Public report — ionic-framework, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 18:49 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Ionic-Team/ionic-Framework

44% At Risk

Medium · 66,873 LoC · rebuild ~0.7 person-years · weakest lens: Architecture (35%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

39/41dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
75findings with an exact file:lineof 88 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
41/112dimensions across the health lenses66873 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ionic-team/ionic-framework carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Architecture (35%) — the code resists change, so features cost more over time. Readiness (46%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: listed violations: import through public entries (package… (Import Boundaries); Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module… (Circular Imports); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Medium (~66,873 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.7 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Architecture 35% · 46% weightReadiness 46% · 25% weightSecurity 51% · 14% weightMaturity 54% · 8% weightCode Health 59% · 4% weightAccessibility 64% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Architecture 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~52.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (41+)

41 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D35 · Change coupling: datetime-button.tsx ↔ datetime.tsx core/src/components/datetime-button/datetime-button.tsx
  • D36 · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
  • D36 · Secret passed as a command-line argument
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/vue-router/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/vue-router/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json
  • R10 · Duplicated block (33 lines × 3 locations) core/src/components/col/col.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (32 lines × 3 locations) core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 26, cognitive 35) core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 33) core/src/components/input-otp/input-otp.tsx
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24, cognitive 32) core/src/utils/transition/ios.transition.ts
  • R2 · Complex function setDateTimeText (cyclomatic 21, cognitive 23) core/src/components/datetime-button/datetime-button.tsx
  • R4 · No test reaches this file core/src/components/refresher/refresher.tsx
  • R7 · Dead file (~1715 LoC) core/src/components/modal/modal.tsx
  • R7 · Dead file (~1332 LoC) core/src/components/select/select.tsx
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@angular-eslint/template-parser'
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@angular/compiler'
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@angular/compiler-cli'

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €36,000–€180,000
Cost to rebuild€36,000–€180,000 (0.4–1.1 person-years (592–1,878 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 44% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code~45853 LoC unreachable (230 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€110,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Architecture at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
+8.1 pts · Medium effort · Import Boundaries
2
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
+8.1 pts · Medium effort · Circular Imports
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+3.1 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Architecture at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.7 person-years rebuild (66,873 LoC) · weakest lens: Architecture 35%
→ Direct remediation budget at Architecture first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.

At a glance — Code Health · 59% · Adequate · gated by R7

At a glance — Architecture · 35% · Weak · gated by R11, R9

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 46% · Weak · gated by R8

At a glance — Security · 51% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 64% · Adequate · gated by AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection16High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures3High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, fix the 11 boundary violations by ensuring all imports go through public entry points and never reach into internal layers. Next, break the six import cycles by extracting shared logic into a module that both sides can import. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for the 42.9% of production files currently unreachable from the test suite. Finally, clean up the dependency list by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring unlisted imports, and demoting type- and test-only packages to dev dependencies. Lastly, implement proper versioning in your build or package manifest to ensure all releases are traceable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.+8.1 ptsMediumImport Boundaries
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.+8.1 ptsMediumCircular Imports
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+3.1 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+3.1 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+3.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+1.4 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ios.transition.ts, nav.tsx, utils.ts.+0.7 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+1.2 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 20 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 20% slop · 70% mixed · 10% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
core/package-lock.json0.0SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
package-lock.json0.0SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/angular-server/package-lock.json1.3SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/react/package-lock.json2.7SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/stencil-nightly.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/actions/publish-npm/action.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/release-orchestrator.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
packages/vue-router/package-lock.json5.1MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/angular/package-lock.json5.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/demos/conference-app/angular/src/index.html7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: gcp-api-key
demos/slides/index.ts7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: flickr-access-token
.github/workflows/actions/build-core-stencil-prerelease/action.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/actions/build-core/action.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/actions/download-archive/action.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/actions/upload-archive/action.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/nightly.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
.github/workflows/release.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
core/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
core/src/components/modal/modal-interface.ts8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: modal-interface.ts ↔ popover-interface.ts
core/src/components/datetime-button/datetime-button.tsx8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: datetime-button.tsx ↔ datetime.tsx

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 39 of 41 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 41 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 75 of 88 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf35-da05-768f-ae8e-f375c8c3e860.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 10 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx (4×26=104)

Hotspot: core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsxcore/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/react/src/components/createInlineOverlayComponent.tsx.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This project's documentation is strong and well-structured: a single README with an aligned architecture/Docs markdown set gives complete coverage of each section in the outline. The main docs are a cohesive developer-resources page that covers What is Ionic Framework?, Guides (contributing, component guide, Sass, shadow parts), Packages, and links to all outlined sections; there is also a dedicated @ionic/core README covering features, usage, framework bindings, and custom elements build, plus Vue-specific documentation. The README itself is clear but slightly thin on the front lines.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — This project's documentation is strong and well-structured: a single README with an aligned architecture/Docs markdown set gives complete coverage of each section in the outline. The main docs are a cohesive developer-resources page that covers What is Ionic Framework?, Guides (contributing, component guide, Sass, shadow parts), Packages, and links to all outlined sections; there is also a dedicated @ionic/core README covering features, usage, framework bindings, and custom elements build, plus Vue-specific documentation. The README itself is clear but slightly thin on the front lines.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: gcp-api-key · ×2packages/demos/conference-app/angular/src/index.html:11detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with index.html, index.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: run-shell-injection · ×16.github/actions/publish-npm/action.yml:40detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yml (7), stencil-nightly.yml (4), release-orchestrator.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002core/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

112 of 185 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is core/src/utils/transition/ios.transition.ts.

Largest orphaned file · ×3core/src/utils/transition/ios.transition.ts
Concentrated knowledge decay

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ios.transition.ts, nav.tsx, utils.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: modal-interface.ts↔popover-interface.ts 59%; datetime-button.tsx↔datetime.tsx 50%

Change coupling: modal-interface.ts ↔ popover-interface.ts · ×2core/src/components/modal/modal-interface.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
Secret passed as a command-line argument
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

50 finding(s): 5 critical, 27 high, 15 medium, 3 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×27packages/angular-server/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5core/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×14packages/react/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]packages/angular-server/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3core/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 27 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (27). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — accordion.tsx:519, popover.tsx:759
  • A click handler on a plain element with no role and no tabindex: even where another element's key handler can reach it, assistive tech can neither focus it nor announce what it is. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0". (×3) — checkbox.tsx:387, input.tsx:907, toggle.tsx:503

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

  • aria-hidden="true" hides the element from assistive tech but leaves it keyboard-focusable — a confusing dead stop. Remove aria-hidden or make the element non-focusable. (×8) — action-sheet.tsx:617, action-sheet.tsx:667, alert.tsx:848, …
  • aria-labelledby is present but empty, so it references no element and the relationship is lost. Point it at the id(s) of the target element, or remove it. — input.tsx:733

What to do

  • Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • a11y checks run in tests (Verified) but aren't gated in CI — wire axe/pa11y/Lighthouse into the pipeline so an a11y regression blocks the merge (Prevented).

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 74 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 4 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.7 pts.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • core/src/components/checkbox/checkbox.tsx:87 · core/src/components/toggle/toggle.tsx:105 — checkbox.tsx:87
  • packages/angular/test/apps/ng16/src/app/lazy/version-test/modal-nav-params/modal-nav-params.component.ts:5 · packages/angular/test/apps/ng17/src/app/lazy/version-test/modal-nav-params/modal-nav-params.component.ts:5 · packages/angular/test/apps/ng18/src/app/lazy/version-test/modal-nav-params/modal-nav-params.component.ts:5 — modal-nav-params.component.ts:5
  • core/src/components/input-otp/input-otp.tsx:136 · core/src/components/input/input.tsx:311 — input-otp.tsx:136
  • core/src/components/card/card.tsx:44 · core/src/components/fab-button/fab-button.tsx:43 — card.tsx:44
  • packages/angular/standalone/src/directives/input-otp.ts:91 · packages/angular/standalone/src/directives/input.ts:113 — input-otp.ts:91
  • core/src/components/breadcrumb/breadcrumb.tsx:49 · core/src/components/fab-button/fab-button.tsx:38 — breadcrumb.tsx:49
  • core/src/components/col/col.tsx:22 · core/src/components/col/col.tsx:64 · core/src/components/col/col.tsx:102 — col.tsx:22
  • core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx:503 · core/src/components/range/range.tsx:298 · core/src/components/searchbar/searchbar.tsx:215 — datetime.tsx:503

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • packages/react/src/components/IonPage.tsx:4 reaches into another package with a relative path (../routing/PageManager) — import the package by name instead. — IonPage.tsx:4
  • packages/react/src/components/IonRouterOutlet.tsx:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (../routing/OutletPageManager) — import the package by name instead. — IonRouterOutlet.tsx:5
  • packages/react/src/components/navigation/IonTabs.tsx:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../routing/PageManager) — import the package by name instead. — IonTabs.tsx:6
  • packages/react/src/index.ts:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (./routing) — import the package by name instead. — index.ts:5
  • packages/react/src/routing/NavManager.tsx:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (../components/IonRouterContext) — import the package by name instead. — NavManager.tsx:5
  • packages/react/src/routing/NavManager.tsx:7 reaches into another package with a relative path (../contexts/NavContext) — import the package by name instead. — NavManager.tsx:7
  • packages/react/src/routing/OutletPageManager.tsx:4 reaches into another package with a relative path (../components/inner-proxies) — import the package by name instead. — OutletPageManager.tsx:4
  • packages/react/src/routing/OutletPageManager.tsx:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (../contexts/IonLifeCycleContext) — import the package by name instead. — OutletPageManager.tsx:5

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — range.tsx:1084, router.ts:213, input-otp.tsx:615, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — datetime.tsx, modal.tsx, select.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 1 file(s) (~2 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — custom-elements
  • 2 file(s) (~88 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — angular-server
  • 3 file(s) (~93 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — ng16
  • Unreachable from the 40 application, 43 tooling and 912 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (40 application, 43 tooling, 912 test roots considered) (×4) — datetime.tsx, modal.tsx, select.tsx, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — toHaveReceivedEventDetail.ts:2, app.server.module.ts:2, server.ts:3
  • Declared in packages/angular/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • core/src/utils/transition/index.ts → core/src/utils/transition/ios.transition.ts → core/src/utils/transition/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/angular/common/src/directives/navigation/router-outlet.ts → packages/angular/common/src/directives/navigation/stack-controller.ts → packages/angular/common/src/providers/nav-controller.ts → packages/angular/common/src/directives/navigation/router-outlet.ts — router-outlet.ts
  • packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/keep-contents-mounted/index.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/keep-contents-mounted/keep-contents-mounted.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/keep-contents-mounted/keep-contents-mounted-routing.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/keep-contents-mounted/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-dynamic-wrapper/index.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-dynamic-wrapper/modal-dynamic-wrapper.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-dynamic-wrapper/modal-dynamic-wrapper-routing.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-dynamic-wrapper/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-inline/index.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-inline/modal-inline.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-inline/modal-inline-routing.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-inline/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-sheet-inline/index.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-sheet-inline/modal-sheet-inline.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-sheet-inline/modal-sheet-inline-routing.module.ts → packages/angular/test/base/src/app/lazy/modal-sheet-inline/index.ts — index.ts

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health59%Adequate — gated by R7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture35%Weak — gated by R11, R9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity54%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness46%Weak — gated by R8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security51%Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility64%Adequate — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~51951 lines of test source are present (.ts, .tsx, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts, .tsx, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source carries this repository's product — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from EF Core usage in .NET source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 51 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×27
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — @angular/common 16.2.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 20.3.25. This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 16.2.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open, so 20.3.25 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of @angular/common 16.2.12 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler 16.2.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.18. This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 16.2.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open, so 20.3.25 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of @angular/compiler 16.2.12 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — @angular/core 16.2.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.19. This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 16.2.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open, so 20.3.25 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of @angular/core 16.2.12 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server 16.2.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.21. This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/platform-server 16.2.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 19.2.25 still leaves at least one of them open, so 19.2.25 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/platform-server 16.2.12 clears all 6 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.1.16 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 8 lockfiles) One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.11 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry). (in 8 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — flatted 3.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.4.2 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of flatted 3.2.5 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — glob 10.4.2: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — http-cache-semantics 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — http-cache-semantics is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-cache-semantics to 4.1.1 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — immutable 4.3.6: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 4.3.9 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 4.3.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.9 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.3.9 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of immutable 4.3.6 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — ini 1.3.5: [GHSA redacted] — ini is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ini to 1.3.6 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ip 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace ip if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of ip 2.0.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.15.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 6 lockfiles) One upgrade of js-yaml 3.14.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — json5 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 1.0.2 with an `overrides` entry). (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.18.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of lodash 4.17.21 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.1.4 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of minimatch 3.0.4 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — path-to-regexp 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.3.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). (in 8 lockfiles) One upgrade of picomatch 2.3.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — piscina 4.6.1: [GHSA redacted] — piscina is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin piscina to 4.9.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — postcss 7.0.35: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.35, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.35; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of postcss 7.0.35 clears all 6 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — rollup 2.35.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.79.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against rollup 2.35.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.80.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.80.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of rollup 2.35.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — semver 5.7.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.7.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular/package-lock.json — sigstore 1.9.0: [GHSA redacted] — sigstore is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.9.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.9.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — tmp 0.0.33: [GHSA redacted] — tmp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tmp to 0.2.6 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against tmp 0.0.33, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 0.2.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 lockfiles) One upgrade of tmp 0.0.33 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×16
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/publish-npm/action.yml:40 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/publish-npm/action.yml:44 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/publish-npm/action.yml:57 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/actions/build-core-stencil-prerelease/action.yml:22 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/actions/build-core/action.yml:23 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/actions/download-archive/action.yml:18 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/actions/upload-archive/action.yml:14 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/nightly.yml:37 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release-orchestrator.yml:61 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release-orchestrator.yml:69 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release-orchestrator.yml:77 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/release.yml:76 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/stencil-nightly.yml:235 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/stencil-nightly.yml:240 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/stencil-nightly.yml:251 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/stencil-nightly.yml:256 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×5
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — @babel/traverse 7.17.3: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json — form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.0.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 lockfiles) One upgrade of form-data 4.0.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.7: [GHSA redacted] — handlebars is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin handlebars to 4.7.9 with an `overrides` entry). One upgrade of handlebars 4.7.7 clears all 8 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular/package-lock.json — minimist 1.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 1.2.6 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.11, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.11; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of tar 6.1.11 clears all 13 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: gcp-api-key packages/demos/conference-app/angular/src/index.html:11 — matched rule 'gcp-api-key'
  • Secret: flickr-access-token demos/slides/index.ts:16 — matched rule 'flickr-access-token'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 core/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
Warning — 20 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×14
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json — @adobe/css-tools 4.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — @adobe/css-tools is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @adobe/css-tools to 4.3.2 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — @babel/helpers 7.17.8: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @octokit/plugin-paginate-rest 4.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — @octokit/plugin-paginate-rest is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 9.2.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.3.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.3.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @octokit/request 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — @octokit/request is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.4.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @octokit/request-error 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — @octokit/request-error is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/react/package-lock.json — got 10.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — got is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.8.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 10.7.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 10.7.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — hosted-git-info 2.8.8: [GHSA redacted] — hosted-git-info is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin hosted-git-info to 2.8.9 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — micromatch 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin micromatch to 4.0.8 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — nanoid 3.3.7: [GHSA redacted] — nanoid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin nanoid to 3.3.8 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] packages/vue-router/package-lock.json — tough-cookie 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — tough-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tough-cookie to 4.1.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — word-wrap 1.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — word-wrap is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin word-wrap to 1.2.4 with an `overrides` entry). (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — yaml 1.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 1.10.3 with an `overrides` entry).
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2
  • Change coupling: modal-interface.ts ↔ popover-interface.ts core/src/components/modal/modal-interface.ts — `core/src/components/modal/modal-interface.ts` and `core/src/components/popover/popover-interface.ts` change together 59% of the time (10 of the 17 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: datetime-button.tsx ↔ datetime.tsx core/src/components/datetime-button/datetime-button.tsx — `core/src/components/datetime-button/datetime-button.tsx` and `core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx` change together 50% of the time (9 of the 18 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×1
  • Hotspot: core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx — core/src/components/datetime/datetime.tsx changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 26. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (conventional-commit.yml, build.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
  • Secret passed as a command-line argument — 4 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): stencil-nightly.yml: curl -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d '{"embeds": [{"title": "✅ Workflow ${{github.workflow}} #${{github.run_number}} finished successfully", "color": 65280, "url": "${{github.server_url}}/${{github.repository}}/actions/runs/${{github.run_id}}"}]}' ${{secrets.DISCORD_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK}}; stencil-nightly.yml: curl -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d '{"title": "✅ Workflow ${{github.workflow}} #${{github.run_number}} finished successfully", "url": "${{github.server_url}}/${{github.repository}}/actions/runs/${{github.run_id}}"}' ${{secrets.SLACK_NOTIFY_SUCCESS_WEBHOOK}}; stencil-nightly.yml: curl -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d '{"content": "Alerting <@&1347593178580254761>!", "embeds": [{"title": "❌ Workflow ${{github.workflow}} #${{github.run_number}} failed", "color": 16711680, "url": "${{github.server_url}}/${{github.repository}}/actions/runs/${{github.run_id}}"}]}' ${{secrets.DISCORD_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK}} …. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1
  • Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] packages/angular-server/package-lock.json — esbuild 0.19.12: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.25.0 with an `overrides` entry). (in 2 lockfiles)
Recommendation — 15 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×3
  • Largest orphaned file core/src/utils/transition/ios.transition.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file core/src/components/nav/nav.tsx — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file core/src/components/popover/utils.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×3
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — @babel/core 7.16.12: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — @tootallnate/once 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @tootallnate/once is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @tootallnate/once to 2.0.1 with an `overrides` entry). (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] core/package-lock.json — on-headers 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — on-headers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin on-headers to 1.1.0 with an `overrides` entry).
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts, .tsx, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 11 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: packages/react/src/components/createInlineOverlayComponent.tsx, packages/angular/common/src/providers/nav-controller.ts, packages/angular/common/src/providers/angular-delegate.ts, core/src/components/modal/safe-area-utils.ts, core/src/components/router/utils/dom.ts, packages/vue-router/src/viewStacks.ts, core/src/components/modal/animations/ios.transition.ts, packages/angular/common/src/directives/navigation/router-link-delegate.ts (+3 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 4 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (15 single-owned of 185 analysed files in total).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 112 of 185 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (85 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 112 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`npm sbom --sbom-format cyclonedx` (npm 9+) or `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` over the lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts, .tsx, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .16artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .1artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .50artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faf35-da05-768f-ae8e-f375c8c3e860 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md