Public report — foodtruacker, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 15:26 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Hiiammalte/foodtruacker

47% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Small · 3,528 LoC · 9 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (26%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

64/67dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
43findings with an exact file:lineof 92 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
67/107dimensions across the health lenses3528 LoC · 9 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

hiiammalte/foodtruacker carries serious risk (47%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (88%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Code Health (58%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Small (~3,528 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 46% weightCode Health 58% · 25% weightMaturity 63% · 14% weightSecurity 67% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 77% · 4% weightArchitecture 88% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 47 → ~63.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 15%Plumbing 62%Tests 10%Generated 14%
New since the last scan (7+)

7 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/appsettings.json
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Release/net9.0/appsettings.json
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: Commands.TourStopPricingModelCreateCommandHandler.Handle foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Commands/TourStopPricingModelCreateCommand.cs
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: Commands.AdminAccountCreateCommandHandler.Handle foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/AdminAccountCreateCommand.cs
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: Commands.CustomerAccountCreateCommandHandler.Handle foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/CustomerAccountCreateCommand.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,500–€7,700
Cost to rebuild€1,500–€7,700 (0.1 person-years (26–81 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 47% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 46% boilerplate · 35% straight-line · 19% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — service/app, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+14.9 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+11.9 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
+11.4 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,528 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 26%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch foodtruacker.API API foodtruacker.Application Application foodtruacker.API->foodtruacker.Application foodtruacker.EmailService EmailService foodtruacker.API->foodtruacker.EmailService foodtruacker.Authentication Authentication foodtruacker.Application->foodtruacker.Authentication foodtruacker.Domain Domain foodtruacker.Application->foodtruacker.Domain foodtruacker.Application->foodtruacker.EmailService foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository EventSourcingRepository foodtruacker.Application->foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository foodtruacker.QueryRepository QueryRepository foodtruacker.Application->foodtruacker.QueryRepository foodtruacker.SharedKernel SharedKernel foodtruacker.Domain->foodtruacker.SharedKernel foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository->foodtruacker.Domain foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository->foodtruacker.SharedKernel foodtruacker.QueryRepository->foodtruacker.SharedKernel

Architecture — module dependency matrix

34 modules, 42 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

foodtruacker.API.DTOs…uacker.API.Middleware…Application.Pipelines…r.Application.Results…ication.Configuration…thentication.Entities…entication.Exceptions…entication.Migrations…ker.Domain.Exceptions…EmailService.Services…ository.Configuration…ository.Configuration…Repository.Repository…truacker.SharedKernel…nagement.QueryObjects…thentication.Services…cingManagement.Events…Management.Exceptions…Management.Exceptions…nagement.ValueObjects…cingRepository.Client…untManagement.Queries…entication.Repository…Management.Aggregates…ountManagement.Events…Repository.Repositoryfoodtruacker…acker.API.Controllers…uacker.API.Extensions…ngManagement.Commands…agement.EventHandlers…anagement.Projections…Management.Aggregates…ntManagement.Commandsfoodtruacker.API.DTOs1…uacker.API.Middleware2…Application.Pipelines3…r.Application.Results4…ication.Configuration5…thentication.Entities6…entication.Exceptions7…entication.Migrations8…ker.Domain.Exceptions9…EmailService.Services10…ository.Configuration11…ository.Configuration12…Repository.Repository13…truacker.SharedKernel14…nagement.QueryObjects15…thentication.Services16…cingManagement.Events17…Management.Exceptions18…Management.Exceptions19…nagement.ValueObjects20…cingRepository.Client21…untManagement.Queries22…entication.Repository23…Management.Aggregates24…ountManagement.Events25…Repository.Repository26foodtruacker27…acker.API.Controllers28…uacker.API.Extensions29…ngManagement.Commands30…agement.EventHandlers31…anagement.Projections32…Management.Aggregates33…ntManagement.Commands342121136233212181611711211111111466384688688

At a glance — Code Health · 58% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5

At a glance — Architecture · 88% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 63% · Adequate

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by D9, P1, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 67% · Adequate

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 77% · Adequate · gated by DM2

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration6High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test every change automatically. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in your infrastructure code, ensuring you have documented recovery time and point objectives. Then, implement health checks for your services and ensure deployments use immutable image tags to simplify rollbacks. After that, extend structured logging across all projects and provide a diagnostics seam for library code. Finally, address the missing tests in the distribution layer to ensure comprehensive coverage.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+14.9 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+11.9 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.+11.4 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+18.0 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+18.0 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.+17.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+16.0 ptsMediumObservability
Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.+10.3 ptsMediumDomain vs controller coverage

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 28 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 21% mixed · 79% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
foodtruacker.Framework/API/appsettings.json5.1MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs7.7MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
foodtruacker.SharedKernel/ValueObject.cs7.8MixedCode Coverage: Low coverage: ValueObject.cs
foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Release/net9.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
foodtruacker.Framework/EmailService/Services/DemoEmailService.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Exceptions/PricingModelNotFound.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: PricingModelNotFound
foodtruacker.SharedKernel/DomainEvent.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: DomainEvent.cs
foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Events/TourStopPricingModelCreatedEvent.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: TourStopPricingModelCreatedEvent.cs
foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Aggregates/TourStopPricingModel.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: TourStopPricingModel.cs
foodtruacker.Application/Results/CommandResult.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: CommandResult.cs
foodtruacker.Application/Pipelines/AppMetricsBehaviour.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AppMetricsBehaviour.cs
foodtruacker.Application/Pipelines/LoggingBehaviour.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: LoggingBehaviour.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetAdminInfoQuery.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: GetAdminInfoQuery.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetAllCustomerInfosQuery.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: GetAllCustomerInfosQuery.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetCustomerInfoQuery.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: GetCustomerInfoQuery.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AdminAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AdminAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs
foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountVerifiedProjection.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: AdminAccountVerifiedProjection.cs

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 64 of 67 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 67 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D35D39AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C4DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P8P9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 43 of 92 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc83b-dcd1-7b80-a7ef-6a8f8e5d925f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: foodtruacker.Authentication · ×2

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 12 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 52.9% — 19 file(s) below 50% · 1 method(s) over the CRAP-30 risk line.

Low coverage: DomainEvent.cs · ×19foodtruacker.SharedKernel/DomainEvent.cs
CRAP 30: ValueObject.OperatorDeclarationfoodtruacker.SharedKernel/ValueObject.cs:29

What to do

  1. Resolve the 19 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with DomainEvent.cs, ValueObject.cs, TourStopPricingModelCreatedEvent.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 CRAP 30 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ValueObject.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

34 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit · ×2
Outdated: EventStore.Client.Grpc · ×34

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keyfoodtruacker.Framework/API/appsettings.json:12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 35 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 3106 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8.

TodoComment · ×2foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs:22
Dead code: PricingModelNotFoundfoodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Exceptions/PricingModelNotFound.cs:5

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 projects, 116 source files, 3570 hand-written lines of code (3106 production / 464 test), plus 640 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 24 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a strong motivation and features document for an event-driven DDD/CQRS project but lacks the structure and completeness of a real documentation set: it mentions no architecture overview (e.g. layers, repositories), does not describe how to get started or prerequisites beyond the one-line Prerequisites note, and omits any guidance on running tests, consuming the API, or connecting to EventStoreDB/MongoDB. The fictional domain is noted as heavily simplified; the absence of a dedicated architecture/usage document leaves this README thin for an enterprise project.

XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.API · ×8foodtruacker.Framework/API/foodtruacker.API.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The single README is a strong motivation and features document for an event-driven DDD/CQRS project but lacks the structure and completeness of a real documentation set: it mentions no architecture overview (e.g. layers, repositories), does not describe how to get started or prerequisites beyond the one-line Prerequisites note, and omits any guidance on running tests, consuming the API, or connecting to EventStoreDB/MongoDB. The fictional domain is noted as heavily simplified; the absence of a dedicated architecture/usage document leaves this README thin for an enterprise project.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 valuable / 5 redundant across 7 sampled comments; 5 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×5foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs:22

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with IdentityMySqlServiceExtensions.cs (3), Customer.cs, Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 9 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 4 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×4foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 258 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `AggregateRoot.AggregateId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — AggregateRoot.cs:10
  • `DomainEvent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvent.cs:7
  • `DomainEvent.AggregateId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvent.cs:8

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency8.1 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Commands.TourStopPricingModelCreateCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — TourStopPricingModelCreateCommand.cs:26
  • `Commands.AdminAccountCreateCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — AdminAccountCreateCommand.cs:32
  • `Commands.CustomerAccountCreateCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CustomerAccountCreateCommand.cs:31

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
  • README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

