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×28yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×14yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 28 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (28). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — database.ts:16
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — schema.module.ts, orm-config.ts, index.ts, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗
What to do
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 80 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~38 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-dev.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-dev.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: digitalocean/action-doctl@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `digitalocean/action-doctl@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/digitalocean/action-doctl/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-prod.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-prod.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: digitalocean/action-doctl@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `digitalocean/action-doctl@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/digitalocean/action-doctl/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-stage.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-do-stage.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: digitalocean/action-doctl@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `digitalocean/action-doctl@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/digitalocean/action-doctl/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:49— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: digitalocean/action-doctl@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `digitalocean/action-doctl@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/digitalocean/action-doctl/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-dev.yml:58— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:49— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: digitalocean/action-doctl@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `digitalocean/action-doctl@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/digitalocean/action-doctl/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-prod.yml:58— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build-publish-stage.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
+ 20 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×28
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @angular/compiler 9.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @angular/compiler is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 19.2.18 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 9.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/compiler 9.0.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @angular/core 9.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @angular/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 19.2.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 9.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/core 9.0.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @apollo/server 5.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.4.0. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against @apollo/server 5.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.5.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.5.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @apollo/server 5.2.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.28.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @hapi/content 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @hapi/content is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @hapi/content to 6.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against @hapi/content 6.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @hapi/content 6.0.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @isaacs/brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @isaacs/brace-expansion to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @nestjs/microservices 11.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.19
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 29 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.13.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of axios 1.13.2 clears all 29 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.12 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of fast-uri 3.1.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of flatted 3.3.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— immutable 3.7.6: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.3.9 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.7.6, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.7.6; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of immutable 3.7.6 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares js-yaml ^4.1.1 directly, at or above the fixed 3.15.0; the vulnerable 3.14.2 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or pin js-yaml with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves. One upgrade of js-yaml 3.14.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— linkify-it 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — linkify-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin linkify-it to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against linkify-it 5.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of linkify-it 5.0.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of lodash 4.17.21 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— minimatch 10.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 10.2.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 10.1.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.2.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.2.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of minimatch 10.1.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— multer 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — multer is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin multer to 2.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against multer 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.2.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.2.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of multer 2.0.2 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— path-to-regexp 8.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 8.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of path-to-regexp 8.3.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of picomatch 2.3.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of postcss 8.5.6 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— semver 7.3.5: [GHSA redacted] — semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin semver to 7.5.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— sigstore 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — sigstore is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sigstore to 4.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— tmp 0.0.33: [GHSA redacted] — tmp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tmp to 0.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against tmp 0.0.33, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of tmp 0.0.33 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @apollo/federation-internals 2.12.2: [GHSA redacted] — @apollo/federation-internals is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @apollo/federation-internals to 2.12.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— fast-xml-parser 5.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — fast-xml-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-xml-parser to 5.3.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 7 advisories this scan raises against fast-xml-parser 5.2.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.7.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.7.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of fast-xml-parser 5.2.5 clears all 7 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — handlebars is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin handlebars to 4.7.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of handlebars 4.7.8 clears all 8 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of shell-quote 1.8.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.2.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of tar 6.2.1 clears all 12 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical IaC: DS-0031 .deploy/api/Dockerfile— Secrets passed via `build-args` or envs or copied secret files
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Build action pinned to a mutable branch · ×1
Build action pinned to a mutable branch — 1 CI action reference(s) point at a mutable BRANCH rather than a version tag or a commit SHA, 1 of them on a THIRD-PARTY action: `snyk/actions/node@master` (.github/workflows/snyk-analysis.yml:24). A branch re-points on every upstream push, so whatever its tip holds when the job runs executes inside your pipeline with that job's secrets — a version tag at least moves only when the publisher cuts a release. Pin these to a full commit SHA first; the remaining tag refs are the same control at a lower blast radius.
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— velocityjs 2.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — velocityjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin velocityjs to 2.1.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of velocityjs 2.1.5 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of serialize-javascript 6.0.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×14
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @conventional-changelog/git-client 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — @conventional-changelog/git-client is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @hapi/wreck 18.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @hapi/wreck is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @hapi/wreck to 18.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against @hapi/wreck 18.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 18.1.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 18.1.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @hapi/wreck 18.1.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @nestjs/core 11.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.18
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @protobufjs/utf8 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @protobufjs/utf8 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @protobufjs/utf8 to 1.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @sigstore/core 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @sigstore/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @sigstore/core to 3.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— @sigstore/verify 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @sigstore/verify is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @sigstore/verify to 3.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— bn.js 4.12.2: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 4.12.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— file-type 21.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — file-type is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin file-type to 21.3.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against file-type 21.3.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.3.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.3.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of file-type 21.3.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— follow-redirects 1.15.11: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— ip-address 10.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — ip-address is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ip-address to 10.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— markdown-it 14.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — markdown-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin markdown-it to 14.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against markdown-it 14.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 14.2.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 14.2.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of markdown-it 14.1.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— micromatch 3.1.10: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.0.8 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.10, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.10; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— qs 6.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.15.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of qs 6.14.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml:30— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml:173— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml:30— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.prod.yaml:173— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.stage.yaml:30— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 4 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 45 floating ref(s) across 12 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs (reported separately, pin those first): `actions/checkout@v7` (.github/workflows/typos.yml:17), `streetsidesoftware/cspell-action@v8` (.github/workflows/typos.yml:18), `actions/checkout@v7` (.github/workflows/snyk-analysis.yml:21), `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2` (.github/workflows/snyk-analysis.yml:32), `actions/checkout@v7` (.github/workflows/release-stage.yml:17), `mathieudutour/github-tag-action@v6.2` (.github/workflows/release-stage.yml:20), `ncipollo/release-action@v1` (.github/workflows/release-stage.yml:28), `actions/checkout@v7` (.github/workflows/release-prod.yml:17), … (+36 more)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (typos.yml, snyk-analysis.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— typeorm 0.3.28: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.3.31. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against typeorm 0.3.28, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.3.31 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.3.31 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of typeorm 0.3.28 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Low IaC: DS-0026 .deploy/api/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: KSV-0003 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 .deploy/k8s/k8s-manifest.dev.yaml— Memory not limited
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cdxgen -t yarn` (or `syft` below) over the yarn workspace — `npm sbom` cannot read `yarn.lock`, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
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Run 019fb0f0-2d67-7db1-b84e-a2af03ed30c1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 86 · Warnings: 38 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 30-07-2026 @ 02:52 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.