Public report — Umi-OCR, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 05:41 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Hiroi-Sora/Umi-OCR

no automated testssingle-maintainer
32% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Critical
Architecture 96% Exemplary Security 60% Adequate Maturity 44% Weak Code Health 43% Weak Readiness 11% Critical

— · weakest lens: Readiness (11%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

33/35dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
25findings with an exact file:lineof 33 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
35/100dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

hiroi-sora/Umi-OCR carries serious gaps (32%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (96%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (11%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (43%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (96%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 43% Weak · gated by R2, R3 Architecture 96% ★ Exemplary Maturity 44% Weak · gated by M2 Readiness 11% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P2, P3 Security 60% Adequate · gated by D29
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 11% · 47% weightCode Health 43% · 26% weightMaturity 44% · 14% weightSecurity 60% · 8% weightArchitecture 96% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 11 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 32 → ~50.

New since the last scan (25+)

25 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py
  • D16 · single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
  • D29 · Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py
  • R10 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 4 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 3 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 9 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/ar.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 6 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 3 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 9 locations) dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts
  • R2 · Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 45, cognitive 44) dev-tools/i18n/release/pt.ts
  • R2 · Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 28) dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts
  • R3 · Large Files
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/ru_RU.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/ta.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/pt.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/fr_FR.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file dev-tools/i18n/release/vi.ts
  • R6 · Tooling
  • P2 · No structured logging

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+17.8 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+17.8 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+20.7 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 43% · Weak · gated by R2, R3

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 7.7 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 5.0
The Ugly
D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 4.6 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 0.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 96% · Exemplary

The Good
D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 44% · Weak · gated by M2

The Good
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 11% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 10.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 60% · Adequate · gated by D29

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 2.1

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection23High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline to automatically build and test every change. Next, implement structured logging and observability across all services to improve monitoring and debugging capabilities. Then, introduce static analysis and security scanning tools to catch issues early in the development process. Finally, expand test coverage to include all production modules and configure linting and type checking within the build process.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+17.8 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+17.8 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+20.7 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+20.7 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+20.7 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+20.7 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+20.7 ptsMediumTooling
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.+5.6 ptsMediumCyclomatic Complexity

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 11 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 9% slop · 46% mixed · 45% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py0.9SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected
dev-tools/i18n/lupdate_all.py6.3MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
dev-tools/i18n/convert_ts_txt.py6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
dev-tools/i18n/convert_txt_ts.py6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/web_server.py7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: sql-injection-db-cursor-execute
UmiOCR-data/py_src/platform/linux/linux_api.py7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-file-permissions
UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
UmiOCR-data/main.py9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: subprocess-shell-true
UmiOCR-data/py_src/platform/win32/win32_api.py9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: subprocess-shell-true
UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_client.py9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: subprocess-shell-true
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: 缺少关于如何在 Windows7 x64 上安装和运行 Umi-OCR 的具体步骤（如解压后配置文件路径）

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 35 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 35 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D8D9D12D13D19D21D26D27D28D29AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 25 of 33 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdabd-dc66-79c7-bb68-f11c0a41ada9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

15 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was _MissionDocClass.msnTask at 43.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

28 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was _MissionDocClass.msnTask at 103.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Umi-OCR 的中文 README 和配套的开发/架构文档质量很高：README 中文页面有完整的目录、下载发行版、使用说明、功能列表和翻译状态，英文 README 包含命令行和 HTTP 接口手册；i18n 读取文件维护指南详细且结构清晰（从源生成 .ts 到 .qm 的二进制包）；架构/设计文档覆盖了项目结构、构建流程、本地化翻译机制、HTTP接口基础说明、注意事项、并发限制、错误恢复等关键内容。

缺少关于如何在 Windows7 x64 上安装和运行 Umi-OCR 的具体步骤（如解压后配置文件路径）README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 缺少关于如何在 Windows7 x64 上安装和运行 Umi-OCR 的具体步骤（如解压后配置文件路径） finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)2.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 16 medium, 3 low.

High: eval-detected · ×4UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:151detected by semgrep finding
Medium: insecure-file-permissions · ×16UmiOCR-data/py_src/platform/linux/linux_api.py:68detected by semgrep finding
Low: subprocess-shell-true · ×3UmiOCR-data/main.py:84detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with bottle.py (8), lupdate_all.py (3), convert_ts_txt.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with bottle.py (3), web_server.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with cmd_client.py, main.py, win32_api.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1194 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1194 — ja_JP.ts:1194
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1675 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1203 — ja_JP.ts:1675
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1651 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1633 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1651 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1669 — ja_JP.ts:1651
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1638 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1656 · dev-tools/i18n/release/zh_TW.ts:1674 — zh_TW.ts:1638
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/ar.ts:1160 · dev-tools/i18n/release/es.ts:1141 · dev-tools/i18n/release/fa.ts:1160 · dev-tools/i18n/release/fr_FR.ts:1163 — ar.ts:1160
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts:1001 · dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts:1975 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1679 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ru_RU.ts:1001 — en_US.ts:1001
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts:1192 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ru_RU.ts:1192 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ta.ts:1192 — en_US.ts:1192
  • dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts:1633 · dev-tools/i18n/release/en_US.ts:1669 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1633 · dev-tools/i18n/release/ja_JP.ts:1669 — en_US.ts:1633

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×2) — pt.ts:1, en_US.ts:1

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 15 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — en_US.ts, ja_JP.ts, ru_RU.ts, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 15 file(s) (~37621 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health43%Weak — gated by R2, R3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture96%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity44%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness11%Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security60%Adequate — gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 66 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 6 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4
  • High: eval-detected UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:151 — Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources.
  • High: eval-detected UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3388 — Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources.
  • High: eval-detected UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3804 — Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources.
  • High: sql-injection-db-cursor-execute UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/web_server.py:56 — User-controlled data from a request is passed to 'execute()'. This could lead to a SQL injection and therefore protected information could be leaked. Instead, use django's QuerySets, which are built with query parameterization and therefore not vulnerable to sql injection. For example, you could use `Entry.objects.filter(date=2006)`.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 18 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×16
  • Medium: insecure-file-permissions UmiOCR-data/py_src/platform/linux/linux_api.py:68 — These permissions `0o755` are widely permissive and grant access to more people than may be necessary. A good default is `0o644` which gives read and write access to yourself and read access to everyone else.
  • Medium: avoid-cPickle UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:2866 — Avoid using `cPickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format.
  • Medium: avoid-pickle UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:2866 — Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format.
  • Medium: avoid-cPickle UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:2880 — Avoid using `cPickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format.
  • Medium: avoid-pickle UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:2880 — Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format.
  • Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3449 — Detected subprocess function 'Popen' with user controlled data. A malicious actor could leverage this to perform command injection. You may consider using 'shlex.quote()'.
  • Medium: mako-templates-detected UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3663 — Mako templates do not provide a global HTML escaping mechanism. This means you must escape all sensitive data in your templates using '| u' for URL escaping or '| h' for HTML escaping. If you are using Mako to serve web content, consider using a system such as Jinja2 which enables global escaping.
  • Medium: mako-templates-detected UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3665 — Mako templates do not provide a global HTML escaping mechanism. This means you must escape all sensitive data in your templates using '| u' for URL escaping or '| h' for HTML escaping. If you are using Mako to serve web content, consider using a system such as Jinja2 which enables global escaping.
  • Medium: missing-autoescape-disabled UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/bottle.py:3708 — Detected a Jinja2 environment without autoescaping. Jinja2 does not autoescape by default. This is dangerous if you are rendering to a browser because this allows for cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. If you are in a web context, enable autoescaping by setting 'autoescape=True.' You may also consider using 'jinja2.select_autoescape()' to only enable automatic escaping for certain file extensions.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml dev-tools/i18n/convert_ts_txt.py:1 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse dev-tools/i18n/convert_ts_txt.py:8 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml dev-tools/i18n/convert_txt_ts.py:1 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse dev-tools/i18n/convert_txt_ts.py:8 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml dev-tools/i18n/lupdate_all.py:7 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse dev-tools/i18n/lupdate_all.py:88 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse dev-tools/i18n/lupdate_all.py:90 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (0 author(s) across 0 commit(s) sampled).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py:11 — UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py:11-28 | UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_server.py:31-49
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×3
  • Low: subprocess-shell-true UmiOCR-data/main.py:84 — Found 'subprocess' function 'Popen' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead.
  • Low: subprocess-shell-true UmiOCR-data/py_src/platform/win32/win32_api.py:133 — Found 'subprocess' function 'Popen' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead.
  • Low: subprocess-shell-true UmiOCR-data/py_src/server/cmd_client.py:92 — Found 'subprocess' function 'run' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · single-commit history · ×1
  • single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots: a single-commit clone exposes no history window, so the churn × complexity hotspot signal is unavailable — not scored for this run.
D19 · Documentation Quality · 缺少关于如何在 Windows7 x64 上安装和运行 Umi-OCR 的具体步骤（如解压后配置文件路径） · ×1
  • 缺少关于如何在 Windows7 x64 上安装和运行 Umi-OCR 的具体步骤（如解压后配置文件路径） README.md — 补充一个简短的 "快速开始" 部分，说明解压后的默认配置位置、启动命令以及首次运行时的界面语言设置
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (0 commit(s) sampled).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .23artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0—

Run 019fdabd-dc66-79c7-bb68-f11c0a41ada9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 6 · Warnings: 18 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 05:41 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md