Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
github-linguist/linguist is sound in substance but carries real gaps (65%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (99%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Security (59%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (62%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Small (~3,622 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
99% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
87%
Strong
Maturity
62%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
64%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
59%
Adequate · gated by D29
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 59% · 46% weightMaturity 62% · 25% weightReadiness 64% · 14% weightArchitecture 87% · 8% weightCode Health 99% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 2%Plumbing 44%Tests 55%
New since the last scan (12+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) samples/PHP/drupal.php
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,400–€12,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,400–€12,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.9× (at 65% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 94% boilerplate · 2% straight-line · 4% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,100 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 59% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
2
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
3
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 59%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 40 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 6 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by establishing an architecture decision record (ADR) log to capture significant design choices and their rationale. Next, update the root README to include a testing section that explains how to run the test suite. Integrate a static application security testing (SAST) step into the CI pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Maintain a changelog to track release history, and resolve orphaned files to improve knowledge freshness.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.7 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +4.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite. | +4.4 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with merged1.vcf, deno.lock, AppController.j. | +1.9 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +1.8 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +1.8 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| tools/grammars/Dockerfile | 3.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| samples/C/process.c | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: use-after-free |
| Dockerfile | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| samples/Nginx/example.com.vhost | 6.7 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-ssl-version |
| samples/Antlers/index.antlers.html | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href |
| samples/TSV/merged1.vcf | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token |
| samples/JSON/filenames/deno.lock | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: square-access-token |
| samples/Objective-J/AppController.j | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| samples/NPM Config/filenames/.npmrc | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age |
| samples/Ruby/formula.rb | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dangerous-exec |
| .devcontainer/Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| samples/PHP/Model.php | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| samples/Go/embedded.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb |
| samples/Mustache/deleteuser.mustache | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href |
| samples/PHP/prefix.fcgi | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: echoed-request |
| samples/Ruby/sinatra.rb | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: check-send-file |
| samples/PHP/Application.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 25 of 27 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 27 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D13D16D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D36AX3AX4AX9DM4DM5DM6M1M2M3M4P1P11P3P4P6
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 54 of 68 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D4 · Code Duplication
5 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Application.php:498
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Model.php:2219
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)samples/PHP/Model.php:2848
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D5 · Coupling
1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D16 · Bus Factor
4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/linguist/blob_helper.rb.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D19 · Documentation Quality
Linguist's documentation is clear and complete for a Ruby gem: an introductory README with links to how-linguist-works.md, overrides.md, troubleshooting.md, and contributing guidelines; a dedicated docs/README.md outlining the full outline (How Linguist works / Change behaviour with overrides / Troubleshooting / Contributing / Releasing); and a troubleshooting section covering misclassified files, search results not appearing in search, and macOS installation. The release process is well documented for GitHub staff only.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — Linguist's documentation is clear and complete for a Ruby gem: an introductory README with links to how-linguist-works.md, overrides.md, troubleshooting.md, and contributing guidelines; a dedicated docs/README.md outlining the full outline (How Linguist works / Change behaviour with overrides / Troubleshooting / Contributing / Releasing); and a troubleshooting section covering misclassified files, search results not appearing in search, and macOS installation. The release process is well documented for GitHub staff only.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: aws-access-token samples/TSV/merged1.vcf:127
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with merged1.vcf, deno.lock, AppController.j. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
40 finding(s): 0 critical, 17 high, 7 medium, 16 low.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4
Medium: var-in-href samples/Antlers/index.antlers.html:18
Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pages.html:29
What to do
- Resolve the 17 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish_docker_image.yml (6), ci.yml (5), process.c (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level).
- Resolve the 16 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pkgdown.html (9), example.com.vhost (3), pcre.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 7 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with index.antlers.html (2), embedded.go, deleteuser.mustache. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0013tools/grammars/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 17 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/linguist/classifier.rb.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Unpinned build actions
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX9 · CQS / query purity
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 8 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P11 · BDD / executable specs
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 99% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 87% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 62% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 64% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 59% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 77 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .mts, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~4361 lines of test source are present (.rb) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .vb — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .mts, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs, .cts, .dart, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .mts, .php, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .mts, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D35 Change Coupling — change coupling unreadable for .cs, .cts, .dart, .erl, .ex, .fs, .java, .kt, .mts, .php, .py, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb — no production change history could be paired for this repository's own source
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Dimension evaluation failed
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .cts, .dart, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .mts, .php, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.rb) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in Swift source-only: the sidecar flattens array/collection types (a child COLLECTION = legitimate membership vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable), and aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every struct-holding-struct reads alike) — advisory
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in Swift source-only: a cross-SwiftPM-target domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel/contracts module, and the corpus is predominantly single-module — advisory
- DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in Swift source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim (schema §6.1 sanctions the advisory demote) — advisory
- ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Swift source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph; the frontend cap resolves call owners only where the receiver type is declared — advisory
- ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Dart source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve — advisory
- ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source carries this repository's product — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from EF Core usage in .NET source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 27 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:24
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:26
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:45
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:56
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:58
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:22
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:29
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:34
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml:51
- High: use-after-free samples/C/process.c:426
- High: use-after-free samples/C/process.c:427
- High: double-free samples/C/process.c:430
- High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age samples/NPM Config/filenames/.npmrc:1
- High: dangerous-exec samples/Ruby/formula.rb:434
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0025 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 tools/grammars/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 tools/grammars/Dockerfile
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: aws-access-token samples/TSV/merged1.vcf:127
- Secret: square-access-token samples/JSON/filenames/deno.lock:54
- Secret: generic-api-key samples/Objective-J/AppController.j:129
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 14 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: var-in-href samples/Antlers/index.antlers.html:18
- Medium: var-in-href samples/Antlers/index.antlers.html:21
- Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb samples/Go/embedded.go:52
- Medium: var-in-href samples/Mustache/deleteuser.mustache:18
- Medium: insecure-ssl-version samples/Nginx/example.com.vhost:25
- Medium: echoed-request samples/PHP/prefix.fcgi:2
- Medium: check-send-file samples/Ruby/sinatra.rb:1654
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Application.php:498
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Model.php:2051
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Model.php:2219
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) samples/PHP/drupal.php:90
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 tools/grammars/Dockerfile
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) samples/PHP/Model.php:2848
Recommendation — 25 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pages.html:29
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:136
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:142
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:144
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:153
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:155
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:156
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:191
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:215
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/HTML/pkgdown.html:219
- Low: request-host-used samples/M4Sugar/filenames/configure.ac:48
- Low: insecure-redirect samples/Nginx/example.com.vhost:62
- Low: request-host-used samples/Nginx/example.com.vhost:62
- Low: request-host-used samples/Nginx/example.com.vhost:216
- Low: use-of-unsafe-block tools/grammars/pcre/pcre.go:39
- Low: use-of-unsafe-block tools/grammars/pcre/pcre.go:51
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .cs, .erl, .ex, .fs, .go, .java, .kt, .py, .rb, .rs, .swift, .vb — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D16 · Bus Factor
- Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D35 · Change Coupling
- change coupling unreadable for .cs, .cts, .dart, .erl, .ex, .fs, .java, .kt, .mts, .php, .py, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, .vb — no production change history could be paired for this repository's own source
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 4 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 40 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 6 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |