hexagonal-architecture-acerola

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ivanpaulovich/hexagonal-architecture-acerola carries serious risk (38%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (28%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (29%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection).

For scale: Small (~2,812 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 73% Strong Architecture 74% Strong Maturity 55% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 28% Weak · gated by D12, P1, P3 Security 29% Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 28% · 47% weightSecurity 29% · 26% weightMaturity 55% · 14% weightCode Health 73% · 8% weightArchitecture 74% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 28 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 38 → ~47.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 15%Plumbing 68%Tests 17%

New since the last scan (2+)

2 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D8 · Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
D12 · Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €980–€4,800

Cost to rebuild	€980–€4,800 (0.1 person-years (16–51 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 38% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 47% boilerplate · 35% straight-line · 18% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 28% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+9.2 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+6.5 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+11.2 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 28%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,812 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 28%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Strong

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

The Bad

D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 5.7

The Ugly

X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0

At a glance — Architecture · 74% · Strong

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 8.9 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.5 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

The Bad

AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.1 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 5.3

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 3.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 28% · Weak · gated by D12, P1, P3

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0

The Bad

P2 · Repo Observability 5.5 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 6.0

The Ugly

D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 2.9 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 29% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 7.3

The Bad

S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 3.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	43	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	6	Medium

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds and tests every change to ensure code quality. Next, integrate automated security scanning into the build process to catch vulnerabilities early. Then, implement data encryption and strict access controls to protect sensitive information and enforce authorization. Finally, configure deployment health checks and rollback strategies to ensure safe and reliable releases.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+9.2 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+6.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+11.2 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+11.2 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+10.5 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.	+10.5 pts	Medium	Access Controls
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.	+10.3 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.	+10.0 pts	Medium	Observability

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 13 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 62% mixed · 38% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj	5.4	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj	5.4	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/CloseAccount/AccountsController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Deposit/AccountsController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/GetAccountDetails/AccountsController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/GetCustomerDetails/CustomersController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Register/CustomersController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Withdraw/AccountsController.cs	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
src/Acerola.Application/CustomerNotFoundException.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: CustomerNotFoundException
src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)
src/Acerola.Infrastructure/InMemoryDataAccess/Queries/AccountsQueries.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
test/Acerola.Domain.Tests/AccountTests.cs	9.3	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment
src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Module.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 47 of 49 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 49 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D39AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 22 of 103 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf46-d0fc-7ebb-b075-2d0ebd6ac0b6.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D19 Documentation Quality — evaluation did not complete — Documentation Quality not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs:78

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)src/Acerola.Infrastructure/InMemoryDataAccess/Queries/AccountsQueries.cs:41

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Acerola.Domain

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 14 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 test methods: 26 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 26 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene2.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

19 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 5 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: MongoDB.Driver · ×3

Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All · ×5

Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer

Outdated: Autofac · ×19

What to do

Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 20 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 2812 LoC (2.1/KLoC) → score 5.7.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×10src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10

Dead code: CustomerNotFoundExceptionsrc/Acerola.Application/CustomerNotFoundException.cs:3

What to do

Resolve the 10 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Acerola.WebApi.csproj (5), Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CustomerNotFoundException.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 projects, 111 source files, 3400 hand-written lines of code (2812 production / 588 test), 14 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 valuable / 3 redundant across 40 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×3src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Module.cs:12

What to do

Resolve the 3 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AccountTests.cs (2), Module.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 7 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

95 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 6 medium, 0 low.

Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×6src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/CloseAccount/AccountsController.cs:8detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 6 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AccountsController.cs (4), CustomersController.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 26 high, 15 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.4.4 · ×26detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.0-preview1-26216-02 · ×15detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level).
Resolve the 15 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 of 6 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 204 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

`Acerola.UseCases.Tests` is a Application project but references `Acerola.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

What to do

Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 1/2 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

EF Core is used but neither migrations nor EnsureCreated were detected — confirm how the production schema is created and evolved.

What to do

Adopt a versioned schema-migration mechanism (with EF Core: dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/6 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×6) — AccountsController.cs:22, AccountsController.cs:21, AccountsController.cs:24, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	73%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	74%	Strong	Strongest area.
Maturity	55%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	28%	Weak — gated by D12, P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	29%	Weak — gated by D30, C1, C2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 48 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D19 Documentation Quality — Documentation Quality not included (check did not complete)
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 2 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 41 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×26

High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.4.4 — MongoDB.Driver 2.4.4 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.19.0
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.0-preview1-26216-02 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.0-preview1-26216-02 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.6
High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.0.0 — System.Net.Security 4.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.0.0 — System.Net.Security 4.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.2
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.3
High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.0.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.1.22
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.HttpOverrides 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.HttpOverrides 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.2
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.4
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.1.39
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.2
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.1.25
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.1.40
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.OData 5.8.2 — Microsoft.Data.OData 5.8.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.8.4
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.4
High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.4.2
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.4.2
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
+ 1 more in this group — see findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×10

NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10 — 1701
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj:10 — 1701
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10 — 1702
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj:10 — 1702
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10 — 1705
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj:10 — 1705
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10 — NU1701
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj:10 — NU1701
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.WebApi/Acerola.WebApi.csproj:10 — CS1591
NoWarnInCsproj src/Acerola.Infrastructure/Acerola.Infrastructure.csproj:10 — CS1591

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3

Vulnerable: MongoDB.Driver — MongoDB.Driver 2.4.4 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.0.0, — ) severity. 2.0.0

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2

Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.6
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.5.1

Warning — 33 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×15

Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.0-preview1-26216-02 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.0-preview1-26216-02 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.5
Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.0.0 — System.Net.Security 4.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.0.0 — System.Net.Security 4.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.8
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.9
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Abstractions 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Abstractions 2.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.8 — Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.8 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.24
Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 1.0.0 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 1.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.3.0
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.1.4 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.7.0
Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.1

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×6

Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/CloseAccount/AccountsController.cs:8 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Deposit/AccountsController.cs:7 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/GetAccountDetails/AccountsController.cs:10 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/GetCustomerDetails/CustomersController.cs:11 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Register/CustomersController.cs:9 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Acerola.WebApi/UseCases/Withdraw/AccountsController.cs:7 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×5

Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.0.0, — ) 2.0.0 Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.RollingFile — Serilog.Sinks.RollingFile 3.3.0 — Legacy Serilog.Sinks.File >= 0.0.0
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.3.1 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost — Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost 2.0.0 — Other,Legacy

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×1

Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer resolves to 2.1.0-preview1-final, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.

D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1

dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — Every one of the 6 significant source file(s) was last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains, so there is no concentration to measure — the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1

Dead code: CustomerNotFoundException src/Acerola.Application/CustomerNotFoundException.cs:3 — NamedType CustomerNotFoundException — no references found in solution.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs:78 — src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs:78-95 | src/Acerola.Infrastructure/MongoDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs:72-89

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Acerola.Infrastructure/InMemoryDataAccess/Queries/AccountsQueries.cs:41 — src/Acerola.Infrastructure/InMemoryDataAccess/Queries/AccountsQueries.cs:41-54 | src/Acerola.Infrastructure/MongoDataAccess/Queries/AccountsQueries.cs:42-55

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: Acerola.Domain — Acerola.Domain: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces and real coverage will be read.

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×3

redundant comment src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Module.cs:12 — "Register all Types in MongoDataAccess namespace" — delete - the builder call already names the registration target
redundant comment test/Acerola.Domain.Tests/AccountTests.cs:14 — "Arrange" — delete - 'Arrange' is a boilerplate label restating this
redundant comment test/Acerola.Domain.Tests/AccountTests.cs:24 — "Assert" — delete - restates Act and Assert

D11 · Test Reliability · Test runner surfaced no tests · ×1

Test runner surfaced no tests — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 26 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation Quality not included (check did not complete) · ×1

Documentation Quality not included (check did not complete) — Documentation Quality could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 2812 LoC across 7 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 6 of 6 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs, src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs, src/Acerola.Infrastructure/MongoDataAccess/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs (and 3 more).

Info — 21 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×19

Outdated: Autofac — Autofac 4.6.0 → 9.3.1 available (referenced by Acerola.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 1.50.4 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by Acerola.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 2.1.0-preview1-final → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Acerola.Infrastructure).
Outdated: MongoDB.Driver — MongoDB.Driver 2.4.4 → 3.10.0 available (referenced by Acerola.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Autofac.Configuration — Autofac.Configuration 4.0.1 → 8.0.1 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Autofac.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Autofac.Extensions.DependencyInjection 4.2.0 → 11.0.2 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.0 → 2.2.8 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 2.6.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 2.1.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Serilog.Extensions.Logging — Serilog.Extensions.Logging 2.0.2 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 3.1.1 → 6.1.1 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.File — Serilog.Sinks.File 4.0.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 1.0.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 15.5.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by Acerola.Domain.Tests).
Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.3.1 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by Acerola.Domain.Tests).
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.3.1 → 3.1.5 available (referenced by Acerola.Domain.Tests).
Outdated: NSubstitute — NSubstitute 3.1.0 → 6.0.0 available (referenced by Acerola.UseCases.Tests).
Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 3.2.0 → 12.0.1 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost — Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost 2.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Acerola.WebApi.Tests).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1

Mock framework: NSubstitute — Acerola.UseCases.Tests references NSubstitute.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	6	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list Hexagonal-Architecture-Acerola.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	43	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019faf46-d0fc-7ebb-b075-2d0ebd6ac0b6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 4 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Government ID (SSN / passport / tax) — 4 field(s)

Customer.SSN src/Acerola.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:11
Customer.SSN src/Acerola.Infrastructure/DapperDataAccess/Entities/Customer.cs:9
Customer.SSN src/Acerola.Infrastructure/EntityFrameworkDataAccess/Entities/Customer.cs:9
Customer.SSN src/Acerola.Infrastructure/MongoDataAccess/Entities/Customer.cs:9

Ivanpaulovich/hexagonal-Architecture-Acerola

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 74% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 28% · Weak · gated by D12, P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 29% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts