Public report of habibsql/TheMicroServices, published 21 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 21 October 2026, 20:28 UTC · Survey ID cd_5789b0bff4d44fa5864449624ae390a9

habibsql/TheMicroServices

Measured 21 October 2026, 20:21 UTC, at code version 5191534

CAI score 37out of 100 At risk Down 5 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Architecture 87 Strong Performance 85 Strong Event-Driven 84 Strong Domain Modelling 54 Adequate Maturity 53 Adequate Code Health 50 Weak Security and Compliance 37 Weak Production Readiness 24 Critical

A small codebase: 2,446 lines of product code in 43 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 24

Findings by how serious they are

21 critical 82 serious 69 minor

8 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
21 October 2026, 20:21 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

83of 87 dimensions measured by tools. The other 4 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
152of 172 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 20 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
87dimensions across 8 lenses, read from 2,446 lines of product code in 43 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

habibsql/TheMicroServices scores 37 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 24 and is rated Critical. Its CI/CD gates dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality and to resolve the 3 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 37 to about 47.

21 findings are critical: ten in Dependency Vulnerabilities, six in IaC & Container Security, two in Aggregate boundaries, one in Explicit Debt, one in Outbox / dual-write and one in Test Quality.

Watchdog couldn't measure 6 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Reliability and Dependency Hygiene, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 2,446 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €2,800, to rebuild.

Code Health 50 Weak, capped by Nullable reference types Architecture 87 Strong Maturity 53 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 24 ⚠ Critical, capped by Test Quality, CI/CD gates, Security & performance tooling and Outbound HTTP resilience Security and Compliance 37 Weak, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities and Access Controls Domain Modelling 54 Adequate, capped by Rich vs anemic model and Encapsulated state Event-Driven 84 Strong Performance 85 Strong

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 24 · counts for 45%Security and Compliance 37 · counts for 25%Code Health 50 · counts for 14%Maturity 53 · counts for 8%Domain Modelling 54 · counts for 4%Event-Driven 84 · counts for 2%Performance 85 · counts for 1%Architecture 87 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 24 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 37 to about 47.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 4%Supporting code 86%Tests 10%
New since the last survey: 40 findings

These 40 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026.

  • Test Quality · No assertions: ShouldReturnTotalItemsCountWhenValidStoreId Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests/InventoryServiceTest.cs
  • Test Quality · Test project verifies nothing: Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests/InventoryServiceTest.cs
  • Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreCommandController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseQueryController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesCommandController.cs
  • Access Controls · No authorization Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesQueryController.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryCommandHandler/CreateStoreCommandHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RemoveItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SaveItems Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetAll Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesCommandHandler/SalesCommandHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesQueryHandler/SalesQueryHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesRepository/SalesRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesRepository/SalesRepository.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Send Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/CommandBus.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SendEmail Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EmailService.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Publish Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EventBus.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Subscribe Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EventBus.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Send Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/QueryBus.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.EventHandler/Inventory.EventHandler/ProductPurchasedEventHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.EventHandler/Inventory.EventHandler/ProductSoldEventHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/PurchaseMicroservice/Purchase.QueryHandler/ProductPurchaseQueryHandler.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.QueryHandler/StoreQueryHandler.cs
  • Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs
  • Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs
  • Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking
  • Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings

These 2 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Coupling · Off the main sequence: Inventory.DTO
  • Coupling · Off the main sequence: Sales.Core
Rebuild cost: about €2,800 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€970 to €4,700, for 16 to 50 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemVery high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 37. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 2,446 lines of product code, of which 59% is declarations and boilerplate, 36% straight logic and 5% logic with branches
Comment linesThe estimate prices 2,369 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 2,446 lines but aren't priced as work.

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs (2), InventoryServiceTest.cs.
Raises the score by about 8 points · Low effort · Test Quality
2
Resolve the 3 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs, RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs, InventoryServiceTest.cs.
Raises the score by about 8 points · Low effort · Test Quality
3
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Low effort · Test Quality

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €2,800 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 24 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
One cause behind 14 Domain Modelling findings · Common cause
14 findings in the Domain Modelling lens come from the same cause. The code models the business as objects, such as an order or a customer, and each object should guard its own rules: an order, for example, should refuse to be shipped before it has been paid. Here the objects don't do that. Other code can change an object's data directly, so it can put an order into a state the rules forbid. Some objects only hold data, while the rules that should keep that data valid sit elsewhere in the code. Because all of these findings have the same cause, fixing it once, in the business objects themselves, deals with them together.
Based on: Encapsulated state (7 findings) · Rich vs anemic model (7 findings)
What to do: Give each business object the methods that enforce its rules, such as a method for shipping an order that first checks it has been paid, and let only those methods change its data. Give each kind of identifier a type of its own, so an order number can't be used where a customer number belongs.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 8 points for low effort, because it clears the 3 Test Quality findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Api Api ctx:CommonAll CommonAll 2 projects Api->ctx:CommonAll ctx:InventoryMicroservice InventoryMicroservice 13 projects Api->ctx:InventoryMicroservice Api.Grpc Api.Grpc Purchase.Api Purchase.Api Purchase.Api->ctx:CommonAll ctx:PurchaseMicroservice PurchaseMicroservice 9 projects Purchase.Api->ctx:PurchaseMicroservice Sales.Api Sales.Api Sales.Api->ctx:CommonAll ctx:SalesMicroservice SalesMicroservice 10 projects Sales.Api->ctx:SalesMicroservice ctx:InventoryMicroservice->ctx:CommonAll ctx:PurchaseMicroservice->ctx:CommonAll ctx:PurchaseMicroservice->ctx:InventoryMicroservice ctx:SalesMicroservice->ctx:CommonAll

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

42 modules, with 53 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 2 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 Common.Core2 Inventory.Api3 Inventory.Api.Grpc4 Inventory.DTO5 Inventory.Event6 InventoryCore7 InventoryDomainService8 InventoryInfrastructure9 InventoryQueryHandler10 Purchase.Api11 Purchase.Core12 Purchase.DTO13 Purchase.Infrastructure14 Sales.Core15 Sales.DTO16 SalesDomainService17 Common.Core.Events18 Common.Infrastructure19 Inventory.Api.Controllers20 Inventory.Command21 Inventory.Domain22 Inventory.Query23 Purchase.Api.Controllers24 Purchase.Command25 Purchase.Domain.Model26 Purchase.Query27 Sales.Api.Controllers28 Sales.Command29 Sales.Domain30 Sales.Query31 Inventory.Repository32 Purchase.Repository33 Sales.Repository34 Inventory.CommandHandler35 Inventory.EventHandler36 Inventory.QueryHandler37 Purchase.CommandHandler38 Purchase.QueryHandler39 Sales.CommandHandler40 Sales.QueryHandler
1 Common.Core
2 Inventory.Api
3 Inventory.Api.Grpc
4 Inventory.DTO
5 Inventory.Event
6 InventoryCore
7 InventoryDomainService
8 InventoryInfrastructure
9 InventoryQueryHandler
10 Purchase.Api
11 Purchase.Core
12 Purchase.DTO
13 Purchase.Infrastructure
14 Sales.Core
15 Sales.DTO
16 SalesDomainService
17 Common.Core.Events2
18 Common.Infrastructure7
19 Inventory.Api.Controllers41
20 Inventory.Command1
21 Inventory.Domain2
22 Inventory.Query1
23 Purchase.Api.Controllers42
24 Purchase.Command2
25 Purchase.Domain.Model4
26 Purchase.Query1
27 Sales.Api.Controllers41
28 Sales.Command1
29 Sales.Domain1
30 Sales.Query1
31 Inventory.Repository44
32 Purchase.Repository221
33 Sales.Repository221
34 Inventory.CommandHandler2111
35 Inventory.EventHandler223
36 Inventory.QueryHandler21111
37 Purchase.CommandHandler51111
38 Purchase.QueryHandler211
39 Sales.CommandHandler31111
40 Sales.QueryHandler211
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 Common.Core2 Inventory.Api3 Inventory.Api.Grpc4 Inventory.DTO5 Inventory.Event6 InventoryCore7 InventoryDomainService8 InventoryInfrastructure9 InventoryQueryHandler10 Purchase.Api11 Purchase.Core12 Purchase.DTO13 Purchase.Infrastructure14 Sales.Core15 Sales.DTO16 SalesDomainService17 Common.Core.Events18 Common.Infrastructure19 Inventory.Api.Controllers20 Inventory.Command21 Inventory.Domain22 Inventory.Query23 Purchase.Api.Controllers24 Purchase.Command25 Purchase.Domain.Model26 Purchase.Query27 Sales.Api.Controllers28 Sales.Command29 Sales.Domain30 Sales.Query31 Inventory.Repository32 Purchase.Repository33 Sales.Repository34 Inventory.CommandHandler35 Inventory.EventHandler36 Inventory.QueryHandler37 Purchase.CommandHandler38 Purchase.QueryHandler39 Sales.CommandHandler40 Sales.QueryHandlerCommon.Core1Inventory.Api2Inventory.Api.Grpc3Inventory.DTO4Inventory.Event5InventoryCore6InventoryDomainService7InventoryInfrastructure8InventoryQueryHandler9Purchase.Api10Purchase.Core11Purchase.DTO12Purchase.Infrastructure13Sales.Core14Sales.DTO15SalesDomainService16Common.Core.Events17Common.Infrastructure18Inventory.Api.Controllers19Inventory.Command20Inventory.Domain21Inventory.Query22Purchase.Api.Controllers23Purchase.Command24Purchase.Domain.Model25Purchase.Query26Sales.Api.Controllers27Sales.Command28Sales.Domain29Sales.Query30Inventory.Repository31Purchase.Repository32Sales.Repository33Inventory.CommandHandler34Inventory.EventHandler35Inventory.QueryHandler36Purchase.CommandHandler37Purchase.QueryHandler38Sales.CommandHandler39Sales.QueryHandler4027411214224141111442212212111223211115111121131111211+2 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 50% · Weak · gated by X5 ·

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.6 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 8.5 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 7.7 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.6
The Ugly
X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 4.3 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 87% · Strong ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.1 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D23 · .NET / C# Boundary Type-Coupling 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.3 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.2

At a glance — Maturity · 53% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0
The Bad
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 6.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 24% · Critical · gated by D10, P1, P3, P7 ·

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0
The Bad
ED5 · Repo Idempotency 6.5 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 0.6 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 4.5 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 37% · Weak · gated by D30, C2 ·

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 7.5 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Bad
D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 1.9 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 54% · Adequate · gated by DM4, DM5 ·

The Good
DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0
The Ugly
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 4.6 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 1.6

At a glance — Event-Driven · 84% · Strong ·

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0
The Bad
ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 6.3

At a glance — Performance · 85% · Strong ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 8.5

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures13High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration12High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by fixing empty and non-asserting tests in RabbitMqServiceBusTest, InventoryServiceTest, and UnitTest1 to ensure the test suite actually validates behavior. Establish a CI workflow that automatically builds and runs these tests on every push or pull request to prevent regressions. Finally, secure the application by implementing default-deny access controls on all endpoints using authorization attributes or imperative guards.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs (2), InventoryServiceTest.cs.+7.7 ptsLowTest Quality
Resolve the 3 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs, RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs, InventoryServiceTest.cs.+7.7 ptsLowTest Quality
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs.+4.5 ptsLowTest Quality
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+5.9 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED.+2.5 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+4.6 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with Sales.Api.csproj.+2.0 ptsLowPlatform End-of-Life
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+3.0 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 22 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 14% slop · 50% mixed · 36% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED1.3SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED1.3SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.7SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
Src/CommonAll/Common.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs6.5MixedTest Quality: No assertions (empty test): Test1
REDACTED6.9MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure.Tests/RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs7.4MixedTest Quality: No assertions: ShouldPublishMessageWhenValidQueueProvided
Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests/InventoryServiceTest.cs7.8MixedTest Quality: No assertions: ShouldReturnTotalItemsCountWhenValidStoreId
Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Sales.Api.csproj7.9MixedPlatform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp3.1
Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 4)
Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)
Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCore/Purchase.Core.csproj8.5Near-cleanCoupling: Off the main sequence: Purchase.Core
Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDto/Purchase.DTO.csproj8.5Near-cleanCoupling: Off the main sequence: Purchase.DTO
Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDto/Sales.DTO.csproj8.5Near-cleanCoupling: Off the main sequence: Sales.DTO
Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Inventory.Domain.csproj8.5Near-cleanCoupling: Off the main sequence: Inventory.Domain

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 21

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 82

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 69

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 8

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 83 of 87 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 87 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D23D26D27D28D29D30D31D35D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C2DM1DM10DM11DM12DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED1ED2ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P7PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 152 of 172 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a16020-72e8-7b01-93b0-5ac36ea6d493.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read. You can widen what we reach: optional: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 8 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: `dotnet list package` exited 1 with no output.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 33 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 97% of the history; the other 1 hold 3% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The C# workspace loaded this repository's projects but reported a load failure, and the dead-code reference search is unreliable over a graph that did not load cleanly, so it was skipped. The other debt markers on this row were read; dead symbols were not, and their absence from the score is not a finding that the code has none. First load diagnostic: Failure: Msbuild failed when processing the file 'Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Purchase.Domain.csproj' with message: The referenced project ../../CommonAll/Common.Core.csproj does not exist.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (33 commit(s) sampled).
  • D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. IL NOT MEASURED: the analyzer's own build of this repository failed for an ENVIRONMENT reason (exit 1) — MSBuild's engine or the CLR gave up, or our image does not carry the SDK band/targeting pack this repository needs. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo, and it is not a statement that this repository fails to build. D18 owns the question of whether this repository builds; it was not answered here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (10 lines × 4)Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:14
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:83

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.1 / 10Stronggated by 5 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

43 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Purchase.Core · ×5Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCore/Purchase.Core.csproj:1
Off the main sequence: Common.InfrastructureREDACTED:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling — start with Purchase.Core.csproj, Purchase.DTO.csproj, Sales.DTO.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 12 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 test methods: 8 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality0.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 4 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 8 tests.

No assertions (empty test): Test1Src/CommonAll/Common.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:8
No assertions: ShouldPublishMessageWhenValidQueueProvided · ×3Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure.Tests/RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs:40
Test project verifies nothing: Common.Core.Tests · ×3Src/CommonAll/Common.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:8
Mock framework: Moq

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs (2), InventoryServiceTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs, RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs, InventoryServiceTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Test Quality in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 239 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 21 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 187 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + unmeasured dead symbols across 2446 LoC in the .NET projects (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6. Dead code not measured: the solution did not load cleanly, so the reference search was skipped.

EmptyCatchBlockSrc/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:179

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with PurchaseCommandHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

36 projects, 95 source files, 2612 hand-written lines of code (2358 production / 254 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 102 inter-project edges.

Shell project: InventoryQueryHandlerSrc/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryQueryHandler/InventoryQueryHandler.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with InventoryQueryHandler.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a single descriptive document that states the project is an event-driven microservices architecture and lists three Boundned contexts (Purchase, Sales, Inventory) with brief purposes before diving into architecture. It describes the system as consisting of three microservices (Purchase, Sales, Inventory), explains each one's role, mentions CQRS inside them, and notes a Nothing-shared architecture model, then shows three communication methods: Event Driven, REST, GRPC, plus a high-level design image and Command/Query Segregation. It is clear but thin on the actual usage, installation, contribution, and licence guidance that would carry over to each subproject.

XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Api · ×38Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Purchase.Api.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The repository's root README is a single descriptive document that states the project is an event-driven microservices architecture and lists three Boundned contexts (Purchase, Sales, Inventory) with brief purposes before diving into architecture. It describes the system as consisting of three microservices (Purchase, Sales, Inventory), explains each one's role, mentions CQRS inside them, and notes a Nothing-shared architecture model, then shows three communication methods: Event Driven, REST, GRPC, plus a high-level design image and Command/Query Segregation. It is clear but thin on the actual usage, installation, contribution, and licence guidance that would carry over to each subproject.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent casing for the same field name in similar controller classes. One uses camelCase (`commandBus`) while the other likely follows the same pattern, but the inconsistency is subtle. However, a more glaring issue is the spelling of the interface/type name itself across the codebase.
Typo in the interface and class name: `IPurchaseRepostiory` and `IPurchaseRepostiory` (missing 's' in Repository). While consistent with itself, it is a typo that should be corrected to `IPurchaseRepository`.
Typo in the constant class/namespace name: `EmailAddressess` (double 's').
Typo in method name: `Decerialize` should be `Deserialize`.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent casing for the same field name in similar controller… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Typo in the interface and class name finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Typo in the constant class/namespace name finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No domain types leak across context boundaries (4 contexts).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 43 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

88 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities1.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 2 critical, 8 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security7.5 / 10Adequategated by 6 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 4 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 43 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp3.1Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Sales.Api.csproj:4

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with Sales.Api.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
  • `StoreCommandController.CreateStore` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreCommandController.cs:23
  • `StoreQueryController.GetAllStores` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs:24
  • `StoreQueryController.IsServiceOn` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs:30
  • `PurchaseCommandController.Purchase` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs:23
  • `PurchaseCommandController.Ping` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs:49
  • `PurchaseQueryController.GetPurchasedData` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseQueryController.cs:25
  • `SalesCommandController.ProductSales` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesCommandController.cs:25
  • `SalesQueryController.GetProudctSalesInfo` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesQueryController.cs:24

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `Purchase` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:14
  • `StoreItem` references the aggregate root `Store` directly (via `Store`) — hold its `StoreId` instead. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:10

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Product` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Product.cs:9
  • `ProductLineItem` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/ProductLineItem.cs:11
  • `Purchase` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:10
  • `User` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/User.cs:5
  • `Store` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Store.cs:8
  • `StoreItem` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:6
  • `Sales` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.cs:8

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `Product` exposes publicly writable state (ProductName). — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Product.cs:9
  • `ProductLineItem` exposes publicly writable state (Product, PurchaseUnitPrice, PurchaseQuantity). — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/ProductLineItem.cs:11
  • `Purchase` exposes publicly writable state (PurchaseDate, User, LineItems). — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:10
  • `User` exposes publicly writable state (Name). — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/User.cs:5
  • `Store` exposes publicly writable state (Manager). — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Store.cs:8
  • `StoreItem` exposes publicly writable state (ItemName, Store, BalanceQuantity). — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:6
  • `Sales` exposes publicly writable state (SalesDate, SalesLineItems). — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.cs:8

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `PurchaseCommandHandler.IsStoreServiceOn` writes to the database while `PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:161

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency6.5 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CommandHandler.PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:43

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `RegisterEventHanders` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:77
  • `RegisterEventHandlers` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Startup.cs:89
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:48, Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:52, Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:54

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 43 of 43 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
  • Only 13/43 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/12 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 12, 4 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `services.AddHttpClient()` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default). — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:30

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:57

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult().
S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×4) — Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:21, Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs:20, Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs:20, …
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. (×4) — Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:21, Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs:20, Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs:20, …

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:57

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 0/28 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×28) — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs:22, Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs:31, Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:74, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:179

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/37 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health50%Weak — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture87%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity53%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness24%Critical — gated by D10, P1, P3, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security37%Weak — gated by D30, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling54%Adequate — gated by DM4, DM5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven84%StrongSolid.
Performance85%StrongSolid.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 44 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the analyzer's build of the target did not succeed
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 21 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×8
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×6
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate · ×2
  • Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Purchase.User Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:14 — `Purchase` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead.
  • Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: StoreItem.Store Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:10 — `StoreItem` references the aggregate root `Store` directly (via `Store`) — hold its `StoreId` instead.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions (empty test) · ×1
  • No assertions (empty test): Test1 Src/CommonAll/Common.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:8 — Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×1
  • EmptyCatchBlock Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:179 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write · Dual write (no outbox) · ×1
  • Dual write (no outbox): PurchaseCommandHandler.IsStoreServiceOn persists, PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle publishes Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:161 — `PurchaseCommandHandler.IsStoreServiceOn` writes to the database while `PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards.
Serious — 82 finding(s)
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×28
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs:22 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/PurchaseRepository.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RegisterBuses Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:74 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryCommandHandler/CreateStoreCommandHandler.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RemoveItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs:35 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: SaveItems Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs:44 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreItemRepository.cs:52 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetAll Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs:18 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/StoreRepository.cs:36 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesCommandHandler/SalesCommandHandler.cs:23 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesQueryHandler/SalesQueryHandler.cs:18 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesRepository/SalesRepository.cs:22 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Save Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesRepository/SalesRepository.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:43 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: IsStoreServiceOn Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:161 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetCurrentStoreItems Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:188 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Send Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/CommandBus.cs:20 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: SendEmail Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EmailService.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Publish Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EventBus.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Subscribe Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/EventBus.cs:40 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Send Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure/QueryBus.cs:17 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.EventHandler/Inventory.EventHandler/ProductPurchasedEventHandler.cs:20 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
C2 · Access Controls · No authorization · ×9
  • No authorization — No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
  • No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreCommandController.cs:23 — `StoreCommandController.CreateStore` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs:24 — `StoreQueryController.GetAllStores` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Controllers/StoreQueryController.cs:30 — `StoreQueryController.IsServiceOn` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs:23 — `PurchaseCommandController.Purchase` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseCommandController.cs:49 — `PurchaseCommandController.Ping` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Controllers/PurchaseQueryController.cs:25 — `PurchaseQueryController.GetPurchasedData` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesCommandController.cs:25 — `SalesCommandController.ProductSales` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
  • No authorization Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Controllers/SalesQueryController.cs:24 — `SalesQueryController.GetProudctSalesInfo` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×7
  • Anemic entity: Product Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Product.cs:9 — `Product` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: ProductLineItem Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/ProductLineItem.cs:11 — `ProductLineItem` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Purchase Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:10 — `Purchase` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: User Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/User.cs:5 — `User` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Store Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Store.cs:8 — `Store` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: StoreItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:6 — `StoreItem` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Sales Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.cs:8 — `Sales` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×7
  • Mutable entity: Product Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Product.cs:9 — `Product` exposes publicly writable state (ProductName).
  • Mutable entity: ProductLineItem Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/ProductLineItem.cs:11 — `ProductLineItem` exposes publicly writable state (Product, PurchaseUnitPrice, PurchaseQuantity).
  • Mutable entity: Purchase Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/Purchase.cs:10 — `Purchase` exposes publicly writable state (PurchaseDate, User, LineItems).
  • Mutable entity: User Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Models/User.cs:5 — `User` exposes publicly writable state (Name).
  • Mutable entity: Store Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Store.cs:8 — `Store` exposes publicly writable state (Manager).
  • Mutable entity: StoreItem Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/StoreItem.cs:6 — `StoreItem` exposes publicly writable state (ItemName, Store, BalanceQuantity).
  • Mutable entity: Sales Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.cs:8 — `Sales` exposes publicly writable state (SalesDate, SalesLineItems).
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×5
  • Off the main sequence: Purchase.Core Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCore/Purchase.Core.csproj:1 — Purchase.Core: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 4 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Purchase.DTO Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDto/Purchase.DTO.csproj:1 — Purchase.DTO: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Sales.DTO Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDto/Sales.DTO.csproj:1 — Sales.DTO: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Inventory.Domain Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Inventory.Domain.csproj:1 — Inventory.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.17, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 5 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Sales.Domain Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.Domain.csproj:1 — Sales.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×3
  • No assertions: ShouldPublishMessageWhenValidQueueProvided Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure.Tests/RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs:40 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: ShouldReceiveMessageWhenValidQueueProvided Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure.Tests/RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs:58 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: ShouldReturnTotalItemsCountWhenValidStoreId Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests/InventoryServiceTest.cs:11 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
D10 · Test Quality · Test project verifies nothing · ×3
  • Test project verifies nothing: Common.Core.Tests Src/CommonAll/Common.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:8 — No conventional assertion call was detected in 1 of 1 tests in `Common.Core.Tests` — the project as a whole, not one method. Two things look like this: verification that happens indirectly (an approval/verifier harness or BDD step methods), or a suite that genuinely checks nothing. If it is the latter, this project passes unconditionally and cannot fail.
  • Test project verifies nothing: Common.Infrastructure.Tests Src/CommonAll/Common.Infrastructure.Tests/RabbitMqServiceBusTest.cs:40 — No conventional assertion call was detected in 2 of 2 tests in `Common.Infrastructure.Tests` — the project as a whole, not one method. Two things look like this: verification that happens indirectly (an approval/verifier harness or BDD step methods), or a suite that genuinely checks nothing. If it is the latter, this project passes unconditionally and cannot fail.
  • Test project verifies nothing: Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests/InventoryServiceTest.cs:11 — No conventional assertion call was detected in 1 of 1 tests in `Inventory.Api.Grpc.Tests` — the project as a whole, not one method. Two things look like this: verification that happens indirectly (an approval/verifier harness or BDD step methods), or a suite that genuinely checks nothing. If it is the latter, this project passes unconditionally and cannot fail.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Empty method body · ×2
  • Empty method body — does nothing with its inputs Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:77 — `RegisterEventHanders` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it.
  • Empty method body — does nothing with its inputs Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Startup.cs:89 — `RegisterEventHandlers` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×2
  • Sync-over-async blocking — 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:57 — `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:14 — Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:14-25 | Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs:15-24 | Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs:15-24 | Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Program.cs:15-24 — before extracting anything, compare `Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs` and `Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 93% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:83 — Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:83-87 | Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Startup.cs:78-82 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1
  • End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp3.1 Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Sales.Api.csproj:4 — Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Sales.Api.csproj declares .NET netcoreapp3.1 as this project's target framework, and .NET Core 3.1 LTS, support ended 2022-12-13. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2022-12-13 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
ED5 · Idempotency · Non-idempotent mutation · ×1
  • Non-idempotent mutation: CommandHandler.PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:43 — `CommandHandler.PurchaseCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1
  • No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Startup.cs:30 — `services.AddHttpClient()` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) · ×1
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Startup.cs:57 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×1
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:179 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Minor — 29 finding(s)
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×5
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:21 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×5
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Src/InventoryMicroservice/Inventory.Api.Grpc/Program.cs:21 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Program.cs:20 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Commented-out code · ×3
  • Commented-out code Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:48 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:52 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommandHandler/PurchaseCommandHandler.cs:54 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: InventoryQueryHandler Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryQueryHandler/InventoryQueryHandler.csproj — `InventoryQueryHandler` contributes only 7 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent casing for the same field name in similar controller classes. One uses camelCase (`commandBus`) while the other likely follows the same pattern, but the inconsistency is subtle. However, a more glaring issue is the spelling of the interface/type name itself across the codebase. · ×1
  • Inconsistent casing for the same field name in similar controller classes. One uses camelCase (`commandBus`) while the other likely follows the same pattern, but the inconsistency is subtle. However, a more glaring issue is the spelling of the interface/type name itself across the codebase. — Standardize field casing to camelCase (`commandBus`) or PascalCase (`CommandBus`) consistently across all controllers. Note: The provided list shows `commandBus` in both, so this specific pair is consistent. The real inconsistency is below. (symbols: Field: private ICommandBus Sales.Api.Controllers.SalesCommandController.commandBus, Field: private ICommandBus Inventory.Api.Controllers.StoreCommandController.commandBus)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in the interface and class name · ×1
  • Typo in the interface and class name: `IPurchaseRepostiory` and `IPurchaseRepostiory` (missing 's' in Repository). While consistent with itself, it is a typo that should be corrected to `IPurchaseRepository`. — Rename `IPurchaseRepostiory` to `IPurchaseRepository` and update all references. (symbols: Type: public Purchase.Repository.IPurchaseRepostiory, Field: private IPurchaseRepostiory Purchase.CommandHandler.PurchaseCommandHandler.purchaseRepository)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in the constant class/namespace name · ×1
  • Typo in the constant class/namespace name: `EmailAddressess` (double 's'). — Rename `EmailAddressess` to `EmailAddresses`. (symbols: Field: public string Purchase.Core.Constants.EmailAddressess.AdminPurchaseEmailAddress, Type: public Purchase.Core.Constants.EmailAddressess)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in method name · ×1
  • Typo in method name: `Decerialize` should be `Deserialize`. — Rename `Decerialize` to `Deserialize`. (symbols: Method: public Task Common.Core.JsonSerializer.Decerialize<T>(string), Type: public Common.Core.JsonSerializer)
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M3 · Folder & project structure · No tests/ separation · ×1
  • No tests/ separation — Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
M3 · Folder & project structure · Inconsistent root namespaces · ×1
  • Inconsistent root namespaces — Only 13/43 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 2/12 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 12, 4 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1
  • No rollback/health safety — Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 0/28 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere · ×1
  • Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere — 0/37 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
Minor — 40 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×38
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Api Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseWebApi/Purchase.Api.csproj — Purchase.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Command Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCommand/Purchase.Command.csproj — Purchase.Command: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/12).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Query Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseQuery/Purchase.Query.csproj — Purchase.Query: 57 % XML-doc coverage (4/7).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Core Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseCore/Purchase.Core.csproj — Purchase.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/8).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Repository Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseRepository/Purchase.Repository.csproj — Purchase.Repository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.Domain Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDomain/Purchase.Domain.csproj — Purchase.Domain: 21 % XML-doc coverage (3/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.DTO Src/PurchaseMicroservice/PurchaseDto/Purchase.DTO.csproj — Purchase.DTO: 4 % XML-doc coverage (1/23).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Api REDACTED — Inventory.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/19).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Command Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryCommand/Inventory.Command.csproj — Inventory.Command: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.CommandHandler Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryCommandHandler/Inventory.CommandHandler.csproj — Inventory.CommandHandler: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Query Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryQuery/Inventory.Query.csproj — Inventory.Query: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).
  • XML-doc coverage: InventoryQueryHandler Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryQueryHandler/InventoryQueryHandler.csproj — InventoryQueryHandler: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Domain Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDomain/Inventory.Domain.csproj — Inventory.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Repository Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryRepository/Inventory.Repository.csproj — Inventory.Repository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/15).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.DTO Src/InventoryMicroservice/InventoryDto/Inventory.DTO.csproj — Inventory.DTO: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Api Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesWebApi/Sales.Api.csproj — Sales.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/13).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Core Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesCore/Sales.Core.csproj — Sales.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Command Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesCommand/Sales.Command.csproj — Sales.Command: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/11).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.CommandHandler Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesCommandHandler/Sales.CommandHandler.csproj — Sales.CommandHandler: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Query Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesQuery/Sales.Query.csproj — Sales.Query: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.QueryHandler Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesQueryHandler/Sales.QueryHandler.csproj — Sales.QueryHandler: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Domain Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDomain/Sales.Domain.csproj — Sales.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/11).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.Repository Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesRepository/Sales.Repository.csproj — Sales.Repository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sales.DTO Src/SalesMicroservice/SalesDto/Sales.DTO.csproj — Sales.DTO: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Purchase.CommandHandler REDACTED — Purchase.CommandHandler: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/3).
  • + 13 more in this group — see findings.md.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — Common.Infrastructure.Tests references Moq.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Common.Infrastructure REDACTED:1 — Common.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.07, distance 0.93 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a19fed0f3204465a88fdb1b5f1c1df0b/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a19fed0f3204465a88fdb1b5f1c1df0b/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list Src/TheMicroservices.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json13artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .12artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a16020-72e8-7b01-93b0-5ac36ea6d493 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 21 · Warnings: 82 · Recommendations: 29 · Info: 40 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 21-10-2026 @ 20:21 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md