Public report — netrock, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
106findings with an exact file:lineof 137 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
82/108dimensions across the health lenses16223 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
fpindej/netrock is in a workable but fragile state (50%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Code Health (89%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (81%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (35%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (54%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Small (~16,223 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (89%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€44,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with init.ps1, appsettings.json.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
116 modules, 141 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
40
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
25
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
10
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate static security analysis into the CI pipeline to fail the build on regressions. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code to ensure data resilience. Then, expand test coverage to include all unreached production modules. After that, resolve the two identified secret leaks in the codebase. Finally, implement health probes and a rolling update strategy to enable automatic rollback of bad releases.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with init.ps1, appsettings.json.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 79 of 82 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 82 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 106 of 137 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations: 13 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
946 test methods: 946 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with init.ps1, appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
55 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
12 projects, 365 source files, 28875 hand-written lines of code (16223 production / 12652 test), 29 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
What to do
Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
NETrock's documentation is clear, complete, and well-structured across READMEs, architecture docs, and XML coverage. The README gives a strong value proposition with generator links, a Why NETrock section, and an outline; the SvelteKit frontend README covers tech stack, prerequisites, installation, API type generation, build, project structure, and feature-based organization, plus a clipped but fully outlined Getting Started guide; the Session Documentation directory is a concrete, well-structured template for AI-assisted coding sessions. The troubleshooting/FAQ doc is long and detailed (2k words) and clips mid-sentence, so its completeness cannot be flagged.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The type `AdminUserResponse` is used for admin-related user data, but there is also a `UserResponse` type (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Users.Dtos.UserResponse`) and an `UpdateUserRequest` DTO. While not strictly the same, the naming convention for user-related DTOs is inconsistent: some use `User` (e.g., `UserResponse`, `UpdateUserRequest`), while others use `AdminUser` or just `User` in different contexts. Specifically, `AdminUserResponse` vs `UserResponse` suggests a split between admin-specific and general user data, but the naming doesn't clearly reflect this distinction (e.g., `AdminUser` vs `User`).
The parameter name `x` is used for `ExternalCallbackRequest` in multiple methods (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest x`), which is a common test/mock convention but inconsistent with the explicit naming `request` used elsewhere (e.g., `DisableTwoFactorRequest request`).
There are two distinct response types for user data: `AdminUserResponse` and `UserResponse`. This indicates a duplication of concepts (User data) split by audience (Admin vs General).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
1 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split MyProject.Infrastructure
What to do
Resolve the 1 Split MyProject.Infrastructure finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
100 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: detect-child-process · ×25.claude/hooks/session-start.mjs:10detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 25 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (9), docker.yml (8), claude-code-review.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002src/frontend/Dockerfile.localdetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×6src/frontend/Dockerfile.local:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.local. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), Dockerfile.local, appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), Dockerfile.local. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×18src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 18 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
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AC2 · Forms & labels5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×11) — LoginForm.svelte:35, LoginForm.svelte:61, RegisterForm.svelte:18, …
A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). — form-button.svelte:3
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — phone-input.svelte:27, +page.svelte:14
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — app.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×2) — breadcrumb-link.svelte:7, sidebar-menu-sub-button.svelte:6
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add vitest-axe to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.
What to do
Accessibility linting is already configured — assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
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C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
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C3 · Audit Trail10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
C4 · Data Retention9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("noreply@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — EmailOptions.cs:25
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Similarity` throws an exception whose message says it isn't finished — a not-implemented stub wearing an ordinary exception. Implement it or remove it. — StringExtensions.cs:40
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:79
A test is skipped ("Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×9) — BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:14, BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:22, BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:30, …
A test is skipped ("EF InMemory provider does not support GroupBy — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×4) — AdminServiceTests.cs:647, AdminServiceTests.cs:671, AdminServiceTests.cs:693, …
A test is skipped ("InMemory EF provider does not support ExecuteDeleteAsync — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — RoleManagementServiceTests.cs:250
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 12 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Only 3/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 3 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 15 use(s) across 16,412 production line(s) (~0.9/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/ForgotPasswordForm.svelte:50 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/RegisterForm.svelte:70 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ForgotPasswordForm.svelte:50
src/frontend/src/routes/(app)/admin/roles/[id]/+page.server.ts:23 · src/frontend/src/routes/(app)/admin/users/[id]/+page.server.ts:25 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — +page.server.ts:23
src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/AccountActions.svelte:36 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/AccountActions.svelte:54 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/AccountInfoCard.svelte:50 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/JobActionsCard.svelte:35 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — AccountActions.svelte:36
src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/AuditTrailCard.svelte:51 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/ActivityLog.svelte:39 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — AuditTrailCard.svelte:51
src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/CreateRoleDialog.svelte:49 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/CreateUserDialog.svelte:55 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/OAuthProviderCard.svelte:58 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/RoleDetailsCard.svelte:53 — the 4 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — CreateRoleDialog.svelte:49
src/frontend/src/lib/components/layout/CommandPalette.svelte:75 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/layout/CommandPalette.svelte:93 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — CommandPalette.svelte:75
src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/TwoFactorDisableDialog.svelte:58 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/TwoFactorRecoveryCodesDialog.svelte:65 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — TwoFactorDisableDialog.svelte:58
src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/TwoFactorRecoveryCodesDialog.svelte:44 · src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/TwoFactorSetupDialog.svelte:87 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — TwoFactorRecoveryCodesDialog.svelte:44
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×2) — shortcuts.svelte.ts:103, middleware.ts:53
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — audit.ts, shortcuts.svelte.ts, AvatarDialog.svelte, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
358 file(s) (~16762 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: src/frontend/src/routes/(app)/+layout.server.ts imports './$types', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — frontend
Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in src/frontend/src/lib/auth/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in src/frontend/src/lib/auth/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. — auth.ts:65
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in src/frontend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — ApplicationBuilderExtensions.cs:66
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 169/202 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×24) — AdminService.cs:601, AdminService.cs:673, AdminService.cs:755, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:195
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 12 suppression(s) across the 69186 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 26 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: detect-child-process .claude/hooks/session-start.mjs:10— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `cmd`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process .claude/hooks/stop-quality-gate.mjs:10— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `cmd`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dorny/paths-filter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dorny/paths-filter@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dorny/paths-filter/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:48— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:71— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:95— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:97— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pnpm/action-setup@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pnpm/action-setup@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pnpm/action-setup/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:101— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `anthropics/claude-code-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/anthropics/claude-code-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `anthropics/claude-code-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/anthropics/claude-code-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:38— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dorny/paths-filter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dorny/paths-filter@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dorny/paths-filter/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:59— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:61— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:63— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:78— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:80— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:82— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age src/frontend/.npmrc:1— This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×18
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— @sveltejs/kit 2.55.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @sveltejs/kit ^2.55.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 2.57.1, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @sveltejs/kit moves onto 2.57.1 or later; if the flagged 2.55.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @sveltejs/kit with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @sveltejs/kit 2.55.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.69.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.69.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @sveltejs/kit 2.55.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 5.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 5.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 5.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 5.0.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— devalue 5.6.3: [GHSA redacted] — devalue is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin devalue to 5.8.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against devalue 5.6.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.8.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.8.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against devalue 5.6.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— devalue 5.6.4: [GHSA redacted] — devalue is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin devalue to 5.8.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— effect 3.19.19: [GHSA redacted] — effect is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin effect to 3.20.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— kysely 0.28.14: [GHSA redacted] — kysely is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin kysely to 0.28.17 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.1.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.1.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— postcss 8.5.8: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— rollup 4.57.1: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 4.59.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— vite 7.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares vite ^7.3.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 7.3.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so vite moves onto 7.3.5 or later; if the flagged 7.3.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin vite with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against vite 7.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.3.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.3.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against vite 7.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential init.ps1:71— hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: signing-key src/backend/MyProject.AppHost/appsettings.json:10— signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
NoWarnInCsproj src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/MyProject.WebApi.csproj:7— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/MyProject.WebApi.csproj:7— CS1573 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/frontend/Dockerfile.local— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: UserManagementCard.svelte ↔ +page.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/UserManagementCard.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/UserManagementCard.svelte` (context components) and `src/frontend/src/routes/(app)/admin/roles/[id]/+page.svelte` (context routes) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— vitest 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares vitest ^3.2.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 3.2.6, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so vitest moves onto 3.2.6 or later; if the flagged 3.2.4 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin vitest with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves.
Change coupling: AuthController.cs ↔ UsersController.cs src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Authentication/AuthController.cs— `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Authentication/AuthController.cs` and `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Users/UsersController.cs` change together 67% of the time (8 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ProfileForm.svelte ↔ ChangePasswordForm.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/ProfileForm.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/ProfileForm.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/ChangePasswordForm.svelte` change together 58% of the time (7 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: LoginForm.svelte ↔ ProfileForm.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/LoginForm.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/LoginForm.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/ProfileForm.svelte` change together 58% of the time (7 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ForgotPasswordForm.svelte ↔ ResetPasswordForm.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/ForgotPasswordForm.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/ForgotPasswordForm.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/auth/ResetPasswordForm.svelte` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: UsersController.cs ↔ ExceptionHandlingMiddleware.cs src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Users/UsersController.cs— `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Users/UsersController.cs` and `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Middlewares/ExceptionHandlingMiddleware.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AdminController.cs ↔ UsersController.cs src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Admin/AdminController.cs— `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Admin/AdminController.cs` and `src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Users/UsersController.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AvatarDialog.svelte ↔ DeleteAccountDialog.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/AvatarDialog.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/AvatarDialog.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/DeleteAccountDialog.svelte` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ChangePasswordForm.svelte ↔ DeleteAccountDialog.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/ChangePasswordForm.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/ChangePasswordForm.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/DeleteAccountDialog.svelte` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ProfileForm.svelte ↔ DeleteAccountDialog.svelte src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/ProfileForm.svelte— `src/frontend/src/lib/components/profile/ProfileForm.svelte` and `src/frontend/src/lib/components/settings/DeleteAccountDialog.svelte` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×7
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— joi 17.13.3: [GHSA redacted] — joi is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin joi to 17.13.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— svelte 5.55.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares svelte ^5.55.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.55.7, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so svelte moves onto 5.55.7 or later; if the flagged 5.55.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin svelte with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against svelte 5.55.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— ts-deepmerge 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — ts-deepmerge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— uuid 10.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 10.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 10.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— uuid 13.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin uuid to 13.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— valibot 1.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — valibot is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin valibot to 1.4.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Off the main sequence: MyProject.ServiceDefaults — MyProject.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: MyProject.Shared — MyProject.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].comment | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 915.
ClassTooLong: AdminService src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 464 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 23 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 21 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 7) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/AppleAuthProvider.cs:92— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/AppleAuthProvider.cs:92-110 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/DiscordAuthProvider.cs:86-104 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GitLabAuthProvider.cs:91-109 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GoogleAuthProvider.cs:91-109 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/LinkedInAuthProvider.cs:91-109 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/MicrosoftAuthProvider.cs:92-110 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/TwitchAuthProvider.cs:92-110 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 9) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/AppleAuthProvider.cs:53— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/AppleAuthProvider.cs:53-69 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/DiscordAuthProvider.cs:47-63 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/FacebookAuthProvider.cs:48-63 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GitLabAuthProvider.cs:52-68 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GoogleAuthProvider.cs:52-68 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/LinkedInAuthProvider.cs:52-68 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/MicrosoftAuthProvider.cs:52-69 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/SlackAuthProvider.cs:53-68 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/TwitchAuthProvider.cs:53-69 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/AppleAuthProvider.cs:53` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GitLabAuthProvider.cs:34— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GitLabAuthProvider.cs:34-46 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/MicrosoftAuthProvider.cs:34-46 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/SlackAuthProvider.cs:35-47 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:283— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:283-294 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:415-426 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:457-468 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs:283` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 5) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/FacebookAuthProvider.cs:124— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/FacebookAuthProvider.cs:124-132 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/GitLabAuthProvider.cs:130-138 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/LinkedInAuthProvider.cs:129-137 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/MicrosoftAuthProvider.cs:131-139 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/SlackAuthProvider.cs:135-143 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalProviders/FacebookAuthProvider.cs:124` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/AuthenticationService.cs:107— src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/AuthenticationService.cs:107-115 | src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/AuthenticationService.cs:145-153 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/AuthenticationService.cs:107` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/frontend/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 3000`, so a request to `localhost:3000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/frontend/Dockerfile.local— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5173`, so a request to `localhost:5173` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 55 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/AdminService.cs, src/backend/MyProject.WebApi/Features/Admin/AdminController.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/ExternalAuthService.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Services/AuthenticationService.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Identity/Services/UserService.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Admin/Services/RoleManagementService.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Shared/ErrorMessages.cs, src/backend/MyProject.Infrastructure/Features/Authentication/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs (+47 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 2 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `HealthProbe` with 11 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 80 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.6 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The type `AdminUserResponse` is used for admin-related user data, but there is also a `UserResponse` type (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Users.Dtos.UserResponse`) and an `UpdateUserRequest` DTO. While not strictly the same, the naming convention for user-related DTOs is inconsistent · ×1
The type `AdminUserResponse` is used for admin-related user data, but there is also a `UserResponse` type (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Users.Dtos.UserResponse`) and an `UpdateUserRequest` DTO. While not strictly the same, the naming convention for user-related DTOs is inconsistent: some use `User` (e.g., `UserResponse`, `UpdateUserRequest`), while others use `AdminUser` or just `User` in different contexts. Specifically, `AdminUserResponse` vs `UserResponse` suggests a split between admin-specific and general user data, but the naming doesn't clearly reflect this distinction (e.g., `AdminUser` vs `User`). — Standardize on `User` for general user data and `AdminUser` only if a distinct model is required. If `AdminUserResponse` is just a subset of `UserResponse`, consider using a single `UserResponse` type with appropriate filtering or a shared base. (symbols: MyProject.WebApi.Features.Admin.Dtos.AdminUserResponse, MyProject.WebApi.Features.Admin.Dtos.AdminUserResponse.FirstName)
D21 · Naming Consistency· The parameter name `x` is used for `ExternalCallbackRequest` in multiple methods (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest x`), which is a common test/mock convention but inconsistent with the explicit naming `request` used elsewhere (e.g., `DisableTwoFactorRequest request`). · ×1
The parameter name `x` is used for `ExternalCallbackRequest` in multiple methods (`MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest x`), which is a common test/mock convention but inconsistent with the explicit naming `request` used elsewhere (e.g., `DisableTwoFactorRequest request`). — Use `request` or `dto` consistently for DTO parameters instead of `x`. (symbols: MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest, MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest.Code, MyProject.WebApi.Features.Authentication.Dtos.External.ExternalCallbackRequest.x)
D21 · Naming Consistency· There are two distinct response types for user data · ×1
There are two distinct response types for user data: `AdminUserResponse` and `UserResponse`. This indicates a duplication of concepts (User data) split by audience (Admin vs General). — Consider using a single `UserResponse` type with a flag or separate DTOs if the data shape differs significantly. If they are the same, unify the naming. (symbols: MyProject.WebApi.Features.Admin.Dtos.AdminUserResponse, MyProject.WebApi.Features.Users.Dtos.UserResponse)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 16k LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
Split MyProject.Infrastructure — Generic catch-all name that is huge (8k LoC) and sprawls over 26 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: split the 26 namespaces into cohesive infrastructure packages
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— cookie 0.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cookie to 0.7.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml— esbuild 0.27.3: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.28.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Skipped (documented): GetById_Existing_ReturnsEntity src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:14— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetById_NonExistent_ReturnsNull src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:22— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetById_SoftDeleted_ReturnsNull src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:30— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): Add_Valid_ReturnsSuccess src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:38— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): SoftDelete_Existing_SetsIsDeleted src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:47— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): Restore_SoftDeleted_ClearsIsDeleted src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:56— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetAll_WithPagination_ReturnsCorrectPage src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:65— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): Exists_MatchingPredicate_ReturnsTrue src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:74— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): Exists_NoMatch_ReturnsFalse src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Persistence/BaseEntityRepositoryTests.cs:82— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires a domain entity registered in DbContext — implement with Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetUsers_ReturnsPagedResults src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Services/AdminServiceTests.cs:647— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: EF InMemory provider does not support GroupBy — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetUsers_WithSearch_FiltersResults src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Services/AdminServiceTests.cs:671— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: EF InMemory provider does not support GroupBy — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetUsers_MapsRolesCorrectly src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Services/AdminServiceTests.cs:693— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: EF InMemory provider does not support GroupBy — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): GetUsers_CalculatesLockoutStatus src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Services/AdminServiceTests.cs:714— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: EF InMemory provider does not support GroupBy — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)
Skipped (documented): SetPermissions_ValidPermissions_ReturnsSuccess src/backend/tests/MyProject.Component.Tests/Services/RoleManagementServiceTests.cs:250— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: InMemory EF provider does not support ExecuteDeleteAsync — requires Testcontainers (issue #174)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc89b-7ec2-7f5b-9a59-8430acaa0672 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 96 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 53 · Warnings: 43 · Recommendations: 16 · Info: 25 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 17:11 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.