Public report of home-assistant/core, published 25 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard. This copy doesn't carry the survey's signed record. How a survey is checked →

home-assistant/core

Measured 25 October 2026, 07:35 UTC, at code version b00174a

No regression since the last survey

A regression is a drop of 0.5 points or more in the score, or of 2.5 or more out of 10 in a dimension, since the last survey.

CAI score 51out of 100 At risk Up 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Architecture 99 Exemplary Performance 90 Exemplary Code Health 83 Strong Maturity 58 Adequate Security and Compliance 58 Adequate Production Readiness 34 Weak

A very large codebase: 1,422,501 lines of product code in 4 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 22.5 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 34

Findings by how serious they are

1235 critical 175 serious 493 minor

22 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
25 October 2026, 07:35 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

54of 56 dimensions measured by tools. The other 2 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
1519of 1903 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 384 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
56dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 1,422,501 lines of product code in 4 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

home-assistant/core scores 51 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 34 and is rated Weak. Its REDACTED Scanning dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.0/10 and to resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 51 to about 64.

1235 findings are critical: 1115 in REDACTED Scanning, 71 in Secrets (history), 45 in Static Analysis (SAST), two in Dependency Vulnerabilities and two in IaC & Container Security.

Watchdog couldn't measure 22 dimensions in this code, among them Cyclomatic Complexity, Cognitive Complexity and Code Duplication, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 1,422,501 lines, which would take an estimated 22.5 person-years, around €3,300,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 83 Strong Architecture 99 ★ Exemplary Maturity 58 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 34 Weak, capped by REDACTED Scanning, Outbound HTTP resilience and Schema migrations Security and Compliance 58 Adequate, capped by Secrets (history) and Static Analysis (SAST) Performance 90 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 34 · counts for 46%Security and Compliance 58 · counts for 25%Maturity 58 · counts for 14%Code Health 83 · counts for 8%Performance 90 · counts for 4%Architecture 99 · counts for 2%

If Production Readiness rose from 34 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 51 to about 64.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 41%Tests 59%
New since the last survey: 1172 findings

These 1172 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 11 October 2026. The first 100 are listed here, and the findings file in the download package lists them all.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 7 findings

These 7 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 11 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Static Analysis (SAST) · High: REDACTED homeassistant/components/python_script/__init__.py
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium: REDACTED homeassistant/components/zinvolt/config_flow.py
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Documentation (README) · README may be stale
  • Async correctness · Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/unifi/hub/websocket.py
  • Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) pylint/plugins/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/actions/swallowed_exceptions.py
Rebuild cost: about €3,300,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€1,100,000 to €5,500,000, for 18,126 to 57,503 hours of work, about 22.5 person-years for 13 to 43 engineers
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 51. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeVery large: 1,422,501 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.0/10.
Raises the score by about 9 points · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Low effort · ADR Quality
3
Resolve the 1115 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (1111), REDACTED, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 15 points · High effort · REDACTED Scanning

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €3,300,000 to build again, about 22.5 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 34 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.0/10. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 9 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong ·

The Good
D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 8.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 7.7 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 8.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 8.0

At a glance — Architecture · 99% · Exemplary ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 9.8 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 58% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good
D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 8.6 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 9.9 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 7.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 34% · Weak · gated by D13, P7, P8 ·

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 8.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 9.2 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 4.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 3.0

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D28, D29 ·

The Good
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 8.1 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 7.2 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Bad
D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 5.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 1.3

At a glance — Performance · 90% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 9.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures1187High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection132High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures5High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration5High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the 1115 leaked secrets by cleaning REDACTED, REDACTED, and REDACTED, and establish architectural decision records in a dedicated docs/adr folder to document key design choices. Strengthen dependency hygiene by ensuring all Python packages use exact pins to maintain currency and security, and harden outbound HTTP calls by adding timeouts, retry logic, and circuit breakers to prevent indefinite hangs.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.0/10.+9.2 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+4.4 ptsLowADR Quality
Resolve the 1115 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (1111), REDACTED, REDACTED.+15.3 ptsHighREDACTED Scanning
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.+3.5 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Pass `timeout=` on every `requests`/`httpx` call (requests has no default and will wait forever), mount an `HTTPAdapter(max_retries=Retry(...))` on shared sessions, and wrap calls to flaky dependencies in `tenacity` retries or a `pybreaker` circuit breaker.+2.2 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Replace SQLAlchemy create_all() with Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.+2.2 ptsMediumSchema migrations
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+1.6 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Resolve the 49 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (10), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (7).+1.4 ptsMediumSecrets (history)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 585 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 1% slop · 94% mixed · 5% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED1.6SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED1.7SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED1.8SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED2.3SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 1235

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 175

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 493

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 22

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 54 of 56 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 56 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D9D10D12D13D16D17D20D21D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D43D44AX10AX3AX4M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P5P6P7P8PF1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 1519 of 1903 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a171fc-d6ee-7d0d-8384-aef63199b752.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
  • D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.py) was not read by duplication detection: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load.
  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — tests/e2e/ (@playwright/test) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml, target 100%) and a coverage step in CI (`--cov=`) shows coverage is measured in your own CI. Commit the lcov/Cobertura report it produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 1 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 8,958 test source file(s) (.py) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.py, .ts) and this repository declares a Python test suite (4 distributions), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository's Python dependency closure is larger than this pass walks (the dependency closure exceeded 500 distributions), so only part of it was read, and a licence verdict over part of a dependency graph is not a licence verdict. Nothing is asserted about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (1441246 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .py, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. A language sidecar this run needed FAILED, so the code model the non-MSBuild public-API collector reads was never built — this is a DEGRADED run, not a settled gap, and the surface may well be collectable on a re-run: The Python sidecar TIMED OUT after 600s against a 600s budget, so its process tree was killed and the Python code model degraded to null. The budget is OURS: the work may simply be larger than it allows, and this repository's Python went unread for that reason alone.
  • D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units (a .NET project, a Maven or Gradle module, an npm, Deno or JSR package, a Go module, a Cargo crate, a Python, Composer, Bundler, RubyGems, Mix, rebar3, sbt, SwiftPM or pub package, an OTP application, an Xcode project or XcodeGen spec, or a checkout that declares no build at all) whose source a code model reads. This repository's production source is in a language no model reads, or in units whose build tool D26 does not recognise. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository's projects are cohesive.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Checkov ran but its report could not be read (checkov produced no output — not a clean result). Every misconfiguration only checkov reports — most of its Terraform, CloudFormation, Bicep and Ansible policies — is absent from this card, so its absence here is not evidence those resources are configured correctly.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Script/hassfest/docker/Dockerfile.dockerignore carries no `FROM` instruction, so it declares no build stage and every REDACTED rule this engine owns — the runtime-hardening, key-material, mutable-clone, no-op-shim, build-context, trust-anchor, install-guard, setuid and world-writable-path rules — is outside its own premise there and returned nothing. That silence is deliberate and correct: with no base image there is no image to reason about. It is reported here because it is NOT the same fact as a clean file, and coverage is stated as 4 of 5 Infrastructure-as-Code manifest(s) fully judged rather than as 100%. The vendor scanners (trivy, checkov) do read these files and their findings above stand; only this engine's own stage-keyed rules are absent. No owner action: a build file with no FROM is a legitimate include fragment.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `homeassistant/auth/__init__.py`, `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/__init__.py`, `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/notify.py`, `homeassistant/auth/permissions/types.py`, `homeassistant/auth/permissions/util.py`, … (+1460 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository defines its own container in homeassistant/core.py, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped.
  • C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
  • ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — neither a .NET project nor a language model of this repository's code reached it — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No function of a language this check models was read, so there was no async code to examine. That is a limit of the analyzer on this repository, not a finding about it.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 32 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 72.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart syntax only, and no C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift or Dart was loaded for this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • Production source was not modelled — run is Degraded — No code model read .py, so the complexity, duplication and architecture dimensions were scored over a minority of this repository rather than its product, and dimensions that abstained did so for want of a model rather than for want of findings. The grade is NOT representative of this repository; diagnostics.md records the exact cause. The Python sidecar TIMED OUT after 600s against a 600s budget, so its process tree was killed and the Python code model degraded to null. The budget is OURS: the work may simply be larger than it allows, and this repository's Python went unread for that reason alone.

Repo exclusion declarations: 21 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 production modules (Python), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

52858 test methods: 52754 unit, 103 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 1 `it`/`test` case(s) across 1 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only. The Python suite contributes 52857 test function(s) across 6435 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 8,958 test source file(s) (.py) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.0 8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 99% · ceiling Verified

337 outdated, 0 yanked pinned Python distributions. 1231 of 1238 shipped distributions were graded against pypi.org (0 not published there, 7 declared without an exact pin, which installs the newest release the declaration admits and so cannot be behind one). Only EXACT pins are graded for currency: a floor or a range already installs the newest release it admits, so reporting one would report this repository for being current. Whether a deliberate upper cap has itself gone stale is a different and weaker question, and is not asked. Whether any distribution is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — PyPI publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Lockfiles are not read (poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock), so a lock-resolved install is outside this verdict. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.

Outdated: adext · ×337

What to do

  1. Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.0/10. — 337 outdated, 0 yanked pinned Python distributions. 1231 of 1238 shipped distributions were graded against pypi.org (0 not published there, 7 declared without an exact pin, which installs the newest release the declaration admits and so cannot be behind one). Only EXACT pins are graded for currency: a floor or a range already installs the newest release it admits, so reporting one would report this repository for being current. Whether a deliberate upper cap has itself gone stale is a different and weaker question, and is not asked. Whether any distribution is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — PyPI publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Lockfiles are not read (poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock), so a lock-resolved install is outside this verdict. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

415 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1115 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (1111), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1115 issue-level).
  2. Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

429 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is homeassistant/components/alexa/capabilities.py. Counted over 2994 of the 10945 production source files in this repository: 7950 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 1 have no attributable history left to measure.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×36
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 36 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Stronggated by 60 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

60 deducted task-comment markers across 1422501 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×58homeassistant/components/coolmaster/climate.py:71
HackComment · ×2homeassistant/components/isy994/helpers.py:111

What to do

  1. Resolve the 58 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED (25), REDACTED (4), device_trigger.py (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (58 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 HackComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

71 finding(s): 0 critical, 71 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 49 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (10), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 22 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

132 finding(s): 0 critical, 45 high, 66 medium, 21 low. 31 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1473 file(s) — `REDACTED` (line 32, line 52), `homeassistant/auth/__init__.py`, `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/__init__.py` (line 96, lines 96–98), `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/notify.py` (line 94), `homeassistant/auth/permissions/types.py` (line 7, line 13, line 15, …), … (+1468 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 16 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 31 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level, 2 of them charged here).
  2. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.1 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.0 7.2 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 80% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 of 2995 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is homeassistant/components/sonarr/helpers.py. Counted over 2995 of the 10945 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×22homeassistant/components/sonarr/helpers.py:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 2 platform declaration(s) and 1238 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.7 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/4 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Make sure a person approves each release. The release job names an environment, but its approval rules live in the code host's settings, where Watchdog can't see them. Check that a reviewer must approve each release, or publish releases as drafts first, so a bad build can be stopped before anyone downloads it.
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
  • Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `requests.Session(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — homeassistant/components/huawei_lte/utils.py:38
  • `aiohttp.ClientSession(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. (×4) — homeassistant/components/octoprint/__init__.py:174, homeassistant/components/octoprint/config_flow.py:284, homeassistant/components/rainbird/coordinator.py:54, …
  • `requests.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. (×4) — script/currencies.py:10, script/currencies.py:24, script/languages.py:13, …
  • `requests.request(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — script/translations/lokalise.py:36

What to do

  • Pass `timeout=` on every `requests`/`httpx` call (requests has no default and will wait forever), mount an `HTTPAdapter(max_retries=Retry(...))` on shared sessions, and wrap calls to flaky dependencies in `tenacity` retries or a `pybreaker` circuit breaker.
P8 · Schema migrations3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • SQLAlchemy create_all() builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment. (×4) — homeassistant/components/recorder/migration.py:349, homeassistant/components/recorder/core.py:1520, packages/pytest-home-assistant/pytest_homeassistant/components/recorder/common.py:174, …

What to do

  • Replace SQLAlchemy create_all() with Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

X1 · Async correctness8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception. (×6) — homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:65, homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:223, homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:278, …

What to do

  • Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept
X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document1.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `add_suggested_values_to_schema` is public and takes `suggested_values: Mapping[str, Any] | None` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 740 (`self.add_suggested_values_to_schema`) with a piece of `suggested_values` — and nowhere in `add_suggested_values_to_schema` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `add_suggested_values_to_schema` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/data_entry_flow.py:740
  • `async_step_manual` is public, takes a document from its caller (line 120) and hands it to `_validate_and_get_device_info`, which calls itself at line 172 (`self._validate_and_get_device_info`) with a piece of `config_data` — and nowhere in `_validate_and_get_device_info` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `_validate_and_get_device_info` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/airos/config_flow.py:172
  • `redact_keys` is public and takes `data: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 85 (`redact_keys`) with a piece of `data` (and at line 94, line 96) — and nowhere in `redact_keys` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `redact_keys` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/diagnostics.py:85
  • `redact_values` is public and takes `data: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 109 (`redact_values`) with a piece of `data` (and at line 117, line 119) — and nowhere in `redact_values` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `redact_values` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/diagnostics.py:109
  • `add_defaults` is public and takes `input_data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 79 (`add_defaults`) with a piece of `input_data` — and nowhere in `add_defaults` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `add_defaults` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/group/notify.py:79
  • `adjust_schema` is public, takes a document from its caller (line 51) and hands it to `_walk_schemas`, which calls itself at line 65 (`_walk_schemas`) with a piece of `schema` (and at line 69, line 72) — and nowhere in `_walk_schemas` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `_walk_schemas` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/openai_conversation/schema.py:65
  • `key_exists` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 74 (`key_exists`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `key_exists` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `key_exists` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/rainmachine/util.py:74
  • `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 110 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/tesla_fleet/coordinator.py:110
  • `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 91 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/teslemetry/helpers.py:91
  • `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 39 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/tessie/coordinator.py:39
  • `async_replace_dict_data` is public and takes `data: Mapping` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 39 (`async_replace_dict_data`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `async_replace_dict_data` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `async_replace_dict_data` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/components/unifi/diagnostics.py:39
  • `template_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 743 (`template_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 747) — and nowhere in `template_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `template_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/helpers/config_validation.py:743
  • `render_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 150 (`render_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 154) — and nowhere in `render_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `render_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/helpers/template/__init__.py:150
  • `is_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 170 (`is_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 172, line 173) — and nowhere in `is_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `is_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — homeassistant/helpers/template/__init__.py:170
  • `raise_contains_mocks` is public and takes `val: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 1725 (`raise_contains_mocks`) with a piece of `val` (and at line 1729) — and nowhere in `raise_contains_mocks` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `raise_contains_mocks` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — packages/pytest-home-assistant/pytest_homeassistant/common.py:1725
  • `find_references` is public and takes `strings: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 111 (`find_references`) with a piece of `strings` — and nowhere in `find_references` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `find_references` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — script/hassfest/translations.py:111
  • `substitute_references` is public and takes `translations: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 118 (`substitute_references`) with a piece of `translations` — and nowhere in `substitute_references` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `substitute_references` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — script/translations/util.py:118
  • `filter_translations` is public and takes `translations: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 78 (`filter_translations`) with a piece of `translations` — and nowhere in `filter_translations` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `filter_translations` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — script/translations/download.py:78

What to do

  • Each finding names the externally-callable member that accepts the document and the self-call that descends, and states that no depth parameter or counter exists anywhere in the walk. Confirm from the two, then thread a depth argument through the walk and reject documents past a fixed maximum, or rewrite it with an explicit stack.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `debug` at line 59 is called with an argument built by `json.dumps(async_redact_lwa_params(lwa_params))` (line 61), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/alexa/auth.py:59
  • `debug` at line 469 is called with an argument built by `list(all_files_in_prefix.keys())` (line 472), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/backblaze_b2/backup.py:469
  • `debug` at line 902 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 904), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:902
  • `debug` at line 924 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 927), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:924
  • `debug` at line 939 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 942), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:939
  • `debug` at line 70 is called with an argument built by `list(res.keys())` (line 74), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/cielo_home/climate.py:70
  • `debug` at line 1553 is called with an argument built by `list(matched_triggers)` (line 1557), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/conversation/default_agent.py:1553
  • `debug` at line 758 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(current_sensors_in_climate)` (line 762), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/ecobee/climate.py:758
  • `debug` at line 182 is called with an argument built by `[s.data for s in subentries]` (line 185), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/energyid/__init__.py:182
  • `debug` at line 288 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_mappings)` (line 288), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/energyid/__init__.py:288
  • `debug` at line 199 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(command_args)` (line 199), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/esphome/ffmpeg_proxy.py:199
  • `debug` at line 239 is called with an argument built by `sorted(wake_words.keys())` (line 239), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — REDACTED:239
  • `debug` at line 389 is called with an argument built by `[(s.state, s.last_updated) for s in history_list]` (line 391), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/filter/sensor.py:389
  • `debug` at line 85 is called with an argument built by `api_response.to_dict()` (line 85), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/fitbit/api.py:85
  • `debug` at line 229 is called with an argument built by `list(self.connection.services.keys())` (line 232), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — REDACTED:229
  • `debug` at line 86 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, self._plants_last_update))` (line 88), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:86
  • `debug` at line 94 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, removed_plants))` (line 94), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:94
  • `debug` at line 107 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, new_plants))` (line 107), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:107
  • `debug` at line 30 is called with an argument built by `"…".join("…" address "…" network "…" if network else "…" address "…" for address, network in zip(controller.listening...` (line 35), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/govee_light_local/coordinator.py:30
  • `debug` at line 98 is called with an argument built by `["…" ipv4["…"] "…" ipv4["…"] "…" for ipv4 in adapter["…"]]` (line 102), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/govee_light_local/__init__.py:98
  • `debug` at line 408 is called with an argument built by `sorted(timetable.keys())` (line 408), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/gtfs/sensor.py:408
  • `debug` at line 167 is called with an argument built by `addon_store_info.to_dict()` (line 167), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/hassio/addon_manager.py:167
  • `debug` at line 162 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_zones)` (line 162), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:162
  • `debug` at line 167 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_controllers)` (line 167), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:167
  • `debug` at line 174 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(new_controller_ids)` (line 174), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:174
  • `debug` at line 183 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(new_zone_ids)` (line 183), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:183
  • `debug` at line 164 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_keys)` (line 164), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/imou/coordinator.py:164
  • `debug` at line 174 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(new_keys)` (line 174), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/imou/coordinator.py:174
  • `debug` at line 126 is called with an argument built by `{ key : value for key, value in slots.items() if not key.startswith("…") and not key.endswith("…") }` (line 131), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/intent_script/helpers.py:126
  • `debug` at line 164 is called with an argument built by `list(discovery_info.service_uuids or[])` (line 168), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/iseo_argo_ble/config_flow.py:164
  • `debug` at line 124 is called with an argument built by `dashboard.to_dict()` (line 126), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py:124
  • `debug` at line 191 is called with an argument built by `dashboard.to_dict()` (line 193), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py:191
  • `debug` at line 215 is called with an argument built by `settings.to_dict()` (line 217), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py:215
  • `debug` at line 230 is called with an argument built by `schedule.to_dict()` (line 232), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py:230
  • `debug` at line 245 is called with an argument built by `statistics.to_dict()` (line 247), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py:245
  • `debug` at line 71 is called with an argument built by `json.dumps(data)` (line 71), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/meraki/device_tracker.py:71
  • `debug` at line 167 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(sorted(incomplete))` (line 170), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/mitsubishi_comfort/__init__.py:167
  • `debug` at line 67 is called with an argument built by `pformat(err.response)` (line 71), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/monzo/coordinator.py:67
  • `debug` at line 620 is called with an argument built by `[e.value for e in HVACAction]` (line 622), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/mqtt/climate.py:620
  • `debug` at line 146 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(str(d) for d in gpio.devices)` (line 148), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on. — homeassistant/components/numato/__init__.py:146

What to do

  • In Python, put the construction behind the logger's own check (`if logger.isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG):`), or pass the collection itself with a `%s` placeholder (`logger.debug("Items %s", items)`) so the logging module renders it only when the record is emitted. The placeholder alone is not the fix when the argument is still built first: it defers the formatting, not a `json.dumps`, a `join` or a comprehension in the argument, and an f-string defers nothing at all.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `dict`, `set` or `deque` it is walking alone — CPython's iterators over those check that the collection has not changed size since the loop began, so a body that removes from (or empties) the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step raise `RuntimeError: dictionary changed size during iteration` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×5) — homeassistant/components/system_log/__init__.py:142, homeassistant/components/tplink/config_flow.py:669, homeassistant/components/unifi_access/config_flow.py:53, …
  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/actions/swallowed_exceptions.py:208

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

  • `error` at line 102 is handed an f-string as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the record is filtered out. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error("order %s moved to %s", order_id, status)` with the standard library's `logging`, which keeps the message and its arguments apart on the record, or `log.error("order moved", order_id=order_id, status=status)` with structlog. — homeassistant/components/evohome/__init__.py:102

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health83%StrongSolid.
Architecture99%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity58%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness34%Weak — gated by D13, P7, P8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security58%Adequate — gated by D28, D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance90%ExemplarySolid.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 25 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not included — 63 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository registers no route and starts no server another machine can reach (no Flask/FastAPI/Starlette route, Django urlpatterns or class-based view, Tornado handler). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or command-line tool is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or MongoEngine model, a migration or a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (Django ORM, SQLAlchemy, psycopg, PyMongo, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — cyclomatic complexity not measured — .py exposed no member bodies
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .py suite was found but not re-run
  • D14 License Compliance — Python dependency closure larger than the licence pass walks
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — cognitive complexity not measured — .py exposed no member bodies
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — D26 measured no build unit over this repository's .js, .py source. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.py) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1465 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .py not exposed to the token comparison
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Python runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 1235 finding(s)
D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1115
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D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×49
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×22
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1
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Serious — 175 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×58
  • TodoComment homeassistant/components/coolmaster/climate.py:71 — # TODO(2026.7.0): When support for unknown fan speeds is — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment homeassistant/components/coolmaster/climate.py:140 — # TODO(2026.7.0): Stop supporting unknown fan speeds. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment REDACTED:362 — # TODO: add lazy_discover as argument # pylint: disable=fixme — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment homeassistant/components/zwave_js/sensor.py:848 — # TODO: Try to limit this to metadata updated event. # pylint: disable=fixme — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/hassfest/mypy_config.py:82 — # TODO: turn these on, address issues — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/backup/tests/test_backup.py:12 — # TODO: verify that the async_post_backup function executes as expected — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/backup/tests/test_backup.py:18 — # TODO: verify that the async_pre_backup function executes as expected — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/config_flow.py:16 — # TODO adjust the data schema to the data that you need — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/config_flow.py:46 — # TODO validate the data can be used to set up a connection. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:7 — # TODO List the platforms that you want to support. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:7 — # TODO List the platforms that you want to support. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_oauth2/integration/__init__.py:14 — # TODO List the platforms that you want to support. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:11 — # TODO Create ConfigEntry type alias with API object — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:11 — # TODO Create ConfigEntry type alias with API object — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:12 — # TODO Rename type alias and update all entry annotations — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_oauth2/integration/__init__.py:19 — # TODO Rename type alias and update all entry annotations — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:16 — # TODO Update entry annotation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:28 — # TODO Update entry annotation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:16 — # TODO Update entry annotation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:28 — # TODO Update entry annotation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_oauth2/integration/__init__.py:41 — # TODO Update entry annotation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:20 — # TODO 1. Create API instance — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:20 — # TODO 1. Create API instance — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow/integration/__init__.py:21 — # TODO 2. Validate the API connection (and authentication) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment script/scaffold/templates/config_flow_discovery/integration/__init__.py:21 — # TODO 2. Validate the API connection (and authentication) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • + 33 more in this group — see findings.md.
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  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document · Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap · ×18
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/data_entry_flow.py:740 — `add_suggested_values_to_schema` is public and takes `suggested_values: Mapping[str, Any] | None` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 740 (`self.add_suggested_values_to_schema`) with a piece of `suggested_values` — and nowhere in `add_suggested_values_to_schema` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `add_suggested_values_to_schema` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/airos/config_flow.py:172 — `async_step_manual` is public, takes a document from its caller (line 120) and hands it to `_validate_and_get_device_info`, which calls itself at line 172 (`self._validate_and_get_device_info`) with a piece of `config_data` — and nowhere in `_validate_and_get_device_info` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `_validate_and_get_device_info` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/diagnostics.py:85 — `redact_keys` is public and takes `data: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 85 (`redact_keys`) with a piece of `data` (and at line 94, line 96) — and nowhere in `redact_keys` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `redact_keys` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/diagnostics.py:109 — `redact_values` is public and takes `data: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 109 (`redact_values`) with a piece of `data` (and at line 117, line 119) — and nowhere in `redact_values` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `redact_values` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/group/notify.py:79 — `add_defaults` is public and takes `input_data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 79 (`add_defaults`) with a piece of `input_data` — and nowhere in `add_defaults` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `add_defaults` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/openai_conversation/schema.py:65 — `adjust_schema` is public, takes a document from its caller (line 51) and hands it to `_walk_schemas`, which calls itself at line 65 (`_walk_schemas`) with a piece of `schema` (and at line 69, line 72) — and nowhere in `_walk_schemas` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `_walk_schemas` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/rainmachine/util.py:74 — `key_exists` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 74 (`key_exists`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `key_exists` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `key_exists` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/tesla_fleet/coordinator.py:110 — `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 110 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/teslemetry/helpers.py:91 — `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 91 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/tessie/coordinator.py:39 — `flatten` is public and takes `data: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 39 (`flatten`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `flatten` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `flatten` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/components/unifi/diagnostics.py:39 — `async_replace_dict_data` is public and takes `data: Mapping` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 39 (`async_replace_dict_data`) with a piece of `data` — and nowhere in `async_replace_dict_data` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `async_replace_dict_data` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/helpers/config_validation.py:743 — `template_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 743 (`template_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 747) — and nowhere in `template_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `template_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/helpers/template/__init__.py:150 — `render_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 150 (`render_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 154) — and nowhere in `render_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `render_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap homeassistant/helpers/template/__init__.py:170 — `is_complex` is public and takes `value: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 170 (`is_complex`) with a piece of `value` (and at line 172, line 173) — and nowhere in `is_complex` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `is_complex` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap packages/pytest-home-assistant/pytest_homeassistant/common.py:1725 — `raise_contains_mocks` is public and takes `val: Any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 1725 (`raise_contains_mocks`) with a piece of `val` (and at line 1729) — and nowhere in `raise_contains_mocks` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `raise_contains_mocks` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap script/hassfest/translations.py:111 — `find_references` is public and takes `strings: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 111 (`find_references`) with a piece of `strings` — and nowhere in `find_references` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `find_references` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap script/translations/util.py:118 — `substitute_references` is public and takes `translations: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 118 (`substitute_references`) with a piece of `translations` — and nowhere in `substitute_references` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `substitute_references` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
  • Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap script/translations/download.py:78 — `filter_translations` is public and takes `translations: dict[str, Any]` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 78 (`filter_translations`) with a piece of `translations` — and nowhere in `filter_translations` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. Python's parsers accept far more nesting than its stack allows: `json.loads` turns 3,000 bytes of brackets into 1,500 levels and `xml.etree.ElementTree` parses tens of thousands, while a walk like this one raises `RecursionError` once it passes the interpreter's default limit of 1,000 frames. Wherever that exception lands, the work fails: a request errors, and outside any `try` the worker or the program exits with it. Raising `sys.setrecursionlimit` only moves the number the document has to beat. Thread a depth argument through `filter_translations` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×10
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience homeassistant/components/huawei_lte/utils.py:38 — `requests.Session(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience homeassistant/components/octoprint/__init__.py:174 — `aiohttp.ClientSession(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience homeassistant/components/octoprint/config_flow.py:284 — `aiohttp.ClientSession(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience homeassistant/components/rainbird/coordinator.py:54 — `aiohttp.ClientSession(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience homeassistant/helpers/aiohttp_client.py:300 — `aiohttp.ClientSession(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience script/currencies.py:10 — `requests.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience script/currencies.py:24 — `requests.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience script/languages.py:13 — `requests.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience script/microsoft_tts.py:13 — `requests.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience script/translations/lokalise.py:36 — `requests.request(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×8
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X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) · ×5
  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) homeassistant/components/system_log/__init__.py:142 — `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) homeassistant/components/tplink/config_flow.py:669 — `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) homeassistant/components/unifi_access/config_flow.py:53 — `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) homeassistant/components/workday/repairs.py:143 — `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
  • Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) homeassistant/helpers/aiohttp_client.py:140 — `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
P8 · Schema migrations · Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) · ×4
  • Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) homeassistant/components/recorder/migration.py:349 — SQLAlchemy create_all() builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment.
  • Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) homeassistant/components/recorder/core.py:1520 — SQLAlchemy create_all() builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment.
  • Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) packages/pytest-home-assistant/pytest_homeassistant/components/recorder/common.py:174 — SQLAlchemy create_all() builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment.
  • Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) packages/pytest-home-assistant/pytest_homeassistant/components/recorder/common.py:443 — SQLAlchemy create_all() builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Alembic (`alembic revision --autogenerate` + `alembic upgrade head`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×3
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×3
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X1 · Async correctness · Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept · ×3
  • Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:65 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
  • Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:223 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
  • Task from `self.hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/homee/config_flow.py:278 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
X1 · Async correctness · Task from `hass.loop.create_task` is not kept · ×3
  • Task from `hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/homee/__init__.py:67 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
  • Task from `hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/keba/__init__.py:68 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
  • Task from `hass.loop.create_task` is not kept homeassistant/components/reolink/__init__.py:338 — The task this creates is not kept anywhere. The event loop holds only a weak reference to its tasks, so a task nobody references can be garbage-collected before it finishes (Python's documentation for `asyncio.create_task`: save a reference to the result); and nothing ever awaits it, so an exception it raises is never handled — it surfaces, if at all, as "Task exception was never retrieved" in a log. Keep the task: `await` it, gather it, start it in an `asyncio.TaskGroup` (`async with asyncio.TaskGroup() as tg: tg.create_task(…)`), or, for genuine fire-and-forget, add it to a set and `task.add_done_callback(tasks.discard)` with a callback that also reads its exception.
D17 · Explicit Debt · HackComment · ×2
  • HackComment homeassistant/components/isy994/helpers.py:111 — # Hacky special-cases for certain devices with different platforms — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
  • HackComment homeassistant/components/skybeacon/sensor.py:144 — # HACK: inject handle mapping collected offline — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×2
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×1
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/actions/swallowed_exceptions.py:208 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Minor — 156 finding(s)
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation · Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted · ×40
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/alexa/auth.py:59 — `debug` at line 59 is called with an argument built by `json.dumps(async_redact_lwa_params(lwa_params))` (line 61), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/backblaze_b2/backup.py:469 — `debug` at line 469 is called with an argument built by `list(all_files_in_prefix.keys())` (line 472), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:902 — `debug` at line 902 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 904), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:924 — `debug` at line 924 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 927), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/backup/manager.py:939 — `debug` at line 939 is called with an argument built by `list(backups)` (line 942), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/cielo_home/climate.py:70 — `debug` at line 70 is called with an argument built by `list(res.keys())` (line 74), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/conversation/default_agent.py:1553 — `debug` at line 1553 is called with an argument built by `list(matched_triggers)` (line 1557), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/ecobee/climate.py:758 — `debug` at line 758 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(current_sensors_in_climate)` (line 762), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/energyid/__init__.py:182 — `debug` at line 182 is called with an argument built by `[s.data for s in subentries]` (line 185), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/energyid/__init__.py:288 — `debug` at line 288 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_mappings)` (line 288), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/esphome/ffmpeg_proxy.py:199 — `debug` at line 199 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(command_args)` (line 199), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted REDACTED:239 — `debug` at line 239 is called with an argument built by `sorted(wake_words.keys())` (line 239), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/filter/sensor.py:389 — `debug` at line 389 is called with an argument built by `[(s.state, s.last_updated) for s in history_list]` (line 391), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/fitbit/api.py:85 — `debug` at line 85 is called with an argument built by `api_response.to_dict()` (line 85), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted REDACTED:229 — `debug` at line 229 is called with an argument built by `list(self.connection.services.keys())` (line 232), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:86 — `debug` at line 86 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, self._plants_last_update))` (line 88), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:94 — `debug` at line 94 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, removed_plants))` (line 94), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/fyta/coordinator.py:107 — `debug` at line 107 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(map(str, new_plants))` (line 107), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/govee_light_local/coordinator.py:30 — `debug` at line 30 is called with an argument built by `"…".join("…" address "…" network "…" if network else "…" address "…" for address, network in zip(controller.listening...` (line 35), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/govee_light_local/__init__.py:98 — `debug` at line 98 is called with an argument built by `["…" ipv4["…"] "…" ipv4["…"] "…" for ipv4 in adapter["…"]]` (line 102), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/gtfs/sensor.py:408 — `debug` at line 408 is called with an argument built by `sorted(timetable.keys())` (line 408), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/hassio/addon_manager.py:167 — `debug` at line 167 is called with an argument built by `addon_store_info.to_dict()` (line 167), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:162 — `debug` at line 162 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_zones)` (line 162), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:167 — `debug` at line 167 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(removed_controllers)` (line 167), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted homeassistant/components/hydrawise/coordinator.py:174 — `debug` at line 174 is called with an argument built by `"…".join(new_controller_ids)` (line 174), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Python evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)` test, no debug flag, no `lambda` the logger calls only when the level is on.
  • + 15 more in this group — see findings.md.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×36
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 67 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/alexa/capabilities.py, homeassistant/components/sma/sensor.py, REDACTED, homeassistant/components/buienradar/sensor.py, homeassistant/setup.py, homeassistant/components/zwave_js/light.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/light/schema_template.py, packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/imports.py (+59 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 43 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/solaredge_modbus/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/plex/server.py, homeassistant/components/lametric/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/jellyfin/media_source.py, packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/flow_translations.py, homeassistant/components/xiaomi_miio/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/peblar/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/wled/light.py (+35 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 43 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/helpers/issue_registry.py, homeassistant/components/purpleair/config_flow.py, homeassistant/helpers/helper_integration.py, homeassistant/components/tasmota/discovery.py, homeassistant/components/websocket_api/automation.py, packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/light_color_mode.py, homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/entity.py, homeassistant/components/threshold/binary_sensor.py (+35 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #4 — If anonymized user #4 becomes unavailable, 14 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/fronius/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/knx/light.py, homeassistant/components/fronius/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/knx/storage/knx_selector.py, homeassistant/components/knx/validation.py, homeassistant/components/knx/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/fronius/const.py, homeassistant/components/knx/cover.py (+6 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #5 — If anonymized user #5 becomes unavailable, 13 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/zonneplan/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/melcloud_home/climate.py, homeassistant/components/profiler/services.py, homeassistant/components/melcloud_home/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/zonneplan/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/portainer/button.py, homeassistant/components/melcloud_home/number.py, homeassistant/components/portainer/update.py (+5 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #6 — If anonymized user #6 becomes unavailable, 11 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/teslemetry/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/cover.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/select.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/number.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/calendar.py, homeassistant/components/tessie/binary_sensor.py (+3 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #7 — If anonymized user #7 becomes unavailable, 9 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/squeezebox/browse_media.py, homeassistant/components/rest/data.py, homeassistant/components/samsung_exlink/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/cloud/stt.py, homeassistant/components/recorder/pool.py, homeassistant/components/esphome/dashboard.py, homeassistant/components/dunehd/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/marantz_infrared/media_player.py (+1 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #8 — If anonymized user #8 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/alexa_devices/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/vodafone_station/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/midea/fan.py, homeassistant/components/vodafone_station/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/mikrotik/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/vodafone_station/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/comelit/alarm_control_panel.py, homeassistant/components/mikrotik/sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #9 — If anonymized user #9 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/select.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/number.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/light.py, homeassistant/components/unifi/button.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/button.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #10 — If anonymized user #10 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/sensibo/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/fritzbox/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/openweathermap/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/feedreader/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/purpleair/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/ecobee/sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #11 — If anonymized user #11 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/gtfs/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/vizio/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/vizio/coordinator.py, homeassistant/helpers/significant_change.py, homeassistant/helpers/template/extensions/collection.py, homeassistant/util/language.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #12 — If anonymized user #12 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/neopool/number.py, homeassistant/components/neopool/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/neopool/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/neopool/switch.py, homeassistant/components/neopool/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/neopool/coordinator.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #13 — If anonymized user #13 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/yoto/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/blueprint/models.py, homeassistant/components/mediaroom/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/lawn_mower.py, homeassistant/components/smartthings/number.py, homeassistant/components/minio/minio_helper.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #14 — If anonymized user #14 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py, homeassistant/auth/providers/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/onedrive/backup.py, packages/pylint-home-assistant/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/exception_translations.py, homeassistant/components/onedrive/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #15 — If anonymized user #15 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/smhi/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/holiday/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/holiday/calendar.py, homeassistant/components/habitica/notify.py, homeassistant/components/azure_data_explorer/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/dnsip/sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #16 — If anonymized user #16 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/smtp/config_flow.py, REDACTED, homeassistant/components/led_infrared/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/keenetic_ndms2/router.py, homeassistant/components/steam_online/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/led_infrared/light.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #17 — If anonymized user #17 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/reolink/number.py, homeassistant/components/reolink/select.py, homeassistant/components/reolink/switch.py, homeassistant/components/reolink/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/reolink/camera.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #18 — If anonymized user #18 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: REDACTED, REDACTED, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/sensor/inverter.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/number.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/switch.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #19 — If anonymized user #19 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/home_connect/select.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/light.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/number.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/common.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/binary_sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #20 — If anonymized user #20 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/vistapool/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/number.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/select.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/switch.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #21 — If anonymized user #21 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/liebherr/select.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/switch.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/number.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/cover.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #22 — If anonymized user #22 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/overkiz/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/number.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/executor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #23 — If anonymized user #23 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/nextdns/switch.py, homeassistant/components/shelly/valve.py, homeassistant/components/airly/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/airly/coordinator.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #24 — If anonymized user #24 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/lyngdorf/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/lyngdorf/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/lyngdorf/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/lyngdorf/number.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #25 — If anonymized user #25 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/ecovacs/sensor.py, script/version_bump.py, script/check_requirements/pypi.py, script/check_requirements/runner.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • + 11 more in this group — see findings.md.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×25
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/enocean/sensor.py:193 — `"DT" in msg.values and msg.values["DT"].raw == 1` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/enocean/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/enocean/switch.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/open_router/schema.py:172 — `"enum" in schema and None not in schema["enum"]` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/open_router/schema.py, homeassistant/components/openai_conversation/schema.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/shelly/coordinator.py:365 — `"inputEvent" not in block.sensor_ids or "inputEventCnt" not in block.sensor_ids` appears character-identically in 3 files — homeassistant/components/shelly/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/shelly/event.py, homeassistant/components/shelly/utils.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate script/hassfest/conditions.py:258 — `"name" not in field_schema and integration.core` appears character-identically in 3 files — script/hassfest/conditions.py, script/hassfest/services.py, script/hassfest/triggers.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate script/hassfest/conditions.py:295 — `"name" not in section_schema and integration.core` appears character-identically in 3 files — script/hassfest/conditions.py, script/hassfest/services.py, script/hassfest/triggers.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/xiaomi_aqara/binary_sensor.py:235 — `"proto" not in device or int(device["proto"][0:1]) == 1` appears character-identically in 3 files — homeassistant/components/xiaomi_aqara/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/xiaomi_aqara/cover.py, homeassistant/components/xiaomi_aqara/switch.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/energy/helpers.py:14 — `"stat_rate_from" in config and "stat_rate_to" in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/energy/helpers.py, homeassistant/components/energy/sensor.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/slide/cover.py:88 — `(1 - pos) <= DEFAULT_OFFSET or pos <= DEFAULT_OFFSET` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/slide/cover.py, homeassistant/components/slide_local/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/climate.py:577 — `(self._topic[CONF_TEMP_STATE_TOPIC] is not None) or ( self._topic[CONF_TEMP_COMMAND_TOPIC] is not None )` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/climate.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/water_heater.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/wilight/light.py:167 — `ATTR_BRIGHTNESS in kwargs and ATTR_HS_COLOR in kwargs` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/wilight/light.py, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/shelly/light.py:287 — `ATTR_BRIGHTNESS in kwargs and brightness_supported(supported_color_modes)` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/shelly/light.py, homeassistant/components/tasmota/light.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/shelly/light.py:294 — `ATTR_COLOR_TEMP_KELVIN in kwargs and ColorMode.COLOR_TEMP in supported_color_modes` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/shelly/light.py, homeassistant/components/tasmota/light.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/automation/logbook.py:47 — `ATTR_ITEM_ID in data and ATTR_RUN_ID in data` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/automation/logbook.py, homeassistant/components/script/logbook.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/advantage_air/climate.py:263 — `ATTR_TARGET_TEMP_LOW in kwargs and ATTR_TARGET_TEMP_HIGH in kwargs` appears character-identically in 3 files — homeassistant/components/advantage_air/climate.py, homeassistant/components/airzone/climate.py, homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/climate.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:999 — `CONF_GET_POSITION_TEMPLATE in config and CONF_GET_POSITION_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:1004 — `CONF_SET_POSITION_TEMPLATE in config and CONF_SET_POSITION_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:988 — `CONF_SET_POSITION_TOPIC in config and CONF_GET_POSITION_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:1009 — `CONF_TILT_COMMAND_TEMPLATE in config and CONF_TILT_COMMAND_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:1014 — `CONF_TILT_STATUS_TEMPLATE in config and CONF_TILT_STATUS_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/heos/config_flow.py:87 — `CONF_USERNAME in user_input or CONF_PASSWORD in user_input` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/heos/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/opensky/config_flow.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py:994 — `CONF_VALUE_TEMPLATE in config and CONF_STATE_TOPIC not in config` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/mqtt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/cover.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/homekit_controller/connection.py:196 — `CharacteristicPermissions.paired_read in char.perms and char.type not in EVENT_CHARACTERISTICS` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/homekit_controller/connection.py, homeassistant/components/homekit_controller/entity.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/homekit/type_heater_coolers.py:220 — `FAN_ON in self.fan_modes or self.ordered_fan_speeds` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/homekit/type_heater_coolers.py, homeassistant/components/homekit/type_thermostats.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/assist_satellite/services.py:43 — `PUNCTUATION_START.search(sentence) or PUNCTUATION_END.search(sentence) or PUNCTUATION_START_WORD.search(sentence) or PUNCTUATION_END_WORD.se…` appears character-identically in 2 files — homeassistant/components/assist_satellite/services.py, homeassistant/components/conversation/trigger.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate homeassistant/components/overkiz/alarm_control_panel.py:232 — `SUPPORTED_DEVICES.get(device.widget) or SUPPORTED_DEVICES.get(device.ui_class)` appears character-identically in 4 files — homeassistant/components/overkiz/alarm_control_panel.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/cover.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/fan.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/switch.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×22
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/sonarr/helpers.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/glances/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/kostal_plenticore/switch.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/bond/button.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/nederlandse_spoorwegen/coordinator.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/homekit/aidmanager.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/airzone/select.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/foscam/coordinator.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/starlink/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/entur_public_transport/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/kostal_plenticore/number.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/ptdevices/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/cloud/ai_task.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/ghost/config_flow.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/envertech_evt800/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/firefly_iii/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/klik_aan_klik_uit/config_flow.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/ads/light.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/vera/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/screenlogic/config_flow.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/chef_iq/sensor.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file homeassistant/components/systemmonitor/util.py:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×8
  • REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×6
  • REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×5
  • REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×2
  • REDACTED
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X6 · Hand-rolled structured-format parsing · Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex · ×2
  • Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex homeassistant/components/blueprint/importer.py:25 — A regex whose pattern encodes JSON/XML syntax is parsing a structured format by hand — malformed or differently-typed content (e.g. `"amount": "5"` as a string) silently mis-parses instead of failing validation. This Python code already uses a real parser in the same package; use it here too.
  • Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex homeassistant/components/ovhcloud_ai_endpoints/entity.py:36 — A regex whose pattern encodes JSON/XML syntax is parsing a structured format by hand — malformed or differently-typed content (e.g. `"amount": "5"` as a string) silently mis-parses instead of failing validation. This Python code already uses a real parser in the same package; use it here too.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 83 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (429 single-owned of 2994 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 2994 of the 10945 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #37 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #38 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #39 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #40 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #41 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #42 (2 file(s)) (+77 more) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above. The files folded here: homeassistant/components/homematicip_cloud/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/homematicip_cloud/migration.py, homeassistant/components/victron_gx/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/victron_gx/entity.py, homeassistant/components/nrgkick/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/nrgkick/number.py, homeassistant/components/edl21/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/xbox/config_flow.py (+89 more).
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 22 of 2995 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 2995 of the 10945 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: homeassistant/components/sonarr/helpers.py, homeassistant/components/glances/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/kostal_plenticore/switch.py, homeassistant/components/bond/button.py, homeassistant/components/nederlandse_spoorwegen/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/homekit/aidmanager.py, homeassistant/components/airzone/select.py, homeassistant/components/foscam/coordinator.py (and 14 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1
  • No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 3/4 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.
P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1
  • No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×1
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging homeassistant/components/evohome/__init__.py:102 — `error` at line 102 is handed an f-string as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the record is filtered out. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error("order %s moved to %s", order_id, status)` with the standard library's `logging`, which keeps the message and its arguments apart on the record, or `log.error("order moved", order_id=order_id, status=status)` with structlog.
Minor — 337 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×337
  • Outdated: adext — `adext` is pinned to 0.4.7, but 0.4.8 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.4.7 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: afsapi — `afsapi` is pinned to 1.0.2, but 1.0.3 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 1.0.2 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aio-geojson-generic-client — `aio-geojson-generic-client` is pinned to 0.5, but 2026.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.5 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aio-geojson-geonetnz-quakes — `aio-geojson-geonetnz-quakes` is pinned to 0.16, but 2026.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.16 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aio-geojson-geonetnz-volcano — `aio-geojson-geonetnz-volcano` is pinned to 0.9, but 2026.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.9 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aio-geojson-nsw-rfs-incidents — `aio-geojson-nsw-rfs-incidents` is pinned to 0.7, but 2026.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.7 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aio-geojson-usgs-earthquakes — `aio-geojson-usgs-earthquakes` is pinned to 0.3, but 2026.8.1 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.3 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aio-georss-gdacs — `aio-georss-gdacs` is pinned to 0.10, but 2026.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.10 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aioacaia — `aioacaia` is pinned to 0.2.2, but 0.2.3 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.2.2 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioairq — `aioairq` is pinned to 0.4.8, but 0.6.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.4.8 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioamazondevices — `aioamazondevices` is pinned to 16.9.1, but 16.11.3 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 16.9.1 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioambient — `aioambient` is pinned to 2024.08.0, but 2025.2.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 2024.08.0 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aioasuswrt — `aioasuswrt` is pinned to 1.5.4, but 2.2.2 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 1.5.4 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aiobafi6 — `aiobafi6` is pinned to 0.9.0, but 0.10.2 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.9.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aiobotocore — `aiobotocore` is pinned to 3.7.0, but 3.10.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 3.7.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aiocomelit — `aiocomelit` is pinned to 3.0.0, but 3.0.1 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 3.0.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioeafm — `aioeafm` is pinned to 0.1.2, but 1.0.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.1.2 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aioesphomeapi — `aioesphomeapi` is pinned to 46.21.0, but 46.22.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 46.21.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioftp — `aioftp` is pinned to 0.21.3, but 0.28.3 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.21.3 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioghost — `aioghost` is pinned to 0.4.16, but 0.4.33 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.4.16 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aioharmony — `aioharmony` is pinned to 1.0.10, but 1.0.11 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 1.0.10 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aiohpprinter — `aiohpprinter` is pinned to 2.0.0, but 3.1.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 2.0.0 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aiohttp-sse — `aiohttp-sse` is pinned to 2.2.0, but 3.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 2.2.0 until the declaration is edited. This crosses a major version, so it is a migration rather than a bump.
  • Outdated: aioipp — `aioipp` is pinned to 0.20.0, but 0.21.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.20.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • Outdated: aiokafka — `aiokafka` is pinned to 0.10.0, but 0.14.0 is the current stable release on PyPI. An exact pin never moves on its own, so this repository installs 0.10.0 until the declaration is edited.
  • + 312 more in this group — see findings.md.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-956a6b61e1aa4857b8656f7d9c524131/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .35artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-956a6b61e1aa4857b8656f7d9c524131/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .13artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .132artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update2artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .5artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1465 file(s) — `homeassistant/auth/__init__.py`, `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/__init__.py`, `homeassistant/auth/mfa_modules/notify.py`, `homeassistant/auth/permissions/types.py`, `homeassistant/auth/permissions/util.py`, … (+1460 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a171fc-d6ee-7d0d-8384-aef63199b752 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 1235 · Warnings: 175 · Recommendations: 156 · Info: 337 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 25-10-2026 @ 07:35 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md