Public report — frank, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
42findings with an exact file:lineof 75 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
20/95dimensions across the health lenses8344 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
frank-fs/frank is sound in substance but carries real gaps (62%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (81%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (56%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (60%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)).
For scale: Small (~8,344 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.9× (at 62% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€23,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 56% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 56%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
32 modules, 17 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
3
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
1
Medium
Roadmap
First, implement draft releases or manual dispatch gates to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Next, establish an architecture decision record system to document significant design choices and their consequences. Then, update the root README to clearly explain how to run the test suite. After that, correct the README to accurately reflect the current single-project structure rather than a microservices architecture. Finally, address the bus factor risk by ensuring proper off-boarding procedures are in place.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 18 of 20 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 20 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 42 of 75 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 15 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 6 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ServerSentEventGenerator.fs (3), Program.fs, Handlers.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Program.fs (3), ServerSentEventGenerator.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with SseDataLineWriter.fs, Program.fs, Handlers.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
7 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Frank's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single README with 19 README files plus architecture/design docs covers the core packages (Frank, Frank.Auth, Frank.OpenApi, Frank.JsonHome, Frank.Datastar), installation, features, examples, test coverage, and related projects. The README itself is an excellent user-facing guide that explains what Frank does, its inspiration, and a basic example with code; each package's README gives full install commands, usage, and test paths. Frank's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs for each package: the main Frank.Auth.Authorization README covers resource-level authorization with code examples for requireAuth/requireClaim/requirePolicy composition, protecting individual methods via handler { }, application wiring, and a full-outlined Authorization Patterns section; the companion Frank.Analyzers README demonstrates compile-time static analysis of duplicate HTTP handlers, media-type duplicates, and IDE integration; Frank.Alps documents hand-authored profiles with compile-checked references, composite-state authoring, startup validation, authorization-and-state-filtered documents, two HTTP exposures, and a detailed Features list; the Validation sample shows SHACL validation before any handler runs and dual-path 422 handling; the Rdf and Provenance samples demonstrate RDF negotiation, provenance recording, and link advertising; all packages are documented with clear examples. The shared architecture theme is well represented across packages. Frank.JsonHome, Frank.Alps, Frank.Provenance, and related projects have clear, well-structured documentation: the READMEs alone already exceed 400 words per sample with run commands, a What's-here table, concrete code examples (e.g. anonymous admin-reports absent), and an outline naming every visible section. The architecture/design docs are also comprehensive, covering hand-authored ALPS profiles, SHACL validation, PROV-O builders, shared response-link providers, and the interdependencies between packages. All four projects' documentation is complete, well-organized, and reflects the project's own design decisions. Frank Content Negotiation is a well-structured draft documenting the design rationale behind the hand-coded `negotiate`/`ctx.Negotiate(statusCode, body)` API and its relationship to existing ASP.NET Core pipelines. It states why it exists (coupling to MVC-era conneg buried inside ObjectResultExecutor), notes that it is never actually called anywhere in the repo and a fake getProductNegotiated sample claims to demonstrate negotiation but always returns JSON regardless of Accept header, and ties this work to an external tracking issue (#483). The document carries its full outline (Goals; Non-goals; Package shape; The design; Why not (only) IOutputFormatter; API shape; Composition with resource/handler nesting; Dispatch algorithm; Registering a wildcard/catch-all; OpenAPI/metadata integration; Bridging to IOutputFormatter; Analyzer coverage for duplicate accepts; Sample fix; Error handling and edge cases; Implementation order; Testing; Future work), so any section named there is present — never flag as missing. It reads like an engineering rationale document rather than a user-facing API reference, which is acceptable given its focus.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.9/10. — Frank's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single README with 19 README files plus architecture/design docs covers the core packages (Frank, Frank.Auth, Frank.OpenApi, Frank.JsonHome, Frank.Datastar), installation, features, examples, test coverage, and related projects. The README itself is an excellent user-facing guide that explains what Frank does, its inspiration, and a basic example with code; each package's README gives full install commands, usage, and test paths. Frank's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs for each package: the main Frank.Auth.Authorization README covers resource-level authorization with code examples for requireAuth/requireClaim/requirePolicy composition, protecting individual methods via handler { }, application wiring, and a full-outlined Authorization Patterns section; the companion Frank.Analyzers README demonstrates compile-time static analysis of duplicate HTTP handlers, media-type duplicates, and IDE integration; Frank.Alps documents hand-authored profiles with compile-checked references, composite-state authoring, startup validation, authorization-and-state-filtered documents, two HTTP exposures, and a detailed Features list; the Validation sample shows SHACL validation before any handler runs and dual-path 422 handling; the Rdf and Provenance samples demonstrate RDF negotiation, provenance recording, and link advertising; all packages are documented with clear examples. The shared architecture theme is well represented across packages. Frank.JsonHome, Frank.Alps, Frank.Provenance, and related projects have clear, well-structured documentation: the READMEs alone already exceed 400 words per sample with run commands, a What's-here table, concrete code examples (e.g. anonymous admin-reports absent), and an outline naming every visible section. The architecture/design docs are also comprehensive, covering hand-authored ALPS profiles, SHACL validation, PROV-O builders, shared response-link providers, and the interdependencies between packages. All four projects' documentation is complete, well-organized, and reflects the project's own design decisions. Frank Content Negotiation is a well-structured draft documenting the design rationale behind the hand-coded `negotiate`/`ctx.Negotiate(statusCode, body)` API and its relationship to existing ASP.NET Core pipelines. It states why it exists (coupling to MVC-era conneg buried inside ObjectResultExecutor), notes that it is never actually called anywhere in the repo and a fake getProductNegotiated sample claims to demonstrate negotiation but always returns JSON regardless of Accept header, and ties this work to an external tracking issue (#483). The document carries its full outline (Goals; Non-goals; Package shape; The design; Why not (only) IOutputFormatter; API shape; Composition with resource/handler nesting; Dispatch algorithm; Registering a wildcard/catch-all; OpenAPI/metadata integration; Bridging to IOutputFormatter; Analyzer coverage for duplicate accepts; Sample fix; Error handling and edge cases; Implementation order; Testing; Future work), so any section named there is present — never flag as missing. It reads like an engineering rationale document rather than a user-facing API reference, which is acceptable given its focus.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~11829 lines of test source are present (.fs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's projects are MSBuild/NuGet projects, whose package licenses are exactly what this dimension reads, but no license could be resolved for them (the .NET license collector did not run, or restore failed). A gap in the analysis run, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .fs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution; this repository's .NET projects are all F# (.fsproj), which the C#/VB workspace does not load, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.fs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — No first-party assembly was produced by the build.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .fs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.fs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 83 value object(s); 6 domain event(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:46— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:46-53 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:149-156 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:191— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:191-198 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:387-394 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:191` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:282— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:282-289 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:419-426 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Falco/Program.fs:88— sample/Frank.Falco/Program.fs:88-95 | sample/Frank.Giraffe/Program.fs:86-93 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Falco/Program.fs:88` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:169— sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:169-176 | sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:251-258 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:169` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Frank.Validation/Shacl.fs:206— src/Frank.Validation/Shacl.fs:206-213 | src/Frank.Validation/Shacl.fs:305-312 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:438— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:438-449 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:531-542 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:438` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:174— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:174-185 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:370-381 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:174` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:161— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:161-172 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:94-105 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:672— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:672-683 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:655-666 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineWriter.fs:19— src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineWriter.fs:19-28 | src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineStream.fs:21-30 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:183— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:183-192 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:116-125 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:183` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:34— sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:34-44 | sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:156-165 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Handlers.fs:34` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Frank.OpenApi/WebHostBuilderExtensions.fs:53— src/Frank.OpenApi/WebHostBuilderExtensions.fs:53-62 | src/Frank.OpenApi/WebHostBuilderExtensions.fs:66-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:313— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:313-334 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:376-397 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:313` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:484— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:484-505 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:616-637 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:484` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:495— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:495-516 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:488-509 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:495` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Frank.Alps/AuthorizationFilter.fs:34— src/Frank.Alps/AuthorizationFilter.fs:34-48 | src/Frank.JsonHome/AuthorizationFilter.fs:48-62 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Frank.Alps/AuthorizationFilter.fs:34` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:530— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:530-546 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:523-537 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:530` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Falco/Extensions.fs:5— sample/Frank.Falco/Extensions.fs:5-19 | sample/Frank.Giraffe/Extensions.fs:5-19 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:275— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:275-291 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:325-341 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:326-342 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:275` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:406— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:406-422 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:506-522 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:499-515 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:406` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Frank.Alps/DescriptorTypes.fsi:49— src/Frank.Alps/DescriptorTypes.fsi:49-66 | src/Frank.Alps/DescriptorTypes.fs:38-54 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Extensions.fs:4— sample/Frank.OpenApi.Sample/Extensions.fs:4-20 | sample/Sample/Extensions.fs:4-20 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:220— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:220-230 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:395-405 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:552— sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:552-562 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:543-553 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Frank.Alps/AuthorizationFilter.fs:25— src/Frank.Alps/AuthorizationFilter.fs:25-33 | src/Frank.JsonHome/AuthorizationFilter.fs:33-47 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:296— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:296-305 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:432-440 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:296` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Medium CVE: AngleSharp 1.4.0 — AngleSharp 1.4.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 3 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (1 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (45 lines × 3) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:582— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:582-626 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Hox/Program.fs:732-776 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:713-757 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:582` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (35 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:125— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:125-159 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:128-162 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:125` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/Types.fsi:1— src/Frank.Datastar/Types.fsi:1-24 | src/Frank.Datastar/Types.fs:1-24 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Frank.Validation/ShapeTypes.fsi:116— src/Frank.Validation/ShapeTypes.fsi:116-137 | src/Frank.Validation/ShapeTypes.fs:87-104 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:69— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:69-84 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:120-135 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:343-358 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/Frank.Datastar.fs:99— src/Frank.Datastar/Frank.Datastar.fs:99-122 | src/Frank.Datastar/Frank.Datastar.fs:172-187 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Frank.Datastar/Frank.Datastar.fs:99` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:210— sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:210-223 | sample/Frank.Datastar.Oxpecker/Program.fs:259-272 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `sample/Frank.Datastar.Basic/Program.fs:210` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineWriter.fs:62— src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineWriter.fs:62-74 | src/Frank.Datastar/SseDataLineStream.fs:76-88 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:56— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:56-64 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:107-115 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:330-338 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:260— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:260-266 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:295-301 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs:431-437 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEvent.fs:15— src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEvent.fs:15-20 | src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEvent.fs:27-32 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the test suite built and its tests PASSED, but the run produced no coverage data — `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` found no data collector, which is what a test project with no `coverlet.collector` PackageReference does. Nothing is wrong with the suite or the build; there is simply no coverage instrumentation wired up. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.fs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .fs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (45571 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .fs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEventGenerator.fs, src/Frank.Datastar/Frank.Datastar.fs, src/Frank.Analyzers/DuplicateHandlerAnalyzer.fs, src/Frank.OpenApi/WebHostBuilderExtensions.fs, src/Frank.Datastar/ServerSentEvent.fs, src/Frank.Datastar/Consts.fs, src/Frank/ContentNegotiation.fs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Outdated: Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub — Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub 1.1.1 → 10.0.301 available (referenced by Frank).
Outdated: FSharp.SystemTextJson — FSharp.SystemTextJson 1.3.13 → 1.4.36 available (referenced by Sample).
Outdated: Giraffe — Giraffe 7.0.2 → 8.3.0 available (referenced by Frank.Giraffe).
Outdated: Falco — Falco 5.0.0 → 5.2.0 available (referenced by Frank.Falco).
Outdated: Falco.Markup — Falco.Markup 1.1.1 → 1.4.0 available (referenced by Frank.Falco).
Outdated: FSharp.Control.TaskSeq — FSharp.Control.TaskSeq 0.4.0 → 1.1.1 available (referenced by Frank.Oxpecker).
Outdated: Oxpecker — Oxpecker 1.2.0 → 2.1.0 available (referenced by Frank.Oxpecker).
Outdated: Oxpecker.Htmx — Oxpecker.Htmx 1.0.0 → 2.0.0 available (referenced by Frank.Oxpecker).
Outdated: FSharp.Analyzers.SDK — FSharp.Analyzers.SDK 0.35.0 → 0.37.2 available (referenced by Frank.Analyzers).
Outdated: FSharp.Core — FSharp.Core 10.0.101 → 10.1.302 available (referenced by Frank.Analyzers).
Outdated: Expecto — Expecto 10.2.3 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by Frank.Auth.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost — Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Frank.Auth.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.14.1 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by Frank.Auth.Tests).
Outdated: YoloDev.Expecto.TestSdk — YoloDev.Expecto.TestSdk 0.14.3 → 0.16.0 available (referenced by Frank.Auth.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.OpenApi — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.9.0 → 3.9.0 available (referenced by Frank.OpenApi).
Outdated: Scalar.AspNetCore — Scalar.AspNetCore 1.2.38 → 2.16.17 available (referenced by Frank.OpenApi).
Outdated: dotNetRdf.Core — dotNetRdf.Core 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 available (referenced by Frank.Rdf).
Outdated: Microsoft.Playwright.NUnit — Microsoft.Playwright.NUnit 1.50.0 → 1.61.0 available (referenced by Frank.Datastar.Tests).
Outdated: NUnit — NUnit 4.3.2 → 4.6.1 available (referenced by Frank.Datastar.Tests).
Outdated: NUnit3TestAdapter — NUnit3TestAdapter 4.6.0 → 6.2.0 available (referenced by Frank.Datastar.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 9.0.18 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Frank.Provenance).
Outdated: dotNetRdf.Shacl — dotNetRdf.Shacl 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 available (referenced by Frank.Validation).
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fd55a-857c-72f3-be39-4e054fb8295d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 3 · Warnings: 43 · Recommendations: 6 · Info: 23 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 04:35 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.