Bank.CleanArchitecture.WebApi

Executive summary

⚠ A critical security finding caps this grade — resolve it before relying on the score below; see the Security lens.

The system is currently at risk, scoring 39% overall. While the underlying code structure is sound and the logic is simple, the lack of operational safeguards creates a fragile foundation for business continuity. The asset is small, comprising roughly 1,700 lines of code with minimal complexity. Rebuilding it would cost approximately €1,600 and require just one engineer for a fraction of a year, indicating that the value tied up here is low, but the risk of losing it entirely is high due to insufficient protection.

The most critical theme is operational fragility. The system scores only 11% on production readiness, meaning it lacks the testing, observability, and disaster recovery mechanisms required for safe operation. Without automated checks or clear recovery procedures, any failure could lead to significant downtime or data loss. This exposes the business to reliability risks that far outweigh the cost of the code itself. The second theme is maintenance opacity. With only 58% maturity and no documented domain models, a new team would struggle to understand the logic quickly. This slows down future changes and increases the likelihood of introducing defects, effectively raising the long-term cost of ownership.

There are genuine strengths to acknowledge. The architecture is robust, scoring 85%, and the code health is decent at 71%. The event-driven components are well-implemented, and the code is largely boilerplate, which reduces the chance of subtle logic errors. These factors mean the core engine is reliable if it can be kept running.

To focus first, the team must add a CI workflow that builds and runs tests on every change. This single action provides the highest leverage by establishing a safety net for all future work. It is the prerequisite for improving maturity and readiness. Until this is in place, other improvements are risky. The picture is partial, as domain modeling and performance were not measured, but the current gaps are severe enough to demand immediate attention to operational basics.

Code Health 71% Adequate · gated by X3 Architecture 85% Strong Maturity 58% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 11% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, P1, P2, P3, P5 Security 58% Adequate · gated by D30, C1 Event-Driven 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 11% · 46% weightMaturity 58% · 25% weightSecurity 58% · 14% weightCode Health 71% · 8% weightArchitecture 85% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 11 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~63.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 13%Plumbing 87%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €540–€2,600

Cost to rebuild	€540–€2,600 (0.1 person-years (9–28 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Hobby · 64% boilerplate · 23% straight-line · 13% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 11% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.7) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.

+22.1 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

+22.1 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+14.5 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

40 modules, 52 dependencies. 3 dependency cycles across 6 modules, marked above the diagonal.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →	5 BankApplication.Api.Service	8 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Queries.GetAccountById	11 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces.Services	13 BankApplication.Application.Services.Queries.Login	14 BankApplication.Contracts.Accounts	15 BankApplication.Contracts.Adminstrator	16 BankApplication.Contracts.Authentication	17 BankApplication.Contracts.Transactions	20 BankApplication.Infrastructure	22 Domain.Models	23 Domain.Domains	24 BankApplication.Application.Authentication.Common	25 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces	26 BankApplication.Domain.Aggregates	27 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Response.Commands	28 BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator.Response.Commands	29 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Response.Commands	30 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Response.Queries	32 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Commands.AddAccountCredit	33 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces.Persistence	39 BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence
1 (global)
2 BankApplication.Api
3 BankApplication.Api.Common.Mapping
4 BankApplication.Api.Mapping
5 BankApplication.Api.Service
6 BankApplication.Application
7 BankApplication.Application.Accounts
8 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Queries.GetAccountById
9 BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator
10 BankApplication.Application.Common.Errors
11 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces.Services
12 BankApplication.Application.Common.Services
13 BankApplication.Application.Services.Queries.Login
14 BankApplication.Contracts.Accounts
15 BankApplication.Contracts.Adminstrator
16 BankApplication.Contracts.Authentication
17 BankApplication.Contracts.Transactions
18 BankApplication.Api.Controllers	1				2	2		1
19 BankApplication.Controllers							2
20 BankApplication.Infrastructure																					1
21 BankApplication.Infrastructure.Services			1
22 Domain.Models											2
23 Domain.Domains										1
24 BankApplication.Application.Authentication.Common											1
25 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces											1
26 BankApplication.Domain.Aggregates										2	1
27 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Response.Commands										1				1
28 BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator.Response.Commands														1
29 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Response.Commands														1
30 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Response.Queries										1				1
31 BankApplication.Infrastructure.Authentication			1								1		1
32 BankApplication.Application.Customers.Commands.AddAccountCredit																1	1			2
33 BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces.Persistence										1	2			4					1
34 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Queries.GetAccounts																		1		1
35 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Queries.GetTransactionsByAccId		1																1		1
36 BankApplication.Application.Authentication.Queries.Login				1								1	1							1
37 BankApplication.Application.Services.Commands.Register												1	1							1
38 BankApplication.Application.Transactions.Commands.Transfer															1					1
39 BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence									6	1	2			4					1	5
40 BankApplication.Application.Accounts.Commands															1					1	1

Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 71% · Adequate · gated by X3 ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

The Bad

X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 6.5

The Ugly

X3 · Repo Exception handling 3.9

At a glance — Architecture · 85% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 8.4 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 8.9 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Bad

AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.1

The Ugly

D22 · .NET / C# Internal API Consistency 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 58% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 7.0

The Bad

D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 5.2 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0

The Ugly

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 4.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 4.5 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 3.0

At a glance — Readiness · 11% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, P1, P2, P3, P5 ·

The Good

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 3.7 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1 ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.1 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 7.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Bad

D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0 C4 · Repo Data Retention 6.5

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 3.2 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 7.0 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	12	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	5	High / Critical

Roadmap

Establish a CI workflow to build and test every push, while implementing structured logging across all services to improve observability. Codify disaster recovery by defining RTO/RPO and automating backups in infrastructure as code, ensuring persistence is protected. Finally, resolve the identified gaps in code coverage and test distribution to ensure comprehensive automated testing.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.	+22.1 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+22.1 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+14.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+14.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+25.2 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.	+25.2 pts	Medium	Observability
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+25.2 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+22.1 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 5 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 20% slop · 20% mixed · 60% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	3.4	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
BankApplication.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregate.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 3)
README.md	9.3	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: Documentation: no installation or build instructions
BankApplication.Application/Authentication/Commands/Register/RegisterCommandHandler.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: misleading comment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 15

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 25

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 64

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 3

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 75 of 81 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 6 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 81 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D35D39D43D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX9C1C2C4ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 38 of 104 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0c19e-62a2-7261-a369-591301b2709f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 36 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. At 1719 LoC across 5 projects this is a mid-range multi-module codebase that warrants explicit bounded contexts. Bounded contexts cannot be inferred from a codebase that is not physically organised by them (D-321), so with none declared there are no boundaries for the coupling pass to measure across. You can widen what we reach: name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (36 commit(s) sampled).

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D21, D22, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (17 lines × 3)BankApplication.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregate.cs:8

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AccountAggregate.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: BankApplication.Domain · ×2

What to do

Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

18 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 3 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: System.Data.SqlClient · ×3

Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets · ×3

Outdated: MediatR · ×18

What to do

Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 250 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 18 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 232 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1719 LoC in the .NET projects (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 projects, 101 source files, 1719 hand-written lines of code (1719 production / 0 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 7 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This single README is a clean, focused web API project page with an explicit disclaimer that it has been retired and no longer maintained. It describes what the project was built to do (create accounts, deposit/withdraw money, transfer between accounts), its intended audience (learning Clean Architecture with Dapper/MediatR), and the technologies used (ASP.NET Core 7 WebApi, REST, CQRS with MediatR, JWT authentication). The body is mostly prose but contains a runnable 'How to run the project' section covering both Docker and native builds. It also lists features as checklists ('*Creation of database and tables are not included in the project...') and ends with an outline marker that all listed sections exist (ASP.NET Core WebApi - Clean Architecture; About The Project; How to run the project; Technologies & Features). Despite being a single README, it is well-structured for a learning/retired project.

Documentation: no installation or build instructions · ×2README.md

XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.Application · ×5BankApplication.Application/BankApplication.Application.csproj

What to do

Resolve the 2 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

The word 'Administrator' is consistently misspelled as 'Adminstrator' across namespaces, types, controllers, and repositories. While this is a consistent typo, it represents a deviation from standard English spelling conventions for the concept of an administrator.

The namespace and class name 'Presistence' is a misspelling of 'Persistence'. This typo appears in the namespace, multiple repository types, and the dependency injection method name.

The property/parameter name 'Telephonenumber' (and 'Telephonecountrycode') uses a concatenated camelCase style that is inconsistent with standard PascalCase naming for properties and often clearer as 'PhoneNumber' or 'TelephoneNumber'. More critically, 'Telephonenumber' is a non-standard spelling of 'PhoneNumber' or 'Telephone Number'.

Inconsistent casing in Domain Models: 'Givenname' is camelCase, while 'Surname', 'City', 'Birthday', 'Country', 'CountryCode' are PascalCase. This inconsistency within the same model namespace suggests a lack of standardization.

What to do

Resolve the 1 The word 'Administrator' is consistently misspelled as 'Adminstrator'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The namespace and class name 'Presistence' is a misspelling of… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The property/parameter name 'Telephonenumber' (and… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D22 · Internal API ConsistencyWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 API inconsistencies across 24 exposed types.

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent the data required to create an account. The 'Data' suffix implies a DTO or internal representation, but the naming convention is inconsistent with other pairs (e.g., TransferRequest vs TransferRequestData). Furthermore, the inclusion of UserId in the 'Data' variant suggests a separation of concerns that isn't reflected in the 'Request' variant, leading to confusion about which type should be used by the client.

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Similar to the CreateAccount pair, these types represent the same query intent. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. This inconsistency in parameter inclusion and naming ('Request' vs 'RequestData') creates ambiguity about the expected input for the operation.

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent a money transfer. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. The naming convention is inconsistent with other request types in the API (some use 'Request', some 'RequestData'), and the parameter difference suggests an unclear boundary between client-facing requests and internal data transfer objects.

Type duplication. `NewCustomerAccountRequest.CustomerAccount` is a nested type within the request, while `CustomerAccount` is a top-level type in the `Adminstrator` namespace. They have identical signatures and likely represent the same entity. This creates confusion about whether the client should use the nested type or the top-level type.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Similar to the… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment ValueWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 valuable / 0 redundant across 12 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

misleading commentBankApplication.Application/Authentication/Commands/Register/RegisterCommandHandler.cs:24

What to do

Resolve the 1 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with RegisterCommandHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 5 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

97 % of calls cross a namespace and 18 % go through an interface, but 95 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 97 % of calls cross a namespace and 18 % go through an interface, but 95 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 1 critical, 8 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.1 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 110 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 5 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET net7.0

What to do

Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.

What to do

Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

`CreateAccountRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/CreateAccount/CreateAccountRequest.cs:6
`CreateAccountRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/CreateAccount/CreateAccountRequestData.cs:4
`GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest.cs:6
`GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData.cs:4
`GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse.cs:4
`AccountTransactionsResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse.cs:12
`GetAccountsRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccounts/GetAccountsRequest.cs:3
`AddAccountCreditRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/AddAccountCredit/AddAccountCreditRequest.cs:6
`NewCustomerAccountRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:6
`CustomerAccount` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:31
`NewCustomerAccountResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:6
`Customer` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:14
`Account` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:25
`User` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:31
`AuthenticationResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/AuthenticationResponse.cs:4
`LoginRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/LoginRequest.cs:4
`RegisterRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/RegisterRequest.cs:6
`TransferRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferRequest.cs:6
`TransferRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferRequestData.cs:4
`TransferResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferResponse.cs:4

What to do

Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

This repository declares its own end of life: `README.md` line 16 reads “This project has been retired and is no longer maintained.”. That is a first-party statement of intent, not an inference — the Maturity and Knowledge lenses otherwise approximate the same fact from decayed commit history (D16 reports a dormant codebase, D34 orphaned files), and this row says the maintainer already told you. It does NOT change any score: an honest end-of-life notice is the README doing its job, and every dimension below still measures the code as it stands. Read the whole report as an assessment of software the author has stopped working on. — README.md:16

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
No test surface was found — this check walked the tree for authored source in the languages it models (`.cs`, `.vb`, `.fs`, `.java`, `.kt`, `.scala`, `.py`, `.php`, `.rb`, `.ex`, `.exs`, `.go`, `.erl`, `.hrl`, `.swift`, `.dart`, `.rs`, `.ts`, `.tsx`, `.mts`, `.cts`) and found none of it test-shaped. ★ `.js`, `.jsx`, `.mjs` and `.cjs` are NOT in that walk, so a Jest or Mocha suite written in plain JavaScript is invisible to it and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than moving anything. Otherwise there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.

What to do

Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README claims the project is retired and no longer maintained — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README claims the project is retired and no longer maintained.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No logging call was found in the 116 `.cs` file(s) this check read. Each was searched for the framework names `ILogger`, `Serilog`, `NLog` and `log4net`; for a call on a receiver whose name ends in `Logger`; for a `System.Diagnostics` write; for a level-gated log facade; and for the builder spellings that CONFIGURE logging for everyone else (`AddLogging(`, `ConfigureLogging(`, `UseSerilog(`, `UseNLog(`, `.Logging.Add…(`). That walk sees only `.cs` documents from projects the workspace loaded, so it cannot see logging in source that did not load, in another language, or through a repo-local wrapper whose name does not end in `Logger` — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 8/16 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×8) — BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.WebApi/Controllers/AdminstratorController.cs:26, BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.WebApi/Controllers/AdminstratorController.cs:39, BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.WebApi/Controllers/AuthenticationController.cs:24, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

`catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×3) — BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/AccountsRepository.cs:34, BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/DispositionRepository.cs:28, BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/UserRepository.cs:39

What to do

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~4.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 37 suppression(s) across the 8528 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	71%	Adequate — gated by X3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	85%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	58%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	11%	Critical — gated by D8, D9, D12, P1, P2, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	58%	Adequate — gated by D30, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo

Not included — 37 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Cross-context type coupling could not be assessed — this codebase's bounded contexts are neither declared nor inferable.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no event handlers detected — temporal-coupling check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 15 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×8

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3

Vulnerable: System.Data.SqlClient — REDACTED — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: Azure.Identity — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1

REDACTED

D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1

No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.

Serious — 25 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3

Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 5.0.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED — Legacy
Deprecated: Azure.Identity — REDACTED — Other

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) · ×3

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/AccountsRepository.cs:34 — `catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/DispositionRepository.cs:28 — `catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) BankApplication.Infrastructure/Presistence/UserRepository.cs:39 — `catch (Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2

Off the main sequence: BankApplication.Domain — BankApplication.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: BankApplication.Contracts — BankApplication.Contracts: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1

No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent the data required to create an account. The 'Data' suffix implies a DTO or internal representation, but the naming convention is inconsistent with other pairs (e.g., TransferRequest vs TransferRequestData). Furthermore, the inclusion of UserId in the 'Data' variant suggests a separation of concerns that isn't reflected in the 'Request' variant, leading to confusion about which type should be used by the client. · ×1

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent the data required to create an account. The 'Data' suffix implies a DTO or internal representation, but the naming convention is inconsistent with other pairs (e.g., TransferRequest vs TransferRequestData). Furthermore, the inclusion of UserId in the 'Data' variant suggests a separation of concerns that isn't reflected in the 'Request' variant, leading to confusion about which type should be used by the client. — Unify into a single `CreateAccountRequest` type. If UserId is required, include it in the request. If the separation is intentional (e.g., one for API contract, one for internal service), rename to `CreateAccountCommand` and `CreateAccountDto` to clarify the distinction, or remove the 'Data' suffix if it adds no semantic value. (signatures: CreateAccountRequest(int AccountTypesId, string Frequency) | CreateAccountRequestData(Guid UserId, string Frequency, int AccountTypesId))

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Similar to the CreateAccount pair, these types represent the same query intent. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. This inconsistency in parameter inclusion and naming ('Request' vs 'RequestData') creates ambiguity about the expected input for the operation. · ×1

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Similar to the CreateAccount pair, these types represent the same query intent. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. This inconsistency in parameter inclusion and naming ('Request' vs 'RequestData') creates ambiguity about the expected input for the operation. — Unify into a single `GetAccountTransactionsRequest` type. Include UserId if it is required for authorization or filtering, or exclude it if the AccountId is sufficient. Remove the redundant 'Data' suffix. (signatures: GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest(int AccountId) | GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData(Guid UserId, int AccountId))

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent a money transfer. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. The naming convention is inconsistent with other request types in the API (some use 'Request', some 'RequestData'), and the parameter difference suggests an unclear boundary between client-facing requests and internal data transfer objects. · ×1

Duplicate intent with inconsistent naming and signature. Both types represent a money transfer. The 'Data' variant includes UserId, while the 'Request' variant does not. The naming convention is inconsistent with other request types in the API (some use 'Request', some 'RequestData'), and the parameter difference suggests an unclear boundary between client-facing requests and internal data transfer objects. — Unify into a single `TransferRequest` type. Standardize the inclusion of UserId (either always include it for context or rely on authentication context). Remove the redundant 'Data' suffix to maintain consistent naming conventions across the API. (signatures: TransferRequest(int AccountId, int Operation, decimal Amount, string Account) | TransferRequestData(Guid UserId, int AccountId, int Operation, decimal Amount, string Account))

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Type duplication. `NewCustomerAccountRequest.CustomerAccount` is a nested type within the request, while `CustomerAccount` is a top-level type in the `Adminstrator` namespace. They have identical signatures and likely represent the same entity. This creates confusion about whether the client should use the nested type or the top-level type. · ×1

Type duplication. `NewCustomerAccountRequest.CustomerAccount` is a nested type within the request, while `CustomerAccount` is a top-level type in the `Adminstrator` namespace. They have identical signatures and likely represent the same entity. This creates confusion about whether the client should use the nested type or the top-level type. — Remove the nested `CustomerAccount` type from `NewCustomerAccountRequest` and reference the top-level `CustomerAccount` type instead. This reduces redundancy and clarifies the public API surface. (signatures: NewCustomerAccountRequest.CustomerAccount(int AccountTypesId, string? Frequency) | CustomerAccount.CustomerAccount(int AccountTypesId, string? Frequency))

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) BankApplication.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregate.cs:8 — BankApplication.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregate.cs:8-24 | BankApplication.Domain/Aggregates/TransferAggregate.cs:8-24 | BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Transaction.cs:10-26 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1

End-of-life runtime: .NET net7.0 — BankApplication.Infrastructure/BankApplication.Infrastructure.csproj declares .NET net7.0 as this project's target framework, and .NET 7, support ended 2024-05-14. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2024-05-14 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.

M1 · Documentation (README) · Repository declared end-of-life · ×1

Repository declared end-of-life README.md:16 — This repository declares its own end of life: `README.md` line 16 reads “This project has been retired and is no longer maintained.”. That is a first-party statement of intent, not an inference — the Maturity and Knowledge lenses otherwise approximate the same fact from decayed commit history (D16 reports a dormant codebase, D34 orphaned files), and this row says the maintainer already told you. It does NOT change any score: an honest end-of-life notice is the README doing its job, and every dimension below still measures the code as it stands. Read the whole report as an assessment of software the author has stopped working on.

P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1

No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

P2 · Observability · No structured logging · ×1

No structured logging — No logging call was found in the 116 `.cs` file(s) this check read. Each was searched for the framework names `ILogger`, `Serilog`, `NLog` and `log4net`; for a call on a receiver whose name ends in `Logger`; for a `System.Diagnostics` write; for a level-gated log facade; and for the builder spellings that CONFIGURE logging for everyone else (`AddLogging(`, `ConfigureLogging(`, `UseSerilog(`, `UseNLog(`, `.Logging.Add…(`). That walk sees only `.cs` documents from projects the workspace loaded, so it cannot see logging in source that did not load, in another language, or through a repo-local wrapper whose name does not end in `Logger` — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.

P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1

No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

Minor — 41 finding(s)

ED3 · Event naming · Event not named in past tense · ×20

Event not named in past tense: CreateAccountRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/CreateAccount/CreateAccountRequest.cs:6 — `CreateAccountRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: CreateAccountRequestData BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/CreateAccount/CreateAccountRequestData.cs:4 — `CreateAccountRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest.cs:6 — `GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData.cs:4 — `GetTransactionsByAccIdResultRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse.cs:4 — `GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: AccountTransactionsResponse BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccount/GetTransactionsByAccIdResultResponse.cs:12 — `AccountTransactionsResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: GetAccountsRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Accounts/GetAccounts/GetAccountsRequest.cs:3 — `GetAccountsRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: AddAccountCreditRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/AddAccountCredit/AddAccountCreditRequest.cs:6 — `AddAccountCreditRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: NewCustomerAccountRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:6 — `NewCustomerAccountRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: CustomerAccount BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:31 — `CustomerAccount` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: NewCustomerAccountResponse BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:6 — `NewCustomerAccountResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: Customer BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:14 — `Customer` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: Account BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:25 — `Account` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: User BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:31 — `User` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: AuthenticationResponse BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/AuthenticationResponse.cs:4 — `AuthenticationResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: LoginRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/LoginRequest.cs:4 — `LoginRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: RegisterRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/RegisterRequest.cs:6 — `RegisterRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: TransferRequest BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferRequest.cs:6 — `TransferRequest` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: TransferRequestData BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferRequestData.cs:4 — `TransferRequestData` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
Event not named in past tense: TransferResponse BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Transactions/Transfer/TransferResponse.cs:4 — `TransferResponse` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×2

Documentation: no installation or build instructions README.md — The 'How to run the project' section gives Docker and native build instructions but no setup steps (e.g. SQL Server credentials, .env configuration) needed to run the web API. Add a minimal setup note for environment variables (.env) required by the JWT authentication flow.
Documentation: no usage examples README.md — The README describes how to build/run the project but provides no runnable usage examples (e.g. POST /Accounts/Create, GET /Transfers/Get). Add a short 'How to call the API' example showing one or two endpoints with curl/json requests.

C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×1

No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.

C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1

Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D21 · Naming Consistency · The word 'Administrator' is consistently misspelled as 'Adminstrator' across namespaces, types, controllers, and repositories. While this is a consistent typo, it represents a deviation from standard English spelling conventions for the concept of an administrator. · ×1

The word 'Administrator' is consistently misspelled as 'Adminstrator' across namespaces, types, controllers, and repositories. While this is a consistent typo, it represents a deviation from standard English spelling conventions for the concept of an administrator. — Rename 'Adminstrator' to 'Administrator' across all affected symbols to correct the spelling error. (symbols: Namespace: BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator, Type: public BankApplication.Contracts.Adminstrator.CustomerAccount, Type: public BankApplication.Contracts.Adminstrator.AddAccountCreditRequest, Type: public BankApplication.Api.Mapping.AddAccountCreditMappingConfig, Method: public BankApplication.Api.Controllers.AdminstratorController.AddAccountCredit(...), Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.AdminstratorRepository, Parameter: BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator.AddAccountCreditResponse dest, Type: public BankApplication.Application.Adminstrator.Response.Commands)

D21 · Naming Consistency · The namespace and class name 'Presistence' is a misspelling of 'Persistence'. This typo appears in the namespace, multiple repository types, and the dependency injection method name. · ×1

The namespace and class name 'Presistence' is a misspelling of 'Persistence'. This typo appears in the namespace, multiple repository types, and the dependency injection method name. — Rename 'Presistence' to 'Persistence' in the namespace and all associated types/methods. (symbols: Method: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.UserRepository.Add(...), Method: public BankApplication.Application.Common.Interfaces.Persistence.IUserRepository.Add(...), Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.UserRepository, Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.IDispositionRepository, Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.TransactionsRepository, Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.DispositionRepository, Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.AccountsRepository, Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.DapperSettings, Method: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.DependencyInjection.AddPersistence(...), Type: public BankApplication.Infrastructure.Presistence.AdminstratorRepository)

D21 · Naming Consistency · The property/parameter name 'Telephonenumber' (and 'Telephonecountrycode') uses a concatenated camelCase style that is inconsistent with standard PascalCase naming for properties and often clearer as 'PhoneNumber' or 'TelephoneNumber'. More critically, 'Telephonenumber' is a non-standard spelling of 'PhoneNumber' or 'Telephone Number'. · ×1

The property/parameter name 'Telephonenumber' (and 'Telephonecountrycode') uses a concatenated camelCase style that is inconsistent with standard PascalCase naming for properties and often clearer as 'PhoneNumber' or 'TelephoneNumber'. More critically, 'Telephonenumber' is a non-standard spelling of 'PhoneNumber' or 'Telephone Number'. — Rename 'Telephonenumber' to 'PhoneNumber' and 'Telephonecountrycode' to 'TelephoneCountryCode' for consistency with standard naming conventions. (symbols: Parameter: string? Telephonenumber, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Telephonenumber, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Telephonecountrycode)

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent casing in Domain Models · ×1

Inconsistent casing in Domain Models: 'Givenname' is camelCase, while 'Surname', 'City', 'Birthday', 'Country', 'CountryCode' are PascalCase. This inconsistency within the same model namespace suggests a lack of standardization. — Rename 'Givenname' to 'GivenName' to match the PascalCase convention used by other properties in the same model. (symbols: Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Givenname, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Surname, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.City, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Birthday, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Country, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.CountryCode, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Telephonenumber, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Telephonecountrycode, Property: public Domain.Models.Customer.Emailaddress)

D24 · Comment Value · misleading comment · ×1

misleading comment BankApplication.Application/Authentication/Commands/Register/RegisterCommandHandler.cs:24 — "validate so that user doesn't exists" — correct - the if is for existence, not absence; fix the comment or delete it

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1

No tests found — No test suite could be collected — no discoverable tests to count. If this repository does test, wiring the suite to a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest) is what makes it countable here; a pipeline step that invokes a runner is not evidence on its own, because a runner over an empty suite passes. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1

No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

M3 · Folder & project structure · No tests/ separation · ×1

No tests/ separation — No test surface was found — this check walked the tree for authored source in the languages it models (`.cs`, `.vb`, `.fs`, `.java`, `.kt`, `.scala`, `.py`, `.php`, `.rb`, `.ex`, `.exs`, `.go`, `.erl`, `.hrl`, `.swift`, `.dart`, `.rs`, `.ts`, `.tsx`, `.mts`, `.cts`) and found none of it test-shaped. ★ `.js`, `.jsx`, `.mjs` and `.cjs` are NOT in that walk, so a Jest or Mocha suite written in plain JavaScript is invisible to it and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than moving anything. Otherwise there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×1

README/code drift — README claims the project is retired and no longer maintained — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1

No security response headers detected — No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 8/16 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1

Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~4.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 37 suppression(s) across the 8528 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

Minor — 23 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×18

Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 11.1.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by BankApplication.Application).
Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 11.0.0 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by BankApplication.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 5.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 7.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Application).
Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.0.123 → 2.1.86 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 7.0.1 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 7.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 7.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 7.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: System.Data.SqlClient — REDACTED → 4.9.1 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED → 8.23.0 available (referenced by BankApplication.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Azure.Identity — REDACTED → 1.21.0 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Mapster — Mapster 7.3.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Mapster.DependencyInjection — Mapster.DependencyInjection 1.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 7.0.1 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 7.0.1 → 10.0.2 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Filters — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Filters 7.0.6 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by BankApplication.WebApi).

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×5

XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.Application BankApplication.Application/BankApplication.Application.csproj — BankApplication.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/66).
XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.Domain BankApplication.Domain/BankApplication.Domain.csproj — BankApplication.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/109).
XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.Infrastructure BankApplication.Infrastructure/BankApplication.Infrastructure.csproj — BankApplication.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/43).
XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.Contracts BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/BankApplication.Contracts.csproj — BankApplication.Contracts: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/24).
XML-doc coverage: BankApplication.WebApi BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.WebApi/BankApplication.WebApi.csproj — BankApplication.WebApi: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/37).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a3ffe1220d6c40f3a59f7b6c08827db5/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a3ffe1220d6c40f3a59f7b6c08827db5/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	0	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list Bank.CleanArchitecture.WebApi.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	12	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	5	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	dotnet	—	dotnet list Bank.CleanArchitecture.WebApi.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	0	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json

Run 01a0c19e-62a2-7261-a369-591301b2709f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 30 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Address — 8 field(s)

NewCustomerAccountCommand.Streetaddress BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:12
NewCustomerAccountCommand.Zipcode BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:14
Customer.Streetaddress BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:16
Customer.Zipcode BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:20
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Streetaddress BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:14
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Zipcode BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:18
Customer.Streetaddress BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:18
Customer.Zipcode BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:20

Name — 8 field(s)

NewCustomerAccountCommand.Givenname BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:10
NewCustomerAccountCommand.Surname BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:11
Customer.Givenname BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:12
Customer.Surname BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:14
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Givenname BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:10
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Surname BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:12
Customer.Givenname BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:16
Customer.Surname BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:17

Email — 7 field(s)

RegisterCommand.Email BankApplication.Application/Authentication/Commands/Register/RegisterCommand.cs:7
LoginQuery.Email BankApplication.Application/Authentication/Queries/Login/LoginQuery.cs:7
User.Email BankApplication.Domain/Entities/User.cs:10
User.Email BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:33
AuthenticationResponse.Email BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/AuthenticationResponse.cs:6
LoginRequest.Email BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/LoginRequest.cs:5
RegisterRequest.Email BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Authentication/RegisterRequest.cs:8

Phone — 7 field(s)

NewCustomerAccountCommand.Telephonecountrycode BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:18
NewCustomerAccountCommand.Telephonenumber BankApplication.Application/Adminstrator/Commands/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountCommand.cs:19
Customer.Telephonecountrycode BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:28
Customer.Telephonenumber BankApplication.Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:30
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Telephonecountrycode BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:24
NewCustomerAccountRequest.Telephonenumber BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountRequest.cs:25
Customer.Telephonenumber BankApplication.Presentation/BankApplication.Contracts/Adminstrator/NewCustomerAccount/NewCustomerAccountResponse.cs:22

Felixsjoberg/Bank.CleanArchitecture.WebApi

Findings by grade

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 71% · Adequate · gated by X3 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 85% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 58% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 11% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, P1, P2, P3, P5 ·

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1 ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts