Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
golang/go carries serious gaps (33%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
The area that most needs attention is Code Health (25%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Readiness (26%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript (Type Safety); oversized components into smaller (Large Files); Delete the dead files and unused exports (Dead Code).
For scale: Very large (~1,502,165 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~13.9 person-years (~8–27 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
25% ⚠
Critical · gated by R1, R3, R7
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
60%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
26%
Weak · gated by R4, P1, P3
Security
67%
Adequate · gated by D29
Accessibility
36%
Weak · gated by AC3, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Code Health 25% · 46% weightReadiness 26% · 25% weightAccessibility 36% · 14% weightMaturity 60% · 8% weightSecurity 67% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight
Raise Code Health 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 33 → ~40.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (10+)
- D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: table.go ↔ doc.go src/internal/godebugs/table.go
- D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: ssa.go ↔ cpuflags.go src/cmd/compile/internal/ssagen/ssa.go
- D35 · Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdTypes.go src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go
- D35 · Change coupling: cpuflags.go ↔ proc.go src/runtime/cpuflags.go
- D35 · Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdrules.go src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go
- D35 · Change coupling: arshal_default.go ↔ doc.go src/encoding/json/v2/arshal_default.go
- D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5932 src/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 misc/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-4599 src/crypto/internal/fips140/nistec/_asm/go.mod
- AC3 · Page without a main landmark src/crypto/internal/fips140test/_browserbridge/index.html
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €670,000–€3,400,000
| Cost to rebuild | €670,000–€3,400,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 33% quality) |
| Size & shape | Very large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
| Dead frontend code | ~615 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~13.9 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,000,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 25% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with platform_root_key.pem.
2
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
3
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Very large asset (~13.9 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 25%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Bad
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 48 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 5 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 3 | Medium |
Roadmap
Begin by migrating the remaining JavaScript files to TypeScript to enforce type safety. Next, split the oversized components into smaller, focused units to improve maintainability. Then, remove dead code and unused exports to reduce maintenance costs. Finally, establish a CI/CD pipeline that builds and tests every change, and integrate automated security scanning to prevent regressions.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with platform_root_key.pem. | +6.8 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Large Files |
| Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Dead Code |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +7.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +7.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +7.8 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +6.8 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/crypto/x509/platform_root_key.pem | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key |
| src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/crypto/internal/fips140/nistec/fiat/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/cmd/trace/goroutines.go | 6.3 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: formatted-template-string |
| src/cmd/trace/regions.go | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: unescaped-data-in-htmlattr |
| src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-rc4 |
| src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-sha1 |
| src/crypto/tls/prf.go | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-sha1 |
| src/internal/syscall/unix/at_wasip1.go | 7.0 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: at_wasip1.go ↔ root_noopenat.go |
| src/cmd/go/internal/tool/tool.go | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dangerous-exec-cmd |
| src/net/http/cgi/host.go | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dangerous-exec-cmd |
| src/runtime/cgo/gcc_util.c | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn |
| src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdTypes.go |
| src/cmd/compile/internal/gc/compile.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| src/cmd/compile/internal/ssa/compile.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| src/cmd/go/internal/fips140/mkzip.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb |
| src/cmd/go/internal/lockedfile/internal/filelock/filelock_fcntl.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| src/cmd/go/internal/lockedfile/lockedfile_plan9.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| src/cmd/go/internal/modfetch/cache.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 31 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
D8D13D16D21D28D29D31D34D35D37D38AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7M1M2M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R2R3R4R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 82 of 110 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D8 · Code Coverage
Statement coverage 100.0% — read from a committed Go coverprofile report (src/cmd/cover/testdata/profile.cov); the in-image collector couldn't run the suite (commonly external-service dependencies). A real measurement, but from a committed artifact rather than a fresh in-image run.
Coverage read from a committed report
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D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: private-keysrc/crypto/x509/platform_root_key.pem:1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with platform_root_key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D16 · Bus Factor
158 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/simd/simd_emulated.go.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-keysrc/crypto/x509/platform_root_key.pem:1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with platform_root_key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
8701 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 52 medium, 8646 low.
High: dangerous-exec-cmd src/cmd/go/internal/tool/tool.go:404
Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/compile/internal/gc/compile.go:10
What to do
- Resolve the 45 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with goroutines.go (3), compile.go (2), regions.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (45 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with tool.go, host.go, gcc_util.c. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 4 medium, 3 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0013 src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0005src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
292 of 1870 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/encoding/xml/xml.go.
Orphaned knowledge src/encoding/xml/xml.go
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 14 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with reader.go (2), xml.go, parser.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: table.go↔doc.go 82%; at_wasip1.go↔root_noopenat.go 70%; at_wasip1.go↔root.go 70%
Boundary-crossing change coupling: table.go ↔ doc.go src/internal/godebugs/table.go
Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdTypes.go src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go
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D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 0 low.
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 misc/go.mod
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5932src/go.mod
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — popup.html:16
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×3) — popup.html:1, wasm_exec.html:7, trace_viewer_full.html:2
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — popup.html:1
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×4) — popup.html:1, wasm_exec.html:7, index.html:5, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- A positive tabindex forces a manual tab order that fights the DOM and is fragile. Use tabindex="0" (or restructure the DOM). — popup.html:16
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
- 1217 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 21 of 23 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
- Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
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R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 5 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
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R10 · Code Duplication
- lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:336 · lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:354 — wasm_exec.js:336
- lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:375 · lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:392 — wasm_exec.js:375
- lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:439 · lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js:454 — wasm_exec.js:439
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — wasm_exec.js:147
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R3 · Large Files
- 1 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×5) — wasm_exec.js, popup.js, gopher.js, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 3 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×2) — wasm_exec.js, wasm_exec_node.js
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
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R9 · Circular Imports
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 25% | Critical — gated by R1, R3, R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 60% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 26% | Weak — gated by R4, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 67% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 36% | Weak — gated by AC3, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~873077 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.go) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .go, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source carries this repository's product — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from EF Core usage in .NET source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — export the report you ALREADY produce — `src/cmd/cover/testdata/profile.cov` is a Go coverage profile this pass cannot read yet — as lcov or Cobertura (e.g. `gcov2lcov -infile src/cmd/cover/testdata/profile.cov -outfile lcov.info`). The unread number is our format gap, not missing work on your side, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 27 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned knowledge src/encoding/xml/xml.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/internal/trace/internal/tracev1/parser.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/internal/fuzz/worker.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/cmd/compile/internal/ssa/html.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/image/draw/draw.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/index/suffixarray/sais.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/go/doc/reader.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/image/png/reader.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/internal/trace/gc.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/cmd/compile/internal/ssa/addressingmodes.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/debug/dwarf/line.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/debug/dwarf/type.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/internal/trace/traceviewer/emitter.go
- Orphaned knowledge src/text/scanner/scanner.go
D35 · Change Coupling
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: table.go ↔ doc.go src/internal/godebugs/table.go
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: at_wasip1.go ↔ root_noopenat.go src/internal/syscall/unix/at_wasip1.go
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: at_wasip1.go ↔ root.go src/internal/syscall/unix/at_wasip1.go
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: symtab.go ↔ cpuflags.go src/cmd/compile/internal/ir/symtab.go
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: ssa.go ↔ cpuflags.go src/cmd/compile/internal/ssagen/ssa.go
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: intrinsics.go ↔ cpuflags.go src/cmd/compile/internal/ssagen/intrinsics.go
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dangerous-exec-cmd src/cmd/go/internal/tool/tool.go:404
- High: dangerous-exec-cmd src/net/http/cgi/host.go:226
- High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn src/runtime/cgo/gcc_util.c:44
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/crypto/internal/fips140/nistec/fiat/Dockerfile
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: private-key src/crypto/x509/platform_root_key.pem:1
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: private-key src/crypto/x509/platform_root_key.pem:1
Warning — 55 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/compile/internal/gc/compile.go:10
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/compile/internal/ssa/compile.go:15
- Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb src/cmd/go/internal/fips140/mkzip.go:142
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/go/internal/lockedfile/internal/filelock/filelock_fcntl.go:22
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/go/internal/lockedfile/lockedfile_plan9.go:11
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/go/internal/modfetch/cache.go:15
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go:23
- Medium: use-of-sha1 src/cmd/go/internal/work/gc.go:568
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/gofmt/gofmt.go:20
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/internal/par/work.go:10
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/internal/robustio/robustio_flaky.go:11
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go:48
- Medium: use-tls src/cmd/link/testdata/dwarf/issue65405/main.go:7
- Medium: formatted-template-string src/cmd/trace/goroutines.go:232
- Medium: unescaped-data-in-htmlattr src/cmd/trace/goroutines.go:235
- Medium: unescaped-data-in-htmlattr src/cmd/trace/goroutines.go:242
- Medium: unescaped-data-in-htmlattr src/cmd/trace/regions.go:264
- Medium: unescaped-data-in-htmlattr src/cmd/trace/regions.go:271
- Medium: math-random-used src/cmd/vet/testdata/assign/assign.go:9
- Medium: math-random-used src/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_legacy.go:13
- Medium: math-random-used src/crypto/internal/cryptotest/hash.go:13
- Medium: math-random-used src/crypto/internal/randutil/randutil.go:11
- Medium: use-of-rc4 src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go:401
- Medium: use-of-DES src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go:406
- Medium: use-of-sha1 src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go:109
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdTypes.go src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go
- Change coupling: cpuflags.go ↔ proc.go src/runtime/cpuflags.go
- Change coupling: gen_simdGenericOps.go ↔ gen_simdrules.go src/simd/archsimd/_gen/simdgen/gen_simdGenericOps.go
- Change coupling: arshal_default.go ↔ doc.go src/encoding/json/v2/arshal_default.go
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 src/crypto/internal/fips140/nistec/fiat/Dockerfile
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 misc/go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-4599 src/crypto/internal/fips140/nistec/_asm/go.mod
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5932 src/go.mod
Recommendation — 25 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #4
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #5
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #6
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #7
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #8
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #9
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #10
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #11
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #12
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #13
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #14
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #15
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #16
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #17
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #18
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #19
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 · Bus Factor
- Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0005 src/crypto/internal/boring/Dockerfile
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
Info — 3 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage read from a committed report
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 5 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 8701 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 9 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 3 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |