Public report of feijie999/JieDDDFramework, published 21 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 21 October 2026, 20:04 UTC · Survey ID cd_dd5dd42026a949dd80511f842332b1c2
feijie999/JieDDDFramework
Measured 21 October 2026, 20:01 UTC, at code version 4d1df00
Test distribution is not measured: No automated tests.
CAI scoreAt riskDown 4 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 4,331 lines of product code in 9 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 15
Findings by how serious they are
31 critical94 serious73 minor
6 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
21 October 2026, 20:01 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
75of 80 dimensions measured by tools. The other 5 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
168of 198 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 30 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
80dimensions across 8 lenses, read from 4,331 lines of product code in 9 projects.
feijie999/JieDDDFramework scores 36 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.
The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 15 and is rated Critical. Its Code Coverage dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 36 to about 52.
31 findings are critical: 11 in Explicit Debt, ten in Dependency Vulnerabilities, three in Dependency Hygiene, two in REDACTED Scanning, two in Secrets (history), one in Code Coverage, one in Coupling and one in Project dependency cycles.
Watchdog couldn't measure Runtime accessibility in this code, so that dimension is left out of the score. The product code is 4,331 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €6,400, to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 3 findings
These 3 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Coupling · Off the main sequence: JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity
€2,100 to €11,000, for 36 to 112 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 36. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 4,331 lines of product code, of which 39% is declarations and boilerplate, 50% straight logic and 11% logic with branches
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 16 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
2
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
Raises the score by about 16 points · Low effort · Code Coverage
3
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Raises the score by about 16 points · Low effort · Test Distribution
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €6,400 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 15 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 16 points for low effort, because it clears the 2 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
30 modules, with 13 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services uses Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations, so a change to Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations can break Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services can't break Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.
Position
Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
Service.Operations uses Core.Models, so a change to Core.Models can break Service.Operations, while a change to Service.Operations can't break Core.Models.
Position
Below the diagonal: Service.Operations uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations uses Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services, so a change to Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services can break Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations can't break Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.DbContext uses Core.Domain, so a change to Core.Domain can break Data.EntityFramework.DbContext, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.DbContext can't break Core.Domain.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.DbContext uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.DbContext uses Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations, so a change to Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations can break Data.EntityFramework.DbContext, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.DbContext can't break Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.DbContext uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework uses Core.Models, so a change to Core.Models can break Data.EntityFramework, while a change to Data.EntityFramework can't break Core.Models.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework uses Data.EntityFramework.DbContext, so a change to Data.EntityFramework.DbContext can break Data.EntityFramework, while a change to Data.EntityFramework can't break Data.EntityFramework.DbContext.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses Core.Domain, so a change to Core.Domain can break Data.EntityFramework.Repositories, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.Repositories can't break Core.Domain.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses Data.Repository, so a change to Data.Repository can break Data.EntityFramework.Repositories, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.Repositories can't break Data.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses Data.EntityFramework.DbContext, so a change to Data.EntityFramework.DbContext can break Data.EntityFramework.Repositories, while a change to Data.EntityFramework.Repositories can't break Data.EntityFramework.DbContext.
Position
Below the diagonal: Data.EntityFramework.Repositories uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 46% · Weak · gated by X4 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
16
High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection
8
Medium
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
Immediately address the two leaked secrets in the client service files to secure the application. Next, establish automated tests for the uncovered code and ensure all components have proper test distribution. Finally, update and remove deprecated dependencies across the identified project files to maintain system stability and hygiene.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 31
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 94
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 73
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 6
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 75 of 80 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 1.0 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 80 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 168 of 198 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 74 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 1 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via Dockerfile (Example/Identity.API/Dockerfile). docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit:
https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.SetIdLengthLimit (cognitive 19), TypeExtensions.IsInherit (cognitive 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.6 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
3 duplicated block group(s) detected. 1 of the 3 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RequestProvider.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RequestProvider.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (18–28 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.1 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Off the main sequence: JieDDDFramework.ServiceJieDDDFramework.Service/JieDDDFramework.Service.csproj:1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling — start with Order.Domain.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling — start with JieDDDFramework.Service.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Low cohesion: Order (LCOM4 4)Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:12
What to do
Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with Order.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cohesion (LCOM4) in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 15 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), Order.API.csproj (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 14 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate REDACTED Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 257 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 28 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 222 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 6 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Order.API.csproj (3), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED, CreateOrderCommandHandler.cs, OrderDbContext.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
9 projects, 131 source files, 4331 hand-written lines of code (4331 production / 0 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 2687 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 13 inter-project edges.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The repository's root README is a single cohesive document that states the project (JieDDDFramework) and its purpose clearly, explains what it uses (Entity Framework Core 2.2), lists adopted technologies with links to Ray for high-concurrency workloads, enumerates DDD features including repositories, domain events, UoW, and identity/authorization via IdentityServer4, and provides a runnable example showing two modules (IdentityServer and OrderServer) with configuration, startup steps, an API call, swagger usage, and an image. It is well written for the project's tier but does not yet show installation/build or contribution guidance.
Resolve the 8 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with REDACTED, JieDDDFramework.Data.csproj, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.
Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.
Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.
1 domain type(s) cross context boundaries across 7 contexts.
Cross-context type ICreatedTimeState (JieDDDFramework.Core → Example)Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:12
What to do
Resolve the 1 Cross-context type ICreatedTimeState (JieDDDFramework.Core → Example) finding(s) in Boundary Type-Coupling — start with Order.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Boundary Type-Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment ValueStrong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
98 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
8 of 8 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs. Counted over 8 of the 93 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with RequestProvider.cs, Repository`1.cs, ProfileService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 9 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with Order.API.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The namespaces JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations ↔ JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services → JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations (JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services.DefaultAutoApplyConfigurationService → JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.ModelConfigurationOption, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultAutoApplyConfigurationService.cs:11
What to do
Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
`IRepositoryBase<TEntity>` declares 20 members under just 8 distinct name(s): `UnitOfWork`, `Insert`, `Insert`, `Insert`, `InsertAsync`, `InsertAsync`, `InsertAsync`, `Update`, `Update`, `Update`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `FindEntity`, `FindEntity`, `FindEntityAsync`, `FindEntityAsync`, `Tables`, `Tables`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 20 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 8 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 20 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface. — JieDDDFramework.Data/Repository/IRepositoryBase`1.cs:14
What to do
Collapse overload sets (optional/default parameters, or an options object) — these interfaces are wide in SIGNATURES, not in responsibilities, so segregating them would relieve no caller.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No in-app HTTPS enforcement, but ForwardedHeaders / 127.0.0.1 binding indicates a reverse-proxy topology — adding UseHttpsRedirection in the app would be wrong in this layout. Verify the reverse proxy enforces TLS. — Example/Identity.API/Startup.cs:117
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable. — Example/Order.API/Controllers/OrderController.cs:21
What to do
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.
`Order` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `Delete`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:79
What to do
Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
`OnModelCreating1` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Data/IdentityUserDbContext.cs:15
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×12) — JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:16, JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:19, JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:22, …
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
The root README is 100 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers.
What to do
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 5/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
`new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default). — JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:113
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().
Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
`.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). — JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:62
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult().
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Example/Order.API/Startup.cs:172
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×2) — Example/Identity.API/Program.cs:29, Example/Order.API/Program.cs:25
What to do
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:62
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`tokenClient` is a `TokenClient`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 42). Every use of it in `Login` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tokenClient = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Example/Order.API/Controllers/AccountController.cs:42
What to do
Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 7/22 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×15) — JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:30, JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:44, JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:66, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.
Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.cs:45
What to do
Swallowed exception (empty catch)
Do you agree with this assessment?
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×7) — JieDDDFramework.Core/MediatR/Behaviors/LoggingBehavior.cs:17, JieDDDFramework.Core/MediatR/Behaviors/LoggingBehavior.cs:19, JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:48, …
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 38 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit:
https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (5 signals for this style, 3 needed — the count is met but a required primary signal is absent): 3 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); 2 domain event(s); its 3 aggregate(s) are building blocks, test types or a library's examples — not the repository's own domain; a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer; 1 aggregate-constrained repository/repositories (IRepository<T> where T : IAggregateRoot); 2 per-aggregate domain namespaces (…/BasketAggregate, …/OrderAggregate); a top-level Example/ tree: a library or framework whose examples are its consumers — these types are building blocks, not a domain
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
NoWarnInCsproj Example/Order.API/Order.API.csproj:12— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:11— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Example/Order.API/Order.API.csproj:12— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:11— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Example/Order.API/Order.API.csproj:12— 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:11— 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
WriteOnlyPrivateField REDACTED:27— private JwtSettings _jwtSettings — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField Example/Order.Domain/Application/Commands/CreateOrderCommandHandler.cs:16— private IMediator _mediator — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField Example/Order.Domain/DbContexts/OrderDbContext.cs:23— private IMediator _mediator — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField Example/Order.Domain/Events/DomainEventHandlers/OrderStartedDomainEventHandler.cs:16— private ILoggerFactory _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
Namespace dependency cycle JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultAutoApplyConfigurationService.cs:11— The namespaces JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations ↔ JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services → JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations (JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.Services.DefaultAutoApplyConfigurationService → JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework.ModelConfigurations.ModelConfigurationOption, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.
EmptyCatchBlock JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.cs:45— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.
Dead code: Connectionstrings JieDDDFramework.Core/Configures/Connectionstrings.cs:4— NamedType Connectionstrings — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: RemoveDomainEvent JieDDDFramework.Core/Domain/IEntity.cs:13— Method RemoveDomainEvent — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: IRepository JieDDDFramework.Core/Domain/IRepository.cs:7— NamedType IRepository — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: GetCopy JieDDDFramework.Core/Domain/ValueObject.cs:56— Method GetCopy — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: IModificationState JieDDDFramework.Core/EntitySpecifications/IModificationState.cs:7— NamedType IModificationState — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: NullButNotEmpty JieDDDFramework.Core/Exceptions/Utilities/Check.cs:48— Method NullButNotEmpty — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: HasNoNulls JieDDDFramework.Core/Exceptions/Utilities/Check.cs:58— Method HasNoNulls — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ValidEntityType JieDDDFramework.Core/Exceptions/Utilities/Check.cs:79— Method ValidEntityType — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SelectTry JieDDDFramework.Core/Extensions/LinqSelectExtensions.cs:9— Method SelectTry — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: OnCaughtException JieDDDFramework.Core/Extensions/LinqSelectExtensions.cs:26— Method OnCaughtException — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: OnCaughtException JieDDDFramework.Core/Extensions/LinqSelectExtensions.cs:31— Method OnCaughtException — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: WhereBetweenTime JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/EntitySpecificationExtensions.cs:17— Method WhereBetweenTime — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: WhereNotDelete JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/EntitySpecificationExtensions.cs:44— Method WhereNotDelete — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: IdentityLoginService Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/IdentityLoginService.cs:9— NamedType IdentityLoginService — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ValidateCredentials Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/ILoginService.cs:8— Method ValidateCredentials — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: FindByUsername Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/ILoginService.cs:9— Method FindByUsername — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SignIn Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/ILoginService.cs:10— Method SignIn — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ExtractRedirectUriFromReturnUrl Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/IRedirectService.cs:6— Method ExtractRedirectUriFromReturnUrl — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.2.0, — ) — the publisher's replacement is `2.2.0` Other,Legacy; migrate the reference to it.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Async method without CancellationToken · ×15
Async method without CancellationToken: GetAsync JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:30— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: PostAsync JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:44— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: PostAsync JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:66— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: PutAsync JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:83— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: DeleteAsync JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:105— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: DispatchDomainEventsAsync JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/MediatorExtension.cs:14— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: InsertAsync JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Repositories/Repository`1.cs:48— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: FindEntityAsync JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Repositories/Repository`1.cs:106— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: FindEntityAsync JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Repositories/Repository`1.cs:116— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Login REDACTED:38— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SeedAsync Example/Identity.API/Init/IdentityUserDbContextSeed.cs:15— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SeedAsync Example/Order.Domain/DbContexts/OrderDbContextSeed.cs:15— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Login Example/Order.API/Controllers/AccountController.cs:39— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CreateOrder Example/Order.API/Controllers/OrderController.cs:40— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Orders Example/Order.API/Controllers/OrderController.cs:54— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Sync-over-async blocking — 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
Sync-over-async blocking JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:62— `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
TodoComment Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/BuyerAggregate/Buyer.cs:43— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.SetIdLengthLimit (cognitive 19) JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.cs:18— DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.SetIdLengthLimit has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TypeExtensions.IsInherit (cognitive 18) JieDDDFramework.Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs:9— TypeExtensions.IsInherit has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cross-context type ICreatedTimeState (JieDDDFramework.Core → Example) Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:12— ICreatedTimeState (context JieDDDFramework.Core) is exposed in Example's public surface via Order.ICreatedTimeState — couples the contexts.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:46— JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:46-54 | JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:85-93 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:55— JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:55-64 | JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:72-81 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:55` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (18–28 lines × 2) Example/Identity.API/Startup.cs:154— Example/Identity.API/Startup.cs:154-171 | Example/Order.API/Startup.cs:130-157 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Example/Identity.API/Startup.cs:154` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp2.2 Example/Order.API/Order.API.csproj:4— Example/Order.API/Order.API.csproj declares .NET netcoreapp2.2 as this project's target framework, and .NET Core 2.2, support ended 2019-12-23. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2019-12-23 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
Off the main sequence: JieDDDFramework.Service JieDDDFramework.Service/JieDDDFramework.Service.csproj:1— JieDDDFramework.Service: abstractness 1.00, instability 1.00, distance 1.00 — zone of uselessness — abstract and unstable, so it's likely unused.
Low cohesion: Order (LCOM4 4) Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:12— Order's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain· Domain type reads the wall clock · ×1
Domain type reads the wall clock: Order Example/Order.Domain/Aggregates/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:79— `Order` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `Delete`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs· Empty method body · ×1
Empty method body — does nothing with its inputs Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Data/IdentityUserDbContext.cs:15— `OnModelCreating1` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it.
Outbound HTTP without resilience JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:113— `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene· NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:62— Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness· Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it · ×1
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Example/Order.API/Controllers/AccountController.cs:42— `tokenClient` is a `TokenClient`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 42). Every use of it in `Login` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tokenClient = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/Services/DefaultFixModelConfigurationService.cs:45— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:16— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:19— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:22— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:23— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:24— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:25— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:26— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/EFInterceptor.cs:27— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/AopConfigurations/ServiceContainerExtensions.cs:16— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/ModelConfigurations/ModelBuilderExtensions.cs:26— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Web/Filters/MvcFilterExtensions.cs:19— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code JieDDDFramework.Web/Filters/MvcFilterExtensions.cs:23— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Repositories/Repository`1.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/ProfileService.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Data/Repository/IRepositoryBase`1.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Core/Exceptions/Utilities/Check.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Core/Models/PagedList`1.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file JieDDDFramework.Web/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Core/MediatR/Behaviors/LoggingBehavior.cs:17— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Core/MediatR/Behaviors/LoggingBehavior.cs:19— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:48— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:65— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs:69— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging JieDDDFramework.Web/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs:29— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging Example/Order.Domain/Events/DomainEventHandlers/UpdateOrderWhenBuyerAndPaymentMethodVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs:31— Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
Documentation: no project overview README.md— The opening paragraph states what the framework is (based on Entity Framework Core 2.2) and its target audience, but it never explains what the project does beyond that sentence; a reader cannot tell whether it implements DDD or just CRUD. Clarify in the first few sentences what JieDDDFramework delivers: domain modeling, repositories, events, identity, etc.
Documentation: no installation or build instructions README.md— The example shows how to configure a MySQL connection and start Identity.API but there are no installation/build commands or prerequisites. Add an Install section covering dotnet new, nuget install, and the startup/configuration steps.
Documentation: no usage examples README.md— The example is excellent (two modules, swagger call), but there are no usage examples for the Order module or any commands outside the IdentityServer path. Add a Usage section covering how to run and invoke the Order.API endpoints.
Documentation: no contributor guidance README.md— The README has no guidance on contributing, unlike the architecture docs that would normally follow. Add a Contributing doc describing pull request structure, test requirements, and CI configuration.
No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No security response headers detected Example/Identity.API/Program.cs:29— This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
No security response headers detected Example/Order.API/Program.cs:25— This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
C2 · Access Controls· No named authorization policies · ×2
No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
No named authorization policies Example/Order.API/Controllers/OrderController.cs:21— This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
Fat interface: IRepositoryBase<TEntity> (20 members) JieDDDFramework.Data/Repository/IRepositoryBase`1.cs:14— `IRepositoryBase<TEntity>` declares 20 members under just 8 distinct name(s): `UnitOfWork`, `Insert`, `Insert`, `Insert`, `InsertAsync`, `InsertAsync`, `InsertAsync`, `Update`, `Update`, `Update`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `Delete`, `FindEntity`, `FindEntity`, `FindEntityAsync`, `FindEntityAsync`, `Tables`, `Tables`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 20 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 8 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 20 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 8 of 8 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 8 of the 93 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: JieDDDFramework.Core/RequestProvider/RequestProvider.cs, Module/JieDDDFramework.Module.Identity/Services/ProfileService.cs, JieDDDFramework.Core/Exceptions/Utilities/Check.cs, JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Repositories/Repository`1.cs, JieDDDFramework.Core/Models/PagedList`1.cs, JieDDDFramework.Data/Repository/IRepositoryBase`1.cs, JieDDDFramework.Data.EntityFramework/Migrate/MigrateDbContextExtensions.cs, JieDDDFramework.Web/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
IL efficiency: 2 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget Example/Identity.API/Init/IdentityServerSeed.cs:29— 2 of 290 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Identity.API.Init.IdentityServerSeed.GetClients @ Example/Identity.API/Init/IdentityServerSeed.cs:29, 308 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.9/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.
No tests found — No test suite could be collected — no discoverable tests to count. If this repository does test, wiring the suite to a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest) is what makes it countable here; a pipeline step that invokes a runner is not evidence on its own, because a runner over an empty suite passes. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Thin README — The root README is 100 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
Logging is not universal — Only 5/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP Example/Order.API/Startup.cs:172— `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 7/22 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
0
—
Run 01a1600d-b859-7663-a12f-128d115ab160 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 4 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 31 · Warnings: 94 · Recommendations: 62 · Info: 11 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 21-10-2026 @ 20:01 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.