Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
hamed.shirbandi/TaskoMask carries serious risk (30%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (81%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (15%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (36%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage).
For scale: Small (~15,862 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 15 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 30 → ~42.
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,200–€25,000
| Cost to rebuild | €5,200–€25,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 30% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 64% boilerplate · 26% straight-line · 10% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€15,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 15% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Trajectory
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Event-Driven
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 24 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test every change automatically. Next, implement structured logging and health checks to improve system observability. Then, increase unit test coverage for the domain layer to ensure core logic is correct. After that, add resilience policies to HTTP clients to prevent external failures from crashing the application. Finally, resolve the four deprecated dependencies to maintain code hygiene.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +12.3 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +9.1 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +12.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +12.8 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most. | +12.8 pts | Medium | Domain vs controller coverage |
| Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down. | +12.6 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +12.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected. | +11.7 pts | Medium | Schema migrations |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| Src/Presentation/3-UI/Website/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/TasksController.cs | 6.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/OwnersController.cs | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Boards/Commands/Handlers/BoardCommandHandlers.cs | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: BoardCommandHandlers.cs ↔ TaskCommandHandlers.cs |
| Src/Tests/Application.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs | 8.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Boards/Queries/Handlers/BoardQueryHandlers.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Cards/Queries/Handlers/CardQueryHandlers.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Organizations/Queries/Handlers/OrganizationQueryHandlers.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Owners/Queries/Handlers/OwnerQueryHandlers.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Projects/Queries/Handlers/ProjectQueryHandlers.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/ValueObjects/Owners/OwnerDisplayName.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Presentation/3-UI/Website/Controllers/HomeController.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/Libraries/1-Infrastructure/Infrastructure.Data/ReadModel/DataProviders/ReadDbSeedData.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: ReadDbSeedData.SyncAdminPanelTempData (cognitive 21) |
| Src/Presentation/3-UI/AdminPanel/Areas/Workspace/Controllers/BoardsController.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) |
| Src/Libraries/1-Infrastructure/Infrastructure.CrossCutting/Services/Security/EncryptionService.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Boards/Entities/Board.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: Board (LCOM4 5) |
| Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Entities/Owner.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: Owner (LCOM4 5) |
| Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Entities/Organization.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: Organization (LCOM4 4) |
| Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Tasks/Entities/Task.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: Task (LCOM4 4) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 75 of 76 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 29 of 106 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ReadDbSeedData.SyncAdminPanelTempData at 21.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
2 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
17 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
4 of 67 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 0.0%, branch coverage 0.0%.
What to do
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
1 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
34 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 34 packages use a banned license.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
D17 · Explicit Debt
14 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 15862 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8.
D18 · Solution Shape
17 projects, 440 .cs files, 15945 hand-written lines of code (15862 production / 83 test), plus 1036 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 93 inter-project edges.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 17 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
97 % of calls cross a namespace and 32 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High interface indirection finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
24 vulnerable package(s): 3 critical, 11 high, 10 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
- Resolve the 10 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
69 of 69 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Membership/Permissions/Services/PermissionService.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: BoardCommandHandlers.cs↔TaskCommandHandlers.cs 50%; BoardCommandHandlers.cs↔CardCommandHandlers.cs 50%; CardCommandHandlers.cs↔TaskCommandHandlers.cs 50%
D39 · IL Efficiency
0 of 5 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — Index.cshtml:80, Index.cshtml:91
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — Default.cshtml:9, _AdminLayout.cshtml:42
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child. (×9) — _ChangePassword.cshtml:4, _ResetPassword.cshtml:4, _SaveForm.cshtml:5, …
- A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×8) — _ItemList.cshtml:39, _ItemList.cshtml:44, _Roles.cshtml:36, …
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×3) — _UpdateRoles.cshtml:21, _UpdatePermissions.cshtml:27, _BasicInfo.cshtml:16
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×5) — Index.cshtml:12, Index.cshtml:8, Index.cshtml:8, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×3) — _AdminLayout.cshtml:3, _Layout.cshtml:3, _Layout.cshtml:0
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — _AdminLayout.cshtml:3, _Layout.cshtml:3
- user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. (×2) — _AdminLayout.cshtml:7, _Layout.cshtml:7
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×3) — _Layout.cshtml:0, _Host.cshtml:0, _Layout.cshtml:0
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×13) — Upsert.razor:43, Upsert.razor:49, Boards.razor:9, …
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
- `Application.Core` is a Domain project but references `Application.Share`, a Application project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
What to do
- Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX6 · Interface segregation
AX8 · Test isolation
AX9 · CQS / query purity
C1 · Data Protection
- No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
What to do
- Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `Activity.TaskId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TaskId { String Value }`). — Activity.cs:21
- `Activity.OwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OwnerId { String Value }`). — Activity.cs:22
- `Board.ProjectId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProjectId { String Value }`). — Board.cs:24
- `Board.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Board.cs:25
- `Card.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — Card.cs:26
- `Member.OwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OwnerId { String Value }`). — Member.cs:27
- `Member.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — Member.cs:28
- `Member.ProjectId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProjectId { String Value }`). — Member.cs:29
- `Member.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Member.cs:30
- `Organization.OwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OwnerId { String Value }`). — Organization.cs:25
- `Project.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Project.cs:25
- `Task.CardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CardId { String Value }`). — Task.cs:25
- `Task.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — Task.cs:26
- `Task.ProjectId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProjectId { String Value }`). — Task.cs:27
- `Task.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Task.cs:28
- `BoardCreatedEvent.ProjectId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProjectId { String Value }`). — BoardCreatedEvent.cs:20
- `CardCreatedEvent.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — CardCreatedEvent.cs:20
- `MemberCreatedEvent.MemberOwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct MemberOwnerId { String Value }`). — MemberCreatedEvent.cs:18
- `MemberCreatedEvent.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — MemberCreatedEvent.cs:20
- `OrganizationCreatedEvent.OwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OwnerId { String Value }`). — OrganizationCreatedEvent.cs:19
- `ProjectCreatedEvent.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — ProjectCreatedEvent.cs:19
- `ActivityCreatedEvent.TaskId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TaskId { String Value }`). — ActivityCreatedEvent.cs:18
- `CommentCreatedEvent.TaskId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TaskId { String Value }`). — CommentCreatedEvent.cs:18
- `TaskCreatedEvent.CardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CardId { String Value }`). — TaskCreatedEvent.cs:21
- `TaskCreatedEvent.BoardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct BoardId { String Value }`). — TaskCreatedEvent.cs:22
- `TaskMovedToAnotherCardEvent.CardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CardId { String Value }`). — TaskMovedToAnotherCardEvent.cs:15
- `DomainEvent.EntityId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EntityId { String Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `IDomainEvent.EntityId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EntityId { String Value }`). — IDomainEvent.cs:12
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `Activity` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Activity.cs:7
- `Board` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Board.cs:7
- `Card` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Card.cs:8
- `Comment` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Comment.cs:10
- `Member` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Member.cs:11
- `Organization` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Organization.cs:7
- `Owner` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Owner.cs:11
- `Project` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Project.cs:7
- `Task` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Task.cs:7
- `User` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — User.cs:5
- `Operator` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Operator.cs:11
- `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Permission.cs:6
- `Role` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Role.cs:9
- `AggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AggregateRoot.cs:14
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `Activity` exposes public setter(s) (TaskId, OwnerId, Description). — Activity.cs:7
- `Board` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, ProjectId, OrganizationId). — Board.cs:7
- `Card` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Type, BoardId). — Card.cs:8
- `Comment` exposes public setter(s) (Content). — Comment.cs:10
- `Member` exposes public setter(s) (OwnerId, BoardId, ProjectId, OrganizationId, AccessLevel). — Member.cs:11
- `Organization` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, OwnerId). — Organization.cs:7
- `Owner` exposes public setter(s) (UserName, IsActive, DisplayName, Email). — Owner.cs:11
- `Project` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, OrganizationId). — Project.cs:7
- `Task` exposes public setter(s) (Title, Description, CardId, BoardId, ProjectId, OrganizationId). — Task.cs:7
- `User` exposes public setter(s) (UserName, IsActive, PasswordHash, PasswordSalt). — User.cs:5
- `Operator` exposes public setter(s) (DisplayName, Email, RolesId). — Operator.cs:11
- `Permission` exposes public setter(s) (DisplayName, SystemName, GroupName). — Permission.cs:6
- `Role` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, PermissionsId). — Role.cs:9
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
DM7 · Repository granularity
- `ActivityRepository` is a repository over `Activity`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Activity` through its owning aggregate instead. — ActivityRepository.cs:13
- `BoardRepository` is a repository over `Board`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Board` through its owning aggregate instead. — BoardRepository.cs:13
- `CardRepository` is a repository over `Card`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Card` through its owning aggregate instead. — CardRepository.cs:13
- `CommentRepository` is a repository over `Comment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Comment` through its owning aggregate instead. — CommentRepository.cs:13
- `MemberRepository` is a repository over `Member`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Member` through its owning aggregate instead. — MemberRepository.cs:13
- `OrganizationRepository` is a repository over `Organization`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Organization` through its owning aggregate instead. — OrganizationRepository.cs:13
- `OwnerRepository` is a repository over `Owner`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Owner` through its owning aggregate instead. — OwnerRepository.cs:13
- `ProjectRepository` is a repository over `Project`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Project` through its owning aggregate instead. — ProjectRepository.cs:13
- `TaskRepository` is a repository over `Task`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Task` through its owning aggregate instead. — TaskRepository.cs:12
- `UserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead. — UserRepository.cs:10
- `OperatorRepository` is a repository over `Operator`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Operator` through its owning aggregate instead. — OperatorRepository.cs:12
- `PermissionRepository` is a repository over `Permission`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Permission` through its owning aggregate instead. — PermissionRepository.cs:14
- `RoleRepository` is a repository over `Role`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Role` through its owning aggregate instead. — RoleRepository.cs:14
- `BoardAggregateRepository` is a repository over `Board`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Board` through its owning aggregate instead. (×2) — BoardAggregateRepository.cs:14, BoardAggregateRepository.cs:14
- `OwnerAggregateRepository` is a repository over `Owner`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Owner` through its owning aggregate instead. (×2) — OwnerAggregateRepository.cs:14, OwnerAggregateRepository.cs:14
- `TaskAggregateRepository` is a repository over `Task`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Task` through its owning aggregate instead. (×2) — TaskAggregateRepository.cs:12, TaskAggregateRepository.cs:12
- `IActivityRepository` is a repository over `Activity`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Activity` through its owning aggregate instead. — IActivityRepository.cs:7
- `IBoardRepository` is a repository over `Board`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Board` through its owning aggregate instead. — IBoardRepository.cs:9
- `ICardRepository` is a repository over `Card`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Card` through its owning aggregate instead. — ICardRepository.cs:8
- `ICommentRepository` is a repository over `Comment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Comment` through its owning aggregate instead. — ICommentRepository.cs:9
- `IMemberRepository` is a repository over `Member`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Member` through its owning aggregate instead. — IMemberRepository.cs:9
- `IOrganizationRepository` is a repository over `Organization`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Organization` through its owning aggregate instead. — IOrganizationRepository.cs:9
- `IOwnerRepository` is a repository over `Owner`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Owner` through its owning aggregate instead. — IOwnerRepository.cs:8
- `IProjectRepository` is a repository over `Project`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Project` through its owning aggregate instead. — IProjectRepository.cs:9
- `ITaskRepository` is a repository over `Task`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Task` through its owning aggregate instead. — ITaskRepository.cs:7
- `IUserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead. — IUserRepository.cs:8
- `IOperatorRepository` is a repository over `Operator`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Operator` through its owning aggregate instead. — IOperatorRepository.cs:8
- `IPermissionRepository` is a repository over `Permission`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Permission` through its owning aggregate instead. — IPermissionRepository.cs:8
- `IRoleRepository` is a repository over `Role`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Role` through its owning aggregate instead. — IRoleRepository.cs:8
What to do
- Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
ED2 · Event/command shape
ED3 · Event naming
- `DomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — DomainEvent.cs:11
- `IDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IDomainEvent.cs:10
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
ED5 · Idempotency
- `Exceptions.ApplicationExceptionsHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — ApplicationExceptionsHandler.cs:44
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `Process` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. (×2) — AuthorizationMappingAction.cs:20, MembershipMappingAction.cs:20
- `Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×5) — ApplicationExceptionsHandler.cs:44, BoardQueryHandlers.cs:95, CardQueryHandlers.cs:81, …
- `InvokeAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — DomainValidationSummary.cs:16
- `Get` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×2) — OwnersController.cs:39, TasksController.cs:38
- `Add` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — OwnersController.cs:52
- `Delete` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — OwnersController.cs:65
- `Create` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×4) — TasksController.cs:53, OperatorsController.cs:63, PermissionsController.cs:92, …
- `Update` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — TasksController.cs:66
- `SetCardId` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — TasksController.cs:79
- `OnGetAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×2) — Login.cshtml.cs:27, Register.cshtml.cs:27
- `known` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — ErrorController.cs:30
- `Unknown` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — ErrorController.cs:46
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — WorkspaceMappingAction.cs:24, BaseRepository.cs:86, CookieAuthenticationConfiguration.cs:33
What to do
- Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 2 of 17 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
- Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations
- EF Core is used but neither migrations nor EnsureCreated were detected — confirm how the production schema is created and evolved.
What to do
- Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.
P9 · Domain vs controller coverage
- Domain coverage is 0% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.
What to do
- Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- Identifier 'passwordHash' looks like a password-hash field/property, but no KDF (PBKDF2 / Argon2 / BCrypt / PasswordHasher) was found anywhere in the source — so passwords aren't protected by a salted key-derivation function (whether a fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim). Password storage needs a salted KDF and a constant-time compare. — UserService.cs:79
- Password-hash field compared with `==` — use a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles (CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals). — UserService.cs:80
- DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. — EncryptionService.cs:61
- `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — JwtAuthenticationConfiguration.cs:43
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Authorization/Users/Services/UserService.cs:79`.
- Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`.
- Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 76/330 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — UserService.cs:45, UserService.cs:59, UserService.cs:73, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 5/15 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 68% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Architecture | 81% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 53% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 15% | Critical — gated by D8, D12, P1, P2, P3, P7, P9 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 39% | Weak — gated by D30, C1, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 42% | Weak — gated by DM2, DM5, DM7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 36% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 28 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 19 finding(s)
- High CVE: AutoMapper 10.1.1
- High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.11.3
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0
- High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0
- High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0
- High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0
- Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0
- Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
- Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.2
- High IaC: DS-0002 Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 Src/Presentation/3-UI/Website/Dockerfile
- No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 Src/Tests/Application.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs:8
- Vulnerable: AutoMapper
- Layer violation: Domain → Application
Warning — 43 finding(s)
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Boards/Queries/Handlers/BoardQueryHandlers.cs:97
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Cards/Queries/Handlers/CardQueryHandlers.cs:83
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Organizations/Queries/Handlers/OrganizationQueryHandlers.cs:79
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Owners/Queries/Handlers/OwnerQueryHandlers.cs:89
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Projects/Queries/Handlers/ProjectQueryHandlers.cs:79
- TodoComment Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/ValueObjects/Owners/OwnerDisplayName.cs:60
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/OwnersController.cs:43
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/OwnersController.cs:56
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/OwnersController.cs:69
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/TasksController.cs:42
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/TasksController.cs:57
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/TasksController.cs:70
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Controllers/TasksController.cs:83
- TodoComment Src/Presentation/3-UI/Website/Controllers/HomeController.cs:48
- Medium CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.11.3
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
- Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1
- Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.1.5
- Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1
- Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0
- Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0
- Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http
- Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity
- Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer
- Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions
- Low cohesion: Board (LCOM4 5) Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Boards/Entities/Board.cs:17
- Low cohesion: Owner (LCOM4 5) Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Entities/Owner.cs:19
- Low cohesion: Organization (LCOM4 4) Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Entities/Organization.cs:13
- Low cohesion: Task (LCOM4 4) Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Tasks/Entities/Task.cs:17
- Change coupling: BoardCommandHandlers.cs ↔ TaskCommandHandlers.cs Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Boards/Commands/Handlers/BoardCommandHandlers.cs
- Change coupling: BoardCommandHandlers.cs ↔ CardCommandHandlers.cs Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Boards/Commands/Handlers/BoardCommandHandlers.cs
- Change coupling: CardCommandHandlers.cs ↔ TaskCommandHandlers.cs Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Cards/Commands/Handlers/CardCommandHandlers.cs
- Off the main sequence: Infrastructure.Share
- Off the main sequence: Domain.Share
- Off the main sequence: Application.Share
- LLM evaluation failed
- ReadDbSeedData.SyncAdminPanelTempData (cognitive 21) Src/Libraries/1-Infrastructure/Infrastructure.Data/ReadModel/DataProviders/ReadDbSeedData.cs:21
- LLM evaluation failed
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) Src/Presentation/3-UI/AdminPanel/Areas/Workspace/Controllers/BoardsController.cs:64
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Src/Libraries/1-Infrastructure/Infrastructure.CrossCutting/Services/Security/EncryptionService.cs:55
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Src/Presentation/2-API/UserPanelAPI/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Src/Presentation/3-UI/Website/Dockerfile
- Small-team knowledge concentration
- Thin analysable surface across projects
- No ADRs found
- Bounded contexts not declared
- High interface indirection
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- Dormant codebase
Info — 35 finding(s)
- Outdated: AutoMapper
- Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection
- Outdated: FluentValidation
- Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions
- Outdated: RedisCache.Core
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions
- Outdated: StackExchange.Redis
- Outdated: MediatR
- Outdated: mongocsharpdriver
- Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Razor.RuntimeCompilation
- Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets
- Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design
- Outdated: MvcPagedList.Core
- Outdated: coverlet.collector
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: MSTest.TestAdapter
- Outdated: MSTest.TestFramework
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json
- Outdated: Blazored.Modal
- Outdated: Blazored.Toast
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list TaskoMask.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 24 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 14 field(s)
- OperatorBasicInfoDto.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application.Share/Dtos/Membership/Operators/OperatorBasicInfoDto.cs:21
- OperatorUpsertDto.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application.Share/Dtos/Membership/Operators/OperatorUpsertDto.cs:25
- OwnerBasicInfoDto.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application.Share/Dtos/Workspace/Owners/OwnerBasicInfoDto.cs:18
- OwnerRegisterDto.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application.Share/Dtos/Workspace/Owners/OwnerRegisterDto.cs:21
- OwnerUpdateDto.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application.Share/Dtos/Workspace/Owners/OwnerUpdateDto.cs:26
- OwnerBaseCommand.Email Src/Libraries/2-Application/Application/Workspace/Owners/Commands/Models/OwnerBaseCommand.cs:34
- DomainConstValues.Owner_Email_Min_Length Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain.Share/Helpers/DomainConstValues.cs:51
- DomainConstValues.Owner_Email_Max_Length Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain.Share/Helpers/DomainConstValues.cs:52
- AuthenticatedUser.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain.Share/Models/AuthenticatedUser.cs:8
- Owner.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/ReadModel/Entities/Owner.cs:28
- Operator.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Membership/Entities/Operator.cs:29
- Owner.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Entities/Owner.cs:52
- OwnerCreatedEvent.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Events/Owners/OwnerCreatedEvent.cs:18
- OwnerUpdatedEvent.Email Src/Libraries/3-Domain/Domain/WriteModel/Workspace/Owners/Events/Owners/OwnerUpdatedEvent.cs:18