Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
huysentruitw/Aggregator is sound in substance but carries real gaps (55%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Security (99%) — its security and compliance posture is in good shape. Architecture (91%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (45%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (47%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback); Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped… (Release Hygiene); Make types internal by default (Library API & versioning).
For scale: Hobby (~1,587 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Security foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
84%
Strong
Architecture
91% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
47%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
45%
Weak · gated by P3
Security
99% ★
Exemplary
Performance
66%
Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 45% · 46% weightMaturity 47% · 25% weightPerformance 66% · 14% weightCode Health 84% · 8% weightArchitecture 91% · 4% weightSecurity 99% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 45 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 55 → ~61.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 4%Plumbing 30%Tests 65%
New since the last scan (1+)
- P12 · Coverage collected but not gated
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,200–€5,900
| Cost to rebuild | €1,200–€5,900 |
| Domain complexity | Low |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 55% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 72% boilerplate · 16% straight-line · 12% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 45% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
2
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
3
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
10.0
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
9.2
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X2 · Repo
Cancellation propagation
9.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
The Bad
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
7.0
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
7.2
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, implement draft releases or manual dispatch gates to ensure builds can be halted before reaching users. Next, maintain a clear changelog to track what is shipped in each release. Then, restrict the public API by making types internal by default to protect consumers from internal changes. Additionally, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated directory to preserve context and consequences. Finally, resolve the remaining orphaned files to ensure knowledge remains current and accessible.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +8.1 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +8.0 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +5.6 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AggregatorModule.cs, ServiceScopeFactoryTests.cs. | +5.4 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +9.1 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +9.1 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. | +8.5 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +8.2 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/Aggregator.Testing/Aggregator.Testing.csproj | 8.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Testing(netstandard2.0) |
| samples/KanbanStyle/src/KanbanStyle.Host/ClientApp/src/app/home/home.component.html | 9.0 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: plaintext-http-link |
| src/Aggregator.Autofac/AggregatorModule.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| tests/Aggregator.Autofac.Tests/ServiceScopeFactoryTests.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 48 of 51 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 51 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D33D34D35D38AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P3P4P6PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 10 of 34 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
17 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 8 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D9 · Test Distribution
103 test methods: 103 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 5 mock references across 125 tests.
Mock framework: Moq
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
7 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 3 deprecated packages.
Vulnerable: Newtonsoft.Json
Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: FluentAssertions
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 16 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1344 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
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D18 · Solution Shape
17 projects, 116 source files, 3799 hand-written lines of code (1344 production / 2455 test), 32 inter-project edges.
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
Thin analysable surface across projects
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D19 · Documentation Quality
Aggregator has a strong README with clear NuGet install instructions and usage for both Microsoft DI and Autofac integration. The main document is an Aggregator README that covers the package, dependency registration, aggregate roots, and a detailed outline (Usage/Registering dependencies/Aggregate roots/Repository/Commands and events/Command handlers/Definition/Registering command handlers/Add command validation to the command handler/Using aggregate roots in a command handler/CommandProcessor/IServiceScopeFactory / IServiceScope/CommandHandlingContext/Store events/Dispatch events/Testing Aggregates/Testing static constructors/Testing aggregate commands/Contributing/License) and ends with an outline marker, so any unshown sections are present but not flagged as missing. The KanbanStyle.Host README adds Angular CLI scaffolding info (dev server, code generation, ng test/ng e2e), which is useful for a companion project. Coverage is moderate: Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore at 72%, Aggregator.Autofac at 100%, Aggregator.Microsoft.DependencyInjection at 100%, Aggregator.Abstractions at 100%, and Aggregator.Testing at 0% (no testing docs).
Low XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Testing(netstandard2.0)src/Aggregator.Testing/Aggregator.Testing.csproj
XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore/Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore.csproj
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Aggregator.Testing.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
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D24 · Comment Value
12 valuable / 2 redundant across 187 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
redundant comment src/Aggregator.Autofac/AggregatorModule.cs:25
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AggregatorModule.cs, ServiceScopeFactoryTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 11 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
94 % of calls cross a namespace and 22 % go through an interface, but 60 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Improve Navigability — currently 7.0/10. — 94 % of calls cross a namespace and 22 % go through an interface, but 60 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
Low: plaintext-http-link samples/KanbanStyle/src/KanbanStyle.Host/ClientApp/src/app/home/home.component.html:5
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 9 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Aggregator/Command/CommandProcessor.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
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AX2 · Stateful singletons
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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AX8 · Test isolation
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 11 of 11 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P10 · Library API & versioning
- 94/112 types (84%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
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PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
- Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
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PF2 · Allocation hygiene
- No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
- On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
- Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
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X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — EventStore.cs:124
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 5/6 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — EventStoreTransaction.cs:100
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 84% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 47% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 45% | Weak — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 99% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 66% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 47 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); 20 aggregate-constrained repository/repositories (IRepository<T> where T : IAggregateRoot)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events)
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 1 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Vulnerable: Newtonsoft.Json
Warning — 7 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Deprecated: xunit
- Deprecated: EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore
- Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D18 · Solution Shape
- Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
D19 · Documentation Quality
- Low XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Testing(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Testing/Aggregator.Testing.csproj
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment src/Aggregator.Autofac/AggregatorModule.cs:25
- redundant comment tests/Aggregator.Autofac.Tests/ServiceScopeFactoryTests.cs:21
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/KanbanStyle/src/KanbanStyle.Host/ClientApp/src/app/home/home.component.html:5
- Low: plaintext-http-link samples/KanbanStyle/src/KanbanStyle.Host/ClientApp/src/app/home/home.component.html:6
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test runner surfaced no tests
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
Info — 18 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: FluentAssertions
- Outdated: Moq
- Outdated: xunit
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
- Outdated: Autofac
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions
- Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json
D10 · Test Quality
- Mock framework: Moq
- Mock framework: Moq
- Mock framework: Moq
- Mock framework: Moq
- Mock framework: Moq
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore/Aggregator.Persistence.EventStore.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Autofac(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Autofac/Aggregator.Autofac.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Aggregator(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator/Aggregator.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Microsoft.DependencyInjection(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Microsoft.DependencyInjection/Aggregator.Microsoft.DependencyInjection.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Aggregator.Abstractions(netstandard2.0) src/Aggregator.Abstractions/Aggregator.Abstractions.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |