Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
gbrayhan/microservices-go is in good overall health (70%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (64%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (68%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation).
For scale: Small (~2,769 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
91% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
69%
Adequate
Readiness
68%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
64%
Adequate
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 64% · 46% weightReadiness 68% · 25% weightMaturity 69% · 14% weightCode Health 91% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
Raise Security 64 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 70 → ~73.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (15+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Validation.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/logger/logger.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3749 go.mod
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,500–€22,000
| Cost to rebuild | €4,500–€22,000 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 1.0× (at 70% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€13,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 64% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy.
2
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with go.yml (2), dependabot.yml, steps.go.
3
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 64%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Bad
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 7 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, integrate a security and performance tooling step into the CI pipeline to automatically fail the build on regressions. Next, document disaster recovery procedures, including RTO/RPO targets and tested restore steps, to ensure data resilience. Then, begin recording significant architectural decisions in an ADR log to capture the rationale behind key design choices. Finally, address the four high-severity static analysis findings and update the vulnerability disclosure policy to include a reporting contact.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. | +3.3 pts | Low | Vulnerability-disclosure Policy |
| Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with go.yml (2), dependabot.yml, steps.go. | +3.1 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +2.8 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (4). | +2.0 pts | Low | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +3.8 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +3.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.9 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| go.mod | 1.9 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/go.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Controller.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17) |
| src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Repository.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 20) |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| Test/integration/steps.go | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: go-unsafe-deserialization-interface |
| src/infrastructure/repository/psql/user/user.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Repository.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 20) |
| src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: UserController.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17) |
| src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/auth/Auth.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
| src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Validation.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
| src/infrastructure/logger/logger.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) |
| src/infrastructure/di/application_context.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| README.md | 9.3 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The README begins with an ISSUE_TEMPLATE badge but does not link to any actual issue template or roadmap document in the body, leaving a gap between the repository's open issues and the documented content. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D37D38AX5DM5DM6DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P11P3P4P5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 31 of 38 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Repository.SearchPaginated at 20.
Repository.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 20) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:193
Controller.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17)src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:185
UserController.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17)src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go:163
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Repository.SearchPaginated at 40.
Repository.SearchPaginated (cognitive 40) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:193
Controller.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29)src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:185
UserController.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29)src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go:163
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Repository.SearchPaginated (cognitive 40) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with medicine.go, user.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Controller.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Medicines.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 UserController.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with User.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
11 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/di/application_context.go:63
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/auth/Auth.go:44
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/logger/logger.go:21
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:238
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:232
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with application_context.go, medicine.go, Medicines.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Auth.go, Validation.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with logger.go, Medicines.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
8 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for a Go microservices project: it includes an authoritative README with architecture diagrams, a detailed Documentation Index covering architecture, features, deployment, and development guides, and a dedicated integration test README explaining the testing framework. The visible content is clean and complete; clipped sections are not penalized.
The README begins with an ISSUE_TEMPLATE badge but does not link to any actual issue template or roadmap document in the body, leaving a gap between the repository's open issues and the documented content.README.md
The architecture diagram shows only the UI/WebAPI/DB subgraph; the full dependency flow is clipped mid-diagram, and no Dependency Flow or Development sections are visible.README.md
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The README begins with an ISSUE_TEMPLATE badge but does not link to any… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 The architecture diagram shows only the UI/WebAPI/DB subgraph; the full… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Improve Secrets (history) — currently 6.0/10. — 4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with go.yml (2), dependabot.yml, steps.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
trivy found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
6 of 14 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.
Disclosure policy has no reporting contact
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
6 finding(s): 2 critical, 0 high, 4 medium, 0 low.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM7 · Repository granularity
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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M1 · Documentation (README)
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P11 · BDD / executable specs
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Readiness | 68% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 64% | Adequate | Largest drag on the score — prioritise here. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~4801 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 6 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:17
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:20
- High: go-unsafe-deserialization-interface Test/integration/steps.go:132
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
Warning — 23 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3749 go.mod
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/di/application_context.go:63
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:294
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:306
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Repository.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 20) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:193
- Repository.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 20) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/user/user.go:187
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Repository.SearchPaginated (cognitive 40) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:193
- Repository.SearchPaginated (cognitive 40) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/user/user.go:187
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/auth/Auth.go:44
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Validation.go:40
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/logger/logger.go:21
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:261
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Controller.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:185
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- UserController.SearchPaginated (cyclomatic 17) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go:163
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Controller.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:185
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- UserController.SearchPaginated (cognitive 29) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/user/User.go:163
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:238
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:232
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/rest/controllers/medicine/Medicines.go:189
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repository/psql/medicine/medicine.go:85
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The README begins with an ISSUE_TEMPLATE badge but does not link to any actual issue template or roadmap document in the body, leaving a gap between the repository's open issues and the documented content. README.md
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The architecture diagram shows only the UI/WebAPI/DB subgraph; the full dependency flow is clipped mid-diagram, and no Dependency Flow or Development sections are visible. README.md
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
- Disclosure policy has no reporting contact
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 4 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 6 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |