graphql-clean-architecture

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

gayankanishka/graphql-clean-architecture carries serious risk (39%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (93%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (77%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (20%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (45%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).

For scale: Small (~2,822 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (93%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 77% Adequate · gated by IC1 Architecture 93% ★ Exemplary Maturity 50% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 45% Weak · gated by D9, P3 Security 20% ⚠ Critical · gated by D29, D36, C1, C2

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 20% · 47% weightReadiness 45% · 26% weightMaturity 50% · 14% weightCode Health 77% · 8% weightArchitecture 93% · 4% weight

Raise Security 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~54.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 3%Plumbing 81%Tests 0%Generated 16%

New since the last scan (42+)

42 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D5 · Off the main sequence: Domain
D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
D12 · Deprecated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore
D12 · Deprecated: xunit
D16 · dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 · TodoComment src/GraphQL/Extensions/ObjectFieldDescriptorExtensions.cs
D17 · NoWarnInCsproj src/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj
D29 · High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-build.yml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-build.yml
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/pr-build.yml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
D36 · Unpinned build actions
D36 · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
C1 · No data-protection/encryption
C2 · No authorization
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Attendees/Queries/GetAttendees/GetAttendeesQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Attendees/Queries/GetAttendeesBySessionId/GetAttendeesBySessionIdQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Common/Behaviours/LoggingBehaviour.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Sessions/Queries/GetSessions/GetSessionsQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Sessions/Queries/GetSessionsByTrack/GetSessionsByTrackQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Speakers/Queries/GetSessionSpeakers/GetSessionSpeakersQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/Application/Speakers/Queries/GetSpeakers/GetSpeakersQueryHandler.cs
IC1 · Skeleton type — most members are unfinished src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs
IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs
IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs
IC1 · Skeleton type — most members are unfinished src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs
IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs
IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs
SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs
GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs
GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs
GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Infrastructure/Persistence/DataLoaders/SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €760–€3,600

Cost to rebuild	€760–€3,600 (0.1 person-years (13–38 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 57% boilerplate · 39% straight-line · 4% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,200 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

+18.3 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection

Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

+18.3 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls

Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-publish.yml (5), pr-build.yml (2), dependabot.yml.

+8.9 pts · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 20%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,822 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 20%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

52 modules, 119 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Adequate · gated by IC1

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.5 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 9.9 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 9.9 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.0

The Ugly

IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 2.8

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 8.4 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.2 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 7.8 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 50% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Ugly

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 4.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 4.5 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 45% · Weak · gated by D9, P3

The Good

D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 7.8 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5 P2 · Repo Observability 8.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0

At a glance — Security · 20% · Critical · gated by D29, D36, C1, C2

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.2

The Bad

S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0

The Ugly

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 2.5 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	8	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	6	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, encrypt sensitive data at rest and manage keys securely, or confirm if this is handled by infrastructure. Next, enforce default-deny access controls on all endpoints using authorization attributes or imperative guards. Then, harden the web-security posture by adding essential security headers for defense in depth. Finally, resolve the eight high-priority static analysis findings and address the missing test coverage to ensure code quality.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+18.3 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.	+18.3 pts	Medium	Access Controls
Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-publish.yml (5), pr-build.yml (2), dependabot.yml.	+8.9 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.	+14.3 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+6.8 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.	+5.4 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+3.7 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+3.6 pts	Low	ADR Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 9 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 33% slop · 23% mixed · 44% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml	2.5	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/GraphQL/Dockerfile	3.4	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/pr-build.yml	3.7	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/dependabot.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
src/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/GraphQL/Extensions/ObjectFieldDescriptorExtensions.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
tests/GraphQL.Tests/GraphQL.Tests.csproj	9.5	Near-clean	Solution Shape: Shell project: GraphQL.Tests
README.md	9.5	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: The README mentions Docker container orchestration but does not explain how to build and run the application from source, which is critical for a CLI project.
src/Domain/Entities/Session.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 49 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D34D35D36AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 23 of 63 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8a8-9450-7ffe-96d4-19660eada723.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Domain

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 4 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

25 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore · ×2

Outdated: HotChocolate.AspNetCore · ×25

What to do

Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 26 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2486 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.5.

NoWarnInCsprojsrc/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj:15

TodoCommentsrc/GraphQL/Extensions/ObjectFieldDescriptorExtensions.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 projects, 129 source files, 2490 hand-written lines of code (2486 production / 4 test), plus 520 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 10 inter-project edges.

Shell project: GraphQL.Teststests/GraphQL.Tests/GraphQL.Tests.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid one-page description of the project (build badge, ChilliCream reference, database schema list, TOC) but it is thin on content and lacks depth for an actual clean-architecture solution. It mentions prerequisites, Docker configuration, migrations, and build/run from source in its outline but only the Quick Start section begins; the rest is clipped mid-sentence, so Prerequisites/Development Environment Setup/Docker Configuration are not visible and cannot be confirmed present or correct. The absence of architecture docs and low XML-doc coverage (2% for Application) means a deeper reference guide would benefit.

The README mentions Docker container orchestration but does not explain how to build and run the application from source, which is critical for a CLI project.README.md

XML-doc coverage: GraphQL · ×4src/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj

What to do

Resolve the 1 The README mentions Docker container orchestration but does not explain… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 valuable / 1 redundant across 17 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/Domain/Entities/Session.cs:19

What to do

Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Session.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 5 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 17 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×8.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker-publish.yml (5), pr-build.yml (2), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 4 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002src/GraphQL/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 · ×4src/GraphQL/Dockerfile:21detected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026src/GraphQL/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 3 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/GraphQL/Program.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions

PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block

No build provenance

No artifact signing

No SBOM

What to do

Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs:44, SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs:60, SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs:44, …

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×6) — GetAttendeesQueryHandler.cs:16, GetAttendeesBySessionIdQueryHandler.cs:18, GetSessionsQueryHandler.cs:16, …
`Process` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — LoggingBehaviour.cs:15
`SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader` has 2 unfinished members out of 4 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs:8
`LoadAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs:42, SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs:42
`Set` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — SessionBySpeakerIdDataLoader.cs:58, SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs:58
`SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader` has 2 unfinished members out of 4 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — SpeakerBySessionIdDataLoader.cs:8

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dotnet test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.

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P2 · Observability8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, and the service already exposes health probe endpoints (healthz/livez/readyz or a container healthcheck), but no compose service declares a `healthcheck:` that uses them and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — so a release that starts but does not serve looks healthy, and reversing it is a manual step.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 88/89 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — DataImporter.cs:9

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~1.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 20 suppression(s) across the 15498 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	77%	Adequate — gated by IC1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	93%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	50%	Weak — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	45%	Weak — gated by D9, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	20%	Critical — gated by D29, D36, C1, C2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 45 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 2486 LoC the codebase is small despite five projects and no boundaries declared, so explicit bounded contexts are not warranted.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 30 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 10 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×8

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:29 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-build.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-build.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1

NoWarnInCsproj src/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj:15 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

High IaC: DS-0002 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.

Warning — 12 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile:21 — Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/pr-build.yml:0 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:14 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2

Deprecated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore — Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore 2.21.0 — Other
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.

D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1

dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 3 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1

TodoComment src/GraphQL/Extensions/ObjectFieldDescriptorExtensions.cs:11 — // TODO : we need a better API for the user. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1

Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 7 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1

PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (pr-build.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: Domain — Domain: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository did not build in our analyzer environment (a C#/MSBuild compiler error), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. We did not read WHERE the failing diagnostic is, so this does not claim the fault is in your test code — a repository written for an older SDK band can compile for you and not for us. Run `dotnet build` on this commit; if it succeeds, the gap is ours. Committing the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces also lets us measure real coverage without building anything.

Recommendation — 11 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · No tests discovered · ×1

No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.

D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1

Shell project: GraphQL.Tests tests/GraphQL.Tests/GraphQL.Tests.csproj — `GraphQL.Tests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The README mentions Docker container orchestration but does not explain how to build and run the application from source, which is critical for a CLI project. · ×1

The README mentions Docker container orchestration but does not explain how to build and run the application from source, which is critical for a CLI project. README.md — Add Build and run from source instructions with a link to docker-publish.yml or an alternative CI workflow.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1

redundant comment src/Domain/Entities/Session.cs:19 — "Bonus points to those who can figure out why this is written this way" — delete - duplicate of the first comment; keep only one

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 src/GraphQL/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5000`, so a request to `localhost:5000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 3 of 3 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: src/GraphQL/Program.cs, src/Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs, src/GraphQL/Mutations/SessionMutations.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1

No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1

No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1

No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.

D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1

No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.

Info — 30 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×25

Outdated: HotChocolate.AspNetCore — HotChocolate.AspNetCore 12.12.1 → 16.5.1 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: HotChocolate.Data — HotChocolate.Data 12.12.1 → 16.5.1 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: HotChocolate.PersistedQueries.InMemory — HotChocolate.PersistedQueries.InMemory 12.12.1 → 13.9.16 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore — Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore 2.21.0 → 3.1.2 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 6.0.1 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by GraphQL).
Outdated: GreenDonut — GreenDonut 12.12.1 → 16.5.1 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: HotChocolate.Types — HotChocolate.Types 12.12.1 → 16.5.1 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 10.0.1 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: HotChocolate.Execution — HotChocolate.Execution 12.12.1 → 15.1.17 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 6.0.6 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Environment — Serilog.Enrichers.Environment 2.2.0 → 3.0.1 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Thread — Serilog.Enrichers.Thread 3.1.0 → 4.0.0 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.ApplicationInsights — Serilog.Sinks.ApplicationInsights 4.0.0 → 5.0.1 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Async — Serilog.Sinks.Async 1.5.0 → 2.1.0 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 3.1.2 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by GraphQL.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.2.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by GraphQL.Tests).
Outdated: Snapshooter.Xunit — Snapshooter.Xunit 0.7.1 → 1.3.1 available (referenced by GraphQL.Tests).
Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.2 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by GraphQL.Tests).
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.4.5 → 3.1.5 available (referenced by GraphQL.Tests).

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×4

XML-doc coverage: GraphQL src/GraphQL/GraphQL.csproj — GraphQL: 4 % XML-doc coverage (2/57).
XML-doc coverage: Application src/Application/Application.csproj — Application: 1 % XML-doc coverage (2/191).
XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/42).
XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 4 % XML-doc coverage (2/50).

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	8	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	6	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc8a8-9450-7ffe-96d4-19660eada723 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 6 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 4 field(s)

RegisterAttendeeCommand.FirstName src/Application/Attendees/Commands/RegisterAttendee/RegisterAttendeeCommand.cs:7
RegisterAttendeeCommand.LastName src/Application/Attendees/Commands/RegisterAttendee/RegisterAttendeeCommand.cs:8
Attendee.FirstName src/Domain/Entities/Attendee.cs:10
Attendee.LastName src/Domain/Entities/Attendee.cs:12

Email — 2 field(s)

RegisterAttendeeCommand.EmailAddress src/Application/Attendees/Commands/RegisterAttendee/RegisterAttendeeCommand.cs:10
Attendee.EmailAddress src/Domain/Entities/Attendee.cs:16

Gayankanishka/graphql-Clean-Architecture

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Adequate · gated by IC1

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 50% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 45% · Weak · gated by D9, P3

At a glance — Security · 20% · Critical · gated by D29, D36, C1, C2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts