Public report of haxnted/pet-family-backend-new, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 02:34 UTC · Survey ID cd_d30a30d0fbaa42ceaf7c12aec7a8ed05

haxnted/pet-family-backend-new

Measured 22 October 2026, 02:26 UTC, at code version 4aa0c08

Supply-chain provenance & signing: not measured

Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.

CAI score 52out of 100 Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Code Health 89 Strong Architecture 85 Strong Event-Driven 80 Strong Domain Modelling 67 Adequate Maturity 64 Adequate Performance 60 Adequate Production Readiness 53 Adequate Security and Compliance 43 Weak

A small codebase: 18,654 lines of product code in 49 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.2 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 43

Findings by how serious they are

74 critical 162 serious 108 minor

7 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 02:26 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

92of 98 dimensions measured by tools. The other 6 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
324of 344 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 20 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
98dimensions across 8 lenses, read from 18,654 lines of product code in 49 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

haxnted/pet-family-backend-new scores 52 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, while seven of its eight lenses score higher still: Code Health at 89, Architecture at 85 and Event-Driven at 80, all rated Strong, and Domain Modelling at 67, Maturity at 64, Performance at 60 and Production Readiness at 53, all rated Adequate.

The score is lower than those seven because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Security and Compliance, which scores 43 and is rated Weak. Its IaC & Container Security dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Security and Compliance can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault and to resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning, and if Security and Compliance rose to 70, the score would rise from 52 to about 60.

74 findings are critical: 33 in Explicit Debt, 20 in IaC & Container Security, six in REDACTED Scanning, five in Secrets (history), three in Static Analysis (SAST), two in Aggregate boundaries, two in Coupling, two in Outbox / dual-write and one in Dependency direction.

Watchdog couldn't measure 4 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Dependency Hygiene and IL Efficiency, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 18,654 lines, which would take an estimated 0.2 person-years, around €33,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 89 Strong Architecture 85 Strong Maturity 64 Adequate Production Readiness 53 Adequate, capped by REDACTED Scanning, Security & performance tooling and Schema migrations Security and Compliance 43 Weak, capped by IaC & Container Security and Data Protection Domain Modelling 67 Adequate, capped by Aggregate boundaries Event-Driven 80 Strong Performance 60 Adequate

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 43 · counts for 45%Production Readiness 53 · counts for 25%Performance 60 · counts for 14%Maturity 64 · counts for 8%Domain Modelling 67 · counts for 4%Event-Driven 80 · counts for 2%Architecture 85 · counts for 1%Code Health 89 · counts for 1%

If Security and Compliance rose from 43 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 52 to about 60.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 9%Supporting code 58%Tests 14%Generated by tools 19%
New since the last survey: 56 findings

These 56 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 18 findings

These 18 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Coupling · Off the main sequence: FileStorage.Infrastructure
  • Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable: MailKit
  • Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable: Microsoft.OpenApi
  • Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Ocelot
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Ocelot.Provider.Polly
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: IdentityModel
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: IdentityModel.AspNetCore
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.OpenApi
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch
  • Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency: StyleCop.Analyzers
  • Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore
  • Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
  • Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Shelter._volunteerAssignments Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Shelter.cs
  • Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Shelter.VolunteerAssignments Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Shelter.cs
Rebuild cost: about €33,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€11,000 to €55,000, for 182 to 576 hours of work, about 0.2 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemVery high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 52. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 18,654 lines of product code, of which 39% is declarations and boilerplate, 48% straight logic and 13% logic with branches
Comment linesThe estimate prices 15,267 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 18,654 lines but aren't priced as work.

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault.
Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Raises the score by about 7 points · Medium effort · Data Protection
2
Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2).
Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
3
Resolve the 68 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (31), REDACTED (22), REDACTED (15).
Raises the score by about 6 points · Medium effort · IaC & Container Security

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €33,000 to build again, about 0.2 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 43 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
One cause behind 13 Domain Modelling findings · Common cause
13 findings in the Domain Modelling lens come from the same cause. The code models the business as objects, such as an order or a customer, and each object should guard its own rules: an order, for example, should refuse to be shipped before it has been paid. Here the objects don't do that. Some objects only hold data, while the rules that should keep that data valid sit elsewhere in the code. Identifiers, such as order numbers and customer numbers, are passed around as plain numbers or text, so nothing stops the code from using one kind where another belongs. Because all of these findings have the same cause, fixing it once, in the business objects themselves, deals with them together.
Based on: Rich vs anemic model (4 findings) · Strongly-typed ids (9 findings)
What to do: Give each business object the methods that enforce its rules, such as a method for shipping an order that first checks it has been paid, and let only those methods change its data. Give each kind of identifier a type of its own, so an order number can't be used where a customer number belongs.
If you do one thing first · First action
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 7 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Hosts.Consumers Hosts.Consumers ctx:Hosts.DI Hosts.DI DI Hosts.Consumers->ctx:Hosts.DI ctx:SharedKernel SharedKernel Application · Contracts · Domain · Infrastructure Hosts.Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi SharedKernel.WebApi WebApi Hosts.Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi Hosts.Endpoints Hosts.Endpoints Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:Hosts.DI Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ApiGateway ApiGateway ApiGateway->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi Endpoints Endpoints ctx:Auth Auth Application · Contracts · Infrastructure Endpoints->ctx:Auth Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi Conversation.Hosts.Consumers Conversation.Hosts.Consumers ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI Conversation.Hosts.DI DI Conversation.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI Conversation.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi Consumers Consumers ctx:FileStorage FileStorage Application · Contracts · Infrastructure Consumers->ctx:FileStorage ctx:DI DI DI Consumers->ctx:DI Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel FileStorage.Endpoints FileStorage.Endpoints FileStorage.Endpoints->ctx:FileStorage FileStorage.Endpoints->ctx:DI FileStorage.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel FileStorage.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi Notification.Hosts.Consumers Notification.Hosts.Consumers ctx:Notification.Hosts.DI Notification.Hosts.DI DI Notification.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:Notification.Hosts.DI Notification.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel Notification.Hosts.Endpoints Notification.Hosts.Endpoints Notification.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:Notification.Hosts.DI Notification.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers ctx:Notification Notification Application · Contracts · Infrastructure VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:Notification VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI DI VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers->ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints->ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI ctx:Account Account Domain · Infrastructure ctx:Account->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Hosts.DI->ctx:Account ctx:Hosts.DI->ctx:FileStorage ctx:Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Auth->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Conversation Conversation Contracts · Domain · Infrastructure ctx:Conversation->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI->ctx:Conversation ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Conversation.Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ctx:FileStorage->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:FileStorage->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ctx:DI->ctx:FileStorage ctx:DI->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:DI->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ctx:Notification->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:Notification.Hosts.DI->ctx:Notification ctx:Notification.Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ctx:VolunteerManagement.Handlers VolunteerManagement.Handlers Handlers ctx:VolunteerManagement.Handlers->ctx:FileStorage ctx:VolunteerManagement.Handlers->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:VolunteerManagement.Services VolunteerManagement.Services Services ctx:VolunteerManagement.Handlers->ctx:VolunteerManagement.Services ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI->ctx:FileStorage ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI->ctx:SharedKernel.WebApi ctx:VolunteerManagement.Hosts.DI->ctx:VolunteerManagement.Handlers ctx:VolunteerManagement.Services->ctx:Notification ctx:VolunteerManagement.Services->ctx:SharedKernel __more__ +7 more contexts

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

205 modules, with 313 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 165 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 Auth.Contracts.Dtos2 Auth.Infrastructure.Common3 FileStorage.Application.Services4 Notification.Core.Models5 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.Auth6 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain.Primitives7 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Abstractions8 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Caching9 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Configurations10 PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi.Services11 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Dtos12 Account.Domain.Aggregates13 Auth.Infrastructure.Services14 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates.Entities15 Notification.Application.Services16 Notification.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers17 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure18 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.ValueObjects.Properties19 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters.Entities20 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.ValueObjects.Properties21 Account.Services22 Auth.Application.Services23 Auth.Infrastructure.Services.Keycloak24 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates25 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.Entities26 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters27 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.Entities28 Conversation.Services29 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds30 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers31 VolunteerManagement.Services.Shelters32 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.MappingExtensions33 VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers34 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Configurations35 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Contexts36 VolunteerManagement.Services.AnimalKinds37 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers38 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Adoption39 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Pets40 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.Volunteers.Pets.Commands.Add
1 Auth.Contracts.Dtos
2 Auth.Infrastructure.Common
3 FileStorage.Application.Services
4 Notification.Core.Models
5 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.Auth
6 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain.Primitives
7 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Abstractions
8 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Caching
9 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Configurations
10 PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi.Services
11 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Dtos
12 Account.Domain.Aggregates1
13 Auth.Infrastructure.Services11
14 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates.Entities1
15 Notification.Application.Services11
16 Notification.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers111
17 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure1
18 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.ValueObjects.Properties2
19 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters.Entities1
20 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.ValueObjects.Properties9
21 Account.Services12
22 Auth.Application.Services411
23 Auth.Infrastructure.Services.Keycloak11
24 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates11
25 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.Entities11
26 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters113
27 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.Entities16
28 Conversation.Services12
29 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds111
30 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers121
31 VolunteerManagement.Services.Shelters12
32 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.MappingExtensions2111111
33 VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers133
34 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Configurations111111
35 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Contexts1111
36 VolunteerManagement.Services.AnimalKinds12
37 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers12
38 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Adoption31
39 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Pets22411
40 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.Volunteers.Pets.Commands.Add1121
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 Auth.Contracts.Dtos2 Auth.Infrastructure.Common3 FileStorage.Application.Services4 Notification.Core.Models5 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.Auth6 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain.Primitives7 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Abstractions8 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Caching9 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Configurations10 PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi.Services11 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Dtos12 Account.Domain.Aggregates13 Auth.Infrastructure.Services14 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates.Entities15 Notification.Application.Services16 Notification.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers17 PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure18 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.ValueObjects.Properties19 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters.Entities20 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.ValueObjects.Properties21 Account.Services22 Auth.Application.Services23 Auth.Infrastructure.Services.Keycloak24 Conversation.Domain.Aggregates25 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.Entities26 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters27 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.Entities28 Conversation.Services29 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds30 VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers31 VolunteerManagement.Services.Shelters32 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.MappingExtensions33 VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers34 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Configurations35 VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Contexts36 VolunteerManagement.Services.AnimalKinds37 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers38 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Adoption39 VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Pets40 VolunteerManagement.Handlers.Volunteers.Pets.Commands.AddAuth.Contracts.Dtos1Auth.Infrastructure.Common2FileStorage.Application.Services3Notification.Core.Models4PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.Auth5PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain.Primitives6PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Abstractions7PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Caching8PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure.Configurations9PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi.Services10VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Dtos11Account.Domain.Aggregates12Auth.Infrastructure.Services13Conversation.Domain.Aggregates.Entities14Notification.Application.Services15Notification.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers16PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure17VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.ValueObjects.Properties18VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters.Entities19VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.ValueObjects.Properties20Account.Services21Auth.Application.Services22Auth.Infrastructure.Services.Keycloak23Conversation.Domain.Aggregates24VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds.Entities25VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Shelters26VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers.Entities27Conversation.Services28VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.AnimalKinds29VolunteerManagement.Domain.Aggregates.Volunteers30VolunteerManagement.Services.Shelters31VolunteerManagement.Handlers.MappingExtensions32VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers.Consumers33VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Configurations34VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure.Common.Contexts35VolunteerManagement.Services.AnimalKinds36VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers37VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Adoption38VolunteerManagement.Services.Volunteers.Pets39VolunteerManagement.Handlers.Volunteers.Pets.Commands.Add4011111111112191241111111111316121111211221111111331111111111121231224111121+165 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Strong ·

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.5 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 9.2 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.8 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.7 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 8.5 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.7
The Bad
D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 6.8 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 5.8

At a glance — Architecture · 85% · Strong ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.3 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D22 · .NET / C# Internal API Consistency 7.0 D23 · .NET / C# Boundary Type-Coupling 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 7.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 64% · Adequate ·

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 53% · Adequate · gated by D13, P3, P8 ·

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 8.8 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 9.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 10.0
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0
The Ugly
D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 3.0

At a glance — Security · 43% · Weak · gated by D31, C1 ·

The Good
D32 · .NET / C# Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) 9.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 C4 · Repo Data Retention 9.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Bad
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 5.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 4.1 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 67% · Adequate · gated by DM1 ·

The Good
DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 9.6 DM3 · Repo Integration-event coupling 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0
The Bad
DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 5.2 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 6.9
The Ugly
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 3.5

At a glance — Event-Driven · 80% · Strong ·

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 8.7
The Bad
ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 6.6

At a glance — Performance · 60% · Adequate ·

The Bad
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.2 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration99High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection17High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures12High / Critical
A01:2025 — Broken Access Control1Medium

Roadmap

First, encrypt sensitive data at rest and manage keys in a vault, unless this is handled by infrastructure. Next, address the 68 medium-severity issues in IaC and container security, beginning with the REDACTED and compose configurations. Then, enforce HTTPS metadata in production and resolve the 11 missing or broken authorization findings in the static analysis scan, focusing on the volunteer, shelter, and auth controllers. Finally, remove the six leaked secrets from the application settings files.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+7.2 ptsMediumData Protection
Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2).+3.3 ptsLowREDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 68 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (31), REDACTED (22), REDACTED (15).+5.5 ptsMediumIaC & Container Security
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).+5.0 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 3 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.+2.3 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 11 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2).+4.0 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.+1.8 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.+1.8 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 52 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 40% slop · 27% mixed · 33% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.9SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED1.6SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED1.6SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.0SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 74

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 162

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 108

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 7

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 92 of 98 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 6 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 98 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D22D23D24D26D27D28D29D31D32D35D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C4DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM3DM4DM5DM6DM8DM9ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 324 of 344 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1616e-2753-793b-a611-11c387837ca3.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read. You can widen what we reach: optional: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: /usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/NuGet.targets(521,5): error MSB3202: The project file "Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Api/FileStorage.Api.csproj" was not found. [Solution/FileStorage/File….
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (36 commit(s) sampled, fewer than the 50 this dimension needs before a bus factor means anything).
  • D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The C# workspace loaded this repository's projects but reported a load failure, and the dead-code reference search is unreliable over a graph that did not load cleanly, so it was skipped. The other debt markers on this row were read; dead symbols were not, and their absence from the score is not a finding that the code has none. First load diagnostic: Failure: Msbuild failed when processing the file 'Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Consumers/Account.Hosts.Consumers.csproj' with message: Detected package version outside of dependency constraint: Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Workspaces.MSBuild 4.14.0 requires Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Workspaces.Common (= 4.14.0) but version Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.….
  • D18 Solution Shape — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserDeletedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserRoleChangedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/FileStorage/FileDeleteRequestedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs`, … (+106 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (36 commit(s) sampled).
  • D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. IL NOT MEASURED: the analyzer's own build of this repository failed for an ENVIRONMENT reason (exit 1) — MSBuild's engine or the CLR gave up, or our image does not carry the SDK band/targeting pack this repository needs. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo, and it is not a statement that this repository fails to build. D18 owns the question of whether this repository builds; it was not answered here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mailpit Error context canceled postgres-notification Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled postgres-account Error context canceled postgres-exporter-notification Error context canceled seq Error context canceled postgres-exporter-conversation Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: postgres-volunteer-request Error context canceled rabbitmq Error context canceled minio Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled seq Error context canceled postgres-exporter-auth Error context canceled elasticsearch Error context canceled kibana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.

Repo exclusion declarations: 1 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D21, D22, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.5 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor at 23.

GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cyclomatic 23)Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/Specifications/GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.cs:32

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cyclomatic 23). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10.
  2. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.2 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor at 29.

GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cognitive 29)Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/Specifications/GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.cs:32

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cognitive 29). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.2 to about 10.0/10.
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.

MethodTooLong: PetAdoptionStateMachine.PetAdoptionStateMachine(…)Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:97

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Stronggated by 11 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

11 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:188
Duplicated block (30 lines × 2)Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/MassTransitOutboxExtensions.cs:24
Duplicated block (16–17 lines × 3)Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/AccountDbContextConfigurator.cs:20
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)REDACTED:502
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs:29

+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs, AdoptPetConsumer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (30 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with MassTransitOutboxExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (16–17 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AccountDbContextConfigurator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

49 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 2 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure · ×2Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Auth.Application.csproj:15
Off the main sequence: Auth.Core · ×2Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Auth.Core.csproj:1
Unstable project Notification.InfrastructureSolution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/Notification.Infrastructure.csproj:1
Unstable project VolunteerManagement.ServicesSolution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/VolunteerManagement.Services.csproj:1
Off the main sequence: PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application · ×3Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application.csproj:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling — start with Auth.Application.csproj, Notification.Application.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling — start with Auth.Core.csproj, Notification.Core.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Unstable project Notification.Infrastructure finding(s) in Coupling — start with Notification.Infrastructure.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 40 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

149 test methods: 103 unit, 46 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 149 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 250 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 71 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 179 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

33 deducted debt markers + unmeasured dead symbols across 18654 LoC in the .NET projects (1.6/KLoC) → score 6.8. Dead code not measured: the solution did not load cleanly, so the reference search was skipped.

AnalyzerSeverityNone · ×33.editorconfig:556

What to do

  1. Resolve the 33 AnalyzerSeverityNone finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with .editorconfig (33). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

49 projects, 469 source files, 21941 hand-written lines of code (18654 production / 3287 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 4352 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 116 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish). Measured across 2 solutions loaded as one workspace: `Solution/Solution.slnx`, `Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.slnx`.

Solution references a project that does not existSolution/FileStorage/FileStorage.slnx
Shell project: Conversation.ContractsSolution/Conversation/Conversation.Contracts/Conversation.Contracts.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Solution references a project that does not exist finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with FileStorage.slnx. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with Conversation.Contracts.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a production-grade .NET 10 microservices reference project for an animal shelter domain, with a strong overview and a detailed table of contents. It describes the system (volunteers register, shelters, adoption chats, photos, email) and the tech stack (RabbitMQ, Keycloak, Docker), plus links to architecture diagrams and coverage across every XML-doc-covered assembly.

XML-doc coverage: Account.Domain · ×45Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Account.Domain.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The repository's root README is a production-grade .NET 10 microservices reference project for an animal shelter domain, with a strong overview and a detailed table of contents. It describes the system (volunteers register, shelters, adoption chats, photos, email) and the tech stack (RabbitMQ, Keycloak, Docker), plus links to architecture diagrams and coverage across every XML-doc-covered assembly.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API ConsistencyStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 API inconsistencies across 29 exposed types.

Duplicate event types with identical structure and intent. Both events carry a FileId and BucketName, suggesting they represent the same domain concept (a request to delete a file/photo) but are split into two distinct types without clear differentiation in the signature.
Inconsistent event naming and lifecycle representation. `CreateAdoptionChat` appears to be a command/intent (contains AdopterName, PetNickName), while `AdoptionChatCreated` and `AdoptionChatCreationFailed` are outcomes. However, `AdoptionChatCreated` lacks the `ChatId` in its signature (only has CorrelationId, ChatId, PetId), whereas `CreateAdoptionChat` does not have a ChatId. More critically, `AdoptionChatCreated` has a `ChatId` property, but `CreateAdoptionChat` does not, which is correct for command vs event, but the naming convention mixes 'Action' (Create) with 'State Change' (Created). A more consistent pattern would be `AdoptionChatRequested` (command) vs `AdoptionChatCreated` (event). The current mix of `Create...` (command-like) and `AdoptionChat...` (event-like) is slightly inconsistent with other pairs like `ReservePet`/`PetReserved`.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicate event types with identical structure and intent. Both events… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent event naming and lifecycle representation.… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No domain types are scored-flagged across 8 context boundaries; 1 contract project(s) carry advisory strong-ID notes.

VolunteerManagement: 3 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment ValueExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 valuable / 0 redundant across 121 sampled comments.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 49 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

92 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 14 medium, 0 low. 2 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 122 file(s) — `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs` (lines 8–14, line 14), `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserDeletedEvent.cs` (line 8), `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserRoleChangedEvent.cs` (line 8), `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/FileStorage/FileDeleteRequestedEvent.cs` (line 8), `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs` (lines 11–12, line 13), … (+117 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 121 of those file(s) — `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserDeletedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserRoleChangedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/FileStorage/FileDeleteRequestedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs`, … (+116 more) — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. In 4 of those file(s) — `Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Exceptions/KeycloakAuthenticationException.cs`, `Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Exceptions/KeycloakException.cs`, `Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Exceptions/KeycloakUserNotFoundException.cs`, `Solution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/Services/Email/EmailService.cs` — the break is at a TYPE DECLARATION (a C# primary constructor semgrep's grammar cannot parse), so the loss is wider than the named lines: rules scoped to that type see no type to scope to and are blind over its whole body, while rules matching statements keep working there. Absence of a type-scoped finding in those types is not evidence of anything.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 2 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 68 medium, 11 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 68 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (31), REDACTED (22), REDACTED (15). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (68 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 20 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (12), REDACTED (5), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 11 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)9.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.

Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR LEAK scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset: personal data crossing a boundary it should not — reaching a log/console sink, a URL or query string, or unprotected browser storage. Matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. A clean sweep is unscored rather than an unearned 10, and is a statement about the leak paths checked only — this dimension does not inventory the personal data a repository holds (the personal-data map and the C1-C5 compliance cards do that), so it never reports that a repository has no personal-data surface. Reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive over the leak paths, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low. semgrep could not parse 111 file(s) — `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserDeletedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserRoleChangedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/FileStorage/FileDeleteRequestedEvent.cs`, `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs`, … (+106 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 47 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

  • `Auth.Application` is a Application project but references `Auth.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one. — Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Auth.Application.csproj:15
  • This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `Auth.Infrastructure`: it names `Auth.Infrastructure.Common`, `Auth.Infrastructure.Services`, `AuthDbContext`, `IKeycloakService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 4, 17, 18. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Services/AuthService.cs:3

What to do

  • Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C4 · Data Retention9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `Volunteer` references the aggregate root `Pet` directly (via `_pets`) — hold its `PetId` instead. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:44
  • `Volunteer` references the aggregate root `Pet` directly (via `Pets`) — hold its `PetId` instead. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:49

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

  • `Pet` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:166
  • `SoftDeletableEntity` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Delete`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain/Primitives/SoftDeletableEntity.cs:29
  • `VolunteerAssignment` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Entities/VolunteerAssignment.cs:62

What to do

  • Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `Account.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Aggregates/Account.cs:33
  • `Chat.LinkedId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Chat.cs:51
  • `Message.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Entities/Message.cs:50
  • `VolunteerAssignment.VolunteerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Entities/VolunteerAssignment.cs:39
  • `Volunteer.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:42
  • `Pet.BreedId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:45
  • `Pet.SpeciesId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:50
  • `Pet.BookerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:80
  • `Pet.ShelterId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:85

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM3 · Integration-event coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Chat` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Chat.cs:12
  • `Message` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Entities/Message.cs:11
  • `Species` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/AnimalKinds/Species.cs:12
  • `Breed` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/AnimalKinds/Entities/Breed.cs:10

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `NotificationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Solution/Notification/Notification.Contracts/Events/NotificationEvent.cs:8
  • `ConfirmAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/ConfirmAdoption.cs:8
  • `RejectAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/RejectAdoption.cs:8
  • `StartPetAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/StartPetAdoption.cs:8

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `NotificationEventConsumer.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/NotificationEventConsumer.cs:22
  • `UserCreatedEventConsumer.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/UserCreatedEventConsumer.cs:20

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency8.8 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `UpdatePhoto.UpdatePhotoHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Commands/UpdatePhoto/UpdatePhotoHandler.cs:19
  • `UpdateProfile.UpdateProfileHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Commands/UpdateProfile/UpdateProfileHandler.cs:19
  • `AssignVolunteer.AssignVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/AssignVolunteer/AssignVolunteerHandler.cs:19
  • `RemoveVolunteer.RemoveVolunteerFromShelterHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/RemoveVolunteer/RemoveVolunteerFromShelterHandler.cs:19
  • `HardRemove.HardRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Commands/HardRemove/HardRemoveVolunteerHandler.cs:19
  • `SoftRemove.SoftRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Commands/SoftRemove/SoftRemoveVolunteerHandler.cs:19
  • `Delete.DeletePetHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Commands/Delete/DeletePetHandler.cs:19

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 49 of 49 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • Only 9/49 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:449
  • README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:452

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/` does not exist; README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/` does not exist.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 77/78 types (99%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 670 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema. (×6) — Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/AccountMigrator.cs:26, Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Infrastructure/ConversationMigrator.cs:26, Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/AuthMigrator.cs:26, …

What to do

  • Replace each EnsureCreated() in production code with the migrations the rest of the repository already uses (`Database.Migrate()` or a migrations bundle), so every database gets its schema from the one versioned path.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 10 use(s) across 24,396 production line(s) (~0.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • Only 0/31 awaits in library code use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
  • `await cache.GetAsync(prefixedKey, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×2) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:27, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:90
  • `await cache.SetAsync(prefixedKey, bytes, cacheOptions, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:52
  • `await cache.RemoveAsync(prefixedKey, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:59
  • `await GetAsync<T>(key, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×3) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:69, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:73, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:109
  • `await factory(ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×2) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:76, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:116
  • `await SetAsync(key, value, ct, expiration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×2) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:80, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:120
  • `await task` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:87
  • `await DbSet.AddAsync(entity, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:40
  • `await DbContext.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×4) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:41, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:50, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:78, …
  • `await DbSet.AddRangeAsync(entities, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:49
  • `await DbSet.WithSpecification(specification) .FirstOrDefaultAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:59
  • `await DbSet.WithSpecification(specification) .ToListAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:67
  • `await action(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×2) — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:25, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:36
  • `await strategy.ExecuteAsync(async () => { await using var transaction = await _dbCo...` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:31
  • `await using … = await _dbContext.Database.BeginTransactionAsync(isolationLevel, can...` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:33
  • `await _dbContext.Database.BeginTransactionAsync(isolationLevel, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:33
  • `await transaction.CommitAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:37
  • `await transaction.RollbackAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:41
  • `await httpContext.Response.WriteAsJsonAsync(problemDetails, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Errors/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:32
  • `await factory.CreateConnectionAsync()` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — REDACTED:97
  • `await context.Response.WriteAsync( System.Text.Json.JsonSerializer.Serialize( new {...` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — REDACTED:211
  • `await base.SendAsync(request, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Handlers/AuthenticationDelegatingHandler.cs:24

What to do

  • In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/AuthenticationExtensions.cs:60
  • `ValidateAudience = false` means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/AuthenticationExtensions.cs:65
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×7) — Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5, Solution/ApiGateway/ApiGateway/Program.cs:6, Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Program.cs:6, …
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. (×7) — Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5, Solution/ApiGateway/ApiGateway/Program.cs:6, Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Program.cs:6, …

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Re-enable token validation — `ValidateAudience` is set to `false`. If it was switched off because the expected value was wrong or absent, supply that value instead (`ValidAudiences`/`ValidIssuers`, or `IssuerSigningKeys`/`IssuerSigningKeyResolver` for the signature) rather than skipping the check: a disabled check accepts every token, not just the one that was failing.
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `cts` is a `CancellationTokenSource`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 13). Every use of it in `CreateCancellationToken` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var cts = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Tests/Abstractions/UnitTestBase.cs:13

What to do

  • Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 217/218 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/UnreservePetConsumer.cs:60

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 42 suppression(s) across the 95669 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health89%StrongStrongest area.
Architecture85%StrongSolid.
Maturity64%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Readiness53%Adequate — gated by D13, P3, P8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security43%Weak — gated by D31, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling67%Adequate — gated by DM1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven80%StrongSolid.
Performance60%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 32 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mailpit Error context canceled postgres-notification Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled postgres-account Error context canceled postgres-exporter-notification Error context canceled seq Error context canceled postgres-exporter-conversation Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: postgres-volunteer-request Error context canceled rabbitmq Error context canceled minio Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled jaeger Error context canceled seq Error context canceled postgres-exporter-auth Error context canceled elasticsearch Error context canceled kibana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the analyzer's build of the target did not succeed
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 74 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · AnalyzerSeverityNone · ×33
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:556 — SA1027 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:559 — SA1101 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:562 — SA1200 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:565 — SA1309 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:568 — SA1633 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:569 — SA1634 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:570 — SA1635 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:571 — SA1636 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:572 — SA1637 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:573 — SA1638 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:574 — SA1640 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:575 — SA1641 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:578 — SA1600 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:579 — SA1601 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:580 — SA1602 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:583 — SA1611 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:584 — SA1615 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:585 — SA1618 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:588 — SA1623 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:589 — SA1629 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:590 — SA1642 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:591 — SA1643 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:594 — SA1313 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:597 — SA1009 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • AnalyzerSeverityNone .editorconfig:598 — SA1111 — this rule is switched off for every file the section matches, in every project under this directory, and the only record that it was ever switched off is this line: nothing at the sites it would have reported says so, so a reader of that code has no reason to look here, and code added years from now inherits the decision silently. Fix what the rule reports and delete the entry, or — where some sites really are legitimate — leave the rule on and suppress it at those sites with their reasons, so it keeps protecting the rest of the tree. If the rule is genuinely unwanted here, say why — on this line after the entry, or in the comment run directly above it: a comment that only repeats the rule's own title is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place.
  • + 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×20
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D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×6
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D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×3
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D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×2
  • Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Auth.Application.csproj:15 — Auth.Application (Application) references Auth.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
  • Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure Solution/Notification/Notification.Application/Notification.Application.csproj:8 — Notification.Application (Application) references PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate · ×2
  • Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Volunteer._pets Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:44 — `Volunteer` references the aggregate root `Pet` directly (via `_pets`) — hold its `PetId` instead.
  • Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Volunteer.Pets Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:49 — `Volunteer` references the aggregate root `Pet` directly (via `Pets`) — hold its `PetId` instead.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write · Dual write (no outbox) · ×2
  • Dual write (no outbox): NotificationEventConsumer.Consume Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/NotificationEventConsumer.cs:22 — `NotificationEventConsumer.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem).
  • Dual write (no outbox): UserCreatedEventConsumer.Consume Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/UserCreatedEventConsumer.cs:20 — `UserCreatedEventConsumer.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem).
AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×1
  • Dependency-rule violation: Auth.Application (Application) → Auth.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Auth.Application.csproj:15 — `Auth.Application` is a Application project but references `Auth.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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Serious — 162 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×68
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  • + 43 more in this group — see findings.md.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) · ×32
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) — Only 0/31 awaits in library code use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:27 — `await cache.GetAsync(prefixedKey, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:52 — `await cache.SetAsync(prefixedKey, bytes, cacheOptions, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:59 — `await cache.RemoveAsync(prefixedKey, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:69 — `await GetAsync<T>(key, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:76 — `await factory(ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:80 — `await SetAsync(key, value, ct, expiration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:90 — `await cache.GetAsync(prefixedKey, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:73 — `await GetAsync<T>(key, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:87 — `await task` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:109 — `await GetAsync<T>(key, ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:116 — `await factory(ct)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:120 — `await SetAsync(key, value, ct, expiration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:40 — `await DbSet.AddAsync(entity, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:41 — `await DbContext.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:49 — `await DbSet.AddRangeAsync(entities, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:50 — `await DbContext.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:59 — `await DbSet.WithSpecification(specification) .FirstOrDefaultAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:67 — `await DbSet.WithSpecification(specification) .ToListAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:78 — `await DbContext.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:88 — `await DbContext.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:25 — `await action(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:31 — `await strategy.ExecuteAsync(async () => { await using var transaction = await _dbCo...` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:33 — `await using … = await _dbContext.Database.BeginTransactionAsync(isolationLevel, can...` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Transactions/TransactionalExecutor.cs:33 — `await _dbContext.Database.BeginTransactionAsync(isolationLevel, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • + 7 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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ED5 · Idempotency · Non-idempotent mutation · ×7
  • Non-idempotent mutation: UpdatePhoto.UpdatePhotoHandler.Handle Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Commands/UpdatePhoto/UpdatePhotoHandler.cs:19 — `UpdatePhoto.UpdatePhotoHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: UpdateProfile.UpdateProfileHandler.Handle Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Commands/UpdateProfile/UpdateProfileHandler.cs:19 — `UpdateProfile.UpdateProfileHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: AssignVolunteer.AssignVolunteerHandler.Handle Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/AssignVolunteer/AssignVolunteerHandler.cs:19 — `AssignVolunteer.AssignVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: RemoveVolunteer.RemoveVolunteerFromShelterHandler.Handle Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/RemoveVolunteer/RemoveVolunteerFromShelterHandler.cs:19 — `RemoveVolunteer.RemoveVolunteerFromShelterHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: HardRemove.HardRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Commands/HardRemove/HardRemoveVolunteerHandler.cs:19 — `HardRemove.HardRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: SoftRemove.SoftRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Commands/SoftRemove/SoftRemoveVolunteerHandler.cs:19 — `SoftRemove.SoftRemoveVolunteerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
  • Non-idempotent mutation: Delete.DeletePetHandler.Handle Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Commands/Delete/DeletePetHandler.cs:19 — `Delete.DeletePetHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.
P8 · Schema migrations · Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations · ×6
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/AccountMigrator.cs:26 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Infrastructure/ConversationMigrator.cs:26 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/AuthMigrator.cs:26 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Solution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/NotificationMigrator.cs:26 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Tests/Fixtures/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs:42 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
  • Schema created with EnsureCreated() outside the migrations Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure/VolunteerManagementMigrator.cs:26 — This repository evolves its schema with versioned migrations, but `EnsureCreated()` here builds a schema straight from the model instead — with no migrations-history row, so a database it creates can't be upgraded by `Migrate()` afterwards and the two paths can disagree about the shape. Apply the migrations here (`Migrate()` / a migrations bundle) rather than creating the schema.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×4
  • Anemic entity: Chat Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Chat.cs:12 — `Chat` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Message Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Entities/Message.cs:11 — `Message` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Species Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/AnimalKinds/Species.cs:12 — `Species` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Breed Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/AnimalKinds/Entities/Breed.cs:10 — `Breed` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads the wall clock · ×3
  • Domain type reads the wall clock: Pet Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:166 — `Pet` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
  • Domain type reads the wall clock: SoftDeletableEntity Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain/Primitives/SoftDeletableEntity.cs:29 — `SoftDeletableEntity` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Delete`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
  • Domain type reads the wall clock: VolunteerAssignment Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Entities/VolunteerAssignment.cs:62 — `VolunteerAssignment` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:188 — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:188-195 | Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:241-248 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:188` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/AdoptPetConsumer.cs:25 — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/AdoptPetConsumer.cs:25-32 | Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/ReservePetConsumer.cs:25-32 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/AdoptPetConsumer.cs:25` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `context` to `ConsumeContext<AdoptPet>` in one and `ConsumeContext<ReservePet>` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: Auth.Core Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Auth.Core.csproj:1 — Auth.Core: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Notification.Core Solution/Notification/Notification.Core/Notification.Core.csproj:1 — Notification.Core: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×1
  • Dependency-rule violation: Auth.Application (Application) → Auth.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Services/AuthService.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `Auth.Infrastructure`: it names `Auth.Infrastructure.Common`, `Auth.Infrastructure.Services`, `AuthDbContext`, `IKeycloakService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 4, 17, 18. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1
  • No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cyclomatic 23) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/Specifications/GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.cs:32 — GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D18 · Solution Shape · Solution references a project that does not exist · ×1
  • Solution references a project that does not exist Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.slnx — `Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.slnx` declares 1 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Api/FileStorage.Api.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor (cognitive 29) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/Specifications/GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.cs:32 — GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.GetPetsWithFilterSpecification.ctor has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate event types with identical structure and intent. Both events carry a FileId and BucketName, suggesting they represent the same domain concept (a request to delete a file/photo) but are split into two distinct types without clear differentiation in the signature. · ×1
  • Duplicate event types with identical structure and intent. Both events carry a FileId and BucketName, suggesting they represent the same domain concept (a request to delete a file/photo) but are split into two distinct types without clear differentiation in the signature. — Merge into a single `FileDeleteRequestedEvent` or clarify if 'Photo' implies a specific subtype that requires distinct handling. If they are identical, remove one. (signatures: FileStorage.Contracts.Events.FileStorage.FileDeleteRequestedEvent | FileStorage.Contracts.Events.FileStorage.PhotoDeleteRequestedEvent)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent event naming and lifecycle representation. `CreateAdoptionChat` appears to be a command/intent (contains AdopterName, PetNickName), while `AdoptionChatCreated` and `AdoptionChatCreationFailed` are outcomes. However, `AdoptionChatCreated` lacks the `ChatId` in its signature (only has CorrelationId, ChatId, PetId), whereas `CreateAdoptionChat` does not have a ChatId. More critically, `AdoptionChatCreated` has a `ChatId` property, but `CreateAdoptionChat` does not, which is correct for command vs event, but the naming convention mixes 'Action' (Create) with 'State Change' (Created). A more consistent pattern would be `AdoptionChatRequested` (command) vs `AdoptionChatCreated` (event). The current mix of `Create...` (command-like) and `AdoptionChat...` (event-like) is slightly inconsistent with other pairs like `ReservePet`/`PetReserved`. · ×1
  • Inconsistent event naming and lifecycle representation. `CreateAdoptionChat` appears to be a command/intent (contains AdopterName, PetNickName), while `AdoptionChatCreated` and `AdoptionChatCreationFailed` are outcomes. However, `AdoptionChatCreated` lacks the `ChatId` in its signature (only has CorrelationId, ChatId, PetId), whereas `CreateAdoptionChat` does not have a ChatId. More critically, `AdoptionChatCreated` has a `ChatId` property, but `CreateAdoptionChat` does not, which is correct for command vs event, but the naming convention mixes 'Action' (Create) with 'State Change' (Created). A more consistent pattern would be `AdoptionChatRequested` (command) vs `AdoptionChatCreated` (event). The current mix of `Create...` (command-like) and `AdoptionChat...` (event-like) is slightly inconsistent with other pairs like `ReservePet`/`PetReserved`. — Rename `CreateAdoptionChat` to `AdoptionChatRequested` to align with the `ReservePet`/`PetReserved` pattern, clearly distinguishing commands from domain events. (signatures: PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.PetAdoption.CreateAdoptionChat | PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.PetAdoption.AdoptionChatCreated | PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.Events.PetAdoption.AdoptionChatCreationFailed)
D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×1
  • MethodTooLong: PetAdoptionStateMachine.PetAdoptionStateMachine(…) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Sagas/PetAdoptionStateMachine.cs:97 — MethodTooLong — PetAdoptionStateMachine(…) runs 114 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 14 over it, 1.14× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (30 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (30 lines × 2) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/MassTransitOutboxExtensions.cs:24 — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/MassTransitOutboxExtensions.cs:24-53 | Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/MassTransitOutboxExtensions.cs:92-121 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16–17 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16–17 lines × 3) Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/AccountDbContextConfigurator.cs:20 — Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/AccountDbContextConfigurator.cs:20-36 | Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Infrastructure/Common/ConversationDbContextConfigurator.cs:20-35 | Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Infrastructure/Common/VolunteerDbContextConfigurator.cs:20-35 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/AccountDbContextConfigurator.cs:20` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `options` to `DbContextOptionsBuilder<AccountDbContext>` in one and `DbContextOptionsBuilder<ConversationDbContext>` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) REDACTED:502 — REDACTED:502-515 | REDACTED:549-562 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs:29 — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs:29-38 | Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs:75-84 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs:29` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/Configurations/AccountConfiguration.cs:46 — Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/Configurations/AccountConfiguration.cs:46-50 | Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Infrastructure/Common/Configurations/ChatConfiguration.cs:35-39 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Common/Configurations/AccountConfiguration.cs:46` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Queries/GetSheltersWithPagination/GetSheltersWithPaginationHandler.cs:23 — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Queries/GetSheltersWithPagination/GetSheltersWithPaginationHandler.cs:23-32 | Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Queries/GetVolunteersWithPagination/GetVolunteersWithPaginationHandler.cs:21-29 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `query` to `GetSheltersWithPaginationQuery` in one and `GetVolunteersWithPaginationQuery` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/PetService.cs:50 — Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/PetService.cs:50-55 | Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Pets/PetService.cs:97-103 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (43 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (43 lines × 2) Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/DependencyInjection.cs:21 — Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/DependencyInjection.cs:21-65 | Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints/DependencyInjection.cs:21-63 — before extracting anything, compare `Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/DependencyInjection.cs` and `Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints/DependencyInjection.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 82% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:69 — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/DistributedCacheService.cs:69-84 | Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Infrastructure/Caching/MemoryCacheService.cs:109-124 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D5 · Coupling · Unstable project Notification.Infrastructure · ×1
  • Unstable project Notification.Infrastructure Solution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/Notification.Infrastructure.csproj:1 — Notification.Infrastructure has instability 0.83 with 1 dependents.
D5 · Coupling · Unstable project VolunteerManagement.Services · ×1
  • Unstable project VolunteerManagement.Services Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/VolunteerManagement.Services.csproj:1 — VolunteerManagement.Services has instability 0.83 with 1 dependents.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Token validation disabled · ×1
  • Token validation disabled Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/AuthenticationExtensions.cs:65 — `ValidateAudience = false` means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it · ×1
  • Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Tests/Abstractions/UnitTestBase.cs:13 — `cts` is a `CancellationTokenSource`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 13). Every use of it in `CreateCancellationToken` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var cts = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×1
  • Async method without CancellationToken: PublishUnreserved Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Consumers/Consumers/UnreservePetConsumer.cs:60 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Minor — 57 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×11
  • REDACTED
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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×9
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Account.UserId Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Aggregates/Account.cs:33 — `Account.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Chat.LinkedId Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Chat.cs:51 — `Chat.LinkedId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Message.UserId Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/Entities/Message.cs:50 — `Message.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: VolunteerAssignment.VolunteerId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Entities/VolunteerAssignment.cs:39 — `VolunteerAssignment.VolunteerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Volunteer.UserId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:42 — `Volunteer.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Pet.BreedId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:45 — `Pet.BreedId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Pet.SpeciesId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:50 — `Pet.SpeciesId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Pet.BookerId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:80 — `Pet.BookerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
  • Primitive id on a domain type: Pet.ShelterId Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:85 — `Pet.ShelterId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×8
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/ApiGateway/ApiGateway/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Endpoints/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×8
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/ApiGateway/ApiGateway/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Endpoints/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/Notification/Hosts/Notification.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Program.cs:5 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
ED3 · Event naming · Event not named in past tense · ×4
  • Event not named in past tense: NotificationEvent Solution/Notification/Notification.Contracts/Events/NotificationEvent.cs:8 — `NotificationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
  • Event not named in past tense: ConfirmAdoption Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/ConfirmAdoption.cs:8 — `ConfirmAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
  • Event not named in past tense: RejectAdoption Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/RejectAdoption.cs:8 — `RejectAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
  • Event not named in past tense: StartPetAdoption Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/PetAdoption/StartPetAdoption.cs:8 — `StartPetAdoption` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×2
  • README/code drift README.md:449 — README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/Application.UnitTests/` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:452 — README.md runs `dotnet test Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/`, but `Solution/VolunteerManagement/Tests/ArchitectureTests/` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×2
  • Duplicated predicate Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain/Primitives/Entity.cs:24 — `obj == null || obj.GetType() != GetType()` appears character-identically in 2 files — Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain/Primitives/Entity.cs, Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Domain/Primitives/ValueObject.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects/Properties/Description.cs:42 — `value.Length < MinLength || value.Length > MaxLength` appears character-identically in 3 files — Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects/Properties/Description.cs, Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects/Properties/Description.cs, Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/AnimalKinds/ValueObjects/Properties/BreedName.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
  • Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: Conversation.Contracts Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Contracts/Conversation.Contracts.csproj — `Conversation.Contracts` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1
  • No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
M3 · Folder & project structure · Inconsistent root namespaces · ×1
  • Inconsistent root namespaces — Only 9/49 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
P10 · Library API & versioning · Large public API surface · ×1
  • Large public API surface — 77/78 types (99%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 670 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline · No performance benchmarks · ×1
  • No performance benchmarks — No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP · ×1
  • OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Extensions/AuthenticationExtensions.cs:60 — `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 217/218 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1
  • Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 42 suppression(s) across the 95669 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
Minor — 51 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×45
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Domain Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Account.Domain.csproj — Account.Domain: 100 % XML-doc coverage (38/38).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Infrastructure Solution/Account/Account.Infrastructure/Account.Infrastructure.csproj — Account.Infrastructure: 100 % XML-doc coverage (13/13).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Handlers Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Account.Handlers.csproj — Account.Handlers: 100 % XML-doc coverage (21/21).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Services Solution/Account/Application/Account.Services/Account.Services.csproj — Account.Services: 100 % XML-doc coverage (14/14).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Hosts.Consumers Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Consumers/Account.Hosts.Consumers.csproj — Account.Hosts.Consumers: 100 % XML-doc coverage (4/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Hosts.DI Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.DI/Account.Hosts.DI.csproj — Account.Hosts.DI: 100 % XML-doc coverage (2/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: Account.Hosts.Endpoints Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Account.Hosts.Endpoints.csproj — Account.Hosts.Endpoints: 100 % XML-doc coverage (8/8).
  • XML-doc coverage: ApiGateway Solution/ApiGateway/ApiGateway/ApiGateway.csproj — ApiGateway: 100 % XML-doc coverage (2/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Domain Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Domain/Conversation.Domain.csproj — Conversation.Domain: 100 % XML-doc coverage (49/49).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Infrastructure Solution/Conversation/Conversation.Infrastructure/Conversation.Infrastructure.csproj — Conversation.Infrastructure: 100 % XML-doc coverage (15/15).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Handlers Solution/Conversation/Application/Conversation.Handlers/Conversation.Handlers.csproj — Conversation.Handlers: 100 % XML-doc coverage (22/22).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Services Solution/Conversation/Application/Conversation.Services/Conversation.Services.csproj — Conversation.Services: 100 % XML-doc coverage (18/18).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Hosts.Consumers Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Consumers/Conversation.Hosts.Consumers.csproj — Conversation.Hosts.Consumers: 100 % XML-doc coverage (4/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Hosts.DI Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.DI/Conversation.Hosts.DI.csproj — Conversation.Hosts.DI: 100 % XML-doc coverage (2/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints Solution/Conversation/Hosts/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints/Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints.csproj — Conversation.Hosts.Endpoints: 100 % XML-doc coverage (9/9).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.Application Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.Application/FileStorage.Application.csproj — FileStorage.Application: 100 % XML-doc coverage (15/15).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.Contracts Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.Contracts/FileStorage.Contracts.csproj — FileStorage.Contracts: 100 % XML-doc coverage (12/12).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.Infrastructure Solution/FileStorage/FileStorage.Infrastructure/FileStorage.Infrastructure.csproj — FileStorage.Infrastructure: 100 % XML-doc coverage (16/16).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.Consumers Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Consumers/FileStorage.Consumers.csproj — FileStorage.Consumers: 100 % XML-doc coverage (4/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.DI Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.DI/FileStorage.DI.csproj — FileStorage.DI: 100 % XML-doc coverage (2/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: FileStorage.Endpoints Solution/FileStorage/Hosts/FileStorage.Endpoints/FileStorage.Endpoints.csproj — FileStorage.Endpoints: 100 % XML-doc coverage (7/7).
  • XML-doc coverage: Auth.Application Solution/Auth/Auth.Application/Auth.Application.csproj — Auth.Application: 100 % XML-doc coverage (10/10).
  • XML-doc coverage: Auth.Contracts Solution/Auth/Auth.Contracts/Auth.Contracts.csproj — Auth.Contracts: 100 % XML-doc coverage (2/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: Auth.Core Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Auth.Core.csproj — Auth.Core: 100 % XML-doc coverage (18/18).
  • XML-doc coverage: Auth.Infrastructure Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Auth.Infrastructure.csproj — Auth.Infrastructure: 100 % XML-doc coverage (57/57).
  • + 20 more in this group — see findings.md.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application.csproj:1 — PetFamily.SharedKernel.Application: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
  • Off the main sequence: PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi.csproj:1 — PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi: abstractness 0.05, instability 0.00, distance 0.95 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
  • Off the main sequence: PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts.csproj:1 — PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts: abstractness 0.05, instability 0.00, distance 0.95 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — PetFamily.SharedKernel.Tests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · VolunteerManagement · ×1
  • VolunteerManagement: 3 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In VolunteerManagement, 3 contract type(s) (PetDto, PetPhotoDto, SocialLinkDto) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (PetPhotoDto, SocialLinkDto); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-227bfdf1abd24ea19b89d89b051197f3/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .5artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-227bfdf1abd24ea19b89d89b051197f3/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .3artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .17artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnuget—nuget: not applicable — nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .99artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a1616e-2753-793b-a611-11c387837ca3 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 61 field(s) across 5 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 20 field(s)
  • UserCreatedEvent.FirstName Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs:29
  • UserCreatedEvent.LastName Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs:34
  • UserDto.FirstName Solution/Auth/Auth.Contracts/Dtos/UserDto.cs:17
  • UserDto.LastName Solution/Auth/Auth.Contracts/Dtos/UserDto.cs:18
  • User.FirstName Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Models/User.cs:21
  • User.LastName Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Models/User.cs:26
  • SeedUser.FirstName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/DevDataSeeder.cs:20
  • SeedUser.LastName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/DevDataSeeder.cs:20
  • CreateUserRequest.FirstName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/CreateUserRequest.cs:16
  • CreateUserRequest.LastName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/CreateUserRequest.cs:17
  • KeycloakUserRepresentation.FirstName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/KeycloakUserRepresentation.cs:26
  • KeycloakUserRepresentation.LastName Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/KeycloakUserRepresentation.cs:31
  • UserRegisterRequest.FirstName Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Requests/UserRegisterRequest.cs:14
  • UserRegisterRequest.LastName Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Requests/UserRegisterRequest.cs:15
  • AddVolunteerCommand.Surname Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Commands/Add/AddVolunteerCommand.cs:18
  • FullNameDto.Surname Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Dtos/FullNameDto.cs:9
  • VolunteerDto.FullName Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Dtos/VolunteerDto.cs:11
  • AddVolunteerRequest.FullName Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/AddVolunteerRequest.cs:9
  • FullName.Surname Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/ValueObjects/Properties/FullName.cs:20
  • Volunteer.FullName Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Volunteer.cs:37
Email — 16 field(s)
  • UserCreatedEvent.Email Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.Contracts/Events/Auth/UserCreatedEvent.cs:24
  • HttpContextCurrentUser.Email Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Services/HttpContextCurrentUser.cs:39
  • ICurrentUser.Email Shared/PetFamily.SharedKernel.WebApi/Services/ICurrentUser.cs:25
  • UserDto.Email Solution/Auth/Auth.Contracts/Dtos/UserDto.cs:16
  • User.Email Solution/Auth/Auth.Core/Models/User.cs:16
  • SeedUser.Email Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/DevDataSeeder.cs:20
  • CreateUserRequest.Email Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/CreateUserRequest.cs:14
  • KeycloakUserRepresentation.Email Solution/Auth/Auth.Infrastructure/Services/Keycloak/Models/KeycloakUserRepresentation.cs:21
  • UserLoginRequest.Email Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Requests/UserLoginRequest.cs:8
  • UserRegisterRequest.Email Solution/Auth/Hosts/Auth.Endpoints/Requests/UserRegisterRequest.cs:12
  • EmailSettingsDto.Email Solution/Notification/Notification.Application/Dtos/EmailSettingsDto.cs:9
  • UserNotificationSettingsDto.EmailSettings Solution/Notification/Notification.Application/Dtos/UserNotificationSettingsDto.cs:18
  • EmailSettings.Email Solution/Notification/Notification.Core/Models/EmailSettings.cs:21
  • UserNotificationSettings.EmailSettings Solution/Notification/Notification.Core/Models/UserNotificationSettings.cs:36
  • NotificationDbContext.EmailSettings Solution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/Common/NotificationDbContext.cs:20
  • SmtpOptions.SenderEmail Solution/Notification/Notification.Infrastructure/Settings/SmtpOptions.cs:41
Phone — 12 field(s)
  • Account.PhoneNumber Solution/Account/Account.Domain/Aggregates/Account.cs:43
  • UpdateProfileCommand.PhoneNumber Solution/Account/Application/Account.Handlers/Commands/UpdateProfile/UpdateProfileCommand.cs:18
  • AccountDto.PhoneNumber Solution/Account/Application/Account.Services/Dtos/AccountDto.cs:15
  • UpdateProfileRequest.PhoneNumber Solution/Account/Hosts/Account.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/UpdateProfileRequest.cs:10
  • AddShelterCommand.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/Add/AddShelterCommand.cs:38
  • UpdateShelterCommand.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/Update/UpdateShelterCommand.cs:23
  • AddPetCommand.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Commands/Add/AddPetCommand.cs:59
  • ShelterDto.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Shelters/Dtos/ShelterDto.cs:26
  • AddPetRequest.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/AddPetRequest.cs:31
  • AddShelterRequest.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/AddShelterRequest.cs:22
  • UpdateShelterRequest.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/UpdateShelterRequest.cs:14
  • Shelter.PhoneNumber Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Shelters/Shelter.cs:58
Address — 7 field(s)
  • AddShelterCommand.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/Add/AddShelterCommand.cs:33
  • UpdateShelterAddressCommand.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Shelters/Commands/UpdateAddress/UpdateShelterAddressCommand.cs:33
  • ShelterDto.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Shelters/Dtos/ShelterDto.cs:25
  • AddressDto.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Dtos/AddressDto.cs:10
  • AddShelterRequest.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/AddShelterRequest.cs:21
  • UpdateShelterAddressRequest.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/UpdateShelterAddressRequest.cs:14
  • Address.ZipCode Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/ValueObjects/Properties/Address.cs:29
Date of birth — 6 field(s)
  • AddPetCommand.BirthDate Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Commands/Add/AddPetCommand.cs:64
  • SearchPetsQuery.BirthDateFrom Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Queries/SearchPets/SearchPetsQuery.cs:31
  • SearchPetsQuery.BirthDateTo Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Handlers/Volunteers/Pets/Queries/SearchPets/SearchPetsQuery.cs:32
  • PetDto.BirthDate Solution/VolunteerManagement/Application/VolunteerManagement.Services/Volunteers/Dtos/PetDto.cs:34
  • AddPetRequest.BirthDate Solution/VolunteerManagement/Hosts/VolunteerManagement.Hosts.Endpoints/Requests/AddPetRequest.cs:32
  • Pet.BirthDate Solution/VolunteerManagement/VolunteerManagement.Domain/Aggregates/Volunteers/Entities/Pet.cs:60

Issues: 74 · Warnings: 162 · Recommendations: 57 · Info: 51 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 02:26 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md