What to do

  • Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.
S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — AuthServicesExtensions.cs:28
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 26/37 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×11) — AdministrationController.cs:24, AdministrationController.cs:46, AdministrationController.cs:60, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×5) — ExceptionMiddleware.cs:28, AppMetricsBehaviour.cs:25, LoggingBehaviour.cs:22, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/8 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health58%Adequate — gated by X4, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture88%StrongSolid.
Maturity63%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Readiness26%Weak — gated by D9, P1, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security67%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Domain Modelling77%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included — 40 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~460 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 4 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 3 finding(s)
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key foodtruacker.Framework/API/appsettings.json:12 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1
  • High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Warning — 32 finding(s)
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×19
  • Low coverage: DomainEvent.cs foodtruacker.SharedKernel/DomainEvent.cs — 40.0% line coverage (6/15).
  • Low coverage: ValueObject.cs foodtruacker.SharedKernel/ValueObject.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/21).
  • Low coverage: TourStopPricingModelCreatedEvent.cs foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Events/TourStopPricingModelCreatedEvent.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: TourStopPricingModel.cs foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Aggregates/TourStopPricingModel.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/22).
  • Low coverage: CommandResult.cs foodtruacker.Application/Results/CommandResult.cs — 29.4% line coverage (10/34).
  • Low coverage: AppMetricsBehaviour.cs foodtruacker.Application/Pipelines/AppMetricsBehaviour.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/11).
  • Low coverage: LoggingBehaviour.cs foodtruacker.Application/Pipelines/LoggingBehaviour.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: GetAdminInfoQuery.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetAdminInfoQuery.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: GetAllCustomerInfosQuery.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetAllCustomerInfosQuery.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: GetCustomerInfoQuery.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Queries/GetCustomerInfoQuery.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/12).
  • Low coverage: AdminAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
  • Low coverage: AdminAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/19).
  • Low coverage: AdminAccountVerifiedProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/AdminAccountVerifiedProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/23).
  • Low coverage: CustomerAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/CustomerAccountChangedEmailProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
  • Low coverage: CustomerAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/CustomerAccountChangedPasswordProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/19).
  • Low coverage: CustomerAccountVerifiedProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/CustomerAccountVerifiedProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/23).
  • Low coverage: UserAccountCreatedProjection.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Projections/UserAccountCreatedProjection.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
  • Low coverage: UserAccountSendEmailVerificationToken.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/EventHandlers/UserAccountSendEmailVerificationToken.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/37).
  • Low coverage: TourStopPricingModelCreateCommand.cs foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Commands/TourStopPricingModelCreateCommand.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/16).
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/appsettings.json:12 — Base64 High Entropy String
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Debug/net9.0/appsettings.json:12 — Base64 High Entropy String
  • Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 foodtruacker.Framework/API/bin/Release/net9.0/appsettings.json:12 — Base64 High Entropy String
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2
  • TodoComment foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs:22 — //TODO: Implement as BusinessRule — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment foodtruacker.Framework/EmailService/Services/DemoEmailService.cs:25 — //TODO: Implementing email service — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: foodtruacker.Authentication — foodtruacker.Authentication: abstractness 0.11, instability 0.00, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: foodtruacker.Domain — foodtruacker.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: PricingModelNotFound foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/TourPricingManagement/Exceptions/PricingModelNotFound.cs:5 — NamedType PricingModelNotFound — no references found in solution.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 30 · ×1
  • CRAP 30: ValueObject.OperatorDeclaration foodtruacker.SharedKernel/ValueObject.cs:29 — Cyclomatic 5 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×5
  • redundant comment foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs:22 — "TODO: Implement as BusinessRule" — delete - the call-site 'Implement as BusinessRule' already states this
  • redundant comment foodtruacker.Framework/API/Extensions/IdentityMySqlServiceExtensions.cs:42 — "Password settings." — delete - restates the obvious property name; remove or link to the Settings page
  • redundant comment foodtruacker.Framework/API/Extensions/IdentityMySqlServiceExtensions.cs:48 — "User settings." — delete - same pattern
  • redundant comment foodtruacker.Framework/API/Extensions/IdentityMySqlServiceExtensions.cs:51 — "SignIn settings." — delete - restates the property name
  • redundant comment foodtruacker.Framework/API/Startup.cs:33 — "This method gets called by the runtime. Use this method to add services to the container." — delete - standard DI boilerplate; only keep the WHY if it explains why ConfigureServices is used here
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 16 commit(s) sampled).
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `foodtruacker.EmailService` with 34 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 95 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.4 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 3106 LoC across 9 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 foodtruacker.Framework/API/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (16 commit(s) sampled).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 45 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×34
  • Outdated: EventStore.Client.Grpc — EventStore.Client.Grpc 23.3.7 → 23.3.9 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: EventStore.Client.Grpc.Operations — EventStore.Client.Grpc.Operations 23.3.7 → 23.3.9 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: EventStore.Client.Grpc.ProjectionManagement — EventStore.Client.Grpc.ProjectionManagement 23.3.7 → 23.3.9 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: EventStore.Client.Grpc.UserManagement — EventStore.Client.Grpc.UserManagement 23.3.7 → 23.3.9 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Grpc.Net.Client — Grpc.Net.Client 2.67.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.11 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 8.0.11 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational 8.0.11 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets 1.21.0 → 1.23.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: MongoDB.Driver — MongoDB.Driver 3.0.0 → 3.10.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql — Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql 8.0.2 → 9.0.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Extensions.Logging — Serilog.Extensions.Logging 8.0.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 6.0.0 → 6.1.1 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 7.1.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger 7.1.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 8.2.1 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: System.Security.Permissions — System.Security.Permissions 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • Outdated: System.Text.Encodings.Web — System.Text.Encodings.Web 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by foodtruacker.API).
  • + 9 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×8
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.API foodtruacker.Framework/API/foodtruacker.API.csproj — foodtruacker.API: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/71).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.Application foodtruacker.Application/foodtruacker.Application.csproj — foodtruacker.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/133).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.Domain foodtruacker.Domain/foodtruacker.Domain.csproj — foodtruacker.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/88).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.SharedKernel foodtruacker.SharedKernel/foodtruacker.SharedKernel.csproj — foodtruacker.SharedKernel: 12 % XML-doc coverage (4/32).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.QueryRepository foodtruacker.Framework/QueryRepository/foodtruacker.QueryRepository.csproj — foodtruacker.QueryRepository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/24).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository foodtruacker.Framework/EventsourcingRepository/foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository.csproj — foodtruacker.EventSourcingRepository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/20).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.EmailService foodtruacker.Framework/EmailService/foodtruacker.EmailService.csproj — foodtruacker.EmailService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: foodtruacker.Authentication foodtruacker.Framework/Authentication/foodtruacker.Authentication.csproj — foodtruacker.Authentication: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/50).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list foodtruacker.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .6artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc83b-dcd1-7b80-a7ef-6a8f8e5d925f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 31 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 19 field(s)
  • AdminAccountChangeEmailCommand.NewEmail foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/AdminAccountChangeEmailCommand.cs:17
  • AdminAccountCreateCommand.Email foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/AdminAccountCreateCommand.cs:15
  • CustomerAccountChangeEmailCommand.NewEmail foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/CustomerAccountChangeEmailCommand.cs:17
  • CustomerAccountCreateCommand.Email foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/CustomerAccountCreateCommand.cs:15
  • UserAccountSendEmailVerificationToken._emailService foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/EventHandlers/UserAccountSendEmailVerificationToken.cs:18
  • AdminInfo.Email foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/AdminInfo.cs:7
  • CustomerInfo.Email foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/CustomerInfo.cs:7
  • Admin.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Admin.cs:13
  • Customer.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Aggregates/Customer.cs:13
  • AdminAccountChangedEmailEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/AdminAccountChangedEmailEvent.cs:9
  • AdminAccountCreatedEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/AdminAccountCreatedEvent.cs:9
  • AdminAccountVerifiedEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/AdminAccountVerifiedEvent.cs:10
  • CustomerAccountChangedEmailEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/CustomerAccountChangedEmailEvent.cs:9
  • CustomerAccountCreatedEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/CustomerAccountCreatedEvent.cs:9
  • CustomerAccountVerifiedEvent.Email foodtruacker.Domain/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Events/CustomerAccountVerifiedEvent.cs:10
  • CreateAdminAccountDTO.Email foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateAdminAccountDTO.cs:5
  • CreateCustomerAccountDTO.Email foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateCustomerAccountDTO.cs:5
  • UpdateEmailAddressDTO.Email foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/UpdateEmailAddressDTO.cs:6
  • User.UnConfirmedEmail foodtruacker.Framework/Authentication/Entities/User.cs:8
Name — 12 field(s)
  • AdminAccountCreateCommand.Firstname foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/AdminAccountCreateCommand.cs:17
  • AdminAccountCreateCommand.Lastname foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/AdminAccountCreateCommand.cs:18
  • CustomerAccountCreateCommand.Firstname foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/CustomerAccountCreateCommand.cs:17
  • CustomerAccountCreateCommand.Lastname foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/Commands/CustomerAccountCreateCommand.cs:18
  • AdminInfo.FirstName foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/AdminInfo.cs:8
  • AdminInfo.LastName foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/AdminInfo.cs:9
  • CustomerInfo.FirstName foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/CustomerInfo.cs:8
  • CustomerInfo.LastName foodtruacker.Application/BoundedContexts/UserAccountManagement/QueryObjects/CustomerInfo.cs:9
  • CreateAdminAccountDTO.Firstname foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateAdminAccountDTO.cs:7
  • CreateAdminAccountDTO.Surname foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateAdminAccountDTO.cs:8
  • CreateCustomerAccountDTO.Firstname foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateCustomerAccountDTO.cs:7
  • CreateCustomerAccountDTO.Surname foodtruacker.Framework/API/DTOs/CreateCustomerAccountDTO.cs:8

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md