Public report — dotnet-starter-kit, published 20 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Medium · 46,688 LoC · 50 projects · rebuild ~1.5 person-years · weakest lens: Code Health (41%)
Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
185findings with an exact file:lineof 422 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
83/118dimensions across the health lenses46688 LoC · 50 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
fullstackhero/dotnet-starter-kit carries serious risk (55%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Event-Driven (85%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Code Health (41%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Maturity (61%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 60 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) (Explicit Debt); oversized components into smaller (Large Files); Delete the dead files and unused exports (Dead Code).
For scale: Medium (~46,688 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.5 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
~14270 LoC unreachable (66 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~1.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€210,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 41% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.2) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 4 NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with FSH.CLI.csproj, Multitenancy.Tests.csproj, Identity.Tests.csproj.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~1.5 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 41%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Code Health first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 60 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Eventing.csproj (5), Modules.Billing.csproj (5), Modules.Auditing.csproj (5). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 60 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Eventing.csproj (5), Modules.Billing.csproj (5), Modules.Auditing.csproj (5).
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
At a glance — Code Health · 41% · Weak · gated by D17, R3, R7
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
24
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
11
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the 60 explicit debt issues in the specified project files to address the most critical technical liabilities. Next, split the 39 oversized files into smaller, more focused components to improve manageability. Then, remove the 66 dead files and 58 unused exports to eliminate maintenance overhead. Finally, reduce code duplication by extracting shared functions and breaking down complex, branch-heavy functions to lower overall cyclomatic complexity.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 4 NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with FSH.CLI.csproj, Multitenancy.Tests.csproj, Identity.Tests.csproj.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 79 of 83 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 83 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 185 of 422 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D22, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1621 test methods: 886 unit, 735 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
125 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Tools/CLI/Commands/NewCommand.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Resolve the 60 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Eventing.csproj (5), Modules.Billing.csproj (5), Modules.Auditing.csproj (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (60 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with FSH.CLI.csproj, Multitenancy.Tests.csproj, Identity.Tests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ProductImagesTests.cs, ProductsEndpointTests.cs, MyTenantStatusTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
This is a top-notch documentation set for a .NET 10 SaaS starter kit: an inviting README with links to full docs and a dedicated 'Why FullStackHero?' section, architecture tests covering module/feature layering, dependency rules, and the Docker Compose deployment guide. The README itself is well written (founded on the real docs site) and the test doc explains how architecture contracts are enforced via NetArchTest.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
2 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 355 exposed types.
Inconsistent naming for write operations: 'Write' is used for all, but the specific domain names (Activity, EntityChange, Security, Exception) are not parallel in structure. 'WriteActivityAsync' and 'WriteExceptionAsync' use the domain type directly, while 'WriteEntityChangeAsync' and 'WriteSecurityAsync' use the action/operation name. This creates a slight cognitive load in remembering which domain uses which naming convention.
Inconsistent query naming pattern: 'GetAuditByIdQuery' uses 'ById' in the class name, while 'GetInvoiceByIdQuery' also uses 'ById'. However, looking at the broader API, there are queries like 'GetAuditsQuery' (plural) and 'GetAuditsByCorrelationQuery'. The inconsistency lies in the singular vs plural and the use of 'ById' vs 'By...' patterns. Specifically, 'GetAuditByIdQuery' is singular, while 'GetAuditsQuery' is plural. This is a minor inconsistency in query naming conventions across the board.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for write operations finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent query naming pattern finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.
Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.
Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.
405 domain type(s) cross context boundaries across 13 contexts.
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Catalog) · ×2
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Chat) · ×2
Cross-context type DisableTwoFactorCommand (Identity → Host)
Cross-context type MarkNotificationReadCommand (Notifications → Host)
Cross-context type AddUsersToGroupResponse (Identity → Host)
+ 207 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 2 Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Catalog) finding(s) in Boundary Type-Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Chat) finding(s) in Boundary Type-Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Cross-context type DisableTwoFactorCommand (Identity → Host) finding(s) in Boundary Type-Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Boundary Type-Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×10src/Host/FSH.Starter.Api/appsettings.Development.json:41detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 10 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (4), appsettings.Development.json (3), terraform.tfvars (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×49.github/workflows/backend.yml:44detected by semgrep finding
Medium: aws-insecure-cloudfront-distribution-tls-versiondeploy/terraform/apps/starter/app_stack/main.tf:270detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 49 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with backend.yml (29), frontend.yml (7), template-smoke.yml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with main.tf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5clients/admin/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: AWS-0104 · ×4deploy/terraform/apps/starter/app_stack/main.tfdetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: AWS-0178 · ×6deploy/terraform/modules/network/main.tfdetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×9clients/admin/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with main.tf (3), Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with main.tf (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with main.tf (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
36 of 212 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Host/FSH.Starter.Migrations.PostgreSQL/Identity/20251222232937_Initial.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id / name — and neither does anything it renders — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label for> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×5) — plan-form-dialog.tsx:310, list.tsx:173, list.tsx:180, …
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×9) — create-webhook-dialog.tsx:199, combobox.tsx:145, brands.tsx:524, …
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — file-dropzone.tsx:111, product-detail.tsx:801
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — invoice-detail.tsx:385
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add jest-axe / playwright-axe to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`RabbitMqEventBus` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection, _channel, _disposed; e.g. `_connection` at line 178). — RabbitMqEventBus.cs:13
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IJobService` declares 17 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IJobService.cs:5
`IUserService` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUserService.cs:7
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX7 · Slice cohesion6.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.
Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.
`QuotaMeteredStorageService` (slice 'FSH.Framework.Storage') depends on `IQuotaService` from slice 'FSH.Framework.Quota'. — QuotaMeteredStorageService.cs:21
What to do
Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
C4 · Data Retention5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a TTL / index expiry (TimeToLive / ExpireAfter / TtlIndex), a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: a TTL/index expiry, a scheduled purge/cleanup job, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`DomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — DomainEvent.cs:10
`IDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IDomainEvent.cs:9
`TenantNearingExpiryIntegrationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — TenantNearingExpiryIntegrationEvent.cs:9
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`AddChannelMembersCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — AddChannelMembersCommandHandler.cs:20
`MarkChannelReadCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — MarkChannelReadCommandHandler.cs:19
`RemoveChannelMemberCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — RemoveChannelMemberCommandHandler.cs:20
`DeleteMessageCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteMessageCommandHandler.cs:22
`EditMessageCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — EditMessageCommandHandler.cs:19
`PinMessageCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — PinMessageCommandHandler.cs:19
`SendMessageCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — SendMessageCommandHandler.cs:28
`UnpinMessageCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UnpinMessageCommandHandler.cs:19
`AddReactionCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — AddReactionCommandHandler.cs:19
`RemoveReactionCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — RemoveReactionCommandHandler.cs:19
`FinalizeUploadCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — FinalizeUploadCommandHandler.cs:30
`CreateTenantCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateTenantCommandHandler.cs:23
`MentionedInChannelIntegrationEventHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — MentionedInChannelIntegrationEventHandler.cs:30
What to do
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
`UpdateGroup.UpdateGroupCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — UpdateGroupCommandHandler.cs:26
What to do
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`SeedAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. (×6) — AuditDbInitializer.cs:23, ChatDbInitializer.cs:20, FilesDbInitializer.cs:20, …
A test is skipped ("Idempotency replay does not engage in the test environment — IDistributedCache (probe) and HybridCache (write-through) are wired to separate in-process stores, so the second call never sees the cached response. Same caveat as IdempotencyFilterTests.cs: 'full replay-with-matching-body coverage is not yet possible'. Backlog item 2.4b tracks the fix.") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — ChatSendMessageTests.cs:74
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 49 of 50 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
1341/1645 types (82%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 286 use(s) across 61,147 production line(s) (~4.7/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Only 864/1345 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
What to do
In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — user-detail.tsx:84, invoice-detail.tsx:73, detail.tsx:50, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
39 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 2 application, 6 tooling and 61 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 6 tooling, 61 test roots considered) (×7) — detail.tsx, create-tenant-dialog.tsx, security.tsx, …
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 472/502 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — RabbitMqEventBus.cs:192, RabbitMqEventBus.cs:227, QuotaEnforcementMiddleware.cs:51, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 35 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .ts, .tsx, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — the 1007 class(es) it could read are an immaterial minority, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — commit a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) anywhere in the repo, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — 61 test file(s) reach none of 254 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
NoWarnInCsproj — 6 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Tests/Webhooks.Tests/Webhooks.Tests.csproj:8— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 6 warning codes (CA1515;CA1861;CA1707;CA1308;S2376;S4581) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 6 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 12 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Tests/Integration.Tests/Integration.Tests.csproj:15— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 12 warning codes (CA1515;CA1861;CA1707;CA1307;CA2234;CA2000;CA1062;CA1031;CA1812;CA1056;S1481;S125) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 12 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 11 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Tests/Integration.Middleware.Tests/Integration.Middleware.Tests.csproj:14— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 11 warning codes (CA1515;CA1861;CA1707;CA1307;CA2234;CA2000;CA1062;CA1031;CA1812;CA1056;S1481) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 11 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 13 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Tests/Framework.Tests/Framework.Tests.csproj:8— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 13 warning codes (CA1515;CA1861;CA1707;CA2007;CA1062;CA1812;CA2227;CA1002;CA1819;S1144;CA1031;S2094;S3459) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 13 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 7 warning codes suppressed in one element src/BuildingBlocks/Web/Web.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 7 warning codes (CA1805;CA1307;CA1308;S1854;CA1812;CA1305;CA2000) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 7 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 7 warning codes suppressed in one element src/BuildingBlocks/Storage/Storage.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 7 warning codes (CA1031;CA1056;CA1002;CA2227;CA1812;CA1308;CA1062) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 7 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 6 warning codes suppressed in one element src/BuildingBlocks/Shared/Shared.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 6 warning codes (CA1716;CA1711;CA1019;CA1305;CA1002;CA2227) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 6 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 7 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Webhooks/Modules.Webhooks/Modules.Webhooks.csproj:5— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 7 warning codes (CA1031;CA1054;CA1056;CA1308;CA1812;CA1859;S3267) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 7 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 7 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Notifications/Modules.Notifications/Modules.Notifications.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 7 warning codes (CA1031;CA1711;CA1812;CA1859;CA1002;CA2227;S3267) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 7 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 10 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Multitenancy/Modules.Multitenancy/Modules.Multitenancy.csproj:5— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 10 warning codes (CA1031;CA1056;CA1008;CA1716;CA1812;S1135;S2139;S6667;S3267;S1172) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 10 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 11 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Identity/Modules.Identity/Modules.Identity.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 11 warning codes (CA1031;CA1812;CA2208;S3267;S3928;CA1062;CA1304;CA1308;CA1311;CA1862;CA2227) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 11 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 6 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Files/Modules.Files/Modules.Files.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 6 warning codes (CA1031;CA1812;CA1859;CA1002;CA2227;S3267) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 6 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj — 6 warning codes suppressed in one element src/Modules/Chat/Modules.Chat/Modules.Chat.csproj:6— A single <NoWarn> suppresses 6 warning codes (CA1031;CA1812;CA1859;CA1002;CA2227;S3267) in one stroke — one team-wide decision, not 6 independent debts. Review the set centrally rather than code-by-code; each code you can re-enable is one less blanket suppression. (Every code still counts toward the score and metrics.)
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:62— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:65— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:70— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:109— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:116— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:131— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:134— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:139— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:161— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:168— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:199— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:202— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:207— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:243— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:246— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:251— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:257— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:271— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:291— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:294— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:299— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:306— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/backend.yml:339— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files src/Tools/CLI/FSH.CLI.csproj:28— The identical NoWarnInCsproj (`CA1515`) appears in 10 files (10 occurrences) — a single repo-wide policy (e.g. a Directory.Build.props decision or an idiomatic suppression), not 10 independent debts. Decide it once centrally rather than file-by-file. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files src/Tests/Multitenancy.Tests/Multitenancy.Tests.csproj:8— The identical NoWarnInCsproj (`CA1707`) appears in 10 files (10 occurrences) — a single repo-wide policy (e.g. a Directory.Build.props decision or an idiomatic suppression), not 10 independent debts. Decide it once centrally rather than file-by-file. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files src/Tests/Identity.Tests/Identity.Tests.csproj:8— The identical NoWarnInCsproj (`CA1861`) appears in 10 files (10 occurrences) — a single repo-wide policy (e.g. a Directory.Build.props decision or an idiomatic suppression), not 10 independent debts. Decide it once centrally rather than file-by-file. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 10 files src/Modules/Webhooks/Modules.Webhooks.Contracts/Modules.Webhooks.Contracts.csproj:5— The identical NoWarnInCsproj (`S2094`) appears in 10 files (10 occurrences) — a single repo-wide policy (e.g. a Directory.Build.props decision or an idiomatic suppression), not 10 independent debts. Decide it once centrally rather than file-by-file. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/message.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/message.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/message.tsx changed 20 times in last 90 days, max complexity 39. 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/admin/src/pages/tenants/detail.tsx clients/admin/src/pages/tenants/detail.tsx— clients/admin/src/pages/tenants/detail.tsx changed 10 times in last 90 days, max complexity 40. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/overview.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/overview.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/overview.tsx changed 8 times in last 90 days, max complexity 40. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/composer.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/composer.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/composer.tsx changed 13 times in last 90 days, max complexity 21. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/identity/user-detail.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/identity/user-detail.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/identity/user-detail.tsx changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 55. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/login.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/login.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/login.tsx changed 12 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/admin/src/pages/billing/invoice-detail.tsx clients/admin/src/pages/billing/invoice-detail.tsx— clients/admin/src/pages/billing/invoice-detail.tsx changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 41. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/components/layout/topbar.tsx clients/dashboard/src/components/layout/topbar.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/components/layout/topbar.tsx changed 11 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/admin/src/pages/login.tsx clients/admin/src/pages/login.tsx— clients/admin/src/pages/login.tsx changed 10 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/channel-rail.tsx clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/channel-rail.tsx— clients/dashboard/src/pages/chat/channel-rail.tsx changed 10 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Medium IaC: AWS-0178 deploy/terraform/modules/network/main.tf— VPC Flow Logs is a feature that enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. After you've created a flow log, you can view and retrieve its data in Amazon CloudWatch Logs. It is recommended that VPC Flow Logs be enabled for packet "Rejects" for VPCs.
Medium IaC: AWS-0176 deploy/terraform/modules/rds_postgres/main.tf— RDS IAM Database Authentication Disabled
Medium IaC: AWS-0177 deploy/terraform/modules/rds_postgres/main.tf— RDS Deletion Protection Disabled
Medium IaC: AWS-0010 deploy/terraform/modules/s3_bucket/main.tf— Cloudfront distribution should have Access Logging configured
Medium IaC: AWS-0010 deploy/terraform/modules/static_site/main.tf— Cloudfront distribution should have Access Logging configured
Medium IaC: AWS-0090 deploy/terraform/modules/static_site/main.tf— S3 Data should be versioned
Off the main sequence: Caching — Caching: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.07, distance 0.93 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Shared — Shared: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.03, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Mailing — Mailing: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.07, distance 0.81 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Jobs — Jobs: abstractness 0.08, instability 0.13, distance 0.79 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Quota — Quota: abstractness 0.18, instability 0.12, distance 0.70 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Dead code: Promote src/Modules/Chat/Modules.Chat/Domain/ChannelMember.cs:31— Method Promote — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CategoryRow src/Tests/Integration.Tests/Tests/Catalog/ProductImagesTests.cs:300— NamedType CategoryRow — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CategoryRow src/Tests/Integration.Tests/Tests/Catalog/ProductsEndpointTests.cs:650— NamedType CategoryRow — no references found in solution.
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Catalog) — FileAccessContext (context Files) is exposed in Catalog's public surface via ProductFileAccessPolicy.CanReadAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Catalog) — FileAccessContext (context Files) is exposed in Catalog's public surface via ProductFileAccessPolicy.CanDeleteAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Chat) — FileAccessContext (context Files) is exposed in Chat's public surface via ChatChannelFileAccessPolicy.CanReadAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileAccessContext (Files → Chat) — FileAccessContext (context Files) is exposed in Chat's public surface via ChatChannelFileAccessPolicy.CanDeleteAsync — couples the contexts.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for write operations · ×1
Inconsistent naming for write operations: 'Write' is used for all, but the specific domain names (Activity, EntityChange, Security, Exception) are not parallel in structure. 'WriteActivityAsync' and 'WriteExceptionAsync' use the domain type directly, while 'WriteEntityChangeAsync' and 'WriteSecurityAsync' use the action/operation name. This creates a slight cognitive load in remembering which domain uses which naming convention. — Standardize on a consistent verb-noun pattern, e.g., 'PublishActivityAsync', 'PublishEntityChangeAsync', etc., or keep 'Write' but ensure the noun is consistent (e.g., 'WriteActivity', 'WriteEntity', 'WriteSecurity', 'WriteException'). (signatures: IAuditClient.WriteActivityAsync | IAuditClient.WriteEntityChangeAsync | IAuditClient.WriteSecurityAsync | IAuditClient.WriteExceptionAsync)
Inconsistent query naming pattern: 'GetAuditByIdQuery' uses 'ById' in the class name, while 'GetInvoiceByIdQuery' also uses 'ById'. However, looking at the broader API, there are queries like 'GetAuditsQuery' (plural) and 'GetAuditsByCorrelationQuery'. The inconsistency lies in the singular vs plural and the use of 'ById' vs 'By...' patterns. Specifically, 'GetAuditByIdQuery' is singular, while 'GetAuditsQuery' is plural. This is a minor inconsistency in query naming conventions across the board. — Adopt a consistent naming convention for queries, e.g., 'GetAuditByIdQuery' and 'GetAuditsQuery' could be 'GetAuditByIdQuery' and 'GetAuditsQuery' is fine, but ensure all 'by' queries follow the same pattern. Consider renaming 'GetAuditByIdQuery' to 'GetAuditQuery' with an Id parameter, or keep 'ById' for all single-entity lookups. (signatures: GetAuditByIdQuery | GetInvoiceByIdQuery)
Cross-context type DisableTwoFactorCommand (Identity → Host) — DisableTwoFactorCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MarkNotificationReadCommand (Notifications → Host) — MarkNotificationReadCommand (context Notifications) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddUsersToGroupResponse (Identity → Host) — AddUsersToGroupResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddUsersToGroupCommand (Identity → Host) — AddUsersToGroupCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateGroupCommand (Identity → Host) — CreateGroupCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteGroupCommand (Identity → Host) — DeleteGroupCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateChannelCommand (Chat → Host) — UpdateChannelCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SendMessageCommand (Chat → Host) — SendMessageCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreChannelCommand (Chat → Host) — RestoreChannelCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RemoveReactionCommand (Chat → Host) — RemoveReactionCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type PresignedUploadResponse (Files → Host) — PresignedUploadResponse (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RequestUploadUrlCommand (Files → Host) — RequestUploadUrlCommand (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreFileCommand (Files → Host) — RestoreFileCommand (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddChannelMembersCommand (Chat → Host) — AddChannelMembersCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RemoveUserFromGroupCommand (Identity → Host) — RemoveUserFromGroupCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddReactionCommand (Chat → Host) — AddReactionCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateChannelCommand (Chat → Host) — CreateChannelCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteMessageCommand (Chat → Host) — DeleteMessageCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type EditMessageCommand (Chat → Host) — EditMessageCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FindOrCreateDmCommand (Chat → Host) — FindOrCreateDmCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MarkChannelReadCommand (Chat → Host) — MarkChannelReadCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type PinMessageCommand (Chat → Host) — PinMessageCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UnpinMessageCommand (Chat → Host) — UnpinMessageCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RemoveChannelMemberCommand (Chat → Host) — RemoveChannelMemberCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ArchiveChannelCommand (Chat → Host) — ArchiveChannelCommand (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateGroupCommand (Identity → Host) — UpdateGroupCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TokenResponse (Identity → Host) — TokenResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteUserCommand (Identity → Host) — DeleteUserCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ConfirmEmailCommand (Identity → Host) — ConfirmEmailCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RegisterUserResponse (Identity → Host) — RegisterUserResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SetProfileImageCommand (Identity → Host) — SetProfileImageCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ProductImageDto (Catalog → Host) — ProductImageDto (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddProductImageCommand (Catalog → Host) — AddProductImageCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RemoveProductImageCommand (Catalog → Host) — RemoveProductImageCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ResendConfirmationEmailCommand (Identity → Host) — ResendConfirmationEmailCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileAssetDto (Files → Host) — FileAssetDto (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FinalizeUploadCommand (Files → Host) — FinalizeUploadCommand (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdminConfirmEmailCommand (Identity → Host) — AdminConfirmEmailCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ImpersonationGrantDto (Identity → Host) — ImpersonationGrantDto (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RevokeImpersonationGrantCommand (Identity → Host) — RevokeImpersonationGrantCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ImpersonationResponse (Identity → Host) — ImpersonationResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type StartImpersonationCommand (Identity → Host) — StartImpersonationCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteRoleCommand (Identity → Host) — DeleteRoleCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdminRevokeSessionCommand (Identity → Host) — AdminRevokeSessionCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RevokeAllSessionsCommand (Identity → Host) — RevokeAllSessionsCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RevokeSessionCommand (Identity → Host) — RevokeSessionCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RefreshTokenCommandResponse (Identity → Host) — RefreshTokenCommandResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RefreshTokenCommand (Identity → Host) — RefreshTokenCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GenerateTokenCommand (Identity → Host) — GenerateTokenCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdminRevokeAllSessionsCommand (Identity → Host) — AdminRevokeAllSessionsCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ReorderProductImagesCommand (Catalog → Host) — ReorderProductImagesCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteFileCommand (Files → Host) — DeleteFileCommand (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — UpdateTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteWebhookSubscriptionCommand (Webhooks → Host) — DeleteWebhookSubscriptionCommand (context Webhooks) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TestWebhookSubscriptionCommand (Webhooks → Host) — TestWebhookSubscriptionCommand (context Webhooks) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GenerateInvoicesCommand (Billing → Host) — GenerateInvoicesCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type IssueInvoiceCommand (Billing → Host) — IssueInvoiceCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MarkInvoicePaidCommand (Billing → Host) — MarkInvoicePaidCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type VoidInvoiceCommand (Billing → Host) — VoidInvoiceCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreatePlanCommand (Billing → Host) — CreatePlanCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdatePlanCommand (Billing → Host) — UpdatePlanCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AssignSubscriptionCommand (Billing → Host) — AssignSubscriptionCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateWebhookSubscriptionCommand (Webhooks → Host) — CreateWebhookSubscriptionCommand (context Webhooks) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TwoFactorEnrollmentResponse (Identity → Host) — TwoFactorEnrollmentResponse (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type VerifyEnrollTwoFactorCommand (Identity → Host) — VerifyEnrollTwoFactorCommand (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdjustTenantValidityCommandResponse (Multitenancy → Host) — AdjustTenantValidityCommandResponse (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdjustTenantValidityCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — AdjustTenantValidityCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChangeTenantActivationCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — ChangeTenantActivationCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateTenantCommandResponse (Multitenancy → Host) — CreateTenantCommandResponse (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateTenantCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — CreateTenantCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CaptureUsageSnapshotsCommand (Billing → Host) — CaptureUsageSnapshotsCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantProvisioningStatusDto (Multitenancy → Host) — TenantProvisioningStatusDto (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RetryTenantProvisioningCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — RetryTenantProvisioningCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateTenantThemeCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — UpdateTenantThemeCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RenewTenantCommandResponse (Multitenancy → Host) — RenewTenantCommandResponse (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RenewTenantCommand (Multitenancy → Host) — RenewTenantCommand (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ApproveTopupRequestCommand (Billing → Host) — ApproveTopupRequestCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateTopupRequestCommand (Billing → Host) — CreateTopupRequestCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteProductCommand (Catalog → Host) — DeleteProductCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreProductCommand (Catalog → Host) — RestoreProductCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateProductCommand (Catalog → Host) — UpdateProductCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AddTicketCommentCommand (Tickets → Host) — AddTicketCommentCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AssignTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — AssignTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateProductCommand (Catalog → Host) — CreateProductCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CloseTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — CloseTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — DeleteTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ReopenTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — ReopenTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ResolveTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — ResolveTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — RestoreTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateTicketCommand (Tickets → Host) — CreateTicketCommand (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChangeFileVisibilityCommand (Files → Host) — ChangeFileVisibilityCommand (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChangeProductPriceCommand (Catalog → Host) — ChangeProductPriceCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateCategoryCommand (Catalog → Host) — UpdateCategoryCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RejectTopupRequestCommand (Billing → Host) — RejectTopupRequestCommand (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateBrandCommand (Catalog → Host) — CreateBrandCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteBrandCommand (Catalog → Host) — DeleteBrandCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type AdjustProductStockCommand (Catalog → Host) — AdjustProductStockCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreBrandCommand (Catalog → Host) — RestoreBrandCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UpdateBrandCommand (Catalog → Host) — UpdateBrandCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CreateCategoryCommand (Catalog → Host) — CreateCategoryCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DeleteCategoryCommand (Catalog → Host) — DeleteCategoryCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type RestoreCategoryCommand (Catalog → Host) — RestoreCategoryCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SetProductThumbnailCommand (Catalog → Host) — SetProductThumbnailCommand (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type DiscoverChannelsQuery (Chat → Host) — DiscoverChannelsQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetChannelByIdQuery (Chat → Host) — GetChannelByIdQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetPinnedMessagesQuery (Chat → Host) — GetPinnedMessagesQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListChannelMessagesQuery (Chat → Host) — ListChannelMessagesQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListMessageRepliesQuery (Chat → Host) — ListMessageRepliesQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListMyChannelsQuery (Chat → Host) — ListMyChannelsQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SearchMessagesQuery (Chat → Host) — SearchMessagesQuery (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListNotificationsQuery (Notifications → Host) — ListNotificationsQuery (context Notifications) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetGroupByIdQuery (Identity → Host) — GetGroupByIdQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetGroupMembersQuery (Identity → Host) — GetGroupMembersQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetGroupsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetGroupsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type PresignedDownloadResponse (Files → Host) — PresignedDownloadResponse (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetFileDownloadUrlQuery (Files → Host) — GetFileDownloadUrlQuery (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetFileMetadataQuery (Files → Host) — GetFileMetadataQuery (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListMyFilesQuery (Files → Host) — ListMyFilesQuery (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListSharedFilesQuery (Files → Host) — ListSharedFilesQuery (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTrashedFilesQuery (Files → Host) — ListTrashedFilesQuery (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetImpersonationGrantsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetImpersonationGrantsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetUserQuery (Identity → Host) — GetUserQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetUserGroupsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetUserGroupsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetCurrentUserPermissionsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetCurrentUserPermissionsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetCurrentUserProfileQuery (Identity → Host) — GetCurrentUserProfileQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetUserRolesQuery (Identity → Host) — GetUserRolesQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type InvoicePdfResult (Billing → Host) — InvoicePdfResult (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetInvoicePdfQuery (Billing → Host) — GetInvoicePdfQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetRoleQuery (Identity → Host) — GetRoleQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetRoleWithPermissionsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetRoleWithPermissionsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetTenantSessionsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetTenantSessionsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetUserSessionsQuery (Identity → Host) — GetUserSessionsQuery (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetWebhookDeliveriesQuery (Webhooks → Host) — GetWebhookDeliveriesQuery (context Webhooks) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetWebhookSubscriptionsQuery (Webhooks → Host) — GetWebhookSubscriptionsQuery (context Webhooks) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type InvoiceDto (Billing → Host) — InvoiceDto (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetInvoiceByIdQuery (Billing → Host) — GetInvoiceByIdQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetInvoicesQuery (Billing → Host) — GetInvoicesQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetMyInvoicesQuery (Billing → Host) — GetMyInvoicesQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetPlansQuery (Billing → Host) — GetPlansQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type PlanTermResponse (Billing → Host) — PlanTermResponse (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetPlanTermQuery (Billing → Host) — GetPlanTermQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SubscriptionDto (Billing → Host) — SubscriptionDto (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetSubscriptionQuery (Billing → Host) — GetSubscriptionQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetTenantStatusQuery (Multitenancy → Host) — GetTenantStatusQuery (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantThemeDto (Multitenancy → Host) — TenantThemeDto (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetTenantProvisioningStatusQuery (Multitenancy → Host) — GetTenantProvisioningStatusQuery (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetAuditByIdQuery (Auditing → Host) — GetAuditByIdQuery (context Auditing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetUsageSnapshotsQuery (Billing → Host) — GetUsageSnapshotsQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ProductDto (Catalog → Host) — ProductDto (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetProductByIdQuery (Catalog → Host) — GetProductByIdQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTrashedProductsQuery (Catalog → Host) — ListTrashedProductsQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SearchProductsQuery (Catalog → Host) — SearchProductsQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TicketDto (Tickets → Host) — TicketDto (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetTicketByIdQuery (Tickets → Host) — GetTicketByIdQuery (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTicketCommentsQuery (Tickets → Host) — ListTicketCommentsQuery (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTrashedTicketsQuery (Tickets → Host) — ListTrashedTicketsQuery (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SearchTicketsQuery (Tickets → Host) — SearchTicketsQuery (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetMyTopupRequestsQuery (Billing → Host) — GetMyTopupRequestsQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type WalletDto (Billing → Host) — WalletDto (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetTopupRequestsQuery (Billing → Host) — GetTopupRequestsQuery (context Billing) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type BrandDto (Catalog → Host) — BrandDto (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetBrandByIdQuery (Catalog → Host) — GetBrandByIdQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTrashedBrandsQuery (Catalog → Host) — ListTrashedBrandsQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type CategoryDto (Catalog → Host) — CategoryDto (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type GetCategoryByIdQuery (Catalog → Host) — GetCategoryByIdQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ListTrashedCategoriesQuery (Catalog → Host) — ListTrashedCategoriesQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SearchCategoriesQuery (Catalog → Host) — SearchCategoriesQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SearchBrandsQuery (Catalog → Host) — SearchBrandsQuery (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Send — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type PasswordChangedEvent (Identity → Host) — PasswordChangedEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MessageEditedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — MessageEditedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MessageDeletedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — MessageDeletedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MessageCreatedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — MessageCreatedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChannelMemberRemovedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — ChannelMemberRemovedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChannelMemberAddedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — ChannelMemberAddedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ChannelCreatedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — ChannelCreatedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileSoftDeletedDomainEvent (Files → Host) — FileSoftDeletedDomainEvent (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type FileFinalizedDomainEvent (Files → Host) — FileFinalizedDomainEvent (context Files) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TicketStatusChangedDomainEvent (Tickets → Host) — TicketStatusChangedDomainEvent (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MessagePinnedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — MessagePinnedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TicketCreatedDomainEvent (Tickets → Host) — TicketCreatedDomainEvent (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TicketAssignedDomainEvent (Tickets → Host) — TicketAssignedDomainEvent (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ProductStockAdjustedDomainEvent (Catalog → Host) — ProductStockAdjustedDomainEvent (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ProductPriceChangedDomainEvent (Catalog → Host) — ProductPriceChangedDomainEvent (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type ProductCreatedDomainEvent (Catalog → Host) — ProductCreatedDomainEvent (context Catalog) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UserRoleAssignedEvent (Identity → Host) — UserRoleAssignedEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UserRegisteredEvent (Identity → Host) — UserRegisteredEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UserDeactivatedEvent (Identity → Host) — UserDeactivatedEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type UserActivatedEvent (Identity → Host) — UserActivatedEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type SessionRevokedEvent (Identity → Host) — SessionRevokedEvent (context Identity) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TicketCommentAddedDomainEvent (Tickets → Host) — TicketCommentAddedDomainEvent (context Tickets) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MessageUnpinnedDomainEvent (Chat → Host) — MessageUnpinnedDomainEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Host's public surface via Mediator.Publish — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantRenewedIntegrationEvent (Multitenancy → Billing) — TenantRenewedIntegrationEvent (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Billing's public surface via TenantRenewedIntegrationEventHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantSubscribedIntegrationEvent (Multitenancy → Billing) — TenantSubscribedIntegrationEvent (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Billing's public surface via TenantSubscribedIntegrationEventHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type InvoiceIssuedIntegrationEvent (Billing → Notifications) — InvoiceIssuedIntegrationEvent (context Billing) is exposed in Notifications's public surface via InvoiceIssuedEmailHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type MentionedInChannelIntegrationEvent (Chat → Notifications) — MentionedInChannelIntegrationEvent (context Chat) is exposed in Notifications's public surface via MentionedInChannelIntegrationEventHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantEnteredGraceIntegrationEvent (Multitenancy → Notifications) — TenantEnteredGraceIntegrationEvent (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Notifications's public surface via TenantEnteredGraceEmailHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantExpiredIntegrationEvent (Multitenancy → Notifications) — TenantExpiredIntegrationEvent (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Notifications's public surface via TenantExpiredEmailHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
Cross-context type TenantNearingExpiryIntegrationEvent (Multitenancy → Notifications) — TenantNearingExpiryIntegrationEvent (context Multitenancy) is exposed in Notifications's public surface via TenantNearingExpiryEmailHandler.HandleAsync — couples the contexts.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 965.
Medium: aws-insecure-cloudfront-distribution-tls-version deploy/terraform/apps/starter/app_stack/main.tf:270— Detected an AWS CloudFront Distribution with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `minimum_protocol_version` to `"TLSv1.2_2018", "TLSv1.2_2019", "TLSv1.2_2021", "TLSv1.2_2025" or "TLSv1.3_2025"`.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run this repository's test suite, whose production source is .ts, .tsx. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, commit a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) anywhere in the repo and real coverage will be read.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 125 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Tools/CLI/Commands/NewCommand.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Split Modules.Identity — A generic catch-all name that is huge (9k LoC) and sprawls over 62 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: Modules.Identity.Security, Modules.Identity.Persistence, Modules.Identity.API
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 36 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (36 orphaned of 212 analysed files in total).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Scanner failed to run · ×1
Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 127 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.
Skipped (documented): SendMessage_Should_Replay_Same_Response_When_Idempotency_Key_Reused src/Tests/Integration.Tests/Tests/Chat/ChatSendMessageTests.cs:74— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Idempotency replay does not engage in the test environment — IDistributedCache (probe) and HybridCache (write-through) are wired to separate in-process stores, so the second call never sees the cached response. Same caveat as IdempotencyFilterTests.cs: 'full replay-with-matching-body coverage is not yet possible'. Backlog item 2.4b tracks the fix.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet — Dependency hygiene is currently assessed for .NET (NuGet) dependencies only, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for other ecosystems (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), an OSGi MANIFEST.MF/target platform, a Maven POM, a Gradle version catalogue, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) are not read yet.
Webhooks: 2 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In Webhooks, 2 contract type(s) (DeleteWebhookSubscriptionCommand, TestWebhookSubscriptionCommand) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (DeleteWebhookSubscriptionCommand, TestWebhookSubscriptionCommand); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019f8047-8474-7c5d-8388-49a7539b52e5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 51 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 132 · Warnings: 256 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 20 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 20-07-2026 @ 16:06 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.