go-srv-kit — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ikaiguang/go-srv-kit carries serious gaps (45%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (94%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (25%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Domain Modelling (54%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning).

For scale: Small (~19,826 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 94% ★ Exemplary Architecture 99% ★ Exemplary Maturity 60% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 25% Weak · gated by P1, P3 Security 61% Adequate · gated by D28 Domain Modelling 54% Adequate · gated by DM4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 25% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 54% · 25% weightMaturity 60% · 14% weightSecurity 61% · 8% weightCode Health 94% · 4% weightArchitecture 99% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 45 → ~60.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (12+)

12 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) data/mysql/mysql.kit.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) service/config/config_from_consul.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) service/mysql/mysql.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) service/logger/logger_writer.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) service/logger/logger_writer.util.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/log/log_console.kit.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/log/log_console.kit.go
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €9,500–€48,000

Cost to rebuild	€9,500–€48,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (159–503 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€29,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 25% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config_example.yaml.

+15.9 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+17.6 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Run what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+17.6 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 25%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (19,826 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 25%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

80 modules, 114 dependencies — 3 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 94% · Exemplary

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	9	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	8	Medium
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	4	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a CI/CD pipeline to automatically build and run tests on every change, ensuring code quality is enforced early. Integrate security and performance tooling into this workflow to fail the build on vulnerabilities or regressions, and immediately resolve the single leaked secret found in the configuration files. Finally, implement manual approval gates for releases to prevent bad builds from reaching users, and refactor the codebase to move business rules into the relevant entities rather than leaving them in anemic services.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config_example.yaml.	+15.9 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+17.6 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+17.6 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.	+9.3 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.	+4.6 pts	Medium	Rich vs anemic model
Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.	+4.6 pts	Medium	Repository granularity
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.	+2.8 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).	+2.8 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 27 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 7% slop · 34% mixed · 59% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
go.mod	1.6	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
service/config/config_example.yaml	3.0	Slop	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
kit/file/file_hash.kit.go	6.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-md5
kit/md5/md5.kit.go	6.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-md5
service/logger/logger_instance.util.go	7.2	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: loggerManager.setupLogger (cyclomatic 18)
kratos/auth/auth.kit.go	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cyclomatic 18)
service/server/server_app.util.go	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: serverutil.NewApp (cyclomatic 16)
kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go	7.8	Mixed	Cognitive Complexity: authRepo.checkLimitAndLogoutOtherAccount (cognitive 20)
service/logger/logger_writer.util.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
kratos/log/log_console.kit.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)
kit/random/random.kit.go	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used
data/consul/consul.kit.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cyclomatic Complexity: consulpkg.NewClient (cyclomatic 16)
kit/download/download.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: downloadpkg.StreamDownload (cognitive 24)
service/logger/logger.util.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: loggerManager.Close (cognitive 22)
kit/header/header.kit.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: headerpkg.ContainsValue (cognitive 19)
kratos/context/context_ip.kit.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: contextpkg.ClientIPFromGRPC (cognitive 19)
kratos/app/app_logging.kit.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: apppkg.ServerLog (cognitive 16)
service/setup/setup.util.go	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: launcherManager
data/mysql/mysql.kit.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 24 of 25 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 25 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D21D28D29D31D34D35D38DM4DM5DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 47 of 55 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc942-4d80-75f8-a0fc-288bf866d215.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken at 18. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being stringpkg.ToString at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cyclomatic 18)kratos/auth/auth.kit.go:255

loggerManager.setupLogger (cyclomatic 18)service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:65

consulpkg.NewClient (cyclomatic 16)data/consul/consul.kit.go:34

serverutil.NewApp (cyclomatic 16)service/server/server_app.util.go:18

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was loggerManager.setupLogger at 25.

loggerManager.setupLogger (cognitive 25)service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:65

downloadpkg.StreamDownload (cognitive 24)kit/download/download.go:38

authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cognitive 24)kratos/auth/auth.kit.go:255

loggerManager.Close (cognitive 22)service/logger/logger.util.go:98

serverutil.NewApp (cognitive 22)service/server/server_app.util.go:18

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 loggerManager.setupLogger (cognitive 25) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with logger_instance.util.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 downloadpkg.StreamDownload (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with download.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with auth.kit.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: launcherManagerservice/setup/setup.util.go:25

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×3kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go:123

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2data/mysql/mysql.kit.go:46

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×2service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go:44

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:236

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)service/mysql/mysql.util.go:79

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialservice/config/config_example.yaml:146

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config_example.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is service/setup/setup_launcher.util.go.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 finding(s): 0 critical, 30 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2service/config/config_example.yaml:259detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with config_example.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 5 medium, 3 low.

Medium: use-of-md5 · ×5kit/file/file_hash.kit.go:25detected by semgrep finding

Low: missing-ssl-minversion · ×3data/etcd/etcd.kit.go:33detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with file_hash.kit.go (2), md5.kit.go (2), random.kit.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with etcd.kit.go, curl.kit.go, websocket.kit.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 of 63 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is data/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.kit.go.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: app.kit.go↔app_json_handler.kit.go 55%

Change coupling: app.kit.go ↔ app_json_handler.kit.gokratos/app/app.kit.go

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 7 medium, 0 low.

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Model` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — gorm_helper.kit.go:21
`ModelForMysql` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — gorm_helper.kit.go:29
`ModelForPostgres` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — gorm_helper.kit.go:37

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM7 · Repository granularity5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`AuthRepo` leaks the infrastructure/framework type `Keyfunc` through its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. — auth_token.kit.go:141

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

141 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	94%	Exemplary	Solid.
Architecture	99%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	60%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	25%	Weak — gated by P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	61%	Adequate — gated by D28	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	54%	Adequate — gated by DM4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 77 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~8393 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (a Go event-sourcing framework import (watermill/eventhorizon/EventStore/eventsourcing))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 5 finding(s)

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2

Secret: generic-api-key service/config/config_example.yaml:259 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key service/config/config_example.yaml:260 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential service/config/config_example.yaml:146 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.52.0. This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — google.golang.org/grpc 1.80.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.82.1

Warning — 40 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×6

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — github.com/go-kratos/kratos/v2 2.9.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/go-kratos/kratos/v2 if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.43.0 (go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage, go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation): GO-2026-5158 — upgrade to 1.44.0
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.53.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.53.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod — golang.org/x/sys 0.43.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.36.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — upgrade to 0.39.0
Medium CVE: GO-2026-4918 go.mod — stdlib 1.25.9 (net/http): GO-2026-4918 — fixed in Go 1.25.10; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.25.9: GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×5

Medium: use-of-md5 kit/file/file_hash.kit.go:25 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-of-md5 kit/file/file_hash.kit.go:55 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-of-md5 kit/md5/md5.kit.go:12 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-of-md5 kit/md5/md5.kit.go:29 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: math-random-used kit/random/random.kit.go:4 — `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go:123 — kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go:123-131 | kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go:172-180 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `kratos/auth/auth_token_manger.kit.go:123` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/log/log_console.kit.go:74 — kratos/log/log_console.kit.go:74-82 | kratos/log/log_file.kit.go:92-100 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `kratos/log/log_console.kit.go:74` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) kratos/log/log_console.kit.go:112 — kratos/log/log_console.kit.go:112-120 | kratos/log/log_file.kit.go:121-129 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) data/mysql/mysql.kit.go:46 — data/mysql/mysql.kit.go:46-58 | data/postgres/postgres.kit.go:46-58 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `data/mysql/mysql.kit.go:46` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:134 — service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:134-147 | service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:154-166 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:134` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go:44 — service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go:44-55 | service/cluster_service_api/client_http_conn.util.go:32-43 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/cluster_service_api/client_grpc_conn.util.go:44` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) service/config/config_from_consul.util.go:91 — service/config/config_from_consul.util.go:91-102 | service/config/config_from_file.util.go:34-45 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/config/config_from_consul.util.go:91` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cyclomatic 18) · ×1

authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cyclomatic 18) kratos/auth/auth.kit.go:255 — authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · loggerManager.setupLogger (cyclomatic 18) · ×1

loggerManager.setupLogger (cyclomatic 18) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:65 — loggerManager.setupLogger has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · consulpkg.NewClient (cyclomatic 16) · ×1

consulpkg.NewClient (cyclomatic 16) data/consul/consul.kit.go:34 — consulpkg.NewClient has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · serverutil.NewApp (cyclomatic 16) · ×1

serverutil.NewApp (cyclomatic 16) service/server/server_app.util.go:18 — serverutil.NewApp has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1

LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1011.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · loggerManager.setupLogger (cognitive 25) · ×1

loggerManager.setupLogger (cognitive 25) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:65 — loggerManager.setupLogger has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 7 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · downloadpkg.StreamDownload (cognitive 24) · ×1

downloadpkg.StreamDownload (cognitive 24) kit/download/download.go:38 — downloadpkg.StreamDownload has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, match/switch 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cognitive 24) · ×1

authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken (cognitive 24) kratos/auth/auth.kit.go:255 — authpkg.validateAuthorizationToken has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, boolean chains 3, loops 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · loggerManager.Close (cognitive 22) · ×1

loggerManager.Close (cognitive 22) service/logger/logger.util.go:98 — loggerManager.Close has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · serverutil.NewApp (cognitive 22) · ×1

serverutil.NewApp (cognitive 22) service/server/server_app.util.go:18 — serverutil.NewApp has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · authRepo.checkLimitAndLogoutOtherAccount (cognitive 20) · ×1

authRepo.checkLimitAndLogoutOtherAccount (cognitive 20) kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:407 — authRepo.checkLimitAndLogoutOtherAccount has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · headerpkg.ContainsValue (cognitive 19) · ×1

headerpkg.ContainsValue (cognitive 19) kit/header/header.kit.go:54 — headerpkg.ContainsValue has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, jumps 3, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · contextpkg.ClientIPFromGRPC (cognitive 19) · ×1

contextpkg.ClientIPFromGRPC (cognitive 19) kratos/context/context_ip.kit.go:60 — contextpkg.ClientIPFromGRPC has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 4 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · apppkg.ServerLog (cognitive 16) · ×1

apppkg.ServerLog (cognitive 16) kratos/app/app_logging.kit.go:161 — apppkg.ServerLog has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 4). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 16 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 166). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.

D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1

TooManyMethods: launcherManager service/setup/setup.util.go:25 — TooManyMethods — 40 methods, declared across 2 files: setup/setup_launcher.util.go (39), setup/setup.util.go (1). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1

Change coupling: app.kit.go ↔ app_json_handler.kit.go kratos/app/app.kit.go — `kratos/app/app.kit.go` and `kratos/app/app_json_handler.kit.go` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1

Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod — github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.5 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:236 — kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:236-250 | kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:283-297 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `kratos/auth/auth_token.kit.go:236` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) service/mysql/mysql.util.go:79 — service/mysql/mysql.util.go:79-89 | service/postgres/postgres.util.go:79-89 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/mysql/mysql.util.go:79` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:65 — service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:65-74 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:99-108 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:65` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:42 — service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:42-50 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:76-84 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:110-118 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:214 — service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:214-222 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:37-43 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:71-77 | service/logger/logger_writer.util.go:105-111 — there are 4 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `service/logger/logger_instance.util.go:214` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×3

Low: missing-ssl-minversion data/etcd/etcd.kit.go:33 — `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion kit/curl/curl.kit.go:70 — `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: websocket-missing-origin-check kratos/websocket/websocket.kit.go:20 — The Origin header in the HTTP WebSocket handshake is used to guarantee that the connection accepted by the WebSocket is from a trusted origin domain. Failure to enforce can lead to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF). As per "gorilla/websocket" documentation: "A CheckOrigin function should carefully validate the request origin to prevent cross-site request forgery.". This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 20 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: service/setup/setup_launcher.util.go, service/setup_backup/setup_launcher.util.go, service/cluster_service_api/client.util.go, service/setup/setup.util.go, service/cluster_service_api/client_const.util.go, kit/random/random.kit.go, kratos/app/app_response_custom.kit.go, service/setup/component.util.go (+12 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 30 location(s) do not all need the same action: 28 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 2 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 23 of 63 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: data/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.kit.go, service/config/config_from_consul.util.go, data/gorm/gorm_batch_insert.kit.go (and 20 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	30	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	8	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	0	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	9	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc942-4d80-75f8-a0fc-288bf866d215 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Ikaiguang/go-Srv-Kit

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 94% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 99% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Weak · gated by P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 61% · Adequate · gated by D28

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 54% · Adequate · gated by DM4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts