Public report — relay, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 15:37 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Facebook/relay

No baseline yet — first run no automated testssingle-maintainer
34% At Risk
Maturity 68% Adequate Code Health 53% Adequate Security 38% Weak Readiness 21% Critical

— · weakest lens: Readiness (21%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

39/41dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
167findings with an exact file:lineof 180 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
41/102dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

facebook/relay carries serious gaps (34%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (21%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (38%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 53% Adequate · gated by D3, R1 Maturity 68% Adequate Readiness 21% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R8, P2, P3 Security 38% Weak · gated by D29, D36, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 21% · 50% weightSecurity 38% · 27% weightCode Health 53% · 15% weightMaturity 68% · 8% weight

Raise Readiness 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 34 → ~49.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+15.2 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+15.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+17.6 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.

At a glance — Code Health · 53% · Adequate · gated by D3, R1

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 7.9 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 7.3 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 8.4 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 9.3 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
R3 · React / TS Large Files 6.6 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 5.8
The Ugly
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 0.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.1

At a glance — Architecture · — · —

The Good
D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9 D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 6.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 6.4
The Ugly
R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 0.0

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Adequate

The Good
D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 7.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 3.0

At a glance — Readiness · 21% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R8, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 4.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 38% · Weak · gated by D29, D36, D38

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 9.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection43High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish comprehensive observability by adopting a structured logging library and implementing health checks. Next, strengthen security and performance tooling by integrating static analysis and secret scanning into the development workflow. Then, improve dependency hygiene by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports. Finally, increase test coverage for unreached modules and resolve the single gap in automated code coverage.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+15.2 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+15.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+17.6 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+17.6 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+17.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+16.1 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+12.1 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 43 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (26), docusaurus.yml (9), update-cargo-lock.yml (3).+4.9 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 71 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 1% slop · 27% mixed · 72% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
compiler/Cargo.lock0.3SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
vscode-extension/yarn.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/docusaurus.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/update-cargo-lock.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/update-yarn-lock.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/vscode.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
yarn.lock5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/babel-plugin-relay/yarn.lock5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
compiler/crates/intern/Cargo.lock6.9MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2024-0384
website/docusaurus.config.js7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57)
packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 47)
packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 45)
packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReader.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: _propagateResolverMetadata (cyclomatic 18)
packages/relay-runtime/store/DataChecker.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 30)
packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReferenceMarker.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27)
website/src/compiler-config/CompilerConfig.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: T (cyclomatic 22)
packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernEnvironment.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: constructor (cyclomatic 18)
packages/relay-runtime/mutations/RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 39 of 41 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 41 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D8D9D12D13D20D21D26D27D28D29D33D36D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 167 of 180 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdcdf-b419-79fc-9750-a067e55819d4.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 57.

(anonymous) (cyclomatic 57)packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:269
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 47)packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:251
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 45)packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:275
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 30)packages/relay-runtime/store/DataChecker.js:365
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 27)packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReferenceMarker.js:123

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 47) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 45) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 70.

(anonymous) (cognitive 19) · ×2packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useQueryLoader.js:252
(anonymous) (cognitive 70)packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:269
(anonymous) (cognitive 65)packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:251
(anonymous) (cognitive 60)packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:275
_propagateResolverMetadata (cognitive 34)packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReader.js:935

+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 (anonymous) (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RelayReferenceMarker.js, useQueryLoader.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cognitive 70) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cognitive 65) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: react-relay/ReactRelayPaginationContainer.js · ×17packages/react-relay/ReactRelayPaginationContainer.js:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 17 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with LiveResolvers-test.js, OperationExecutor.js, QueryResource.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Improve Coupling — currently 6.9/10. — 0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 0 mechanizable ADRs, 0 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

What to do

  1. Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 37 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 3.0/10 (frequently incomplete). 33 flagged with a specific gap.

No context/problem and no explicit decision: the body is a status-updates list of PRs with no stated problem or decision · ×3meta/meeting-notes/2016-03-31-team-sync.md
Status updates only; no context/problem and no decision are stated · ×2meta/meeting-notes/2016-03-01-team-sync.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the open-source plan; only status updates and a vague 'We discussed various ways to increase our transparency improve the communication with our open source users'meta/meeting-notes/2016-02-02-sync-notes.md
The body is a status update log of ongoing work by members rather than an explicit context/problem decision with consequencesmeta/meeting-notes/2016-02-09-team-sync.md
No decision is stated (only status notes) and there are no consequences/trade-offs in a readable formmeta/meeting-notes/2016-02-18-team-sync.md

+ 25 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 No context/problem and no explicit decision finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2016-03-31-team-sync.md, 2016-04-19-team-sync.md, 2016-08-09-team-sync.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Status updates only; no context/problem and no decision are stated finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2016-03-01-team-sync.md, 2016-05-03-team-sync.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the open-source… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2016-02-02-sync-notes.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

Secret: generic-api-keywebsite/docusaurus.config.js:506detected by gitleaks finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 finding(s): 0 critical, 43 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×43.github/workflows/ci.yml:18detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 43 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (26), docusaurus.yml (9), update-cargo-lock.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (43 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

75 finding(s): 2 critical, 37 high, 29 medium, 7 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×37compiler/Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2compiler/Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 · ×11compiler/Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 37 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (32), Cargo.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (37 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock, yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 37) — reach 50 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
R1 · Type Safety0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 20 typed · 2443 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/LiveResolversTest10Query.graphql.js:16 · packages/relay-runtime/mutations/__tests__/__generated__/commitMutationTest3Query.graphql.js:16 · packages/relay-runtime/mutations/__tests__/__generated__/readUpdatableQueryTestUpdatableQuery.graphql.js:16 — LiveResolversTest10Query.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/__tests__/useBlockingPaginationFragment-test.js:215 · packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/__tests__/useBlockingPaginationFragment-with-suspense-transition-test.js:226 — useBlockingPaginationFragment-test.js:215
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverInterfaceTestWeakAnimalColorQuery.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverInterfaceTestWeakAnimalGreetingQuery.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverModelTestFieldWithArgumentsQuery.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverModelTestNullWeakClientEdgeQuery.graphql.js:16 — RelayResolverInterfaceTestWeakAnimalColorQuery.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_RelayResolverInterfaceTestAnimalLegsQuery_animal.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_RelayResolverInterfaceTestAnimalsLegsQuery_animals.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_RelayResolverMixedInterfaceTestVehicleBicycleInStoreQuery_vehicle.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_RelayResolverMixedInterfaceTestVehicleBicycleQuery_vehicle.graphql.js:16 — ClientEdgeQuery_RelayResolverInterfaceTestAnimalLegsQuery_animal.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_ClientEdgesTest1Query_me__client_node.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_ClientEdgesTest2Query_me__client_node.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_ClientEdgesTest3Query_me__client_node.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgeQuery_ClientEdgesTest5Query_me__same_user_client_edge.graphql.js:16 — ClientEdgeQuery_ClientEdgesTest1Query_me__client_node.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverModelTestFragment.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/RelayResolverModelTestWithPluralFragment.graphql.js:16 — RelayResolverModelTestFragment.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/CatchTest1Query.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/CatchTestRequiredThrowQuery.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/LiveResolversTest14Query.graphql.js:16 · packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/LiveResolversTest6Query.graphql.js:16 — CatchTest1Query.graphql.js:16
  • packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/__tests__/FragmentResource-Resolver-test.js:23 · packages/relay-runtime/mutations/__tests__/readUpdatableQuery-test.js:46 — FragmentResource-Resolver-test.js:23

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/CatchTestResolverErrorThrowQuery.graphql.js:72 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/UserAlwaysThrowsResolver) — import the package by name instead. — CatchTestResolverErrorThrowQuery.graphql.js:72
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgesTest1Query.graphql.js:90 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/UserClientEdgeNodeResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientEdgesTest1Query.graphql.js:90
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgesTest2Query.graphql.js:90 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/UserClientEdgeNodeResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientEdgesTest2Query.graphql.js:90
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgesTest3Query.graphql.js:92 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/UserClientEdgeNodeResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientEdgesTest3Query.graphql.js:92
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgesTest4Query.graphql.js:110 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/UserClientEdgeClientObjectResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientEdgesTest4Query.graphql.js:110
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientEdgesTest4Query.graphql.js:116 reaches into another package with a relative path (./../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/__generated__/User__client_object$normalization.graphql) — import the package by name instead. — ClientEdgesTest4Query.graphql.js:116
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientOnlyQueriesTest2Query.graphql.js:64 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/HelloWorldResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientOnlyQueriesTest2Query.graphql.js:64
  • packages/react-relay/__tests__/__generated__/ClientOnlyQueriesTest3Query.graphql.js:71 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../relay-runtime/store/__tests__/resolvers/HelloUserResolver) — import the package by name instead. — ClientOnlyQueriesTest3Query.graphql.js:71

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:269, useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:251, useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:275, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 35 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — OperationExecutor.js, RelayStoreTypes.js, jest_v29.x.x.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 14 application, 101 tooling and 1981 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (14 application, 101 tooling, 1981 test roots considered) (×7) — OperationExecutor.js, RelayStoreTypes.js, jest_v29.x.x.js, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — ReactRelayFragmentContainer.js:24, ReactRelayFragmentContainer-test.js:716, ReactRelayPaginationContainer.js:59
  • Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Only test files import it — move it to devDependencies. — commitMutation-test.js:44

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • packages/relay-runtime/multi-actor-environment.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/multi-actor-environment.d.ts — multi-actor-environment.d.ts
  • packages/relay-runtime/mutations/RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/mutations/commitMutation.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernStore.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayOperationTracker.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayStoreTypes.d.ts → packages/relay-runtime/mutations/RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.d.ts — RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.d.ts

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health53%Adequate — gated by D3, R1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity68%AdequateStrongest area.
Readiness21%Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R8, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security38%Weak — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 62 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — none of 37 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 85 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×43
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:40 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:53 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:72 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:100 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:101 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:126 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:127 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:147 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:148 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:194 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:195 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:203 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:221 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:242 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:257 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:258 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:266 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:271 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:276 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:281 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • + 18 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×37
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.78
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.78
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.78
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.78
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.79
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/babel-plugin-relay/yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/babel-plugin-relay/yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.1 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.3 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.5 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — form-data 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — glob 11.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — jws 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — linkify-it 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] vscode-extension/yarn.lock — linkify-it 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.2
  • + 12 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — wee_alloc: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.4
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key website/docusaurus.config.js:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 87 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×17
  • FileTooLong: react-relay/ReactRelayPaginationContainer.js packages/react-relay/ReactRelayPaginationContainer.js:0 — FileTooLong — 965 lines.
  • FileTooLong: relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1070 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/LiveResolvers-test.js packages/react-relay/__tests__/LiveResolvers-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 2154 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/ReactRelayPaginationContainer-test.js packages/react-relay/__tests__/ReactRelayPaginationContainer-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 2107 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/ReactRelayQueryRenderer-test.js packages/react-relay/__tests__/ReactRelayQueryRenderer-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 2069 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/RelayResolverNullableModelClientEdge-test.js packages/react-relay/__tests__/RelayResolverNullableModelClientEdge-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 572 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/RelayResolvers-withOutputType-test.js packages/react-relay/__tests__/RelayResolvers-withOutputType-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 712 lines.
  • FileTooLong: relay-hooks/QueryResource.js packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/QueryResource.js:0 — FileTooLong — 614 lines.
  • FileTooLong: relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:0 — FileTooLong — 708 lines.
  • FileTooLong: relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:0 — FileTooLong — 805 lines.
  • FileTooLong: network/RelayObservable.js packages/relay-runtime/network/RelayObservable.js:0 — FileTooLong — 633 lines.
  • FileTooLong: store/OperationExecutor.js packages/relay-runtime/store/OperationExecutor.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1836 lines.
  • FileTooLong: store/RelayModernRecord.js packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernRecord.js:0 — FileTooLong — 748 lines.
  • FileTooLong: store/RelayModernSelector.js packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernSelector.js:0 — FileTooLong — 536 lines.
  • FileTooLong: store/RelayReader.js packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReader.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1989 lines.
  • FileTooLong: store/RelayStoreTypes.js packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayStoreTypes.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1650 lines.
  • FileTooLong: __tests__/RelayMockPayloadGenerator-test.js packages/relay-test-utils/__tests__/RelayMockPayloadGenerator-test.js:0 — FileTooLong — 2203 lines.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×11
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 compiler/Cargo.lock — bincode: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 compiler/Cargo.lock — crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — upgrade to 0.9.20 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.72
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.80
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.70
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.10.79
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0004 compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: RUSTSEC-2025-0004 — upgrade to 0.10.70
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0022 compiler/Cargo.lock — openssl 0.10.68: RUSTSEC-2025-0022 — upgrade to 0.10.72
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2022-0054 compiler/Cargo.lock — wee_alloc: RUSTSEC-2022-0054
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2024-0384 compiler/crates/intern/Cargo.lock — instant: RUSTSEC-2024-0384
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 compiler/crates/intern/Cargo.lock — rand 0.8.5: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 — upgrade to 0.8.6
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision · ×3
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision: the body is a status-updates list of PRs with no stated problem or decision meta/meeting-notes/2016-03-31-team-sync.md — Add an Context section stating what problem this ADR addresses (e.g. 'The internal app needs Graph Mode to handle paths that do not fit into a fixed graph') and a Decision section describing the explicit change (Graph Mode writer in, lazy paths) along with its consequences
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision: the only content is a task list of people doing status updates (no problem/decision framing) meta/meeting-notes/2016-04-19-team-sync.md — Add an Context section stating what problem the Relay project addresses and an Explicit Decision section naming the design choice or rule adopted
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision: the body is a contributor activity log rather than an ADR document meta/meeting-notes/2016-08-09-team-sync.md — Convert this to an actual architecture decision by stating what problem it addresses (e.g. long load times from Tasks perf hits) and the decision (e.g. inlined 150 fragments, landed V1 compatibility component). The status log is not a decision.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 19) packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useQueryLoader.js:252 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 19) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReferenceMarker.js:123 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D20 · ADR Quality · Status updates only; no context/problem and no decision are stated · ×2
  • Status updates only; no context/problem and no decision are stated meta/meeting-notes/2016-03-01-team-sync.md — Delete the status-updates section entirely and replace it with a one-paragraph problem statement (e.g. why Relay sync to www is needed) plus an explicit Decision that addresses the gap
  • Status updates only; no context/problem and no decision are stated meta/meeting-notes/2016-05-03-team-sync.md — Replace the status update list with a Context section explaining what changed (e.g. mutation debugging, deferred-fragment fix) and an explicit Decision stating the architectural change being documented
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57) packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:269 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 57 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 47) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 47) packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:251 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 47 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 45) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 45) packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:275 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 45 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 30) packages/relay-runtime/store/DataChecker.js:365 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReferenceMarker.js:123 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · T (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • T (cyclomatic 22) website/src/compiler-config/CompilerConfig.js:285 — T has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · constructor (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • constructor (cyclomatic 18) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernEnvironment.js:108 — constructor has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · _propagateResolverMetadata (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • _propagateResolverMetadata (cyclomatic 18) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReader.js:935 — _propagateResolverMetadata has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) packages/relay-runtime/mutations/RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.js:253 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (0 author(s) across 0 commit(s) sampled).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1088.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 70) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 70) packages/relay-test-utils/RelayMockPayloadGenerator.js:269 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 70 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 65) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 65) packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_CURRENT.js:251 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 65 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 60) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 60) packages/react-relay/relay-hooks/useFragmentInternal_EXPERIMENTAL.js:275 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 60 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _propagateResolverMetadata (cognitive 34) · ×1
  • _propagateResolverMetadata (cognitive 34) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayReader.js:935 — _propagateResolverMetadata has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 26) packages/relay-runtime/store/DataChecker.js:365 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 22) packages/relay-runtime/mutations/createUpdatableProxy.js:334 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · T (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • T (cognitive 21) website/src/compiler-config/CompilerConfig.js:285 — T has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 20) packages/relay-runtime/mutations/RelayDeclarativeMutationConfig.js:253 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · constructor (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • constructor (cognitive 19) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernEnvironment.js:108 — constructor has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · validateField (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • validateField (cognitive 18) packages/relay-runtime/mutations/validateMutation.js:179 — validateField has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · handleFieldErrors (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • handleFieldErrors (cognitive 17) packages/relay-runtime/util/handlePotentialSnapshotErrors.js:22 — handleFieldErrors has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · dispose (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • dispose (cognitive 16) packages/relay-runtime/store/RelayModernStore.js:378 — dispose has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the open-source plan; only status updates and a vague 'We discussed various ways to increase our transparency improve the communication with our open source users' · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs for the open-source plan; only status updates and a vague 'We discussed various ways to increase our transparency improve the communication with our open source users' meta/meeting-notes/2016-02-02-sync-notes.md — Add the problem motivating the open-source decisions (e.g. lack of visibility/good PR process) and document trade-offs such as increased work effort, risk of drifting from the original plan, and how the consequences are managed
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is a status update log of ongoing work by members rather than an explicit context/problem decision with consequences · ×1
  • The body is a status update log of ongoing work by members rather than an explicit context/problem decision with consequences meta/meeting-notes/2016-02-09-team-sync.md — Convert the log into a real ADR: state the problem (e.g. persisted queries, contextual state for server rendering) and the explicit decisions being made (open source PR, RelayConnection integration), plus their trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · No decision is stated (only status notes) and there are no consequences/trade-offs in a readable form · ×1
  • No decision is stated (only status notes) and there are no consequences/trade-offs in a readable form meta/meeting-notes/2016-02-18-team-sync.md — Replace with an ADR that states the explicit architectural decision being documented and its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · Is a status/agenda document; the body is pure contributor activity notes with no context/problem and no explicit decision · ×1
  • Is a status/agenda document; the body is pure contributor activity notes with no context/problem and no explicit decision meta/meeting-notes/2016-03-22-team-sync.md — Convert this to an actual architecture decision by stating what problem it addresses (e.g. slow persisted query diffing) and its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision; only a status-agenda list of work items · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision; only a status-agenda list of work items meta/meeting-notes/2016-04-05-team-sync.md — Add an Context section stating the problem (e.g. payload handling in Graph Mode) and a Decision section describing what was implemented (Graph Diff out, profiling, persisted query impact measurement). Consequences/trade-offs should follow.
D20 · ADR Quality · The visible content is a GitHub status feed listing ongoing work rather than an architecture decision document (context/problem + explicit decision + consequences) · ×1
  • The visible content is a GitHub status feed listing ongoing work rather than an architecture decision document (context/problem + explicit decision + consequences) meta/meeting-notes/2016-04-14-team-sync.md — Convert this into an ADR: state the problem being solved, the decision made by the team, and its consequences.
D20 · ADR Quality · Status updates only; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • Status updates only; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs meta/meeting-notes/2016-04-26-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining the problem being solved (e.g. broken Relay tests, persisting queries) and a Consequences section on trade-offs like added complexity of validation/transaction refactoring
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision (only a list of work items) in the body · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision (only a list of work items) in the body meta/meeting-notes/2016-05-09-team-sync.md — State what problem the RelayConnection work addresses and document the concrete architectural decision made
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no decision statement (only work-in-progress tasking) · ×1
  • No context/problem and no decision statement (only work-in-progress tasking) meta/meeting-notes/2016-05-17-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining the problem being solved and an explicit Decision stating what was implemented or adopted
D20 · ADR Quality · Status updates only; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs are present · ×1
  • Status updates only; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs are present meta/meeting-notes/2016-05-26-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining the problem being solved (e.g. persisted queries, RANGE_DELETE edge removal) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs like added complexity of generated types or refactoring burden
D20 · ADR Quality · Not an architecture decision record · ×1
  • Not an architecture decision record: status update list with no context, explicit decision, or consequences meta/meeting-notes/2016-05-31-team-sync.md
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision statement (only status notes) · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision statement (only status notes) meta/meeting-notes/2016-06-07-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining the problem being solved and an Explicit Decision section stating what the ADR commits to
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no decision (only status updates) in a non-structured log format · ×1
  • No context/problem and no decision (only status updates) in a non-structured log format meta/meeting-notes/2016-06-14-team-sync.md — Convert this into an ADR by stating what problem it addresses, the explicit decision (e.g. add a benchmarking tool), and its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision in a readable form · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision in a readable form meta/meeting-notes/2016-06-21-team-sync.md — Convert the list into an ADR: state what problem motivated this work (e.g. decoupling examples from main repo), document each decision (e.g. adding Jest runtime for scripts), and note consequences/trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision; only a status update list · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision; only a status update list meta/meeting-notes/2016-07-05-team-sync.md — State what problem the prototype addresses (optimistic updates, persisted queries) and document the decision (which API shape to adopt) with its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · Status update log with no context/problem statement and no explicit decision or consequences · ×1
  • Status update log with no context/problem statement and no explicit decision or consequences meta/meeting-notes/2016-07-14-team-sync.md — Convert this to an ADR by stating the problem being solved (e.g. stalled Relay prototype/API, Pokes migration) and recording the decision (batch API client-side BatchLoader, persisted queries strategy), plus any trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision; only status notes (people/commitments) are present · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision; only status notes (people/commitments) are present meta/meeting-notes/2016-07-21-team-sync.md — Add a Context section stating what problem this backlog addresses and an Explicit Decision section describing the intended change
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision (only work-item notes present) · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision (only work-item notes present) meta/meeting-notes/2016-07-26-team-sync.md — Add the problem motivating this ADR and state what concrete decision will replace the work items
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem statement; the visible content is a task tracker list (status updates) rather than an ADR · ×1
  • No context/problem statement; the visible content is a task tracker list (status updates) rather than an ADR meta/meeting-notes/2016-08-19-team-sync.md
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision are stated; the visible content is only status notes (Agenda) and work-in-progress tracker · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision are stated; the visible content is only status notes (Agenda) and work-in-progress tracker meta/meeting-notes/2016-08-23-team-sync.md — Add an Context section describing what was being built/why it matters and an Explicit Decision section stating the actual architectural choice made
D20 · ADR Quality · Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent; only status and work items are present · ×1
  • Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent; only status and work items are present meta/meeting-notes/2016-08-30-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining why Relay 2 integration is needed (e.g. backward compatibility with existing Relay 1 codebase) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as increased complexity of the compatibility container or risk of breaking existing Relay 1 consumers
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs sections; all content is project update/task status with owners · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs sections; all content is project update/task status with owners meta/meeting-notes/2016-09-06-team-sync.md — Add a Context section explaining why Relay 1/2 integration matters (e.g. backward compatibility, new features) and a Consequences section noting trade-offs like refactoring effort or test risk
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem statement (what problem the Relay/2 core was addressing) and no explicit decision; only a vague 'we've been focusing on building an experimental new core' and a migration pathway are present · ×1
  • No context/problem statement (what problem the Relay/2 core was addressing) and no explicit decision; only a vague 'we've been focusing on building an experimental new core' and a migration pathway are present meta/meeting-notes/2016-12-09-update.md — Add a Context section explaining why Relay 2 was needed (performance, static core hypothesis) and a Decision section stating what APIs were adopted and when the new product API will replace RelayContainer
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a present list of contributors and updates sections · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a present list of contributors and updates sections meta/meeting-notes/2017-01-17-team-sync.md — Add an overview section stating what problem this sync was for (holiday catch-up) and a Consequences section on trade-offs such as time spent coordinating across teams
D20 · ADR Quality · The document is a team meeting/updates summary with no context/problem and no explicit decision; it is pure status logging · ×1
  • The document is a team meeting/updates summary with no context/problem and no explicit decision; it is pure status logging meta/meeting-notes/2017-01-24-team-sync.md — Convert this to an ADR by stating what problem the team is solving (e.g. preparing Relay APIs for web rollout) and recording the concrete decision (when, who, what deliverables), plus any consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · No informative title and no explicit decision statement; only a work-item list with minimal context · ×1
  • No informative title and no explicit decision statement; only a work-item list with minimal context meta/meeting-notes/2017-02-07-team-sync.md — Give the ADR an informative title (e.g. 'Relay API Documentation and Branch Setup Roadmap') and state the concrete decision (e.g. documentation for new APIs plus experimental branch setup) so it is readable from the top
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no explicit decision (ship date, trade-offs of experimental branch) are stated · ×1
  • No context/problem and no explicit decision (ship date, trade-offs of experimental branch) are stated meta/meeting-notes/2017-02-14-team-sync.md — Add a Context section on why the new core is needed and an Explicit Decision stating the ship date and any consequences of running the experimental branch
D20 · ADR Quality · No decision statement and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a themes list with current projects and potential projects notes only · ×1
  • No decision statement and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a themes list with current projects and potential projects notes only meta/roadmaps/2016-H1.md — Add an explicit Decision section stating what Relay will look like (core/primitives vs user-space tooling) and its rationale, then a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as reduced flexibility for product teams or higher memory usage
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · single-commit history · ×1
  • single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots: a single-commit clone exposes no history window, so the churn × complexity hotspot signal is unavailable — not scored for this run.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (0 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .43artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .75artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdcdf-b419-79fc-9750-a067e55819d4 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 85 · Warnings: 87 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 15:37 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md