Public report — SolenLms, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-06-2026 @ 21:52 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

IliasHamdaoui/SolenLms

No regression coverage not measuredbounded contexts not declared
42% At Risk
Event-Driven 91% Exemplary Code Health 83% Strong Architecture 82% Strong Security 62% Adequate Maturity 51% Adequate Domain Modelling 47% Weak Accessibility 47% Weak Readiness 31% Weak

Small · 16,325 LoC · 16 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (31%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

71/74dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
53findings with an exact file:lineof 165 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
74/103dimensions across the health lenses16325 LoC · 16 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

iliasHamdaoui/SolenLms carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (91%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Code Health (83%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (31%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (47%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: Small (~16,325 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (91%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 83% Strong Architecture 82% Strong Maturity 51% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 31% Weak · gated by D13, P3, P5, P7 Security 62% Adequate · gated by D30, D36, C1 Domain Modelling 47% Weak · gated by DM1, DM2 Event-Driven 91% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 47% Weak · gated by AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 31% · 45% weightAccessibility 47% · 25% weightDomain Modelling 47% · 14% weightMaturity 51% · 8% weightSecurity 62% · 4% weightArchitecture 82% · 2% weightCode Health 83% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 91% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 31 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~51.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 11%Plumbing 56%Tests 11%Generated 22%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€53,000
Cost to rebuild€11,000–€53,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (177–562 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 38% boilerplate · 47% straight-line · 16% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€32,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 31% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+9.2 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with api.key, idp.key, web.key.
+9.2 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+9.5 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 31%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (16,325 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 31%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
52 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 2 · DM4 anemic: 9 · DM2 primitive ids: 41
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+7.0 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +7.0 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 42, unchanged across 5 runs.

025507510029 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain ModellingEvent-DrivenAccessibility

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Tests Tests Startup Startup ctx:IdentityProvider IdentityProvider Core · Infrastructure · WebApi Startup->ctx:IdentityProvider Learning.Tests Learning.Tests Shared.Tests Shared.Tests WebApi.Startup WebApi.Startup ctx:SolenLmsApp SolenLmsApp Core · CourseManagement · Infrastructure · Learning … WebApi.Startup->ctx:SolenLmsApp WebClient WebClient WebClient.Startup WebClient.Startup ctx:IdentityProvider->ctx:SolenLmsApp

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 9.4 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.7 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.6 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 7.6 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.5 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.1 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.9 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 8.1

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.9 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 8.9 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.6 AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Ugly
AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 51% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 31% · Weak · gated by D13, P3, P5, P7

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0
The Bad
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 5.0 P2 · Repo Observability 6.5
The Ugly
D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 62% · Adequate · gated by D30, D36, C1

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 7.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.1 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 10.0
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 1.5 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 47% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2

The Good
DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 9.6 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Bad
DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 6.8
The Ugly
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 1.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 91% · Exemplary

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 9.8 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 7.9

At a glance — Accessibility · 47% · Weak · gated by AC4

The Good
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 10.0 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Bad
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 5.2
The Ugly
AC3 · Repo Page structure 4.7 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components17High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration10High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures7High / Critical

Roadmap

First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure-as-code while documenting recovery time and point objectives to ensure true disaster resilience. Next, implement HTTP resilience handlers to protect the application from flaky dependencies. Then, address all nine deprecated dependencies and resolve the three leaked secrets, specifically api.key, idp.key, and web.key. Finally, extend structured logging across all service-like projects to ensure full production observability.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+9.2 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with api.key, idp.key, web.key.+9.2 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+9.5 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+9.5 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.+8.6 ptsMediumObservability
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.+7.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+1.7 ptsLowADR Quality
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+2.5 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 25 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 52% mixed · 48% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
nginx/web.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
nginx/idp.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
nginx/api.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
nginx/nginx.Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj5.3MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj5.3MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj5.3MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Server/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 3)
SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/Login/Index.cshtml.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: Index.OnPost (cognitive 22)
IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/Data/SeedData.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: SeedData.EnsureSeedData (cognitive 17)
SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Features/Courses/Queries/GetAllCourses.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: GetAllCoursesSpec.GetAllCoursesSpec.ctor (cognitive 16)
SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Administration/Organization/UI/Index.razor8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: Index.razor › __RazorCode_Index_1
SolenLmsApp/Api/Resources/Src/Infrastructure/Data/ResourcesDbContext.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/MediatR/Pipelines/RequestValidationBehavior.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)
SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/EventHandlers/Instructors/UserAddedHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D35D36AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 53 of 165 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f155e-a22e-7839-8a96-f7a2402912a9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Index.OnPost at 22.

Index.OnPost (cognitive 22)IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/Login/Index.cshtml.cs:58
SeedData.EnsureSeedData (cognitive 17)IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/Data/SeedData.cs:13
GetAllCoursesSpec.GetAllCoursesSpec.ctor (cognitive 16)SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Features/Courses/Queries/GetAllCourses.cs:106

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: Index.razor › __RazorCode_Index_1SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Administration/Organization/UI/Index.razor:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

13 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×3SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:129
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×2SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/MediatR/Pipelines/RequestValidationBehavior.cs:24
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:9
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3)SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs:62
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/ErrorsController.cs:32

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: WebClient · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 91 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: Course (LCOM4 6)SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Domain/Courses/Course.cs:8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

163 test methods: 163 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 163 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

66 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 9 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit · ×9
Outdated: AutoFixture · ×66

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-key · ×3nginx/web.key:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with api.key, idp.key, web.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 4 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

18 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 12779 LoC (1.2/KLoC) → score 7.6.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×18SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 18 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CourseManagement.csproj (6), IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj (6), WebApi.Startup.csproj (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 projects, 388 .cs files, 15574 hand-written lines of code (12779 production / 2795 test), plus 5431 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 52 inter-project edges (build failed).

Thin analysable surface across projects
Build did not complete in the analyzer

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 1 redundant across 151 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentIdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/DI/OpenApi.cs:29

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 16 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split WebClient

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split WebClient finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×3nginx/api.key:1detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with api.key, idp.key, web.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 10 high, 5 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.4 · ×10detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 1 medium, 4 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001nginx/nginx.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×4IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), nginx.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3), nginx.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with nginx.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×6) — Index.cshtml:29, CategoriesListComponent.razor:22, ArticleLecture.razor:8, …
  • A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. — LoggedOut.cshtml:7
  • A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child. (×3) — Index.cshtml:19, Index.cshtml:18, Index.cshtml:21
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×4) — Index.cshtml:22, Index.cshtml:21, Index.cshtml:25, …
  • A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×7) — ArticleLecture.razor:17, ArticleLecture.razor:18, ArticleLecture.razor:19, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. — LoggedOut.cshtml:12
  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×3) — Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0, _Layout.cshtml:0
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0, _Layout.cshtml:0
  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×4) — CourseInfoComponent.razor:13, CourseInfoComponent.razor:32, CourseComponent.razor:14, …
  • user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — index.html:6

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×22) — UsersListComponent.razor:43, UsersListComponent.razor:47, CategoriesListComponent.razor:28, …
  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — index.html:29

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IWebApiClient` declares 60 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CourseManagementApiClient.g.cs:20
  • `IWebApiClient` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — LearningApiClient.g.cs:20

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
  • No in-app HTTPS enforcement, but ForwardedHeaders / 127.0.0.1 binding indicates a reverse-proxy topology — adding UseHttpsRedirection in the app would be wrong in this layout. Verify the reverse proxy enforces TLS. — HostingExtensions.cs:51

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `Course` references the aggregate root `CourseCategory` directly (via `_categories`) — hold its `CourseCategoryId` instead. (×2) — Course.cs:11, Course.cs:10
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `LearnerCourseProgress` directly (via `_learnersProgress`) — hold its `LearnerCourseProgressId` instead. (×2) — Course.cs:12, Course.cs:13
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `Instructor` directly (via `Instructor`) — hold its `InstructorId` instead. (×2) — Course.cs:27, Course.cs:32
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `CourseCategory` directly (via `Categories`) — hold its `CourseCategoryId` instead. (×2) — Course.cs:30, Course.cs:29
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `LearnerCourseProgress` directly (via `LearnersProgress`) — hold its `LearnerCourseProgressId` instead. (×2) — Course.cs:31, Course.cs:31
  • `CourseCategory` references the aggregate root `Course` directly (via `Course`) — hold its `CourseId` instead. (×2) — CourseCategory.cs:8, CourseCategory.cs:9
  • `CourseCategory` references the aggregate root `Category` directly (via `Category`) — hold its `CategoryId` instead. (×2) — CourseCategory.cs:10, CourseCategory.cs:11
  • `Learner` references the aggregate root `LearnerCourseProgress` directly (via `_coursesProgress`) — hold its `LearnerCourseProgressId` instead. — Learner.cs:6
  • `Learner` references the aggregate root `LearnerCourseProgress` directly (via `CoursesProgress`) — hold its `LearnerCourseProgressId` instead. — Learner.cs:25
  • `Category` references the aggregate root `Course` directly (via `_courses`) — hold its `CourseId` instead. — Category.cs:7
  • `Category` references the aggregate root `Course` directly (via `Courses`) — hold its `CourseId` instead. — Category.cs:19
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `BookmarkedCourse` directly (via `_learnersBookmarks`) — hold its `BookmarkedCourseId` instead. — Course.cs:12
  • `Course` references the aggregate root `BookmarkedCourse` directly (via `LearnersBookmarks`) — hold its `BookmarkedCourseId` instead. — Course.cs:30
  • `LearnerCourseAccess` references the aggregate root `Learner` directly (via `Learner`) — hold its `LearnerId` instead. — LearnerCourseAccess.cs:9
  • `LearnerCourseProgress` references the aggregate root `Learner` directly (via `Learner`) — hold its `LearnerId` instead. — LearnerCourseProgress.cs:9
  • `LearnerCourseProgress` references the aggregate root `Course` directly (via `Course`) — hold its `CourseId` instead. — LearnerCourseProgress.cs:11

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `CategoryCreated.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — CategoryCreated.cs:4
  • `CategoryCreated.CategoryId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CategoryId { Int32 Value }`). — CategoryCreated.cs:4
  • `CategoryDeleted.CategoryId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CategoryId { Int32 Value }`). — CategoryDeleted.cs:3
  • `CategoryUpdated.CategoryId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CategoryId { Int32 Value }`). — CategoryUpdated.cs:4
  • `CourseDeleted.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — CourseDeleted.cs:5
  • `CourseDeleted.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — CourseDeleted.cs:6
  • `CourseUnpublished.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — CourseUnpublished.cs:4
  • `LectureDeleted.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — LectureDeleted.cs:5
  • `LectureDeleted.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — LectureDeleted.cs:6
  • `LectureDeleted.ModuleId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ModuleId { String Value }`). — LectureDeleted.cs:7
  • `LectureDeleted.LectureId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LectureId { String Value }`). — LectureDeleted.cs:8
  • `LectureWithResourceCreated.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — LectureWithResourceCreated.cs:9
  • `LectureWithResourceCreated.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — LectureWithResourceCreated.cs:10
  • `LectureWithResourceCreated.ModuleId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ModuleId { String Value }`). — LectureWithResourceCreated.cs:11
  • `LectureWithResourceCreated.LectureId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LectureId { String Value }`). — LectureWithResourceCreated.cs:12
  • `ModuleDeleted.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — ModuleDeleted.cs:5
  • `ModuleDeleted.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — ModuleDeleted.cs:6
  • `ModuleDeleted.ModuleId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ModuleId { String Value }`). — ModuleDeleted.cs:7
  • `OrganizationDeleted.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — OrganizationDeleted.cs:2
  • `UserDeleted.UserId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { String Value }`). — UserDeleted.cs:3
  • `LearnerCourseProgressUpdated.LearnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LearnerId { String Value }`). — LearnerCourseProgressUpdated.cs:7
  • `LearnerCourseProgressUpdated.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — LearnerCourseProgressUpdated.cs:8
  • `Category.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Category.cs:16
  • `Course.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Course.cs:23
  • `Course.InstructorId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct InstructorId { String Value }`). — Course.cs:28
  • `Lecture.ModuleId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ModuleId { Int32 Value }`). — Lecture.cs:19
  • `Lecture.ResourceId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ResourceId { String Value }`). — Lecture.cs:24
  • `Module.CourseId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { Int32 Value }`). — Module.cs:19
  • `CourseCategory.CourseId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { Int32 Value }`). — CourseCategory.cs:7
  • `CourseCategory.CategoryId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CategoryId { Int32 Value }`). — CourseCategory.cs:9
  • `Instructor.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Instructor.cs:21
  • `Learner.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — Learner.cs:22
  • `LearnerCourseProgress.LearnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LearnerId { String Value }`). — LearnerCourseProgress.cs:6
  • `LearnerCourseProgress.CourseId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { Int32 Value }`). — LearnerCourseProgress.cs:7
  • `LectureResource.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrganizationId { String Value }`). — LectureResource.cs:24
  • `LectureResource.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — LectureResource.cs:25
  • `LectureResource.ModuleId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ModuleId { String Value }`). — LectureResource.cs:26
  • `LectureResource.LectureId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LectureId { String Value }`). — LectureResource.cs:27
  • `BookmarkedCourse.LearnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct LearnerId { String Value }`). — BookmarkedCourse.cs:5
  • `BookmarkedCourse.CourseId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CourseId { String Value }`). — BookmarkedCourse.cs:6
  • 13 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 53.

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `BaseAuditEntity` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. (×2) — BaseEntity.cs:15, BaseEntity.cs:28
  • `CourseCategory` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. (×2) — CourseCategory.cs:5, CourseCategory.cs:6
  • `Instructor` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Instructor.cs:3
  • `Learner` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Learner.cs:4
  • `BookmarkedCourse` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — BookmarkedCourse.cs:3
  • `Instructor` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Instructor.cs:3
  • `Learner` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Learner.cs:3

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `BaseAuditEntity` exposes public setter(s) (CreatedBy, CreatedAt, LastModifiedBy, LastModifiedAt, Version). (×2) — BaseEntity.cs:15, BaseEntity.cs:28

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `BaseIntegrationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BaseIntegrationEvent.cs:5

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `CreateCategoryCommandHandler.AddTheNewCategoryToRepository` writes to the database while `AzureServiceBusEventsListener.MessageHandler` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateCategory.cs:97

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `OnActionExecuting` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. (×2) — ErrorResponseFilter.cs:29, ErrorResponseFilter.cs:30
  • `ExecuteAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — RabbitMqIntegrationEventBroker.cs:55
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — IEmailService.cs:5, Index.cshtml.cs:21, Helpers.cs:16
  • `OnGet` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. (×5) — AccessDenied.cshtml.cs:7, Index.cshtml.cs:26, PasswordResetRequestSent.cshtml.cs:7, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 16 of 16 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 10/12 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 232/353 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — AzureServiceBusEventsListener.cs:40, UserScopeMiddleware.cs:18, RabbitMqIntegrationEventListener.cs:74, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 11/13 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~1.0 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health83%StrongSolid.
Architecture82%StrongSolid.
Maturity51%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness31%Weak — gated by D13, P3, P5, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security62%Adequate — gated by D30, D36, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling47%Weak — gated by DM1, DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven91%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility47%Weak — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 30 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 40 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×18
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:12 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:16 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:21 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:25 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:11 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:15 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:12 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:16 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:21 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:25 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:11 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:15 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:12 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/WebApi.Startup.csproj:16 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:21 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/CourseManagement.csproj:25 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:11 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/IdentityProvider.WebApi.csproj:15 — 1591
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×10
  • High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.4 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 11 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Yarp.ReverseProxy 1.1.0 — Yarp.ReverseProxy 1.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.0 — AutoMapper 12.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×5
  • High IaC: DS-0002 IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Server/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 nginx/nginx.Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×3
  • Leaked secret: private-key nginx/web.key:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key nginx/idp.key:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key nginx/api.key:1 — private-key detected.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×3
  • Secret: private-key nginx/api.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key nginx/idp.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key nginx/web.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 39 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×9
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.2 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: IdentityModel — IdentityModel 6.1.0-preview.1 — Legacy Duende.IdentityModel >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore — Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore 2.21.0 — Other
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.2.5 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Duende.BFF — Duende.BFF 2.0.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Duende.BFF.Yarp — Duende.BFF.Yarp 2.0.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Blazored.Video — Blazored.Video 1.0.1 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Duende.IdentityServer.AspNetIdentity — Duende.IdentityServer.AspNetIdentity 6.2.3 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Duende.IdentityServer.EntityFramework — Duende.IdentityServer.EntityFramework 6.2.3 — Legacy
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Duende.AccessTokenManagement 1.0.0 — Duende.AccessTokenManagement 1.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Duende.IdentityServer 6.2.3 — Duende.IdentityServer 6.2.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:129 — SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:129-145 | SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:96-112
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:160 — SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:160-176 | SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:127-143
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Resources/Src/Infrastructure/Data/ResourcesDbContext.cs:53 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Resources/Src/Infrastructure/Data/ResourcesDbContext.cs:53-68 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Infrastructure/Data/LearningDbContext.cs:66-82
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: WebClient — WebClient: abstractness 0.04, instability 0.00, distance 0.96 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Shared.WebApi — Shared.WebApi: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.11, distance 0.72 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: CourseManagement — CourseManagement: abstractness 0.01, instability 0.29, distance 0.70 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/MediatR/Pipelines/RequestValidationBehavior.cs:24 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/MediatR/Pipelines/RequestValidationBehavior.cs:24-37 | IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/MediatR/RequestValidationBehavior.cs:24-38
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/EventHandlers/Instructors/UserAddedHandler.cs:30 — SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/EventHandlers/Instructors/UserAddedHandler.cs:30-44 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Infrastructure/EventHandlers/Instructors/UserAddedHandler.cs:30-44
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:9 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:9-16 | IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:10-17
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:31 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:31-38 | IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/RoutePrefixConvention.cs:32-39
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1125.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Index.OnPost (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • Index.OnPost (cognitive 22) IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/Login/Index.cshtml.cs:58 — Index.OnPost has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SeedData.EnsureSeedData (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • SeedData.EnsureSeedData (cognitive 17) IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/Data/SeedData.cs:13 — SeedData.EnsureSeedData has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GetAllCoursesSpec.GetAllCoursesSpec.ctor (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • GetAllCoursesSpec.GetAllCoursesSpec.ctor (cognitive 16) SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Features/Courses/Queries/GetAllCourses.cs:106 — GetAllCoursesSpec.GetAllCoursesSpec.ctor has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: Index.razor › __RazorCode_Index_1 SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Administration/Organization/UI/Index.razor:0 — TooManyMethods — 0 lines, 35 methods.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 nginx/nginx.Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs:62 — SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs:62-75 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Resources/Src/Infrastructure/Data/ResourcesDbContext.cs:48-61 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Infrastructure/Data/LearningDbContext.cs:61-74
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/ErrorsController.cs:32 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Presentation/WebApi/ErrorsController.cs:32-44 | IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/WebApi/Controllers/ErrorsController.cs:26-39
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusEventsListener.cs:67 — SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Infrastructure/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusEventsListener.cs:67-78 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Resources/Src/Infrastructure/VideoDurationCalculator/VideoDurationCalculatorListenerService.cs:53-64
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/CourseDetail/UI/General/GeneralComponent.razor:155 — SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/CourseDetail/UI/General/GeneralComponent.razor:155-165 | SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/CourseDetail/UI/General/GeneralComponent.razor:178-188
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:114 — SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/Learning/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:114-120 | SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Client/CourseManagement/Courses/UI/FiltersComponent.razor:82-88
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs:44 — SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Infrastructure/Data/CourseManagementDbContext.cs:44-48 | SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Infrastructure/Data/LearningDbContext.cs:43-47
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: Course (LCOM4 6) SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Domain/Courses/Course.cs:8 — Course's methods form 6 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 17 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×4
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 SolenLmsApp/Api/Startup/WebApi/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 SolenLmsApp/WebClient/Server/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 nginx/nginx.Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability · No tests discovered · ×1
  • No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 38 commit(s) sampled).
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `WebApi.Startup` with 10 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 94 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 12k LoC across 16 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/DI/OpenApi.cs:29 — "add the FluentValidationSchemaProcessor as a scoped service" — trim - AddOpenApi comment already states this; keep only the link to docs if it adds intent
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split WebClient · ×1
  • Split WebClient — A generic WebClient name that is huge and sprawls over 17 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: HttpClient, Authentication, Caching, Streaming
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (38 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
Info — 69 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×66
  • Outdated: AutoFixture — AutoFixture 4.18.0 → 4.18.1 available.
  • Outdated: AutoFixture.Xunit2 — AutoFixture.Xunit2 4.18.0 → 4.18.1 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 3.2.0 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 6.10.0 → 8.10.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing 7.0.20 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite 7.0.20 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.5.0 → 18.7.0 available.
  • Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.18.4 → 4.20.72 available.
  • Outdated: System.Net.Http.Json — System.Net.Http.Json 7.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Testcontainers — Testcontainers 2.4.0 → 4.12.0 available.
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.2 → 2.9.3 available.
  • Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.4.5 → 3.1.5 available.
  • Outdated: Ardalis.Specification — Ardalis.Specification 6.1.0 → 9.3.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.5.1 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: Hashids.net — Hashids.net 1.6.1 → 1.7.0 available.
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.0.1 → 14.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus — Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus 7.12.0 → 7.20.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.5.1 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: IdentityModel — IdentityModel 6.1.0-preview.1 → Not available.
  • Outdated: MicroElements.Swashbuckle.FluentValidation — MicroElements.Swashbuckle.FluentValidation 5.7.0 → 7.1.7 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore — Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.AspNetCore 2.21.0 → 3.1.2 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 7.0.20 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: NSwag.AspNetCore — NSwag.AspNetCore 13.18.2 → 14.7.1 available.
  • Outdated: RabbitMQ.Client — RabbitMQ.Client 6.4.0 → 7.2.1 available.
  • Outdated: Scrutor — Scrutor 4.2.1 → 7.0.0 available.
  • + 41 more in this group — see findings.md.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — Shared.Tests references Moq.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1
  • Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 2 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic — an SDK / target-framework / restore mismatch in the analyzer environment, not a code defect (common for an older codebase whose target framework the analyzer's SDK can't build). Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped; the C# semantic analysis loads independently and is unaffected.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .3artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list SolenLmsSolution.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json17artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .10artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0—

Run 019f155e-a22e-7839-8a96-f7a2402912a9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 37 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 20 field(s)
  • User.GivenName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/Domain/Entities/User.cs:27
  • User.FamilyName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/Domain/Entities/User.cs:28
  • User.FullName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/Domain/Entities/User.cs:33
  • AddUserCommand.FamilyName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:8
  • AddUserCommand.GivenName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:9
  • UserForGetUsersQueryResult.GivenName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Queries/GetUsersQueryResult.cs:16
  • UserForGetUsersQueryResult.FamilyName IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Queries/GetUsersQueryResult.cs:17
  • InputModel.GivenName IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/OrganizationRegistration/InputModel.cs:10
  • InputModel.FamilyName IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/OrganizationRegistration/InputModel.cs:15
  • RegistrationInput.GivenName IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/UserRegistration/PasswordInput.cs:11
  • RegistrationInput.FamilyName IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/UserRegistration/PasswordInput.cs:16
  • Instructor.GivenName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:23
  • Instructor.FamilyName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:24
  • Instructor.FullName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:25
  • Learner.GivenName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Learners/Learner.cs:23
  • Learner.FamilyName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Learners/Learner.cs:24
  • Learner.FullName SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Learners/Learner.cs:26
  • Instructor.GivenName SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:15
  • Instructor.FamilyName SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:16
  • Instructor.FullName SolenLmsApp/Api/Learning/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:17
Email — 17 field(s)
  • AddUserCommand.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:7
  • DeleteUserCommand.UserEmail IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Commands/DeleteUser/DeleteUserCommand.cs:7
  • RegenerateRegistrationCodeCommand.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Commands/RegenerateRegistrationCode/RegenerateRegistrationCodeCommand.cs:7
  • UserForGetUsersQueryResult.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Core/UseCases/Users/Queries/GetUsersQueryResult.cs:18
  • AccountService._emailService IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/Services/AccountService.cs:22
  • EmailBackgroundService._emailSettings IdentityProvider/Src/Infrastructure/Services/EmailBackgroundService.cs:18
  • InputModel.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/Login/InputModel.cs:13
  • Index._emailService IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/OrganizationRegistration/Index.cshtml.cs:11
  • InputModel.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/OrganizationRegistration/InputModel.cs:32
  • IndexModel._emailService IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/PasswordResetRequest/Index.cshtml.cs:11
  • IndexModel.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/PasswordResetRequest/Index.cshtml.cs:18
  • InputModel.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/ResendConfirmationEmail/InputModel.cs:11
  • ResetPasswordInput.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/ResetPassword/ResetPasswordInput.cs:23
  • IndexModel._emailService IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/UserActivation/Index.cshtml.cs:12
  • RegistrationInput.Email IdentityProvider/Src/Presentation/Web/Pages/Account/UserRegistration/PasswordInput.cs:34
  • Instructor.Email SolenLmsApp/Api/CourseManagement/Src/Domain/Instructors/Instructor.cs:22
  • UserAdded.Email SolenLmsApp/Api/Shared/Core/Events/IdentityProvider/UserAdded.cs:8

Issues: 40 · Warnings: 39 · Recommendations: 17 · Info: 69 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-06-2026 @ 21:52 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md