Public report of iammukeshm/CleanArchitecture.WebApi, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 03:36 UTC · Survey ID cd_d5b112408dab49bcb82090a7f712d30f

iammukeshm/CleanArchitecture.WebApi

Measured 22 October 2026, 03:33 UTC, at code version a0e6aba

Code coverage: not measuredTest distribution: not measured

Code coverage is not measured: Tests deferred to the consumer.

Test distribution is not measured: No automated tests.

CAI score 48out of 100 At risk Down 7 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Performance 100 Exemplary Security and Compliance 69 Adequate Architecture 62 Adequate Code Health 53 Adequate Maturity 52 Adequate Production Readiness 37 Adequate

A very small codebase: 1,908 lines of product code in 6 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 37

Findings by how serious they are

20 critical 71 serious 67 minor

5 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 03:33 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

66of 71 dimensions measured by tools. The other 5 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
130of 158 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 28 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
71dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 1,908 lines of product code in 6 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

iammukeshm/CleanArchitecture.WebApi scores 48 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 37 and is rated Adequate. Its Test Distribution dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution and to resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 48 to about 57.

20 findings are critical: six in Dependency Vulnerabilities, five in Dependency Hygiene, five in Explicit Debt, two in Secret Scanning and two in Static Analysis (SAST).

Watchdog couldn't measure Runtime accessibility in this code, so that dimension is left out of the score. The product code is 1,908 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €2,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 53 Adequate, capped by Structured logging and Nullable reference types Architecture 62 Adequate, capped by Slice cohesion Maturity 52 Adequate, capped by Knowledge Freshness Production Readiness 37 Adequate, capped by Test Distribution, Dependency Hygiene and Secret Scanning Security and Compliance 69 Adequate, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 37 · counts for 46%Maturity 52 · counts for 25%Code Health 53 · counts for 14%Architecture 62 · counts for 8%Security and Compliance 69 · counts for 4%Performance 100 · counts for 2%

If Production Readiness rose from 37 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 48 to about 57.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 7%Supporting code 68%Generated by tools 25%
New since the last survey: 43 findings

These 43 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

  • Secret Scanning · REDACTED
  • Secret Scanning · REDACTED
  • Explicit Debt · Dead code: BaseEntity Domain/Common/BaseEntity.cs
  • Explicit Debt · Dead code: GetAllAsync Application/Interfaces/IGenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Explicit Debt · Dead code: AuthenticationHelper Infrastructure.Identity/Helpers/AuthenticationHelper.cs
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetByIdAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetPagedReponseAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: AddAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: DeleteAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetAllAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: IsUniqueBarcodeAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/ProductRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: AuthenticateAsync Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RegisterAsync Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: ForgotPassword Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SendAsync Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken: Invoke WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Features/Products/Commands/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommand.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Features/Products/Queries/GetProductById/GetProductByIdQuery.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Interfaces/Repositories/IProductRepositoryAsync.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Mappings/GeneralProfile.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Services/AuthenticatedUserService.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Startup.cs
  • Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Startup.cs

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Rebuild cost: about €2,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€680 to €3,300, for 11 to 35 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 48. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeVery small: 1,908 lines of product code, of which 46% is declarations and boilerplate, 45% straight logic and 9% logic with branches

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Raises the score by about 11 points · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).
Raises the score by about 10 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Resolve the 5 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Raises the score by about 8 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 11 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 Test Distribution findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Application Application Domain Domain Application->Domain Infrastructure.Identity Identity Infrastructure.Identity->Application Infrastructure.Persistence Persistence Infrastructure.Persistence->Application Infrastructure.Persistence->Domain Infrastructure.Shared Shared Infrastructure.Shared->Application WebApi WebApi WebApi->Application WebApi->Infrastructure.Identity WebApi->Infrastructure.Persistence WebApi->Infrastructure.Shared

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

38 modules, with 42 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 Application2 Application.Behaviours3 Application.DTOs.Account4 Application.DTOs.Email5 Application.Enums6 Application.Exceptions7 Application.Filters8 Application.Mappings9 Application.Wrappers10 Domain.Common11 Domain.Settings12 Infrastructure.Identity13 Infrastructure.Identity.Contexts14 Infrastructure.Identity.Helpers15 Infrastructure.Persistence16 Infrastructure.Shared17 WebApi18 WebApi.Extensions19 WebApi.Middlewares20 WebApi.Models21 Application.Interfaces22 Domain.Entities23 Infrastructure.Identity.Models24 Application.Interfaces.Repositories25 Infrastructure.Identity.Seeds26 Infrastructure.Identity.Services27 Infrastructure.Persistence.Contexts28 Infrastructure.Shared.Services29 WebApi.Controllers30 WebApi.Services31 Application.Features.Products.Commands.CreateProduct32 Application.Features.Products.Commands.DeleteProductById33 Application.Features.Products.Commands.UpdateProduct34 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetAllProducts35 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetProductById36 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repository37 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repositories38 WebApi.Controllers.v1
1 Application
2 Application.Behaviours
3 Application.DTOs.Account
4 Application.DTOs.Email
5 Application.Enums
6 Application.Exceptions
7 Application.Filters
8 Application.Mappings
9 Application.Wrappers
10 Domain.Common
11 Domain.Settings
12 Infrastructure.Identity
13 Infrastructure.Identity.Contexts
14 Infrastructure.Identity.Helpers
15 Infrastructure.Persistence
16 Infrastructure.Shared
17 WebApi
18 WebApi.Extensions
19 WebApi.Middlewares
20 WebApi.Models
21 Application.Interfaces511
22 Domain.Entities1
23 Infrastructure.Identity.Models1
24 Application.Interfaces.Repositories1
25 Infrastructure.Identity.Seeds3
26 Infrastructure.Identity.Services61131
27 Infrastructure.Persistence.Contexts21
28 Infrastructure.Shared.Services112
29 WebApi.Controllers41
30 WebApi.Services1
31 Application.Features.Products.Commands.CreateProduct12
32 Application.Features.Products.Commands.DeleteProductById11
33 Application.Features.Products.Commands.UpdateProduct11
34 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetAllProducts111
35 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetProductById111
36 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repository11
37 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repositories1111
38 WebApi.Controllers.v11111
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 Application2 Application.Behaviours3 Application.DTOs.Account4 Application.DTOs.Email5 Application.Enums6 Application.Exceptions7 Application.Filters8 Application.Mappings9 Application.Wrappers10 Domain.Common11 Domain.Settings12 Infrastructure.Identity13 Infrastructure.Identity.Contexts14 Infrastructure.Identity.Helpers15 Infrastructure.Persistence16 Infrastructure.Shared17 WebApi18 WebApi.Extensions19 WebApi.Middlewares20 WebApi.Models21 Application.Interfaces22 Domain.Entities23 Infrastructure.Identity.Models24 Application.Interfaces.Repositories25 Infrastructure.Identity.Seeds26 Infrastructure.Identity.Services27 Infrastructure.Persistence.Contexts28 Infrastructure.Shared.Services29 WebApi.Controllers30 WebApi.Services31 Application.Features.Products.Commands.CreateProduct32 Application.Features.Products.Commands.DeleteProductById33 Application.Features.Products.Commands.UpdateProduct34 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetAllProducts35 Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetProductById36 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repository37 Infrastructure.Persistence.Repositories38 WebApi.Controllers.v1Application1Application.Behaviours2Application.DTOs.Account3Application.DTOs.Email4Application.Enums5Application.Exceptions6Application.Filters7Application.Mappings8Application.Wrappers9Domain.Common10Domain.Settings11Infrastructure.Identity12Infrastructure.Identity.Contexts13Infrastructure.Identity.Helpers14Infrastructure.Persistence15Infrastructure.Shared16WebApi17WebApi.Extensions18WebApi.Middlewares19WebApi.Models20Application.Interfaces21Domain.Entities22Infrastructure.Identity.Models23Application.Interfaces.Repositories24Infrastructure.Identity.Seeds25Infrastructure.Identity.Services26Infrastructure.Persistence.Contexts27Infrastructure.Shared.Services28WebApi.Controllers29WebApi.Services30Application.Features.Products.Commands.CreateProduct31Application.Features.Products.Commands.DeleteProductById32Application.Features.Products.Commands.UpdateProduct33Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetAllProducts34Application.Features.Products.Queries.GetProductById35Infrastructure.Persistence.Repository36Infrastructure.Persistence.Repositories37WebApi.Controllers.v138511111361131211124111211111111111111111111

At a glance — Code Health · 53% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5 ·

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 6.9 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0
The Bad
X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 5.5
The Ugly
X4 · Repo Structured logging 3.5 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 62% · Adequate · gated by AX7 ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 7.1 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.8
The Ugly
AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 1.0

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by D34 ·

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 8.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0
The Bad
M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 4.0
The Ugly
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 3.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Adequate · gated by D9, D12, D13 ·

The Good
D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 6.2 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 8.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0
The Ugly
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 0.7 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0

At a glance — Security · 69% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 7.0 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 7.5 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0
The Bad
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 4.7 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 3.7 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 3.5

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures13High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection10High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the 22 outdated dependencies, prioritizing updates in REDACTED, REDACTED, and REDACTED. Immediately remediate the two leaked secrets found in REDACTED and resolve the single instance of missing tests. Finally, eliminate the five vulnerable dependencies and address the four deprecated items, focusing first on REDACTED, REDACTED, and REDACTED.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+10.6 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).+10.0 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 5 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+7.9 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED.+5.5 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 22 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (7), REDACTED (7).+10.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ServiceExtensions.cs (2), AccountService.cs, Program.cs.+3.1 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 3 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (3).+2.4 ptsLowDocumentation Quality
Resolve the 2 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AccountService.cs (2).+1.9 ptsLowExplicit Debt

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 17 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 12% slop · 23% mixed · 65% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED0.0SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED2.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED2.6MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs3.9MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED5.8MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanDependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9Near-cleanDependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED
WebApi/Models/Metadata.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: Metadata
Domain/Common/BaseEntity.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: BaseEntity
Application/Interfaces/IGenericRepositoryAsync.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetAllAsync
Infrastructure.Identity/Helpers/AuthenticationHelper.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: AuthenticationHelper
Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
README.md9.1Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Documentation: no installation or build instructions

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 20

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 71

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 67

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 5

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 66 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D39D44AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX7AX9C2C3ED5GD1IC1M1M3M4P1P2P6P8PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 130 of 158 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a161ab-f8bd-7b88-a9fd-2c4d637f0db9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (7 contributor(s) across 128 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 94% of the history; the other 6 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via ToolchainServer (WebApi). the service exited before it opened a port — `ASPNETCORE_URLS=http://127.0.0.1:0 ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet run --no-build --no-launch-profile --project 'REDACTED'`: share/dotnet The following frameworks were found: 6.0.36 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 7.0.20 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 8.0.27 at [/usr/sha…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because REDACTED is a Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web project).

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs:16

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DefaultBasicUser.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 2 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene0.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

31 outdated, 5 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper · ×5
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×4REDACTED:35
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson · ×22REDACTED:34
Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×9

What to do

  1. Resolve the 22 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (7), REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 258 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 31 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 219 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted debt markers + 4 dead symbols across 1908 LoC in the .NET projects (1.6/KLoC) → score 6.9.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×3REDACTED:16
WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×2Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:32
Dead code: Metadata · ×4WebApi/Models/Metadata.cs:8
TodoCommentInfrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:104

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AccountService.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Metadata.cs, BaseEntity.cs, IGenericRepositoryAsync.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 62 source files, 1908 hand-written lines of code (1908 production / 0 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 786 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 9 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a single document that is mostly announcement-driven and contains only one real section ('0.0.1 RC is available now!') with no overview of what the project does or what it contains, no installation/build/usage instructions, no contribution guidance, and no licence statement. It also includes an unverifiable claim that the author 'is no longer supporting this project' and a full stack hero redirect to a non-existent new project, which is stale and misleading.

Documentation: no installation or build instructions · ×3README.md
XML-doc coverage: WebApi · ×6REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment ValueStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 24 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:161

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AccountService.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 45 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Scattered collaborators

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 8 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 2 critical, 4 high, 7 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 of 4 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs. Counted over 4 of the 62 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×4Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ServiceExtensions.cs (2), AccountService.cs, Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 119 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 6 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp3.1REDACTED:4

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

  • `CreateProductCommandHandler` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'. — Application/Features/Products/Commands/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommand.cs:30
  • `GetProductByIdQuery` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'. — Application/Features/Products/Queries/GetProductById/GetProductByIdQuery.cs:14
  • `IProductRepositoryAsync` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'. — Application/Interfaces/Repositories/IProductRepositoryAsync.cs:9
  • `GeneralProfile` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'. — Application/Mappings/GeneralProfile.cs:15
  • `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAccountService` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:16
  • `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `AuthenticationRequest` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:22
  • `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `RegisterRequest` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:27
  • `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ForgotPasswordRequest` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:39
  • `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ResetPasswordRequest` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:45
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetAllProductsParameter` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:24
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetAllProductsQuery` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:27
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetProductByIdQuery` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:34
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `CreateProductCommand` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:40
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `UpdateProductCommand` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:48
  • `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `DeleteProductByIdCommand` from slice 'Application'. — REDACTED:62
  • `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `Response` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:32
  • `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ApiException` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:36
  • `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ValidationException` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:40
  • `AuthenticatedUserService` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAuthenticatedUserService` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Services/AuthenticatedUserService.cs:11
  • `Startup` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ServiceExtensions` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Startup.cs:25
  • `Startup` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAuthenticatedUserService` from slice 'Application'. — WebApi/Startup.cs:33

What to do

  • Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.
AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable. (×3) — REDACTED:39, REDACTED:47, REDACTED:59

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M3 · Folder & project structure4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • Only 3/6 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README.md names .NET 6, but the projects target .NET 3. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:28
  • README.md installs the package `Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql` (`dotnet add package Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql --version 3.1.2`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:97

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README.md names .NET 6, but the projects target .NET 3; README.md installs the package `Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql` (`dotnet add package Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql --version 3.1.2`), but no project or props file references it.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability6.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P6 · Release Hygiene8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The changelog this check read carries 2 versioned entries, against a bar of 3. Counted as either the distinct `x.y.z` versions it names (a link's target is not counted) or its version-shaped section headings (`## [1.2.0]`, `## V14.x.x`, `## Updates in 8.0.x`), whichever is the larger — so a log sectioned by minor series counts its sections, not its individual patch numbers. Entries recorded somewhere this check does not read — release notes generated at tag time from a generator config it did not recognise, or a log kept outside the repository — are not counted here, and this row is about what is re-findable in the tree rather than about how often you release.

What to do

  • Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceExtensions.cs:52
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. — WebApi/Program.cs:61

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 7/29 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×21) — REDACTED:22, REDACTED:27, REDACTED:33, …
  • 1 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
  • Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.RequestAborted`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.RequestAborted` to them. — WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:22

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `request.Body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs:35

What to do

  • Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs:46

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/6 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health53%Adequate — gated by X4, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture62%Adequate — gated by AX7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity52%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness37%Adequate — gated by D9, D12, D13Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security69%Adequate — gated by D30Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 44 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the service exited before it opened a port — `ASPNETCORE_URLS=http://127.0.0.1:0 ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet run --no-build --no-launch-profile --project 'REDACTED'`: share/dotnet The following frameworks were found: 6.0.36 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 7.0.20 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 8.0.27 at [/usr/sha…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because REDACTED is a Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web project) This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (1,908 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 5 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 20 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×5
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — REDACTED — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: Newtonsoft.Json — REDACTED — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MimeKit — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: MailKit — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×4
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×3
  • NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:16 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:16 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:16 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×2
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:32 — private RoleManager<IdentityRole> _roleManager — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:36 — private IDateTimeService _dateTimeService — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
Serious — 71 finding(s)
AX7 · Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling · ×21
  • Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Features/Products/Commands/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommand.cs:30 — `CreateProductCommandHandler` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Features/Products/Queries/GetProductById/GetProductByIdQuery.cs:14 — `GetProductByIdQuery` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Interfaces/Repositories/IProductRepositoryAsync.cs:9 — `IProductRepositoryAsync` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Application → Domain Application/Mappings/GeneralProfile.cs:15 — `GeneralProfile` (slice 'Application') depends on `Product` from slice 'Domain'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:16 — `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAccountService` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:22 — `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `AuthenticationRequest` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:27 — `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `RegisterRequest` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:39 — `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ForgotPasswordRequest` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:45 — `AccountController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ResetPasswordRequest` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:24 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetAllProductsParameter` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:27 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetAllProductsQuery` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:34 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `GetProductByIdQuery` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:40 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `CreateProductCommand` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:48 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `UpdateProductCommand` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application REDACTED:62 — `ProductController` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `DeleteProductByIdCommand` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:32 — `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `Response` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:36 — `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ApiException` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:40 — `ErrorHandlerMiddleware` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ValidationException` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Services/AuthenticatedUserService.cs:11 — `AuthenticatedUserService` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAuthenticatedUserService` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Startup.cs:25 — `Startup` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `ServiceExtensions` from slice 'Application'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: WebApi → Application WebApi/Startup.cs:33 — `Startup` (slice 'WebApi') depends on `IAuthenticatedUserService` from slice 'Application'.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×21
  • Async method without CancellationToken: AuthenticateAsync REDACTED:22 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RegisterAsync REDACTED:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ConfirmEmailAsync REDACTED:33 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ForgotPassword REDACTED:39 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ResetPassword REDACTED:45 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Get REDACTED:24 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Get REDACTED:32 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Post REDACTED:40 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Put REDACTED:48 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Delete REDACTED:60 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetByIdAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:21 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetPagedReponseAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:26 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: AddAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:36 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:43 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: DeleteAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:49 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetAllAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/GenericRepositoryAsync.cs:55 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: IsUniqueBarcodeAsync Infrastructure.Persistence/Repositories/ProductRepositoryAsync.cs:22 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: AuthenticateAsync Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:52 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RegisterAsync Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:82 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ForgotPassword Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:203 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: SendAsync Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs:25 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×7
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×4
  • Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore REDACTED:35 — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 9.1.2 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning REDACTED:33 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning 4.1.1 — Other — the publisher's replacement is `Asp.Versioning.Mvc`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: System.Text.Json REDACTED:17 — System.Text.Json 4.7.2 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt REDACTED:20 — REDACTED — Legacy
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×4
  • Dead code: Metadata WebApi/Models/Metadata.cs:8 — NamedType Metadata — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including WebApi, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: BaseEntity Domain/Common/BaseEntity.cs:7 — NamedType BaseEntity — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: GetAllAsync Application/Interfaces/IGenericRepositoryAsync.cs:11 — Method GetAllAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: AuthenticationHelper Infrastructure.Identity/Helpers/AuthenticationHelper.cs:10 — NamedType AuthenticationHelper — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Infrastructure.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:104 — //TODO: Attach Email Service here and configure it via appsettings — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs:16 — Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs:16-32 | Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultSuperAdmin.cs:18-34 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs:16` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultSuperAdmin.cs:35` calls `AddToRoleAsync`, `ToString` and `Infrastructure.Identity/Seeds/DefaultBasicUser.cs:33` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1
  • End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp3.1 REDACTED:4 — REDACTED declares .NET netcoreapp3.1 as this project's target framework, and .NET Core 3.1 LTS, support ended 2022-12-13. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2022-12-13 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken · ×1
  • Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken: Invoke WebApi/Middlewares/ErrorHandlerMiddleware.cs:22 — Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.RequestAborted`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.RequestAborted` to them.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped · Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×1
  • Untrusted text written into markup unescaped Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs:35 — `request.Body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Minor — 52 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×22
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson REDACTED:34 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools REDACTED:13 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design REDACTED:24 — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 3.1.4 → 10.0.2 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore REDACTED:27 — Serilog.AspNetCore 3.4.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Settings.Configuration REDACTED:31 — Serilog.Settings.Configuration 3.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer REDACTED:32 — Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer 5.5.1 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore REDACTED:25 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 5.5.1 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger REDACTED:26 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger 5.5.1 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper REDACTED:9 — REDACTED → 16.2.0 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection REDACTED:10 — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 8.0.1 → 12.0.1 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation REDACTED:11 — FluentValidation 9.1.2 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions REDACTED:12 — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 9.1.2 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection REDACTED:14 — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 8.1.0 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:15 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory REDACTED:13 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: System.Text.Json REDACTED:17 — System.Text.Json 4.7.2 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:11 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED:12 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions REDACTED:21 — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Persistence).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer REDACTED:9 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 3.1.18 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Identity).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:10 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Identity).
  • Outdated: microsoft.extensions.dependencyinjection REDACTED:17 — microsoft.extensions.dependencyinjection 3.1.7 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Identity).
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×4
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies REDACTED:39 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies REDACTED:47 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies REDACTED:59 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×4
  • Orphaned file Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file WebApi/Extensions/ServiceExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file WebApi/Program.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×3
  • Documentation: no installation or build instructions README.md — There are no installation/build/usage instructions in the document. Add a short 'How to get started' section covering cloning the repo, dotnet restore, and running the WebApi host.
  • Documentation: no usage examples README.md — The README contains no usage examples or invocation commands. Write one or two short code blocks showing how to add a dependency project reference and run the WebApi host.
  • Documentation: no licence statement README.md — No licence statement appears in the README. Insert a line stating the project's MIT or Apache 2.0 license so readers can verify it matches the codebase.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:161 — "convert random bytes to hex string" — delete - restates BitConverter.ToString(...).Replace
  • redundant comment Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs:173 — "Email Service Call Here" — delete - the call to SendVerificationEmail already says this
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×2
  • README/code drift README.md:28 — README.md names .NET 6, but the projects target .NET 3. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:97 — README.md installs the package `Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql` (`dotnet add package Pomelo.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql --version 3.1.2`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×2
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected WebApi/Program.cs:61 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
C3 · Audit Trail · Partial audit-trail evidence · ×1
  • Partial audit-trail evidence — An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
D27 · Navigability · Scattered collaborators · ×1
  • Scattered collaborators — 99 % of calls cross a namespace and only 45 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 4 of 4 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 4 of the 62 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: Infrastructure.Identity/Services/AccountService.cs, WebApi/Extensions/ServiceExtensions.cs, WebApi/Program.cs, Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceExtensions.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D8 · Code Coverage · No tests · ×1
  • No tests — template/sample — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — no discoverable tests to count. If this repository does test, wiring the suite to a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest) is what makes it countable here; a pipeline step that invokes a runner is not evidence on its own, because a runner over an empty suite passes. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1
  • No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
M3 · Folder & project structure · Inconsistent root namespaces · ×1
  • Inconsistent root namespaces — Only 3/6 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
P6 · Release Hygiene · Changelog looks stale/thin · ×1
  • Changelog looks stale/thin — The changelog this check read carries 2 versioned entries, against a bar of 3. Counted as either the distinct `x.y.z` versions it names (a link's target is not counted) or its version-shaped section headings (`## [1.2.0]`, `## V14.x.x`, `## Updates in 8.0.x`), whichever is the larger — so a log sectioned by minor series counts its sections, not its individual patch numbers. Entries recorded somewhere this check does not read — release notes generated at tag time from a generator config it did not recognise, or a log kept outside the repository — are not counted here, and this row is about what is re-findable in the tree rather than about how often you release.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP · ×1
  • OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceExtensions.cs:52 — `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 7/29 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept · ×1
  • Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept — 1 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×1
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging Infrastructure.Shared/Services/EmailService.cs:46 — Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere · ×1
  • Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere — 0/6 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
Minor — 15 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×9
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 9.1.2 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning 4.1.1 → 5.1.0 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Environment — Serilog.Enrichers.Environment 2.1.3 → 3.0.1 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Process — Serilog.Enrichers.Process 2.0.1 → 3.0.0 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Thread — Serilog.Enrichers.Thread 3.1.0 → 4.0.0 available (referenced by WebApi).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — REDACTED → 13.0.4 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: MimeKit — REDACTED → 4.18.2 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Identity).
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED → 8.23.0 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Identity).
  • Outdated: MailKit — REDACTED → 4.18.1 available (referenced by Infrastructure.Shared).
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×6
  • XML-doc coverage: WebApi REDACTED — WebApi: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/37).
  • XML-doc coverage: Domain Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/25).
  • XML-doc coverage: Application REDACTED — Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/121).
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Persistence REDACTED — Infrastructure.Persistence: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/18).
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Identity REDACTED — Infrastructure.Identity: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/27).
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Shared REDACTED — Infrastructure.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/9).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0a85e1119b1c4e7f8466598257f8d090/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0a85e1119b1c4e7f8466598257f8d090/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .10artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list CleanArchitecture.WebApi.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json13artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a161ab-f8bd-7b88-a9fd-2c4d637f0db9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 10 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 6 field(s)
  • AuthenticationRequest.Email Application/DTOs/Account/AuthenticationRequest.cs:9
  • AuthenticationResponse.Email Application/DTOs/Account/AuthenticationResponse.cs:11
  • ForgotPasswordRequest.Email Application/DTOs/Account/ForgotPasswordRequest.cs:12
  • RegisterRequest.Email Application/DTOs/Account/RegisterRequest.cs:18
  • ResetPasswordRequest.Email Application/DTOs/Account/VerifyEmailRequest.cs:12
  • MailSettings.EmailFrom Domain/Settings/MailSettings.cs:9
Name — 4 field(s)
  • RegisterRequest.FirstName Application/DTOs/Account/RegisterRequest.cs:11
  • RegisterRequest.LastName Application/DTOs/Account/RegisterRequest.cs:14
  • ApplicationUser.FirstName Infrastructure.Identity/Models/ApplicationUser.cs:11
  • ApplicationUser.LastName Infrastructure.Identity/Models/ApplicationUser.cs:12

Issues: 20 · Warnings: 71 · Recommendations: 52 · Info: 15 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 03:33 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md