Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
j5ik2o/cqrs-es-example-js is in good overall health (63%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (88%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (57%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (59%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Small (~4,707 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 57 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 63 → ~66.
New since the last scan (24+)
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 tools/migrate/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 Dockerfile
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 5 locations) packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) packages/rmu/src/group-chat-dao.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3 locations) packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) packages/command/interface-adaptor-impl/src/graphql/inputs.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3 locations) packages/command/interface-adaptor-impl/src/graphql/inputs.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) packages/query/interface-adaptor/src/graphql/outputs.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) packages/command/domain/.eslintrc.cjs
- R9 · Import cycle (2 files) packages/bootstrap/src/dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,500–€12,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,500–€12,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.9× (at 63% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
| Dead frontend code | ~100 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 57% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 30 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 14 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 10 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, enforce security by adding a SAST step to the CI pipeline to fail the build on vulnerabilities. Next, document disaster recovery procedures, including RTO/RPO and tested restore steps, to ensure data resilience. Then, expand test coverage by adding tests for unreached modules to improve reliability. After that, implement an approval gate before production promotion to control deployments. Finally, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +3.1 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +6.1 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +5.9 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (10), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3), renovate.json. | +3.4 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +3.4 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| pnpm-lock.yaml | 0.0 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile | 2.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0017 |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| pnpm-workspace.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies |
| tools/migrate/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| renovate.json | 7.2 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): High: renovate-missing-minimum-release-age |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 29 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 29 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 54 of 60 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
12 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
14 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (10), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3), renovate.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
30 finding(s): 1 critical, 14 high, 9 medium, 6 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
- Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 8 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims a 'Spanner read-model pipeline' but the evidence shows no Spanner project
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a 'Spanner read-model pipeline' but the evidence shows no Spanner project.
P1 · CI/CD gates
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
R1 · Type Safety
R10 · Code Duplication
- packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:234 · packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:302 · packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:372 · packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:444 · +1 more site(s) not listed — all 5 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — group-chat-events.ts:234
- packages/rmu/src/apply-read-model.ts:36 · packages/rmu/src/apply-read-model.ts:52 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — apply-read-model.ts:36
- packages/rmu/src/group-chat-dao.ts:123 · packages/rmu/src/group-chat-dao.ts:196 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — group-chat-dao.ts:123
- packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:393 · packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:465 · packages/command/domain/src/group-chat/group-chat-events.ts:537 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — group-chat-events.ts:393
- packages/command/interface-adaptor-impl/src/graphql/inputs.ts:8 · packages/command/interface-adaptor-impl/src/graphql/outputs.ts:5 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — inputs.ts:8
- packages/command/interface-adaptor-impl/src/graphql/inputs.ts:36 · packages/query/interface-adaptor/src/graphql/outputs.ts:9 · packages/query/interface-adaptor/src/graphql/outputs.ts:30 — the 3 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — inputs.ts:36
- packages/query/interface-adaptor/src/graphql/outputs.ts:6 · packages/query/interface-adaptor/src/graphql/outputs.ts:27 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — outputs.ts:6
- packages/command/domain/.eslintrc.cjs:8 · packages/command/interface-adaptor-if/.eslintrc.cjs:8 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — .eslintrc.cjs:8
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×5) — spanner-change-stream-lowlevel.verify.test.ts:176, spanner-change-stream-reader.ts:83, dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts:265, …
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts, group-chat-command-processor.ts, write-api-main.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 13 application, 10 tooling and 17 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (13 application, 10 tooling, 17 test roots considered) (×2) — spanner-rmu-handler.ts, dynamodb-lambda-rmu-handler.ts
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — dynamodb-lambda-rmu-handler.ts:2
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
- packages/bootstrap/src/dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts → packages/bootstrap/src/index.ts → packages/bootstrap/src/dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 6 files) — dynamodb-local-rmu-main.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 86% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 88% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 66% | Adequate — gated by D16 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 57% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 59% | Adequate — gated by D29, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 83 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1803 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 32 finding(s)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:12
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:13
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:16
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:34
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:35
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:39
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:57
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:58
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:61
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:65
- High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- High: pnpm-minimum-release-age pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- High: pnpm-trust-policy pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- High: renovate-missing-minimum-release-age renovate.json:12
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High IaC: DS-0017 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 tools/migrate/Dockerfile
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
Warning — 15 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile:3
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 tools/migrate/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 Dockerfile:1
- LLM evaluation failed
Recommendation — 11 finding(s)
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 tools/dynamodb-setup/Dockerfile
- Test reliability not included
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 14 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 10 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 30 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |