Public report — DispatchR, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 03-08-2026 @ 16:19 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Hasanxdev/DispatchR

bounded contexts not declared
48% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate
Event-Driven 100% Exemplary Architecture 94% Exemplary Code Health 71% Strong Performance 70% Adequate Maturity 66% Adequate Readiness 48% Weak Security 33% Weak

Small · 2,362 LoC · 15 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (33%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

58/61dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
23findings with an exact file:lineof 63 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
61/101dimensions across the health lenses2362 LoC · 15 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

hasanxdev/DispatchR carries serious risk (48%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (94%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (33%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (48%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Small (~2,362 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 71% Strong Architecture 94% ★ Exemplary Maturity 66% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 48% Weak · gated by P3 Security 33% Weak · gated by D36, C2 Event-Driven 100% ★ Exemplary Performance 70% Adequate · gated by PF3
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 33% · 46% weightReadiness 48% · 25% weightMaturity 66% · 14% weightPerformance 70% · 8% weightCode Health 71% · 4% weightArchitecture 94% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Security 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 48 → ~60.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 8%Plumbing 39%Tests 53%
New since the last scan (11+)

11 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,100–€16,000
Cost to rebuild€3,100–€16,000 (0.1 person-years (52–166 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 48% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 45% boilerplate · 37% straight-line · 17% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€9,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — microservices, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
+13.3 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls
2
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
+12.3 pts · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-release.yml (3).
+4.6 pts · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,362 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 33%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch AspireModularSample.AppHost AppHost AspireModularSample.ServiceA ServiceA AspireModularSample.AppHost->AspireModularSample.ServiceA AspireModularSample.ServiceB ServiceB AspireModularSample.AppHost->AspireModularSample.ServiceB AspireModularSample.Modules Modules DispatchR DispatchR AspireModularSample.Modules->DispatchR AspireModularSample.ServiceA->AspireModularSample.Modules AspireModularSample.ServiceA->DispatchR AspireModularSample.ServiceB->AspireModularSample.Modules AspireModularSample.ServiceB->DispatchR DispatchR.Abstractions Abstractions DispatchR->DispatchR.Abstractions

Architecture — module dependency matrix

20 modules, 31 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)Benchmark…chR.Abstractions.Send…spatchR.ConfigurationDispatchR.ExceptionsProjects…ModularSample.Modules…ractions.Notification…R.Abstractions.StreamDispatchR.Extensions…ication.MultiHandlers…on.MultiHandlersAsync…ication.SingleHandlerDispatchRBenchmark.SendRequest…nchmark.StreamRequestMediator.InternalsMediatorBenchmark.Notification…s.DependencyInjection(global)1Benchmark2…chR.Abstractions.Send3…spatchR.Configuration4DispatchR.Exceptions5Projects6…ModularSample.Modules7…ractions.Notification8…R.Abstractions.Stream9DispatchR.Extensions10…ication.MultiHandlers11…on.MultiHandlersAsync12…ication.SingleHandler13DispatchR14Benchmark.SendRequest15…nchmark.StreamRequest16Mediator.Internals17Mediator18Benchmark.Notification19…s.DependencyInjection2041114422252521111116111111442111

At a glance — Code Health · 71% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.3 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 8.2 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.9 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.7 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.2
The Bad
D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 6.8 X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.6 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 6.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 5.4

At a glance — Architecture · 94% · Exemplary

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 8.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 8.1 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 66% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.8 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 6.1
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 4.8 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 3.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 48% · Weak · gated by P3

The Good
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 10.0 D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 9.5 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 4.9 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 1.0

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D36, C2

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0
The Bad
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 6.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 6.4 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0
The Ugly
D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 7.0

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Adequate · gated by PF3

The Good
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 9.5 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 10.0
The Ugly
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 3.4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components12High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection3High / Critical

Roadmap

First, enforce strict access controls by implementing default-deny policies and imperative guards across all handlers to secure endpoints. Next, harden the web security posture by adding critical response headers and integrating a static analysis step into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions. Additionally, improve observability by extending structured logging and exposing diagnostics seams for better monitoring. Finally, implement manual approval gates for releases to ensure builds are validated before deployment.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+13.3 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+12.3 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-release.yml (3).+4.6 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+6.2 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+6.2 ptsMediumObservability
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+6.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+6.2 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+3.1 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 9 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 22% mixed · 78% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/build-release.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs6.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cyclomatic 27)
src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamDispatchRCommands.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamMediatRCommands.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamMediatSGCommands.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/DispatchR.Abstractions/IMediator.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: ObsoleteWithCallers
src/DispatchR/Mediator.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: ObsoleteWithCallers
src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.AppHost/AspireModularSample.AppHost.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: AspireModularSample.AppHost
src/Benchmark/SendRequest/MediatSGCommands.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 58 of 61 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 61 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX8AX9C2ED1ED3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 23 of 63 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc86c-bd28-7e0d-9eba-26a9d7472b12.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers at 27.

ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cyclomatic 27)src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:10

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers at 77.

ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cognitive 77)src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:10

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cognitive 77) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ServiceRegistrator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

15 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 90.7%.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

34 test methods: 34 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 34 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

10 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

Outdated: MediatR · ×10

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 17 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs (2×27=54)

Hotspot: src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cssrc/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/DispatchR/Mediator.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2362 LoC (0.6/KLoC) → score 8.9.

BarePragmaDisable · ×3src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamDispatchRCommands.cs:1
ObsoleteWithCallers · ×2src/DispatchR.Abstractions/IMediator.cs:28

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with StreamDispatchRCommands.cs, StreamMediatRCommands.cs, StreamMediatSGCommands.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 ObsoleteWithCallers finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with IMediator.cs, Mediator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 projects, 162 source files, 3572 hand-written lines of code (2362 production / 1210 test), 23 inter-project edges.

Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
Shell project: AspireModularSample.AppHostsrc/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.AppHost/AspireModularSample.AppHost.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with AspireModularSample.AppHost.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The README is a strong single-document guide for the DispatchR library with a compelling title and an excellent benchmark-note that links readers to compare MediatR vs DispatchR. It lists ⚡ Key Features covering dependency injection, zero reflection, handler return-type flexibility, heap-alloc-free design, real-world outperformance, MediatR compatibility, assembly-inclusion/exclusion for Aspire modules, and a detailed Request/Stream/Notification section with numbered subitems. The AspireModularExample README is also solid: it explains the IncludeHandlers/ExcludeHandlers features on an assembly-wide level, shows concrete Program.cs code for both exclude-only and include-only service configurations, and names each referenced project (Modules, ServiceA, ServiceB, AppHost). Both docs are well written but clipped mid-sentence in the middle of the Request Definition section, so any outline sections beyond that cannot be confirmed missing. The visible material is clear and complete.

XML-doc coverage: Benchmark · ×8src/Benchmark/Benchmark.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The README is a strong single-document guide for the DispatchR library with a compelling title and an excellent benchmark-note that links readers to compare MediatR vs DispatchR. It lists ⚡ Key Features covering dependency injection, zero reflection, handler return-type flexibility, heap-alloc-free design, real-world outperformance, MediatR compatibility, assembly-inclusion/exclusion for Aspire modules, and a detailed Request/Stream/Notification section with numbered subitems. The AspireModularExample README is also solid: it explains the IncludeHandlers/ExcludeHandlers features on an assembly-wide level, shows concrete Program.cs code for both exclude-only and include-only service configurations, and names each referenced project (Modules, ServiceA, ServiceB, AppHost). Both docs are well written but clipped mid-sentence in the middle of the Request Definition section, so any outline sections beyond that cannot be confirmed missing. The visible material is clear and complete.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation for MediatR) is used for others.
Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation) is used in another.
Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' is used for others.
Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' is used in another.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 100 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2src/Benchmark/SendRequest/MediatSGCommands.cs:18

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with MediatSGCommands.cs, ServiceRegistrator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 11 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

97 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 86 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.6/10. — 97 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 86 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×3.github/workflows/build-release.yml:20detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-release.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 9 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 · ×3detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
Secret passed as a command-line argument
No build provenance
No artifact signing

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 79 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:14

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `MultiHandlersNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×3) — MultiHandlersNotification.cs:5, MultiHandlersNotification.cs:5, MultiHandlersNotification.cs:5
  • `MultiHandlersAsyncNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — MultiHandlersAsyncNotification.cs:5
  • `SingleHandlerNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — SingleHandlerNotification.cs:5
  • `GenericAwareNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — GenericAwareNotification.cs:5

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 11 of 11 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 139/176 types (79%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 5 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 3 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
  • Only 36/100 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
  • In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
X1 · Async correctness6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×3) — NotificationBenchmarks.cs:141, NotificationBenchmarks.cs:142, NotificationBenchmarks.cs:143

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 22/66 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×25) — MediatRVsDispatchRBenchmark.cs:144, MediatRVsDispatchRBenchmark.cs:155, MediatRVsDispatchRBenchmark.cs:179, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×2) — Program.cs:91, Program.cs:109

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.0 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 12 suppression(s) across the 11762 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health71%StrongSolid.
Architecture94%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity66%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness48%Weak — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D36, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Performance70%Adequate — gated by PF3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 40 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (6 domain event(s))
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ED4 Outbox / dual-write — no persistence writes or publishes observed in handlers — atomicity not assessable
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 6 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×3
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-release.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-release.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-release.yml:45 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `codecov/codecov-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/codecov/codecov-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 21 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×3
  • BarePragmaDisable src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamDispatchRCommands.cs:1 — #pragma warning disable CS1998 // Async method lacks 'await' operators and will run synchronously — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamMediatRCommands.cs:1 — #pragma warning disable CS1998 // Async method lacks 'await' operators and will run synchronously — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/Benchmark/StreamRequest/StreamMediatSGCommands.cs:1 — #pragma warning disable CS1998 // Async method lacks 'await' operators and will run synchronously — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithCallers · ×2
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/DispatchR.Abstractions/IMediator.cs:28 — [Obsolete] Publish
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/DispatchR/Mediator.cs:59 — [Obsolete] Publish
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cyclomatic 27) · ×1
  • ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cyclomatic 27) src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:10 — ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). Of this number, 19 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 8 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×1
  • Hotspot: src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs — src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 27. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored — This repository contains 2 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `DispatchR.slnx` — the other 1 (`src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularExample.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cognitive 77) · ×1
  • ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers (cognitive 77) src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:10 — ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers has cognitive complexity 77 (threshold 15). Of this number, 60 points are the body's own statements and 17 belong to 8 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 3 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (1 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
  • Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): build-release.yml: dotnet nuget push "./nupkgs/*.nupkg" --api-key ${{ secrets.NUGET_API_KEY }} --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Recommendation — 15 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment src/Benchmark/SendRequest/MediatSGCommands.cs:18 — "version 2.x" — delete - version number restates the file-level comment; only needed for readers who skip past it
  • redundant comment src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:84 — "Sort pipelines by the specified order passed via ConfigurationOptions" — delete - ordering is evident from the pipeline-configuration path
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/DispatchR/Mediator.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: AspireModularSample.AppHost src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.AppHost/AspireModularSample.AppHost.csproj — `AspireModularSample.AppHost` contributes only 4 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 3 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `AspireModularSample.ServiceA` with 13 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 60 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 3.2 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation for MediatR) is used for others. · ×1
  • Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation for MediatR) is used for others. — Standardize on 'MediatR' for all MediatR-related types. (symbols: Benchmark.SendRequest.PingHandlerMediatR, Benchmark.SendRequest.PingHandlerMediatSG)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation) is used in another. · ×1
  • Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' (likely a typo or inconsistent abbreviation) is used in another. — Standardize on 'MediatR' for all MediatR-related types. (symbols: Benchmark.StreamRequest.PingStreamMediatR, Benchmark.StreamRequest.PingStreamMediatSg)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' is used for others. · ×1
  • Inconsistent suffix for MediatR vs DispatchR implementations. 'MediatR' is used for some types, while 'MediatSG' is used for others. — Standardize on 'MediatR' for all MediatR-related types. (symbols: Benchmark.SendRequest.PingMediatR, Benchmark.SendRequest.PingMediatSG)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' is used in another. · ×1
  • Inconsistent casing in suffix 'MediatR' vs 'MediatSg'. 'MediatR' is used in one place, while 'MediatSg' is used in another. — Standardize on 'MediatR' for all MediatR-related types. (symbols: Benchmark.StreamRequest.PingStreamMediatR, Benchmark.StreamRequest.PingStreamMediatSg)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 2362 LoC across 15 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:14 — 1 of 79 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: DispatchR.Configuration.ServiceRegistrator.RegisterHandlers @ src/DispatchR/Configuration/ServiceRegistrator.cs:14, 308 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.7/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 21 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×10
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 14.1.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by Benchmark).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 10.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by DispatchR).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Sample).
  • Outdated: Scalar.AspNetCore — Scalar.AspNetCore 2.14.11 → 2.16.17 available (referenced by Sample).
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.AppHost — Aspire.Hosting.AppHost 13.3.0 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by AspireModularSample.AppHost).
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting — Aspire.Hosting 13.3.0 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by AspireModularSample.ServiceA).
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.4 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by DispatchR.IntegrationTest).
  • Outdated: coverlet.msbuild — coverlet.msbuild 6.0.4 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by DispatchR.IntegrationTest).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 10.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by DispatchR.IntegrationTest).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 18.5.1 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by DispatchR.IntegrationTest).
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×8
  • XML-doc coverage: Benchmark src/Benchmark/Benchmark.csproj — Benchmark: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/152).
  • XML-doc coverage: DispatchR.Abstractions(net8.0) src/DispatchR.Abstractions/DispatchR.Abstractions.csproj — DispatchR.Abstractions(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: DispatchR(net8.0) src/DispatchR/DispatchR.csproj — DispatchR(net8.0): 14 % XML-doc coverage (3/21).
  • XML-doc coverage: Sample src/Sample/Sample.csproj — Sample: 2 % XML-doc coverage (1/53).
  • XML-doc coverage: AspireModularSample.AppHost src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.AppHost/AspireModularSample.AppHost.csproj — AspireModularSample.AppHost: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: AspireModularSample.Modules src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.Modules/AspireModularSample.Modules.csproj — AspireModularSample.Modules: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • XML-doc coverage: AspireModularSample.ServiceA src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.ServiceA/AspireModularSample.ServiceA.csproj — AspireModularSample.ServiceA: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: AspireModularSample.ServiceB src/AspireModularExample/AspireModularSample.ServiceB/AspireModularSample.ServiceB.csproj — AspireModularSample.ServiceB: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: Moq — DispatchR.IntegrationTest references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — DispatchR.UnitTest references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .3artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list DispatchR.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json12artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fc86c-bd28-7e0d-9eba-26a9d7472b12 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 6 · Warnings: 21 · Recommendations: 15 · Info: 21 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 16:19 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md