Public report — core, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-07-2026 @ 17:19 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Home-Assistant/core

61% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 100% Exemplary Domain Modelling 85% Strong Code Health 78% Strong Readiness 62% Adequate Maturity 61% Adequate Security 53% Adequate

Very large · 1,255,705 LoC · rebuild ~25.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (53%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

28/29dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
0findings with an exact file:lineof 54 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
29/102dimensions across the health lenses1255705 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

home-assistant/core is sound in substance but carries real gaps (61%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (85%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (53%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (61%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10 (Secrets (history)); Static Analysis (SAST) (Static Analysis (SAST)); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Very large (~1,255,705 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~25.1 person-years (~14–48 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 78% Strong Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 61% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 62% Adequate Security 53% Adequate · gated by D28, D29 Domain Modelling 85% Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 53% · 46% weightMaturity 61% · 25% weightReadiness 62% · 14% weightCode Health 78% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 85% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight

Raise Security 53 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 61 → ~66.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (1+)

1 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D36 · Build action pinned to a mutable branch

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,200,000–€6,100,000
Cost to rebuild€1,200,000–€6,100,000 (12.0–38.2 person-years (20,207–64,104 h), ~14–48 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 61% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeVery large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~25.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,700,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 53% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10.
+4.9 pts · Medium effort · Secrets (history)
2
Improve Static Analysis (SAST) — currently 0.1/10.
+4.9 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
3
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
+3.7 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Very large asset (~25.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 53%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Very large, ~25.1 person-years rebuild (1,255,705 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 53%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 7.3/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 2–5% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2 complexity, D4 duplication, D6 cohesion: averaging 7.3/10 across the code-quality signals
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.

At a glance — Code Health · 78% · Strong

The Good
D3 · Python God Classes 9.3 D4 · Python Code Duplication 9.9
The Bad
D1 · Python Cyclomatic Complexity 6.3 D2 · Python Cognitive Complexity 5.7

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Python Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · Python Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · Python Bus Factor 8.4 D21 · Python Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Python Knowledge Freshness 9.9 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.5
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 62% · Adequate

The Good
P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0
The Bad
D13 · Python Secret Scanning 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

At a glance — Security · 53% · Adequate · gated by D28, D29

The Good
D31 · Python IaC & Container Security 9.3 D33 · Python JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D38 · Python OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 7.5
The Bad
D36 · Python Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 5.0
The Ugly
D28 · Python Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · Python Static Analysis (SAST) 0.1

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 85% · Strong

The Good
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Bad
DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 5.8

Roadmap

Immediately address the 13 high-severity secrets in the repository history to eliminate critical security risks. Next, resolve the 101 static analysis findings, prioritizing the seven high-impact issues to improve code quality. Begin documenting significant architectural decisions in an ADR log to preserve institutional knowledge. Finally, update the README with a quick-start section for new contributors and maintain a changelog to track release history.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10.+4.9 ptsMediumSecrets (history)
Improve Static Analysis (SAST) — currently 0.1/10.+4.9 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+3.7 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.+3.5 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+3.5 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.+3.1 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+1.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.+2.8 ptsMediumFolder & project structure

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 29 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 29 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38DM1DM4DM5DM6DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 0 of 54 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faee3-a74b-7aa9-abc3-b74770367562.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 23 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

315 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was services._create_or_update_task at 73. A further 3 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being BitcoinSensor.update at 22 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

786 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was intent.async_match_targets at 132.

What to do

  1. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

192 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

231 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

What to do

  1. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: homeassistant/components/overkiz/cover.py (47×17=799); homeassistant/helpers/llm.py (18×44=792); homeassistant/components/habitica/services.py (7×73=511)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

482 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is homeassistant/helpers/device_registry.py.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×44
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 44 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (44 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

What to do

  1. Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10. — 13 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

101 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 71 medium, 23 low.

What to do

  1. Improve Static Analysis (SAST) — currently 0.1/10. — 101 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 71 medium, 23 low.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

32 of 2978 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is homeassistant/components/lektrico/sensor.py.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: select.py↔sensor.py 73%; climate.py↔sensor.py 73%; climate.py↔select.py 71%

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Build action pinned to a mutable branch
Unpinned build actions
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

What to do

  1. Improve OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — currently 7.5/10. — 4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `PlexSession` exposes publicly writable state (media_position). — models.py:23

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 8766 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — application code, tests and tooling are mixed at the repository root.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health78%StrongSolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity61%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness62%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Security53%Adequate — gated by D28, D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling85%StrongSolid.
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~1665838 lines of test source are present (.py, .ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.py, .ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source carries this repository's product — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from EF Core usage in .NET source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 1 finding(s)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Build action pinned to a mutable branch · ×1
  • Build action pinned to a mutable branch — 5 CI action reference(s) point at a mutable BRANCH rather than a version tag or a commit SHA, 5 of them on a THIRD-PARTY action: `home-assistant/actions/helpers/version@master` (.github/workflows/builder.yml:52), `home-assistant/actions/helpers/verify-version@master` (.github/workflows/builder.yml:57), `home-assistant/actions/helpers/git-init@master` (.github/workflows/builder.yml:300), `home-assistant/actions/helpers/version-push@master` (.github/workflows/builder.yml:307), `home-assistant/actions/helpers/version-push@master` (.github/workflows/builder.yml:317). A branch re-points on every upstream push, so whatever its tip holds when the job runs executes inside your pipeline with that job's secrets — a version tag at least moves only when the publisher cuts a release. Pin these to a full commit SHA first; the remaining tag refs are the same control at a lower blast radius.
Warning — 2 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1140.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 5 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s), 5 of them mutable BRANCH refs (reported separately, pin those first).
Recommendation — 49 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×44
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 69 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/emulated_hue/hue_api.py, homeassistant/components/filter/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/accuweather/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/light/schema_template.py, homeassistant/components/qnap/sensor.py, pylint/plugins/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/imports.py, homeassistant/components/osramlightify/light.py, homeassistant/components/tuya/climate.py (+61 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 26 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/helpers/device_registry.py, homeassistant/components/websocket_api/commands.py, homeassistant/components/script/__init__.py, homeassistant/helpers/target.py, homeassistant/components/todo/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/homeassistant/exposed_entities.py, homeassistant/components/calendar/trigger.py, homeassistant/components/logbook/websocket_api.py (+18 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 22 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/xbox/media_source.py, homeassistant/components/ntfy/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/habitica/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/smtp/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/edl21/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/uptime_kuma/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/steam_online/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/xbox/coordinator.py (+14 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #4 — If anonymized user #4 becomes unavailable, 19 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/forked_daapd/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/onvif/config_flow.py, script/translations/migrate.py, homeassistant/components/fumis/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/rest/switch.py, homeassistant/components/peblar/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/met/weather.py, homeassistant/components/smappee/config_flow.py (+11 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #5 — If anonymized user #5 becomes unavailable, 14 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/portainer/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/portainer/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/melcloud_home/climate.py, homeassistant/components/lametric/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/sma/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/portainer/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/proxmoxve/entity.py, homeassistant/components/melcloud_home/switch.py (+6 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #6 — If anonymized user #6 becomes unavailable, 13 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/template/weather.py, homeassistant/components/template/template_entity.py, homeassistant/components/template/config.py, homeassistant/components/template/cover.py, homeassistant/components/template/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/template/lock.py, homeassistant/components/template/trigger_entity.py, homeassistant/components/template/alarm_control_panel.py (+5 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #7 — If anonymized user #7 becomes unavailable, 11 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/knx/schema.py, homeassistant/components/knx/storage/entity_store_schema.py, homeassistant/components/knx/light.py, homeassistant/components/knx/expose.py, homeassistant/components/knx/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/knx/cover.py, homeassistant/components/knx/fan.py, homeassistant/components/knx/storage/config_store.py (+3 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #8 — If anonymized user #8 becomes unavailable, 11 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/immich/media_source.py, homeassistant/components/isy994/helpers.py, homeassistant/components/tasmota/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/airgradient/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/airzone_cloud/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/immich/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/qingping/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/fibaro/sensor.py (+3 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #9 — If anonymized user #9 becomes unavailable, 10 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/teslemetry/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/cover.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/select.py, homeassistant/components/teslemetry/number.py, homeassistant/components/tessie/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/splunk/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/tesla_fleet/switch.py (+2 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #10 — If anonymized user #10 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/switch.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/select.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/camera.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/number.py, homeassistant/components/unifiprotect/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/unifi_access/config_flow.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #11 — If anonymized user #11 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/overkiz/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/water_heater/domestic_hot_water_production.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/number.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/climate/atlantic_pass_apc_heating_zone.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/executor.py, homeassistant/components/overkiz/entity.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #12 — If anonymized user #12 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/bluetooth/match.py, homeassistant/components/esphome/ffmpeg_proxy.py, homeassistant/components/esphome/update.py, homeassistant/components/inkbird/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/keymitt_ble/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/bluemaestro/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/bluetooth/util.py, homeassistant/components/mopeka/sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #13 — If anonymized user #13 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/number.py, homeassistant/components/onedrive/backup.py, homeassistant/components/onedrive/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/lamarzocco/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/azure_storage/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/tedee/lock.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #14 — If anonymized user #14 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/go2rtc/server.py, script/version_bump.py, script/check_requirements/pypi.py, homeassistant/components/startca/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/blueprint/websocket_api.py, script/check_requirements/runner.py, homeassistant/components/ecovacs/config_flow.py, script/check_requirements/render.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #15 — If anonymized user #15 becomes unavailable, 8 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/comelit/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/vodafone_station/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/vodafone_station/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/comelit/alarm_control_panel.py, homeassistant/components/alexa_devices/switch.py, homeassistant/components/alexa_devices/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/comelit/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/alexa_devices/binary_sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #16 — If anonymized user #16 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/growatt_server/sensor/tlx.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/sensor/storage.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/sensor/sph.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/sensor/inverter.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/number.py, homeassistant/components/growatt_server/switch.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #17 — If anonymized user #17 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/home_connect/select.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/light.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/services.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/number.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/common.py, homeassistant/components/home_connect/binary_sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #18 — If anonymized user #18 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/nextdns/switch.py, homeassistant/components/shelly/media_player.py, homeassistant/components/nextdns/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/airly/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/accuweather/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/tractive/switch.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #19 — If anonymized user #19 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/saunum/climate.py, homeassistant/components/airobot/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/switch.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/select.py, homeassistant/components/liebherr/number.py, homeassistant/components/airobot/climate.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #20 — If anonymized user #20 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/miele/switch.py, homeassistant/components/miele/services.py, homeassistant/components/miele/vacuum.py, homeassistant/components/aqvify/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/miele/button.py, homeassistant/components/miele/coordinator.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #21 — If anonymized user #21 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/indevolt/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/indevolt/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/indevolt/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/indevolt/const.py, homeassistant/components/indevolt/binary_sensor.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #22 — If anonymized user #22 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/alexa/state_report.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/mqtt/lock.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #23 — If anonymized user #23 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: pylint/plugins/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/quality_scale/entity_unique_id.py, pylint/plugins/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/entity_unique_id_format.py, pylint/plugins/pylint_home_assistant/checkers/quality_scale/has_entity_name.py, homeassistant/components/ouman_eh_800/climate.py, homeassistant/components/ouman_eh_800/coordinator.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #24 — If anonymized user #24 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/qbus/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/volvo/config_flow.py, homeassistant/components/qbus/light.py, homeassistant/components/qbus/cover.py, homeassistant/components/qbus/climate.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #25 — If anonymized user #25 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: homeassistant/components/vistapool/binary_sensor.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/number.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/__init__.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/vistapool/config_flow.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • + 19 more in this group — see findings.md.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.py, .ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 94 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (482 single-owned of 2978 analysed files in total).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 32 of 2978 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: homeassistant/components/lektrico/sensor.py, homeassistant/components/openweathermap/coordinator.py, homeassistant/components/enphase_envoy/switch.py (and 29 more).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-py` over the resolved Python environment/lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Your CI already runs an attestation step, so the cheapest route is to emit the SBOM there and attach it as a subject rather than adding a separate pipeline.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml, target 100%) and a coverage step in CI (`--cov=`) show(s) coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.py, .ts), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .13artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .101artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .2artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .4artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019faee3-a74b-7aa9-abc3-b74770367562 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 1 · Warnings: 2 · Recommendations: 49 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 17:19 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md