Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
fsprojects/Rezoom.SQL is in a workable but fragile state (69%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Architecture (94%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (91%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (60%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (65%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make types internal by default and expose only the deliberate… (Library API & versioning); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor (Bus Factor).
For scale: Hobby (~1,152 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
91% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
94% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
65%
Adequate · gated by D16, M2
Readiness
60%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
85%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 60% · 47% weightMaturity 65% · 26% weightSecurity 85% · 14% weightCode Health 91% · 8% weightArchitecture 94% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 60 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 69 → ~73.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 5%Plumbing 11%Tests 84%
New since the last scan (1+)
- D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Annotations(netstandard2.0) src/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations.csproj
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,900–€20,000
| Cost to rebuild | €3,900–€20,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 1.0× (at 69% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 44% boilerplate · 25% straight-line · 31% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€12,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 60% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
2
Make types internal by default and expose only the deliberate public API — even for a small library, every public type is a stability contract.
3
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Make types internal by default and expose only the deliberate public API — even for a small library, every public type is a stability contract. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by tightening the library's public API by making types internal by default to establish a clear stability contract. Next, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated ADR format to capture context and consequences. Address bus factor risks to mitigate off-boarding threats, then add a quick-start section to the README to help new users. Finally, improve the overall value of code comments to enhance maintainability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +6.4 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Make types internal by default and expose only the deliberate public API — even for a small library, every public type is a stability contract. | +8.8 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +6.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +5.8 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (2). | +1.3 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Improve Comment Value — currently 8.0/10. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Comment Value |
| Resolve the 3 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj, Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite.csproj, Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres.csproj. | +0.5 pts | Low | Explicit Debt |
| Resolve the 1 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Rezoom.SQL.Annotations.csproj. | +0.4 pts | Low | Documentation Quality |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj |
| src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite.csproj | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj |
| src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres.csproj | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj |
| src/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations.csproj | 8.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Annotations(netstandard2.0) |
| src/Rezoom.SQL.Mapping/CompositeColumnGenerator.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: CompositeColumnGenerator.fs ↔ ManyColumnGenerator.fs |
| Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The meta-package README mentions Microsoft.Data.SqlClient but does not state which SQL dialects it supports (e.g., T-SQL vs. PostgreSQL) or how to configure the backend. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 35 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 35 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D9D10D13D14D16D17D19D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D34D35AX10AX3AX4AX5AX8GD1M1M2M3M4P1P10P3P6X1X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 11 of 19 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D5 · Coupling
7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
16 test methods: 16 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 16 tests.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 15 packages use a banned license.
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D16 · Bus Factor
52 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider/ProvidedTypes.fs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D17 · Explicit Debt
3 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 88 LoC (1.4/KLoC) → score 7.1.
NoWarnInCsproj src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj:15
What to do
- Resolve the 3 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj, Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite.csproj, Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
Rezoom.SQL documentation is clear and complete for a type-provider library. The READMEs are well written with an excellent tutorial that walks through creating a project, installing Rezoom.SQL, setting up the database model, running queries, and querying complex data types like IUsers, plus a motivating example showing how to delete many documents without re-querying permissions each time. There is strong architecture coverage (Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/SQLite/Postgres meta-packages, the compiler, mapping, annotations) and an API reference that explains the namespaces and their purposes. The UserTypes guide covers layout, mapping own types, single-case unions, ToPrimitive/fromPrimitive wrappers, and row interfaces; it also links to a migration tree configuration doc and Pitfalls.md for limitations. A dedicated Quirks section documents surprising behavior across backends. The Rezoom.SQL.UserTypes documentation is clear and complete for its audience. It covers pitfalls (must map each specific type, no chaining primitives, generics not supported), field-length-and-storage attributes (SQLTypeLength, RawBackendSQLType), advanced primitive mapping (re-mapping builtins, supporting Decimal/DateTimeOffset on SQLite), and a switch-to-TSQL/Postgres tutorial with migration config. The outline is fully present in each file; the XML-doc coverage for SQL annotations is thin but not clipped.
Low XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Annotations(netstandard2.0)src/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations.csproj
The meta-package README mentions Microsoft.Data.SqlClient but does not state which SQL dialects it supports (e.g., T-SQL vs. PostgreSQL) or how to configure the backend.Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/README.md
XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 65 sampled symbols.
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D22 · Internal API Consistency
0 API inconsistencies across 9 exposed types.
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D24 · Comment Value
14 valuable / 0 redundant across 28 sampled comments.
What to do
- Improve Comment Value — currently 8.0/10. — 14 valuable / 0 redundant across 28 sampled comments.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
1 of 5 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Rezoom.SQL.Annotations
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Split Rezoom.SQL.Annotations finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D27 · Navigability
82 % of calls cross a namespace and 1 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: CompositeColumnGenerator.fs↔ManyColumnGenerator.fs 75%
Change coupling: CompositeColumnGenerator.fs ↔ ManyColumnGenerator.fssrc/Rezoom.SQL.Mapping/CompositeColumnGenerator.fs
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX8 · Test isolation
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.4 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P10 · Library API & versioning
What to do
- Make types internal by default and expose only the deliberate public API — even for a small library, every public type is a stability contract.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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X5 · Nullable reference types
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 94% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 65% | Adequate — gated by D16, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 60% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 85% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 60 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .fs, .py, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D4 Code Duplication — Code Duplication not included (time budget)
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .fs, .py, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 5 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt
- NoWarnInCsproj src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj:15
- NoWarnInCsproj src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite.csproj:15
- NoWarnInCsproj src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres.csproj:15
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:22
Warning — 4 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
D19 · Documentation Quality
- Low XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Annotations(netstandard2.0) src/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations/Rezoom.SQL.Annotations.csproj
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: CompositeColumnGenerator.fs ↔ ManyColumnGenerator.fs src/Rezoom.SQL.Mapping/CompositeColumnGenerator.fs
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The meta-package README mentions Microsoft.Data.SqlClient but does not state which SQL dialects it supports (e.g., T-SQL vs. PostgreSQL) or how to configure the backend. Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/README.md
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D26 · Project Cohesion
- Split Rezoom.SQL.Annotations
D4 · Code Duplication
- Code Duplication not included (time budget)
Info — 4 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.TSQL.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.SQLite.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres src/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres/Rezoom.SQL.Provider.Postgres.csproj
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |