Public report — progcoder-shop-microservices, published 20 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 20-07-2026 @ 19:05 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Huynxtb/progcoder-Shop-Microservices

No baseline yet — first run no automated testsbounded contexts not declared
28% At Risk
Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Architecture 89% Strong Event-Driven 73% Strong Maturity 67% Adequate Performance 60% Adequate Accessibility 47% Weak Code Health 39% Weak Security 38% Weak Readiness 9% Critical

Medium · 28,362 LoC · 58 projects · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (9%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

83/85dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
275findings with an exact file:lineof 388 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
85/117dimensions across the health lenses28362 LoC · 58 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

huynxtb/progcoder-shop-microservices carries serious risk (28%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (89%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (9%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (38%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Medium (~28,362 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 39% Weak · gated by R1, R10, R7 Architecture 89% Strong Maturity 67% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 9% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, D13, R4, R6, R8, P3, P5 Security 38% Weak · gated by D28, D29, D30, D36, D38, C1 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Event-Driven 73% Strong Accessibility 47% Weak · gated by AC4 Performance 60% Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 9% · 45% weightSecurity 38% · 25% weightCode Health 39% · 14% weightAccessibility 47% · 8% weightPerformance 60% · 4% weightMaturity 67% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 73% · 1% weightArchitecture 89% · 1% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 0% weight

Raise Readiness 9 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 28 → ~44.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 18%Plumbing 71%Generated 11%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €16,000–€79,000
Cost to rebuild€16,000–€79,000 (0.2–0.5 person-years (262–830 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 28% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 51% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 20% branching logic
Dead frontend code~35622 LoC unreachable (290 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€47,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 9% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+15.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with web.yml (2), prometheus.yml.
+15.2 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+15.2 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 9%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.3 person-years rebuild (28,362 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 9%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Job Job ctx:BuildingBlocks BuildingBlocks BuildingBlocks Job->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Common Common Common Job->ctx:Common Api Api ctx:Basket Basket Application · Domain · Infrastructure Api->ctx:Basket Api->ctx:Common Worker.Outbox Worker.Outbox Worker.Outbox->ctx:Basket Worker.Outbox->ctx:BuildingBlocks Worker.Outbox->ctx:Common ctx:EventSourcing EventSourcing EventSourcing Worker.Outbox->ctx:EventSourcing Catalog.Api Catalog.Api ctx:Catalog Catalog Application · Domain · Infrastructure Catalog.Api->ctx:Catalog Catalog.Api->ctx:Common Grpc Grpc Grpc->ctx:Catalog ctx:Contract Contract Contract Grpc->ctx:Contract Grpc->ctx:Common Worker.Consumer Worker.Consumer Worker.Consumer->ctx:Catalog Worker.Consumer->ctx:Common Worker.Consumer->ctx:EventSourcing Catalog.Worker.Outbox Catalog.Worker.Outbox Catalog.Worker.Outbox->ctx:BuildingBlocks Catalog.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Catalog Catalog.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Common Catalog.Worker.Outbox->ctx:EventSourcing Communication.Api Communication.Api Communication.Api->ctx:BuildingBlocks Communication.Api->ctx:Common Communication.Api->ctx:EventSourcing Discount.Api Discount.Api Discount.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Discount Discount Application · Domain · Infrastructure Discount.Api->ctx:Discount Discount.Grpc Discount.Grpc Discount.Grpc->ctx:Common Discount.Grpc->ctx:Discount ctx:Discount.Contract Discount.Contract Contract Discount.Grpc->ctx:Discount.Contract Inventory.Api Inventory.Api Inventory.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Inventory Inventory Application · Domain · Infrastructure Inventory.Api->ctx:Inventory Inventory.Grpc Inventory.Grpc Inventory.Grpc->ctx:Common Inventory.Grpc->ctx:Inventory ctx:Inventory.Contract Inventory.Contract Contract Inventory.Grpc->ctx:Inventory.Contract Inventory.Worker.Consumer Inventory.Worker.Consumer Inventory.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Common Inventory.Worker.Consumer->ctx:EventSourcing Inventory.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Inventory Inventory.Worker.Outbox Inventory.Worker.Outbox Inventory.Worker.Outbox->ctx:BuildingBlocks Inventory.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Common Inventory.Worker.Outbox->ctx:EventSourcing Inventory.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Inventory Notification.Api Notification.Api Notification.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Notification Notification Application · Domain · Infrastructure Notification.Api->ctx:Notification Notification.Worker.Consumer Notification.Worker.Consumer Notification.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Common Notification.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Notification Worker.Processor Worker.Processor Worker.Processor->ctx:EventSourcing Worker.Processor->ctx:Notification Order.Api Order.Api Order.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Order Order Application · Domain · Infrastructure Order.Api->ctx:Order Order.Grpc Order.Grpc Order.Grpc->ctx:Common Order.Grpc->ctx:Order Order.Worker.Consumer Order.Worker.Consumer Order.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Common Order.Worker.Consumer->ctx:EventSourcing Order.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Order Order.Worker.Outbox Order.Worker.Outbox Order.Worker.Outbox->ctx:BuildingBlocks Order.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Common Order.Worker.Outbox->ctx:EventSourcing Order.Worker.Outbox->ctx:Order Report.Api Report.Api Report.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Report Report Application · Domain · Infrastructure Report.Api->ctx:Report Report.Grpc Report.Grpc Report.Grpc->ctx:Common Report.Grpc->ctx:Report Search.Api Search.Api Search.Api->ctx:Common ctx:Search Search Application · Domain · Infrastructure Search.Api->ctx:Search Search.Worker.Consumer Search.Worker.Consumer Search.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Common Search.Worker.Consumer->ctx:EventSourcing Search.Worker.Consumer->ctx:Search YarpApiGateway YarpApiGateway ctx:Basket->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Basket->ctx:Common ctx:Basket->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:BuildingBlocks->ctx:Common ctx:Catalog->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Catalog->ctx:Common ctx:Catalog->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:Discount->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Discount->ctx:Common ctx:Discount->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:EventSourcing->ctx:Common ctx:Inventory->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Inventory->ctx:Common ctx:Inventory->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:Notification->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Notification->ctx:Common ctx:Notification->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:Order->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Order->ctx:Common ctx:Order->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:Report->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Report->ctx:Common ctx:Report->ctx:EventSourcing ctx:Search->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Search->ctx:Common ctx:Search->ctx:EventSourcing __more__ +2 more contexts

At a glance — Code Health · 39% · Weak · gated by R1, R10, R7

The Good
D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.6 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.9 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.3 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.8 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.4 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 7.2 R3 · React / TS Large Files 8.1 X1 · Repo Async correctness 7.7 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.2 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 8.9
The Ugly
R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 3.9 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 89% · Strong

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.9 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.7 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 8.9 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 6.2

At a glance — Maturity · 67% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 9.8 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 4.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 3.5

At a glance — Readiness · 9% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, D12, D13, R4, R6, R8, P3, P5

The Good
ED5 · Repo Idempotency 9.8 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5 P2 · Repo Observability 9.5 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 7.7
The Bad
D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 0.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.3 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 38% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D30, D36, D38, C1

The Good
D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.6 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 7.5
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.5

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 73% · Strong

The Good
ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 8.9
The Bad
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 6.7 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 6.1

At a glance — Accessibility · 47% · Weak · gated by AC4

The Good
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 7.7 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 7.4
The Bad
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 5.2 AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.4
The Ugly
AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 2.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 60% · Adequate

The Bad
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.1 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components74High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures54High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration30High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate a security analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on vulnerabilities. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure-as-code and document recovery time objectives. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for all currently unreachable production modules. After that, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. Finally, add missing tooling such as TypeScript checking and linting to the build scripts.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+15.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with web.yml (2), prometheus.yml.+15.2 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+15.2 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+15.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+13.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance.+9.0 ptsLowLicense Compliance
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+15.9 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+15.9 ptsMediumDR & Backup

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 109 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 1% slop · 55% mixed · 44% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/Apps/App.Store/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/Apps/App.Admin/pnpm-lock.yaml4.6MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Processor/appsettings.Development.json5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/appsettings.Development.json5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/appsettings.json5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/_ci.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/Apps/App.Admin/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Apps/App.Store/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs6.6MixedExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
config/prometheus/web.yml7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
config/prometheus/prometheus.yml7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
config/alertmanager/web.yml7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Basket/Api/Basket.Api/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Grpc/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 83 of 85 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 85 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D37D38D39AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX9C1C2C3DM6ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8PF1PF2PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 275 of 388 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f80eb-0d38-7573-a13b-1427548a8fb1.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

21 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×3src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:89
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) · ×2src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:65
Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Extensions/GrpcClientExtension.cs:20
Duplicated block (33 lines × 2)src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:27
Duplicated block (27 lines × 8)src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:67

+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

58 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Common · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 77 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: ProductEntity (LCOM4 12) · ×2src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Domain/Entities/ProductEntity.cs:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

59 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 6 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol · ×3
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×6
Outdated: FluentValidation · ×59

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential · ×3config/prometheus/web.yml:7

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with web.yml (2), prometheus.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 65 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: MySql.Data · ×2

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Consumer/EventHandlers/Integrations/OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.cs.

Small-team knowledge concentration

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 27172 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.

CommentedOutCode · ×4src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs:24
TodoCommentsrc/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Consumer/EventHandlers/Integrations/OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.cs:131

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

58 projects, 916 source files, 27172 hand-written lines of code (27172 production / 0 test), plus 3529 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 230 inter-project edges.

Shell project: Catalog.Contract · ×5src/Shared/Contracts/Catalog.Contract/Catalog.Contract.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The README is a solid project landing page with an extensive table of contents outlining the architecture, technology stack, microservices, and CI/CD pipeline. It links out to a YouTube tutorial playlist, a donate/support page, and a Facebook group, which are excellent community engagement tools. However, it is a single README file (the main ProG Coder Shop project landing page) with no dedicated architecture or design documentation for the 20+ services in the solution, leaving many of them undocumented despite the table-of-contents outline.

XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks · ×58src/Shared/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README is a solid project landing page with an extensive table of contents outlining the architecture, technology stack, microservices, and CI/CD pipeline. It links out to a YouTube tutorial playlist, a donate/support page, and a Facebook group, which are excellent community engagement tools. However, it is a single README file (the main ProG Coder Shop project landing page) with no dedicated architecture or design documentation for the 20+ services in the solution, leaving many of them undocumented despite the table-of-contents outline.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Typo in namespace 'Reponses' (should be 'Responses')
Typo in class name 'DatabaseExtentions' (should be 'DatabaseExtensions')

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 58 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

97 % of calls cross a namespace and 11 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 97 % of calls cross a namespace and 11 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

82 finding(s): 0 critical, 82 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×50src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/appsettings.Development.json:52detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json (26), appsettings.json (24). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

433 finding(s): 0 critical, 228 high, 0 medium, 205 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/workflows/_ci.yml:32detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with bild-and-deploy.yml (48), _ci.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 14 high, 8 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 · ×14detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: Marten 7.26.4detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.9.0 · ×8detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 28 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2src/Apps/App.Admin/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×28src/ApiGateway/YarpApiGateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 28 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (28). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

78 of 117 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Infrastructure/Data/ProductSeedData.cs.

Concentrated knowledge decay

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (.github/SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 finding(s): 2 critical, 40 high, 46 medium, 10 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×40src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×8src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 40 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (35), pnpm-lock.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (40 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

20 of 2568 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 20 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OutboxMessageConfiguration.cs:17

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. Add a <track kind="captions"> (or confirm captions are provided another way). — VideoPlayer.jsx:12
  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×5) — DropZone.jsx:45, productDetails.jsx:627, productDetails.jsx:667, …

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×13) — rangeSlider.jsx:19, rangeSlider.jsx:25, rangeSlider.jsx:51, …
  • This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id / name — and neither does anything it renders — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label for> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×4) — SearchModal.jsx:89, create.jsx:339, details.jsx:552, …
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×8) — Chat.jsx:204, index.jsx:52, TodoHeader.jsx:46, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×24) — index.jsx:846, productDetails.jsx:546, BannerSection10.jsx:60, …
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — productDetails.jsx:386

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×25) — index.jsx:93, MonoChrome.jsx:8, Notification.jsx:174, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. (×5) — cart-step.jsx:105, forgot-password.jsx:53, forgot-password2.jsx:33, …

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` makes a synchronous remote call (a gRPC call) while handling an event. The handler now depends, in real time, on another service being up and fast — the opposite of why you went event-driven. Publish a follow-up message (or use the outbox) instead of calling out and awaiting a response inside the handler. — OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.cs:30

What to do

  • Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers — react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.
ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `BasketCheckoutIntegrationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BasketCheckoutIntegrationEvent.cs:3
  • `IDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×8) — IDomainEvent.cs:9, IDomainEvent.cs:9, IDomainEvent.cs:9, …
  • `TransferOutDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — TransferOutDomainEvent.cs:9
  • `BasketCheckoutDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BasketCheckoutDomainEvent.cs:10

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `ChangeProductStatusCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — ChangeProductStatusCommand.cs:37
  • `CreateProductCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateProductCommand.cs:66
  • `DeleteProductCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteProductCommand.cs:32
  • `PublishProductCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — PublishProductCommand.cs:37
  • `UnpublishProductCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UnpublishProductCommand.cs:37
  • `UpdateProductCommandHandler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateProductCommand.cs:67
  • `BasketCheckoutIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — BasketCheckoutIntegrationEventHandler.cs:26
  • `ReservationExpiredIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — ReservationExpiredIntegrationEventHandler.cs:26
  • `OrderCancelledIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — OrderCancelledIntegrationEventHandler.cs:25
  • `OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.cs:30
  • `OrderDeliveredIntegrationEventHandler.Consume` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — OrderDeliveredIntegrationEventHandler.cs:25

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency9.8 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Commands.CreateLocationCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateLocationCommand.cs:38

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `PushToOutboxAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×2) — DeletedUnPublishedProductDomainEventHandler.cs:32, UpsertedProductDomainEventHandler.cs:32
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×28) — DependencyInjection.cs:47, OutboxRepository.cs:50, OutboxRepository.cs:96, …

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 58 of 58 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
  • Only 8/58 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack (e.g. `./gradlew test`, `sbt test`, `mvn test`, `dotnet test`, `npm test`, `pytest`, `go test`, `cargo test`, `flutter test`/`dart test`, `swift test`/`xcodebuild test`, `rebar3 eunit`/`rebar3 ct`, `mix test`) and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 39/46 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step — or codehealth.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 8 use(s) across 57,051 production line(s) (~0.1/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 5 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 646 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/components/modal.jsx:459 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/components/modal.jsx:539 — modal.jsx:459
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/services/keycloakService.js:54 · src/Apps/App.Store/src/services/keycloakService.js:62 — keycloakService.js:54
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/app/email/BottomFilter.jsx:7 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/app/todo/BottomFilter.jsx:7 — BottomFilter.jsx:7
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/services/catalogService.js:135 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/services/inventoryService.js:121 — catalogService.js:135
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/services/keycloakService.js:177 · src/Apps/App.Store/src/services/keycloakService.js:234 — keycloakService.js:177
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/components/partials/Table/company-table.jsx:96 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/components/partials/Table/recentOrder-table.jsx:107 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/components/partials/Table/team-table.jsx:214 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/components/partials/Table/transactions.jsx:160 — company-table.jsx:96
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/brand/index.jsx:276 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/category/index.jsx:346 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/coupon/index.jsx:544 — index.jsx:276
  • src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/orders/index.jsx:458 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/product/index.jsx:348 · src/Apps/App.Admin/src/pages/product/orders.jsx:321 — index.jsx:458

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — details.jsx:63, index.jsx:53, CheckoutSection.jsx:163, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — Data.jsx, index.jsx, table-data.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 2 application, 3 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×7) — data.js, modal.jsx, orders.jsx, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — index.jsx:10, MobileMenu.jsx:14, App.jsx:36
  • Declared in src/Apps/App.Admin/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×5) — DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:16, DependencyInjection.cs:80, DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:16, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 285/412 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — CreateBrand.cs:31, CreateCategory.cs:31, CreateProduct.cs:41, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health39%Weak — gated by R1, R10, R7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture89%StrongSolid.
Maturity67%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness9%Critical — gated by D8, D9, D12, D13, R4, R6, R8, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security38%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D30, D36, D38, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Event-Driven73%StrongSolid.
Accessibility47%Weak — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance60%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 32 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (an event-store package (Marten/EventStore))
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — commit a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) anywhere in the repo, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 168 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×50
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/appsettings.Development.json:52 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Basket/Api/Basket.Api/appsettings.Development.json:63 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/appsettings.Development.json:41 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/appsettings.Development.json:63 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Grpc/appsettings.Development.json:60 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/appsettings.Development.json:46 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json:46 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Communication/Api/Communication.Api/appsettings.Development.json:36 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Discount/Api/Discount.Api/appsettings.Development.json:58 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Discount/Api/Discount.Grpc/appsettings.Development.json:61 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Api/appsettings.Development.json:70 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Grpc/appsettings.Development.json:54 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json:71 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/appsettings.Development.json:40 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Processor/appsettings.Development.json:86 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Processor/appsettings.Development.json:75 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json:93 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json:82 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/appsettings.Development.json:109 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/appsettings.Development.json:98 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Order/Api/Order.Api/appsettings.Development.json:69 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/appsettings.Development.json:40 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Worker.Consumer/appsettings.Development.json:46 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Report/Api/Report.Api/appsettings.Development.json:47 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Services/Search/Api/Search.Api/appsettings.Development.json:63 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/_ci.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/_ci.yml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:172 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:175 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:178 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:181 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:187 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:203 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:206 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:209 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:212 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:218 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:235 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:238 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:241 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:244 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:250 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:266 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:269 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:272 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:275 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:281 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/bild-and-deploy.yml:297 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×40
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — @remix-run/router 1.23.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.23.2 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.13.5 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — immutable 5.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.5 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — react-router 7.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.14.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — react-router 7.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.13.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — react-router 7.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.12.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — react-router 7.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.15.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — react-router 7.9.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.14.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — rollup 4.53.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.59.0 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — vite 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.4.3 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — vite 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.4.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — ws 7.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.11
  • + 15 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×14
  • High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.3.1
  • High CVE: System.Linq.Dynamic.Core 1.3.5 — System.Linq.Dynamic.Core 1.3.5 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.0
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.4 — System.Text.Json 8.0.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.1 — AutoMapper 12.0.1 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 39 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 15.1.1
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.10.2
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.3
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 17 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.3 — System.Text.Json 8.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.3 — System.Text.Json 8.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 23 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 23 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Npgsql 8.0.0 — Npgsql 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.0.3
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2 — Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.9.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 12.0.1 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: Marten — Marten 7.26.4 — Critical severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×3
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential config/prometheus/web.yml:7 — hardcoded-credential detected.
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential config/prometheus/prometheus.yml:21 — hardcoded-credential detected.
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential config/alertmanager/web.yml:5 — hardcoded-credential detected.
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×2
  • Banned license: MySql.Data — MySql.Data 9.0.0 is licensed GPL-2.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: MySql.EntityFrameworkCore — MySql.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.5 is licensed GPL-2.0-only (banned by policy).
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Apps/App.Admin/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Apps/App.Store/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — swiper 11.2.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 12.1.2 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Store/package-lock.json — @babel/traverse 7.22.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.23.2
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: Marten 7.26.4 — Marten 7.26.4 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.37.0
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 55 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×8
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.9.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.9.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.3
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.9.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.9.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.3
  • Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 42 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.4
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.0
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.0
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.4
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×8
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.18.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Apps/App.Admin/package-lock.json — axios 1.13.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×6
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 12.0.1 — Legacy AutoMapper >= 13.0.0
  • Deprecated: Polly.Extensions.Http — Polly.Extensions.Http 3.0.0 — Legacy Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: Aspire.Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Aspire.Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 8.0.2 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Elasticsearch.Net — Elasticsearch.Net 7.17.5 — Legacy Elastic.Clients.Elasticsearch >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: NEST — NEST 7.17.5 — Legacy Elastic.Clients.Elasticsearch >= 0.0.0
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×4
  • CommentedOutCode src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs:24 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs:55 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs:102 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Application/Repositories/UnitOfWorkUsageExample.cs:32 — 6 consecutive commented-code lines
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:89 — src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:89-106 | src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/SqlServerDatabaseProvider.cs:87-104
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:89 — src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:89-106 | src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/SqlServerDatabaseProvider.cs:87-104
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:77 — src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:77-94 | src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:88-105
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: Common — Common: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: EventSourcing — EventSourcing: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.02, distance 0.98 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: BuildingBlocks — BuildingBlocks: abstractness 0.23, instability 0.02, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:65 — src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:65-86 | src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Providers/SqlServerDatabaseProvider.cs:63-84
  • Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:65 — src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/MySqlDatabaseProvider.cs:65-86 | src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Providers/SqlServerDatabaseProvider.cs:63-84
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×2
  • Low cohesion: ProductEntity (LCOM4 12) src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Domain/Entities/ProductEntity.cs:12 — ProductEntity's methods form 12 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
  • Low cohesion: OrderEntity (LCOM4 5) src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/Entities/OrderEntity.cs:12 — OrderEntity's methods form 5 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Consumer/EventHandlers/Integrations/OrderCreatedIntegrationEventHandler.cs:131 — // TODO: Publish InventoryReservationFailedIntegrationEvent — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].verdict | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 983.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Extensions/GrpcClientExtension.cs:20 — src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Extensions/GrpcClientExtension.cs:20-56 | src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Extensions/GrpcClientExtension.cs:20-56
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:27 — src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:27-59 | src/Services/Report/Api/Report.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:27-59
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (27 lines × 8) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (27 lines × 8) src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:67 — src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:67-93 | src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:66-92 | src/Services/Order/Api/Order.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:66-92 | src/Services/Basket/Api/Basket.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:70-96 | src/Services/Discount/Api/Discount.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:70-96 | src/Services/Search/Api/Search.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:76-102 | src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:65-91 | src/Services/Report/Api/Report.Api/DependencyInjection.cs:65-91
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (23 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (23 lines × 3) src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:47 — src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:47-69 | src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:48-70 | src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:47-69
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13–22 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13–22 lines × 2) src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:42 — src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:42-54 | src/Services/Discount/Core/Discount.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:29-50
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13–16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13–16 lines × 2) src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Jobs/Inventory/ExpireInventoryReservationsJob.cs:34 — src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Jobs/Inventory/ExpireInventoryReservationsJob.cs:34-49 | src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Jobs/Report/SyncDashboardReportJob.cs:52-64
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:58 — src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:58-72 | src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:58-72
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:59 — src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:59-72 | src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/Processors/OutboxProcessor.cs:57-70
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Domain/Entities/OutboxMessageEntity.cs:74 — src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Domain/Entities/OutboxMessageEntity.cs:74-86 | src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Domain/Entities/OutboxMessageEntity.cs:74-86 | src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/Entities/InboxMessageEntity.cs:66-78 | src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/Entities/OutboxMessageEntity.cs:66-78 | src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Domain/Entities/OutboxMessageEntity.cs:74-86
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:83 — src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:83-95 | src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:84-96 | src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:83-95 | src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/BackgroundServices/OutboxBackgroundService.cs:83-95
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/AuditableEntityInterceptor.cs:40 — src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/AuditableEntityInterceptor.cs:40-52 | src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/AuditableEntityInterceptor.cs:40-52
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 5) src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:23 — src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:23-34 | src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:23-34 | src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:23-34 | src/Services/Report/Core/Report.Infrastructure/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:23-34 | src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/GrpcClients/Interceptors/GrpcApiKeyInterceptor.cs:26-37
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:31 — src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:31-42 | src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:31-42
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Application/Features/Product/Commands/CreateProductCommand.cs:143 — src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Application/Features/Product/Commands/CreateProductCommand.cs:143-153 | src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Application/Features/Product/Commands/UpdateProductCommand.cs:176-186
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Infrastructure/Repositories/NotificationRepository.cs:33 — src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Infrastructure/Repositories/NotificationRepository.cs:33-41 | src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Infrastructure/Repositories/NotificationRepository.cs:93-101
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Shared/Common/Extensions/StringExtension.cs:21 — src/Shared/Common/Extensions/StringExtension.cs:21-28 | src/Shared/Common/Extensions/StringExtension.cs:40-47
Recommendation — 47 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×28
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/ApiGateway/YarpApiGateway/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Apps/App.Admin/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Apps/App.Store/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Basket/Api/Basket.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Grpc/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Woker.Outbox/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Worker/Catalog.Worker.Consumer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Communication/Api/Communication.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Discount/Api/Discount.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Discount/Api/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Grpc/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Consumer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Notification/Api/Notification.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Consumer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Notification/Worker/Notification.Worker.Processor/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Api/Order.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Api/Order.Grpc/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Worker.Consumer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Report/Api/Report.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×5
  • Shell project: Catalog.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Catalog.Contract/Catalog.Contract.csproj — `Catalog.Contract` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: Discount.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Discount.Contract/Discount.Contract.csproj — `Discount.Contract` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: Order.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Order.Contract/Order.Contract.csproj — `Order.Contract` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: Report.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Report.Contract/Report.Contract.csproj — `Report.Contract` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: Inventory.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Inventory.Contract/Inventory.Contract.csproj — `Inventory.Contract` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 9 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 9 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in namespace 'Reponses' (should be 'Responses') · ×1
  • Typo in namespace 'Reponses' (should be 'Responses') — Rename namespace 'Common.Models.Reponses' to 'Common.Models.Responses' to fix the typo. (symbols: Common.Models.Reponses.ApiUpdatedResponse<T>, Common.Models.Context.UserContext.Roles, Common.Models.Context.UserContext.Roles)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in class name 'DatabaseExtentions' (should be 'DatabaseExtensions') · ×1
  • Typo in class name 'DatabaseExtentions' (should be 'DatabaseExtensions') — Rename class 'DatabaseExtentions' to 'DatabaseExtensions' to fix the typo. (symbols: Report.Infrastructure.Data.Extensions.DatabaseExtentions, Report.Infrastructure.Data.Extensions.DatabaseExtentions.InitialiseDatabaseAsync, Report.Infrastructure.Data.Extensions.DatabaseExtentions.SeedDashboardTotalAsync)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 27k LoC across 58 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are warranted. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 9 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.59.1
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 78 of 117 significant files have no living knowledge, yet the repository itself is active (1 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 78 separate risks and not a dormant codebase. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 20 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OutboxMessageConfiguration.cs:17 — 20 of 2568 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Inventory.Infrastructure.Data.Configurations.OutboxMessageConfiguration.Configure @ src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OutboxMessageConfiguration.cs:17, 499 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.8/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite was found in this repository.
Info — 118 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×59
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.9.2 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 → 11.3.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.9.2 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.3.0 → 14.2.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.8 → 10.0.10 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 8.0.7 → 10.0.10 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.FeatureManagement.AspNetCore — Microsoft.FeatureManagement.AspNetCore 3.4.0 → 4.6.0 available.
  • Outdated: MongoDB.Driver — MongoDB.Driver 3.4.2 → 3.10.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.9.0 → 1.17.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.9.0 → 1.17.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.9.0 → 1.17.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.9.0 → 1.17.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime 1.9.0 → 1.17.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.0.1 → 4.4.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 8.0.2 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 6.0.0 → 6.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.OpenTelemetry — Serilog.Sinks.OpenTelemetry 4.1.0 → 4.2.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Seq — Serilog.Sinks.Seq 8.0.0 → 9.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: SharpAbp.Abp.OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — SharpAbp.Abp.OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore 3.1.0 → 4.7.3 available.
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available.
  • Outdated: MassTransit.RabbitMQ — MassTransit.RabbitMQ 8.5.1 → 9.1.2 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 8.0.2 → 10.0.10 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available.
  • Outdated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.UI.Client — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.UI.Client 8.0.0 → 9.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Yarp.ReverseProxy — Yarp.ReverseProxy 2.1.0 → 2.3.0 available.
  • + 34 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×58
  • XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks src/Shared/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.csproj — BuildingBlocks: 3 % XML-doc coverage (2/74).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing src/Shared/EventSourcing/EventSourcing.csproj — EventSourcing: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/84).
  • XML-doc coverage: YarpApiGateway src/ApiGateway/YarpApiGateway/YarpApiGateway.csproj — YarpApiGateway: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: Common src/Shared/Common/Common.csproj — Common: 2 % XML-doc coverage (7/427).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Contract src/Shared/Contracts/Catalog.Contract/Catalog.Contract.csproj — Catalog.Contract: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Api src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Api/Catalog.Api.csproj — Catalog.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/117).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Grpc src/Services/Catalog/Api/Catalog.Grpc/Catalog.Grpc.csproj — Catalog.Grpc: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/9).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Application src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Application/Catalog.Application.csproj — Catalog.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/274).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Domain src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Domain/Catalog.Domain.csproj — Catalog.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/101).
  • XML-doc coverage: Catalog.Infrastructure src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Infrastructure/Catalog.Infrastructure.csproj — Catalog.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/50).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Api src/Services/Inventory/Api/Inventory.Api/Inventory.Api.csproj — Inventory.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/54).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Application src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Application/Inventory.Application.csproj — Inventory.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/214).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Infrastructure src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Infrastructure/Inventory.Infrastructure.csproj — Inventory.Infrastructure: 5 % XML-doc coverage (5/96).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Domain src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Domain/Inventory.Domain.csproj — Inventory.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/108).
  • XML-doc coverage: Order.Api src/Services/Order/Api/Order.Api/Order.Api.csproj — Order.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/39).
  • XML-doc coverage: Order.Application src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Order.Application.csproj — Order.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/195).
  • XML-doc coverage: Order.Domain src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/Order.Domain.csproj — Order.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/124).
  • XML-doc coverage: Order.Infrastructure src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Infrastructure/Order.Infrastructure.csproj — Order.Infrastructure: 9 % XML-doc coverage (8/86).
  • XML-doc coverage: Order.Worker.Outbox src/Services/Order/Worker/Order.Woker.Outbox/Order.Worker.Outbox.csproj — Order.Worker.Outbox: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/26).
  • XML-doc coverage: Inventory.Worker.Outbox src/Services/Inventory/Worker/Inventory.Worker.Outbox/Inventory.Worker.Outbox.csproj — Inventory.Worker.Outbox: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/26).
  • XML-doc coverage: Basket.Api src/Services/Basket/Api/Basket.Api/Basket.Api.csproj — Basket.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/18).
  • XML-doc coverage: Basket.Application src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Application/Basket.Application.csproj — Basket.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/101).
  • XML-doc coverage: Basket.Domain src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Domain/Basket.Domain.csproj — Basket.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/74).
  • XML-doc coverage: Basket.Infrastructure src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Infrastructure/Basket.Infrastructure.csproj — Basket.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/40).
  • XML-doc coverage: Basket.Worker.Outbox src/Services/Basket/Worker/Basket.Worker.Outbox/Basket.Worker.Outbox.csproj — Basket.Worker.Outbox: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • + 33 more in this group — see findings.md.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .82artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .433artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list progcoder-shop-microservices.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json24artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .30artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .98artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019f80eb-0d38-7573-a13b-1427548a8fb1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 55 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 22 field(s)
  • KeycloakUser.EmailVerified src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Models/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:29
  • KeycloakUser.Email src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Models/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:38
  • BasketCheckoutCustomerDto.Email src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Application/Dtos/Baskets/BasketCheckoutCustomerDto.cs:9
  • CustomerDomainEvent.Email src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Domain/Events/BasketCheckoutDomainEvent.cs:19
  • KeycloakUserEvent.VerifyEmail src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserEvent.cs:17
  • KeycloakUserDto.EmailVerified src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Application/Dtos/Keycloaks/KeycloakUserDto.cs:17
  • KeycloakUserDto.Email src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Application/Dtos/Keycloaks/KeycloakUserDto.cs:23
  • KeycloakUser.EmailVerified src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:29
  • KeycloakUser.Email src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:38
  • KeycloakUserEvent.VerifyEmail src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserEvent.cs:17
  • CustomerDto.Email src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Dtos/ValueObjects/CustomerDto.cs:13
  • Customer.Email src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/ValueObjects/Customer.cs:13
  • KeycloakUserResponse.EmailVerified src/Services/Report/Core/Report.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:29
  • KeycloakUserResponse.Email src/Services/Report/Core/Report.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:38
  • SwaggerGenCfg.ContactEmail src/Shared/Common/Configurations/SwaggerGenCfg.cs:15
  • CustomClaimTypes.EmailVerified src/Shared/Common/Constants/CustomClaimTypes.cs:13
  • MessageCode.InvalidEmailAddress src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:11
  • MessageCode.EmailIsRequired src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:53
  • MessageCode.EmailAlreadyExists src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:79
  • UserContext.Email src/Shared/Common/Models/Context/UserContext.cs:17
  • UserContext.EmailVerified src/Shared/Common/Models/Context/UserContext.cs:19
  • CustomerIntegrationEvent.Email src/Shared/EventSourcing/Events/Baskets/BasketCheckoutIntegrationEvent.cs:26
Name — 16 field(s)
  • KeycloakUser.FirstName src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Models/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:32
  • KeycloakUser.LastName src/JobOrchestrator/App.Job/Models/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:35
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.FirstName src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:9
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.LastName src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:11
  • KeycloakUserDto.FirstName src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Application/Dtos/Keycloaks/KeycloakUserDto.cs:19
  • KeycloakUserDto.LastName src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Application/Dtos/Keycloaks/KeycloakUserDto.cs:21
  • KeycloakUser.FirstName src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:32
  • KeycloakUser.LastName src/Services/Notification/Core/Notification.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:35
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.FirstName src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:9
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.LastName src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:11
  • KeycloakUserResponse.FirstName src/Services/Report/Core/Report.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:32
  • KeycloakUserResponse.LastName src/Services/Report/Core/Report.Domain/Models/Externals/Keycloaks/KeycloakUser.cs:35
  • MessageCode.FirstNameIsRequired src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:57
  • MessageCode.LastNameIsRequired src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:59
  • UserContext.FirstName src/Shared/Common/Models/Context/UserContext.cs:11
  • UserContext.LastName src/Shared/Common/Models/Context/UserContext.cs:13
Phone — 11 field(s)
  • BasketCheckoutCustomerDto.PhoneNumber src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Application/Dtos/Baskets/BasketCheckoutCustomerDto.cs:11
  • CustomerDomainEvent.PhoneNumber src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Domain/Events/BasketCheckoutDomainEvent.cs:20
  • CategorySeedData.PhonesId src/Services/Catalog/Core/Catalog.Infrastructure/Data/CategorySeedData.cs:14
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.PhoneNumber src/Services/Inventory/Core/Inventory.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:7
  • KeycloakUserAttributes.PhoneNumber src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Constants/KeycloakUserAttributes.cs:7
  • CustomerDto.PhoneNumber src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Dtos/ValueObjects/CustomerDto.cs:9
  • Customer.PhoneNumber src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/ValueObjects/Customer.cs:9
  • WhatsAppSettings.PhoneNumberId src/Shared/Common/Configurations/NotificationCfg.cs:38
  • MessageCode.InvalidPhoneNumber src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:13
  • MessageCode.PhoneNumberIsRequired src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:161
  • CustomerIntegrationEvent.PhoneNumber src/Shared/EventSourcing/Events/Baskets/BasketCheckoutIntegrationEvent.cs:28
Address — 6 field(s)
  • BasketCheckoutAddressDto.PostalCode src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Application/Dtos/Baskets/BasketCheckoutAddressDto.cs:17
  • AddressDomainEvent.PostalCode src/Services/Basket/Core/Basket.Domain/Events/BasketCheckoutDomainEvent.cs:28
  • AddressDto.PostalCode src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Application/Dtos/ValueObjects/AddressDto.cs:17
  • Address.PostalCode src/Services/Order/Core/Order.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:17
  • MessageCode.PostalCodeIsRequired src/Shared/Common/Constants/MessageCode.cs:169
  • AddressIntegrationEvent.PostalCode src/Shared/EventSourcing/Events/Baskets/BasketCheckoutIntegrationEvent.cs:43

Issues: 168 · Warnings: 55 · Recommendations: 47 · Info: 118 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 20-07-2026 @ 19:05 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md