Public report — headroom, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 05:46 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Headroomlabs-Ai/headroom

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measuredno automated testssingle-maintainer
47% Provisional
Maturity 78% Strong Code Health 69% Strong Security 62% Adequate Readiness 26% Weak

Hobby · weakest lens: Readiness (26%)

Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

41/44dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
225findings with an exact file:lineof 236 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
44/102dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.

headroomlabs-ai/headroom carries serious gaps (47%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (62%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.2 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 69% Strong Maturity 78% Strong Readiness 26% Weak · gated by D9, P2, P5 Security 62% Adequate · gated by D29, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 50% weightSecurity 62% · 27% weightCode Health 69% · 15% weightMaturity 78% · 8% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 47 → ~66.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+22.7 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with .gitguardian.yaml.
+20.6 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+22.7 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

At a glance — Code Health · 69% · Strong

The Good
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 7.5 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 9.2 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 7.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 5.5 R3 · React / TS Large Files 6.7
The Ugly
D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 4.5 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 4.6

At a glance — Architecture · — · —

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9 D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 78% · Strong

The Good
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 8.3 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · .NET / C# ADR Conformance 7.5 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 8.5 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by D9, P2, P5

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 6.6 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 8.5 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 6.5
The Bad
D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 62% · Adequate · gated by D29, D38

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.1 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0
The Bad
D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 5.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration13High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the single missing test case in the Test Distribution area to ensure code coverage. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to improve observability and enable effective debugging. Secure the codebase by resolving the identified leaked secret and establishing a robust disaster recovery plan that includes automated backups and documented recovery procedures. Finally, enforce release hygiene by standardizing versioning and tagging to ensure all builds and releases are fully traceable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+22.7 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with .gitguardian.yaml.+20.6 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+22.7 ptsMediumObservability
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+22.7 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+20.6 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+17.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+16.9 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+14.9 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 18 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 0% slop · 56% mixed · 44% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
e2e/init/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
e2e/wrap/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/dependabot.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
uv.lock5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.devcontainer/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
docker/differential-network-capture/Dockerfile.runner6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfile6.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: DS-0001
headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: process (cyclomatic 140)
.gitguardian.yaml7.2Near-cleanSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: jwt
Cargo.lock7.9Near-cleanOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0204
REALIGNMENT/00-overview.md8.0Near-cleanADR Conformance: ADR not followed: 00 — Overview & Wrong Mental Model
REALIGNMENT/09-phase-G-rtk-observability.md8.0Near-cleanADR Conformance: ADR not followed: Phase G — RTK Breadth + Observability
deploy/beacon/worker.js8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: extract (cognitive 17)
REALIGNMENT/11-phase-I-test-infra.md8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: Decision/consequences are absent and trade-offs are only hinted ("LOW risk")
crates/headroom-simulators/Dockerfile9.3Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 41 of 44 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D9D12D13D20D21D25D26D27D28D29D31D33D36D37D38AX5M1M2M3P1P2P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 225 of 236 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdac1-cabd-78dd-9519-bd8cb7ec7576.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace returned 0 projects, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, D25 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

50 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was process at 140.

(anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) · ×22headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4229
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) · ×8headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4112
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) · ×7headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4388
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) · ×2headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6835
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) · ×2headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5527

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 22 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 7 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

57 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was process at 216.

(anonymous) (cognitive 25) · ×20headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4229
(anonymous) (cognitive 27) · ×8headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4112
(anonymous) (cognitive 23) · ×5headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6712
(anonymous) (cognitive 26) · ×3headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4648
(anonymous) (cognitive 24) · ×2headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4388

+ 18 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 20 (anonymous) (cognitive 25) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (20). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 (anonymous) (cognitive 27) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 5 (anonymous) (cognitive 23) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with entry.opencode.js (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: _dist/entry.opencode.jsheadroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with entry.opencode.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 10 mechanizable ADRs, 4 are prevented by analyzers, 6 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: jwt.gitguardian.yaml:22

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with .gitguardian.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Prevented (currently Verified). — Hardens enforcement from Verified toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 15 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.3/10 (consistently complete and clear). 1 flagged with a specific gap.

Decision/consequences are absent and trade-offs are only hinted ("LOW risk")REALIGNMENT/11-phase-I-test-infra.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Decision/consequences are absent and trade-offs are only hinted ("LOW… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 11-phase-I-test-infra.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 conform / 2 violate across 15 ADRs.

ADR not followed: 00 — Overview & Wrong Mental Model · ×2REALIGNMENT/00-overview.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 ADR not followed finding(s) in ADR Conformance — start with 00-overview.md, 09-phase-G-rtk-observability.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Enforce ADR Conformance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

265 finding(s): 0 critical, 181 high, 57 medium, 27 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:37detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (40), action.yml (5), dependabot.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 4 medium, 5 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×4Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×5.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3), Dockerfile.runner. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), Dockerfile.runner. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

105 finding(s): 1 critical, 48 high, 55 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×48sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0204Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 48 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with headroom-sbom.spdx.json (47), uv.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (48 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 15) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • sdk/typescript/src/index.ts:113 · sdk/typescript/test/paths.test.ts:10 — index.ts:113
  • sdk/typescript/src/index.ts:75 · sdk/typescript/src/index.ts:116 · sdk/typescript/test/paths.test.ts:13 — index.ts:75
  • headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6755 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8932 — entry.opencode.js:6755
  • sdk/typescript/test/config.test.ts:5 · sdk/typescript/test/models.test.ts:5 — config.test.ts:5
  • headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4151 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4432 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4551 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4688 — entry.opencode.js:4151
  • headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4267 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6752 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8057 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8929 — entry.opencode.js:4267
  • headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6959 · headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6993 — entry.opencode.js:6959
  • plugins/openclaw/test/gateway-config.test.ts:112 · plugins/openclaw/test/gateway-config.test.ts:178 · plugins/openclaw/test/gateway-config.test.ts:200 — gateway-config.test.ts:112

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — entry.opencode.js:10482, entry.opencode.js:11187, entry.opencode.js:7067, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 5 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage6.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — entry.opencode.js, models.ts, build_npm_release_assets.mjs, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 4 file(s) (~13463 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
  • Unreachable from the 5 application, 7 tooling and 31 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (5 application, 7 tooling, 31 test roots considered) (×5) — models.ts, config.ts, handler.js, …
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — plugin.ts:68

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene6.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — plugin.ts:3
  • Declared in sdk/typescript/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health69%StrongSolid.
Maturity78%StrongStrongest area.
Readiness26%Weak — gated by D9, P2, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security62%Adequate — gated by D29, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 59 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~189805 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM accuracy check did not return a usable verdict.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 107 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:46 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:150 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/headroom-e2e-setup/action.yml:160 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:17 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:30 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:45 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:59 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:51 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:52 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:109 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:110 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:114 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:136 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:137 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:140 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:141 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:148 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:160 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:161 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:164 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:165 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:173 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×48
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — agno: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — aiohttp 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.14.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.7
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.8
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.9
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — cryptography 48.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 50.0.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — cryptography 48.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 49.0.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.51 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.57 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.53 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.54 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.55 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.51 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.54 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.54 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.52 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — gitpython 3.1.50: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.51 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — js-yaml 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — js-yaml 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — lxml-html-clean 0.4.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.4.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — mcp 1.26.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.27.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — mcp 1.26.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.27.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — mcp 1.26.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.28.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — next 16.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 16.2.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sbom/headroom-sbom.spdx.json — next 16.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 16.2.11
  • + 23 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4
  • High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 docker/differential-network-capture/Dockerfile.runner — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 e2e/init/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 e2e/wrap/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D25 · ADR Conformance · ADR not followed · ×2
  • ADR not followed: 00 — Overview & Wrong Mental Model REALIGNMENT/00-overview.md — The summary shows no type or namespace reflecting the 'never touch the hot zone' rule, and ICM with a frozen_message_count=0 hardcoded contradicts the audit's finding that it drops messages from index 0. (REALIGNMENT/00-overview.md)
  • ADR not followed: Phase G — RTK Breadth + Observability REALIGNMENT/09-phase-G-rtk-observability.md — The headroom/lean_ctx/rtk packages and the --context-tool flags were removed entirely as per the ADR's decision that RTK stays on the wrap-CLI side, not the proxy. (REALIGNMENT/09-phase-G-rtk-observability.md)
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: jwt .gitguardian.yaml:22 — jwt detected.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock — chromadb: [GHSA redacted]
Warning — 118 finding(s)
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) · ×22
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4229 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4779 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4898 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5015 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5400 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5763 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5999 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6117 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6234 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6470 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7188 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7424 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7542 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7659 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7777 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8178 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8300 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8537 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8773 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8889 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9012 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9364 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 25) · ×20
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4229 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4779 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4898 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5015 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5400 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5999 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6117 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6234 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6470 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7188 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7424 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7542 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7659 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7777 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8300 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8537 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8773 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8889 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9012 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9364 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) · ×8
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4112 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4510 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5133 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5280 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5646 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5881 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6352 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8018 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 27) · ×8
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4112 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4510 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5133 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5280 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5646 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5881 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6352 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8018 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) · ×7
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4388 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6594 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6712 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7307 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8655 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9130 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9247 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 23) · ×5
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 23) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6712 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 23) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7307 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 23) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8655 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 23) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9130 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 23) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9247 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 e2e/init/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 e2e/wrap/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 26) · ×3
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4648 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5763 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8178 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6835 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8418 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5527 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9482 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 24) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4388 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 24) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6594 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 22) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 22) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:3826 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 22) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:5527 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · process (cyclomatic 140) · ×1
  • process (cyclomatic 140) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:10482 — process has cyclomatic complexity 140 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · isTransforming (cyclomatic 54) · ×1
  • isTransforming (cyclomatic 54) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:11187 — isTransforming has cyclomatic complexity 54 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 37) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 37) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7067 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · emit (cyclomatic 32) · ×1
  • emit (cyclomatic 32) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:10997 — emit has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 28) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 28) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7900 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:4648 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getParsedType (cyclomatic 26) · ×1
  • getParsedType (cyclomatic 26) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:812 — getParsedType has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · parse (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • parse (cyclomatic 21) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:3282 — parse has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · parsedTypeFromType (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • parsedTypeFromType (cyclomatic 17) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6901 — parsedTypeFromType has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (0 author(s) across 0 commit(s) sampled).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.summary | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1051.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · process (cognitive 216) · ×1
  • process (cognitive 216) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:10482 — process has cognitive complexity 216 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · emit (cognitive 49) · ×1
  • emit (cognitive 49) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:10997 — emit has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · parse (cognitive 41) · ×1
  • parse (cognitive 41) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:3282 — parse has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 38) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 38) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7067 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getParsedType (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • getParsedType (cognitive 30) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:812 — getParsedType has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 30) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:6835 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 29) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:8418 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 28) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 28) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:7900 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · parse (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • parse (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:3211 — parse has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · isTransforming (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • isTransforming (cognitive 25) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:11187 — isTransforming has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · processError (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • processError (cognitive 22) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:1274 — processError has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 21) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:9482 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · runChecks (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • runChecks (cognitive 20) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:2190 — runChecks has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · mergeValues (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • mergeValues (cognitive 20) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:3147 — mergeValues has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · extract (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • extract (cognitive 17) deploy/beacon/worker.js:98 — extract has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · shape (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • shape (cognitive 16) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:1030 — shape has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · processError (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • processError (cognitive 16) headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:1238 — processError has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D20 · ADR Quality · Decision/consequences are absent and trade-offs are only hinted ("LOW risk") · ×1
  • Decision/consequences are absent and trade-offs are only hinted ("LOW risk") REALIGNMENT/11-phase-I-test-infra.md — Add a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as the ~10 PR surface burdening CI, the cost of maintaining parallel test fixtures, and how this phase stays safe after landing.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: _dist/entry.opencode.js headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js:0 — FileTooLong — 12906 lines.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock — crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — upgrade to 0.9.20 (in 2 lockfiles)
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×5
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 crates/headroom-simulators/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/differential-network-capture/Dockerfile.runner — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 e2e/init/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 e2e/wrap/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · single-commit history · ×1
  • single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots: a single-commit clone exposes no history window, so the churn × complexity hotspot signal is unavailable — not scored for this run.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (0 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .265artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .13artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .105artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdac1-cabd-78dd-9519-bd8cb7ec7576 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 107 · Warnings: 118 · Recommendations: 10 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 05:46 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md