Public report — candi, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
124findings with an exact file:lineof 135 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
21/97dimensions across the health lenses25306 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
golangid/candi is sound in substance but carries real gaps (51%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (97%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (78%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (42%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (49%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 31 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)).
For scale: Medium (~25,306 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 51% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€31,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.3) — event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 7.2/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 2–5% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 7.2/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
32 modules, 89 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
34
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
9
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by documenting significant architectural decisions in a dedicated directory to preserve context and consequences. Next, resolve the 31 high-priority static analysis findings, prioritizing the most affected files. Simultaneously, update the README to accurately reflect the current state of the codebase and include instructions for running the test suite. Finally, integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions from being merged.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 20 of 21 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 21 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 124 of 135 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
23 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was main.parseInput at 62. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being candihelper.ToString at 19 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 18 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 main.parseInput (cyclomatic 62) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with cli_parser.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 candihelper.ToDelimited (cyclomatic 38) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with helper.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 main.filterWorkerHandler (cyclomatic 37) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with project_generator_utils.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 28 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 main.parseInput (cognitive 94) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with cli_parser.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 taskQueueWorker.execJob (cognitive 61) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with trigger_task.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 candihelper.ToDelimited (cognitive 53) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with helper.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
10 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×31.github/workflows/build.yml:14detected by semgrep finding
Medium: use-of-sha1candihelper/helper.go:302detected by semgrep finding
Low: use-of-unsafe-block · ×2candihelper/helper.go:508detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with persistent_sql.go (23), deploy-binaries.yml (4), build.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with helper.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with helper.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 · ×5go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774 · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
21 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~960 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit)
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED2 Event/command shape — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED3 Event naming — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED4 Outbox / dual-write — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (2 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:17— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `codecov/codecov-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/codecov/codecov-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-binaries.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-binaries.yml:15— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-binaries.yml:21— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-binaries.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:67— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:104— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:124— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:141— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:148— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:155— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:204— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:212— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:241— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:253— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:282— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:287— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:311— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:313— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:331— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:377— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:389— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
High: string-formatted-query codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:416— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here: the statement takes the value in a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known, so "use a parameterised query" is not available for this site. The control that IS available: check the name against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: template_env.go ↔ environment.go cmd/candi/template_env.go— `cmd/candi/template_env.go` (context cmd) and `config/env/environment.go` (context config) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 53% of the time (32 of the 60 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.80.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.82.1
Change coupling: graphql_schema.go ↔ task_queue_worker.go codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_schema.go— `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_schema.go` and `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/task_queue_worker.go` change together 79% of the time (23 of the 29 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: basic.go ↔ bearer.go middleware/basic.go— `middleware/basic.go` and `middleware/bearer.go` change together 76% of the time (16 of the 21 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: project_generator_add_handler.go ↔ init.go cmd/candi/project_generator_add_handler.go— `cmd/candi/project_generator_add_handler.go` and `init.go` change together 60% of the time (15 of the 25 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: subscribers.go ↔ types.go codebase/app/task_queue_worker/subscribers.go— `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/subscribers.go` and `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/types.go` change together 59% of the time (17 of the 29 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: template_domain.go ↔ init.go cmd/candi/template_domain.go— `cmd/candi/template_domain.go` and `init.go` change together 55% of the time (11 of the 20 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: project_generator.go ↔ init.go cmd/candi/project_generator.go— `cmd/candi/project_generator.go` and `init.go` change together 53% of the time (18 of the 34 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: acl_permission.go ↔ bearer.go middleware/acl_permission.go— `middleware/acl_permission.go` and `middleware/bearer.go` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×5
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.43.0 (go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage, go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation): GO-2026-5158 — upgrade to 1.44.0
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.53.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.53.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.43.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.36.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-4599 go.mod— stdlib 1.26.0 (crypto/x509): GO-2026-4599 — fixed in Go 1.26.1; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 25 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.26.0: GO-2026-4599, GO-2026-4600, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4866, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:402— candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:402-410 | candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:415-423 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:402` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:408— cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:408-416 | cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:421-429 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:220— codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:220-228 | codebase/app/redis_worker/redis_worker.go:186-194 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:220` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) cmd/candi/types.go:210— cmd/candi/types.go:210-217 | cmd/candi/project_generator.go:412-419 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/candi/types.go:210` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) codebase/app/graphql_server/graphql_server.go:69— codebase/app/graphql_server/graphql_server.go:69-76 | codebase/app/rest_server/rest_server.go:114-121 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/graphql_server/graphql_server.go:69` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) cmd/candi/project_generator_add_usecase.go:13— cmd/candi/project_generator_add_usecase.go:13-21 | cmd/candi/project_generator_add_usecase.go:82-89 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/candi/project_generator_add_usecase.go:13` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:388— candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:388-392 | candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:424-428 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:388` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) codebase/app/kafka_worker/kafka_worker.go:59— codebase/app/kafka_worker/kafka_worker.go:59-63 | codebase/app/redis_worker/redis_worker.go:68-72 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/kafka_worker/kafka_worker.go:59` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:224— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:224-228 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:265-269 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:224` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×2
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774 go.mod— github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.2.5 (github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware): GO-2026-5774 — upgrade to 5.3.0. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.2.5: GO-2026-5774, GO-2026-5775, GO-2026-5777.
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod— github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.5 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:519— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:519-529 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:542-552 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:519` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:379— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:379-389 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:418-428 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:379` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
main.parseInput (cyclomatic 62) cmd/candi/cli_parser.go:13— main.parseInput has cyclomatic complexity 62 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
candihelper.ToDelimited (cyclomatic 38) candihelper/helper.go:345— candihelper.ToDelimited has cyclomatic complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
main.filterWorkerHandler (cyclomatic 37) cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:198— main.filterWorkerHandler has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
taskQueueWorker.execJob (cyclomatic 33) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/trigger_task.go:78— taskQueueWorker.execJob has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). Of this number, 27 points are the body's own statements and 6 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
DBUpdateTools.ToMap (cyclomatic 30) candishared/database_update_tools.go:101— DBUpdateTools.ToMap has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
candihelper.MustParseEnv (cyclomatic 28) candihelper/helper.go:170— candihelper.MustParseEnv has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
main.getNeedFileUpdates (cyclomatic 25) cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:251— main.getNeedFileUpdates has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
candihelper.ParseFromQueryParam (cyclomatic 24) candihelper/query_param.go:27— candihelper.ParseFromQueryParam has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 24 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 61, 28). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
maskImpl.Mask (cyclomatic 23) logger/masker.go:58— maskImpl.Mask has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
candihelper.ParseDurationExpression (cyclomatic 22) candihelper/time_parser.go:32— candihelper.ParseDurationExpression has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
main.scopeAddHandler (cyclomatic 21) cmd/candi/project_generator_add_handler.go:13— main.scopeAddHandler has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
taskqueueworker.AddJob (cyclomatic 19) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/job_operation.go:63— taskqueueworker.AddJob has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
expression.calculateActualDaysOfMonth (cyclomatic 18) candiutils/cronparser/next.go:165— expression.calculateActualDaysOfMonth has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
connection.readLoop (cyclomatic 18) codebase/app/graphql_server/ws/conn.go:149— connection.readLoop has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 5 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
restMiddleware.Tracer (cyclomatic 18) codebase/app/rest_server/middleware.go:43— restMiddleware.Tracer has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 18 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 50). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
env.Load (cyclomatic 18) config/env/environment.go:112— env.Load has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
main.projectGenerator (cyclomatic 17) cmd/candi/project_generator.go:17— main.projectGenerator has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
postgresWorker.execEvent (cyclomatic 17) codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:196— postgresWorker.execEvent has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
candihelper.ToCamelCase (cyclomatic 16) candihelper/helper.go:308— candihelper.ToCamelCase has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
taskqueueworker.NewMongoPersistent (cyclomatic 16) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:26— taskqueueworker.NewMongoPersistent has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
configurationUsecase.setConfiguration (cyclomatic 16) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/configuration.go:67— configurationUsecase.setConfiguration has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
MongoPersistent.toBsonFilter (cyclomatic 16) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:398— MongoPersistent.toBsonFilter has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
SQLPersistent.toQueryFilter (cyclomatic 16) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:461— SQLPersistent.toQueryFilter has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1288.
main.parseInput (cognitive 94) cmd/candi/cli_parser.go:13— main.parseInput has cognitive complexity 94 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 63, jumps 16, boolean chains 6, loops 6, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
taskQueueWorker.execJob (cognitive 61) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/trigger_task.go:78— taskQueueWorker.execJob has cognitive complexity 61 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 54, match/switch 3, boolean chains 2, jumps 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 27). Of this number, 50 points are the body's own statements and 11 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
candihelper.ToDelimited (cognitive 53) candihelper/helper.go:345— candihelper.ToDelimited has cognitive complexity 53 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31, boolean chains 21, loops 1 (nesting depth added 21). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
maskImpl.Mask (cognitive 51) logger/masker.go:58— maskImpl.Mask has cognitive complexity 51 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 36, loops 6, boolean chains 5, match/switch 4 (nesting depth added 33). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
candihelper.MustParseEnv (cognitive 45) candihelper/helper.go:170— candihelper.MustParseEnv has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 36, match/switch 5, boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 25). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
DBUpdateTools.ToMap (cognitive 41) candishared/database_update_tools.go:101— DBUpdateTools.ToMap has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, boolean chains 10, loops 5, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.getNeedFileUpdates (cognitive 38) cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:251— main.getNeedFileUpdates has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, loops 14, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
candihelper.ParseFromQueryParam (cognitive 37) candihelper/query_param.go:27— candihelper.ParseFromQueryParam has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 28, loops 4, boolean chains 3, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 18). Most of this is not in the body itself: 13 of the 37 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 61, 28). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
connection.readLoop (cognitive 37) codebase/app/graphql_server/ws/conn.go:149— connection.readLoop has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27, match/switch 6, loops 4 (nesting depth added 25). Of this number, 20 points are the body's own statements and 17 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
expression.calculateActualDaysOfMonth (cognitive 34) candiutils/cronparser/next.go:165— expression.calculateActualDaysOfMonth has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, loops 10, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 17). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.filterWorkerHandler (cognitive 33) cmd/candi/project_generator_utils.go:198— main.filterWorkerHandler has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 24, if/else 9. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
main.execGenerator (cognitive 31) cmd/candi/project_generator.go:385— main.execGenerator has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, jumps 4, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
taskqueueworker.NewMongoPersistent (cognitive 27) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:26— taskqueueworker.NewMongoPersistent has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 9 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
taskQueueWorker.prepare (cognitive 27) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/task_queue_worker.go:82— taskQueueWorker.prepare has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 3, loops 3 (nesting depth added 13). Most of this is not in the body itself: 12 of the 27 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 116). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
cronexpr.genericFieldParse (cognitive 26) candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:354— cronexpr.genericFieldParse has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
postgresworker.NewWorker (cognitive 22) codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:47— postgresworker.NewWorker has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 6, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
restMiddleware.Tracer (cognitive 22) codebase/app/rest_server/middleware.go:43— restMiddleware.Tracer has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 2, boolean chains 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 4). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 22 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 50). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
main.projectGenerator (cognitive 21) cmd/candi/project_generator.go:17— main.projectGenerator has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 6, boolean chains 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
env.Load (cognitive 21) config/env/environment.go:112— env.Load has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
candihelper.ToCamelCase (cognitive 20) candihelper/helper.go:308— candihelper.ToCamelCase has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.serviceRunner (cognitive 20) cmd/candi/service_runner.go:13— main.serviceRunner has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 6 (nesting depth added 9). Of this number, 19 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
taskqueueworker.AddJob (cognitive 20) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/job_operation.go:63— taskqueueworker.AddJob has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 2). Of this number, 19 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
configurationUsecase.setConfiguration (cognitive 20) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/configuration.go:67— configurationUsecase.setConfiguration has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 2, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 8). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
candihelper.ParseDurationExpression (cognitive 19) candihelper/time_parser.go:32— candihelper.ParseDurationExpression has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
expression.domFieldHandler (cognitive 19) candiutils/cronparser/parser.go:287— expression.domFieldHandler has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.main (cognitive 18) cmd/candi/main.go:15— main.main has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, jumps 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 9). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
env.parseAppConfig (cognitive 18) config/env/environment.go:201— env.parseAppConfig has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
otelTraceImpl.Finish (cognitive 18) tracer/otel.go:256— otelTraceImpl.Finish has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
candihelper.ParseToQueryParam (cognitive 17) candihelper/query_param.go:118— candihelper.ParseToQueryParam has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.scopeAddHandler (cognitive 17) cmd/candi/project_generator_add_handler.go:13— main.scopeAddHandler has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8, loops 5, match/switch 4 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
postgresWorker.execEvent (cognitive 17) codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:196— postgresWorker.execEvent has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 3). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
restMiddleware.CORS (cognitive 17) codebase/app/rest_server/middleware.go:193— restMiddleware.CORS has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 4). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 202). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
restserver.transformURLParam (cognitive 16) codebase/app/rest_server/route_wrapper.go:72— restserver.transformURLParam has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Medium: use-of-sha1 candihelper/helper.go:302— Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
TooManyMethods: SQLPersistent codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:19— TooManyMethods — 31 methods, declared across 2 files: task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go (21), task_queue_worker/persistent_sql_tools.go (10). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 7 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (2 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) validator/json_schema_storage.go:46— validator/json_schema_storage.go:46-59 | validator/json_schema_storage.go:100-113 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `validator/json_schema_storage.go:46` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:35— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:35-47 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:65-77 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:137-148 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_mongo.go:35` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:348— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:348-358 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/summary.go:53-62 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go:348` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) codebase/app/cron_worker/cron_worker.go:184— codebase/app/cron_worker/cron_worker.go:184-190 | codebase/app/postgres_worker/postgres_worker.go:220-226 | codebase/app/redis_worker/redis_worker.go:186-192 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_resolver.go:239— codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_resolver.go:239-244 | codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_resolver.go:643-648 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `codebase/app/task_queue_worker/graphql_resolver.go:239` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block candihelper/helper.go:508— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block candihelper/helper.go:513— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 10 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_sql.go, codebase/app/task_queue_worker/job_operation.go, config/env/environment.go, codebase/app/task_queue_worker/persistent_model.go, cmd/candi/template_configs.go, codebase/app/redis_worker/redis_worker.go, codebase/app/task_queue_worker/summary.go, tracer/utils.go (+2 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc963-170b-7ca7-bf9e-877a790dda77 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 34 · Warnings: 91 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 20:49 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.