Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
felangel/bloc carries serious gaps (49%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (93%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (42%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Readiness (44%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark,… (Page structure); accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses (A11y enforcement); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Small (~16,297 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
93% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
89%
Strong
Maturity
65%
Adequate
Readiness
44%
Weak · gated by R4, P3
Security
47%
Weak · gated by D29, D36
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
42%
Weak · gated by AC3
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Accessibility 42% · 46% weightReadiness 44% · 25% weightSecurity 47% · 14% weightMaturity 65% · 8% weightArchitecture 89% · 4% weightCode Health 93% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight
Raise Accessibility 42 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 49 → ~54.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €13,000–€63,000
| Cost to rebuild | €13,000–€63,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 49% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€38,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
2
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
3
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 39 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 7 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, fix the page structure by adding proper language, title, and semantic landmarks to improve accessibility and SEO. Next, enforce accessibility checks in your existing UI test suite and gate them in CI to prevent regressions. Then, introduce static security analysis in your CI pipeline to catch vulnerabilities early. After that, increase test coverage by adding tests for unreached modules. Finally, ensure deployment protections are visible and active to prevent bad builds from reaching users.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +6.7 pts | Medium | Page structure |
| Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. | +6.7 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +5.4 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 38 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yaml (19), main.yaml (17), dependabot.yml. | +2.6 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +2.1 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| extensions/vscode/package-lock.json | 1.8 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/main.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/actions/dart_compile/action.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/actions/angular_dart_package/action.yaml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/actions/astro_site/action.yaml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| examples/flutter_firebase_login/android/app/google-services.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: gcp-api-key |
| examples/flutter_firestore_todos/android/app/google-services.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: gcp-api-key |
| examples/flutter_firebaseauth/android/app/google-services.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| extensions/vscode/src/utils/exec.ts | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: detect-child-process |
| examples/github_search/angular_github_search/lib/src/search_form/search_body/search_results/search_result_item/search_result_item_component.html | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href |
| packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_provider.dart | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: bloc_provider.dart ↔ repository_provider.dart |
| packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_consumer.dart | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: bloc_consumer.dart ↔ bloc_provider.dart |
| packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_listener.dart | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: bloc_listener.dart ↔ bloc_provider.dart |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 37 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 37 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D16D21D28D29D33D34D35D36D38AC3AC6AC7AX9DM4DM5DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 52 of 65 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D16 · Bus Factor
11 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/bloc/lib/src/bloc.dart.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: gcp-api-key examples/flutter_firebase_login/android/app/google-services.json:68
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with google-services.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
39 finding(s): 0 critical, 38 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/angular_dart_package/action.yaml:22
Medium: var-in-hrefexamples/github_search/angular_github_search/lib/src/search_form/search_body/search_results/search_result_item/search_result_item_component.html:7
What to do
- Resolve the 38 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yaml (19), main.yaml (17), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with search_result_item_component.html. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
6 of 43 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is extensions/intellij/intellij_generator_plugin/src/main/java/com/bloc/intellij_generator_plugin/action/GenerateEquatablePropsAction.kt.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: bloc_provider.dart↔repository_provider.dart 86%; bloc_consumer.dart↔bloc_provider.dart 55%; bloc_listener.dart↔bloc_provider.dart 53%
Change coupling: bloc_provider.dart ↔ repository_provider.dart packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_provider.dart
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 1 medium, 1 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted]extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×9) — description.html:1, description.html:1, description.html:1, …
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×8) — description.html:1, description.html:1, description.html:1, …
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×8) — description.html:1, description.html:1, description.html:1, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no accessibility linting at author time and no automated accessibility check in tests or CI. Add your UI toolkit's own accessibility assertion to the test suite (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in the pipeline.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
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AX9 · CQS / query purity
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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M1 · Documentation (README)
- 21 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 4 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.3 pts.
- Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
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R1 · Type Safety
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R10 · Code Duplication
- extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-bloc.command.ts:162 · extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-cubit.command.ts:121 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — new-bloc.command.ts:162
- extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-bloc.command.ts:132 · extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-bloc.command.ts:159 · extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-cubit.command.ts:118 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — new-bloc.command.ts:132
- extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc-event.template.ts:6 · extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc-state.template.ts:6 · extensions/vscode/src/templates/cubit-state.template.ts:6 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — bloc-event.template.ts:6
- extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc-state.template.ts:24 · extensions/vscode/src/templates/cubit-state.template.ts:24 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — bloc-state.template.ts:24
- extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-bloc.command.ts:40 · extensions/vscode/src/commands/new-cubit.command.ts:36 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — new-bloc.command.ts:40
- extensions/vscode/src/language-server/language-server.ts:48 · extensions/vscode/src/language-server/language-server.ts:70 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — language-server.ts:48
- extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc.template.ts:4 · extensions/vscode/src/templates/cubit.template.ts:4 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — bloc.template.ts:4
- extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc-event.template.ts:47 · extensions/vscode/src/templates/bloc-state.template.ts:53 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — bloc-event.template.ts:47
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — get-selected-text.ts:6
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 36 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in extensions/vscode/src/utils/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in extensions/vscode/src/utils/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. — get-dart-version.ts:4
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in extensions/vscode/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
- extensions/vscode/src/utils/analyze-dependencies.ts → extensions/vscode/src/utils/index.ts → extensions/vscode/src/utils/analyze-dependencies.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 8 files) — analyze-dependencies.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 93% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 89% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 65% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Readiness | 44% | Weak — gated by R4, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 47% | Weak — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 42% | Weak — gated by AC3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 77 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~24801 lines of test source are present (.dart) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.dart) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Dart: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every class-holding-class reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Dart: a cross-package domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most repositories ship a single package — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Dart: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, which this analysis does not build from source alone for this language. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 46 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/angular_dart_package/action.yaml:22
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/angular_dart_package/action.yaml:46
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/astro_site/action.yaml:18
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/astro_site/action.yaml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/dart_compile/action.yaml:30
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/dart_compile/action.yaml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/dart_compile/action.yaml:47
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:53
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:74
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:79
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:84
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:98
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/dart_package/action.yaml:107
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:53
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:74
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:79
- High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:93
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:108
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/flutter_package/action.yaml:117
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yaml:40
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yaml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yaml:58
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yaml:68
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yaml:104
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: gcp-api-key examples/flutter_firebase_login/android/app/google-services.json:68
- Secret: gcp-api-key examples/flutter_firestore_todos/android/app/google-services.json:24
- Secret: generic-api-key examples/flutter_firebaseauth/android/app/google-services.json:40
Warning — 7 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: bloc_provider.dart ↔ repository_provider.dart packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_provider.dart
- Change coupling: bloc_consumer.dart ↔ bloc_provider.dart packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_consumer.dart
- Change coupling: bloc_listener.dart ↔ bloc_provider.dart packages/flutter_bloc/lib/src/bloc_listener.dart
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: var-in-href examples/github_search/angular_github_search/lib/src/search_form/search_body/search_results/search_result_item/search_result_item_component.html:7
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .dart, .java, .kt, .rs, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] extensions/vscode/package-lock.json
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 3 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 39 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 7 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |