Public report — NorthwindTraders, published 19 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 19-06-2026 @ 21:47 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Jasontaylordev/NorthwindTraders

coverage not measuredbounded contexts not declared
50% At Risk
Event-Driven 84% Healthy Architecture 73% Healthy Accessibility 69% Fair Code Health 63% Fair Maturity 61% Fair Security 44% Poor Readiness 43% Poor

Medium · 20,904 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (43%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

72/76dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
95findings with an exact file:lineof 119 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
76/105dimensions across the health lenses20904 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

jasontaylordev/NorthwindTraders carries serious risk (50%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (43%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (44%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); policy-based authorization (Access Controls).

For scale: Medium (~20,904 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 63% Fair · gated by X5 Architecture 73% Healthy Maturity 61% Fair · gated by M2 Readiness 43% Poor · gated by R4, P3 Security 44% Poor · gated by D33, D36, C1 Event-Driven 84% Healthy Accessibility 69% Fair
Code composition — where the lines go Plumbing-heavy — business logic is 2% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 1%Plumbing 81%Tests 4%Generated 14%
New since the last scan (12+)

12 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-06-18) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Common Src/Common/Common.csproj
  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Domain Src/Domain/Domain.csproj
  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Application Src/Application/Application.csproj
  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure Src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj
  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: Persistence Src/Persistence/Persistence.csproj
  • D19 · Low XML-doc coverage: WebUI Src/WebUI/WebUI.csproj
  • D28 · Secret: aws-access-token Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs
  • D28 · Secret: aws-access-token Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs
  • R4 · No test reaches this file Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/test.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/app.routing.module.ts
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: CreateCustomer.Handler.Handle Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: CreateProduct.CreateProductCommandHandler.Handle Src/Application/Products/Commands/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommandHandler.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€53,000
Cost to rebuild€11,000–€53,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (176–558 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 50% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 10% boilerplate · 89% straight-line · 2% branching logic
Dead frontend code~31 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€32,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.7) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
+2.9 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation
2
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
+2.5 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection
3
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
+1.8 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 43%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (20,904 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 43%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+13.2 pts/run over 4 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +13.2 pts/run over 4 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 50 ▲ 6 over 4 runs.

025507510018 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityAccessibility

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Application Application Common Common Application->Common Domain Domain Application->Domain Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure->Application Infrastructure->Common Persistence Persistence Persistence->Application Persistence->Common Persistence->Infrastructure WebUI WebUI WebUI->Common WebUI->Infrastructure WebUI->Persistence

At a glance — Code Health · 63% · Fair · gated by X5

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.8 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.9 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.2 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.7 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 9.5 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 8.7 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.6 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.2 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 5.1
The Ugly
X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Healthy

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.2 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D22 · .NET / C# Internal API Consistency 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 8.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.5 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 9.8 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.4 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 5.5
The Ugly
AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Fair · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.5 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 6.5
The Ugly
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 2.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 43% · Poor · gated by R4, P3

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 8.6 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0
The Bad
D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 5.6 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P2 · Repo Observability 6.5 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 6.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 3.5

At a glance — Security · 44% · Poor · gated by D33, D36, C1

The Good
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Bad
C2 · Repo Access Controls 5.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.5
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 4.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 84% · Healthy

The Good
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 10.0
The Bad
ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 6.3

At a glance — Accessibility · 69% · Fair

The Good
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 10.0 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Bad
AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.3
The Ugly
AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures4High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by establishing an ADR log to document significant architectural decisions and their rationale. Next, implement data protection by encrypting sensitive data at rest and managing keys in a secure vault, or rely on infrastructure-level encryption if applicable. Add policy-based authorization to enforce access controls, and enforce accessibility standards through tooling and CI gates. Finally, ensure proper page structure by declaring language, titles, and landmarks to improve semantic correctness.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+2.9 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+2.5 ptsMediumData Protection
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.+1.8 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.+1.7 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+0.7 ptsLowADR Quality
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+1.4 ptsMediumPage structure
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.+1.3 ptsMediumOutbox / dual-write
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+1.3 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 25 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 16% mixed · 80% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs1.2SlopSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json4.4MixedJS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [CVE redacted]
Src/Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts7.4MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts ↔ ProductsController.cs
Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs7.8MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: CustomersController.cs ↔ ProductsController.cs
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Categories/GetCategoryList.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: ReturnsSuccessResult
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Create.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: GivenCreateCustomerCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Delete.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: GivenId_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Update.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: GivenUpdateCustomerCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Products/Delete.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: GivenId_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode
Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Products/Update.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: GivenUpdateProductCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode
Src/Common/Common.csproj8.0Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Common
Src/Application/Employees/Commands/DeleteEmployee/DeleteEmployeeCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
Src/Application/Products/Commands/DeleteProduct/DeleteProductCommandHandler.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
Src/Application/Products/Queries/GetProductsList/GetProductsListQueryHandler.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandValidator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)
Src/Domain/Domain.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Domain
Src/Application/Application.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Application
Src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure
Src/Persistence/Persistence.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Persistence

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 76 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D33D34D35D36D38AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 95 of 119 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementQwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019ee1da-a180-727d-9b06-09c57aa6ff97.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct, and component-wrapped fields (e.g. a <TextField>) are skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — only literal inline colours and in-repo <style>-block CSS are read; external stylesheets, CSS-in-JS, computed/runtime/theme colour, and image contrast are all out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the markup itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (7): D19, D20, D21, D22, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.csSrc/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:0
ClassTooLong: SampleDataSeederSrc/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (7 lines × 11)Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:651
Duplicated block (7 lines × 4)Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:611
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandValidator.cs:9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Domain

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 test methods: 22 unit, 19 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality5.6 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 6 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 41 tests.

No assertions: ReturnsSuccessResult · ×6Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Categories/GetCategoryList.cs:16
Mock framework: Moq · ×2

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with Delete.cs (2), Update.cs (2), Create.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialSrc/Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:52

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with DependencyInjection.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 36 packages use a banned license.

Licenses scanned

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted debt markers + 4 dead symbols across 19359 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9.

TodoComment · ×4Src/Application/Employees/Commands/DeleteEmployee/DeleteEmployeeCommand.cs:47

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 161 .cs files, 20387 hand-written lines of code (19359 production / 1028 test), plus 3538 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 31 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Shell project: CommonSrc/Common/Common.csproj
Build status unknown
Common (Production)Src/Common/Common.csproj
Domain (Production)Src/Domain/Domain.csproj
Application (Production)Src/Application/Application.csproj

+ 7 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The documentation is minimal and largely symbolic. The primary README explicitly states the project is archived and provides no substantive technical details, installation steps, or usage guidelines. Subdirectory READMEs offer only one-line descriptions of architectural layers without explaining dependencies, configurations, or implementation details. Furthermore, there is zero XML documentation coverage across all projects, indicating a lack of inline code documentation. The overall quality is low due to the archived status and lack of actionable information for users or developers.

Low XML-doc coverage: Common · ×6Src/Common/Common.csproj
The README explicitly states the project is archived and provides no installation or usage instructions, making it unhelpful for new users.README.md
The description is vague and lacks specific examples or guidelines on how to implement interfaces.Src/Application/README.md
The mention of Entity Framework and testing providers is confusing and lacks context.Src/Domain/README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Application.csproj, Common.csproj, Domain.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The README explicitly states the project is archived and provides no… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 The description is vague and lacks specific examples or guidelines on… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No public API surface exposed; nothing to be inconsistent.

No exposed public API

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Fair◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Fair / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 valuable / 12 redundant across 38 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2Tests/Application.UnitTests/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandTests.cs:15

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with CreateCustomerCommandTests.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion8.0 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split Application

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split Application finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

87 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 96 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)4.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: aws-access-token · ×2Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:338detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with SampleDataSeeder.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

101 finding(s): 10 critical, 51 high, 35 medium, 5 low.

High CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×40Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding
Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×10Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 40 High CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (40). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (40 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 10 Critical CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts↔ProductsController.cs 55%; CustomersController.cs↔ProductsController.cs 55%; northwind-traders-api.ts↔CustomersController.cs 54%

Change coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts ↔ ProductsController.cs · ×5Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).

No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, fieldsets have a legend, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

AC3 · Page structure5.3 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — Login.cshtml:11, Register.cshtml:10
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — _Layout.cshtml:0

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, and no aria-hidden on a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction5.5 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

  • `Application.UnitTests` is a Application project but references `Persistence`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

What to do

  • Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `INorthwindDbContext` declares 34 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — INorthwindDbContext.cs:8

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls5.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • [AllowAnonymous] (6) outweighs [Authorize] (3) — review whether the open surface is intended.

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
  • Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write6.3 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `Handler.Handle` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateCustomerCommand.cs:44

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency8.6 / 10Healthy◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CreateCustomer.Handler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateCustomerCommand.cs:44
  • `CreateProduct.CreateProductCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateProductCommandHandler.cs:18

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.7 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `SendAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — NotificationService.cs:9

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.5 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 6 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability6.5 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication5.1 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/login/login.component.ts:5 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/logout/logout.component.ts:6 — login.component.ts:5
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/authorize.service.ts:120 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/authorize.service.ts:177 — authorize.service.ts:120
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:1054 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:1882 — northwind-traders-api.ts:1054
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:84 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:314 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:367 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:598 — northwind-traders-api.ts:84
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/api-authorization.module.ts:3 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/app.module.ts:17 — api-authorization.module.ts:3
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/login-menu/login-menu.component.spec.ts:1 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/login/login.component.spec.ts:1 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/logout/logout.component.spec.ts:1 — login-menu.component.spec.ts:1
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/login/login.component.ts:98 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/api-authorization/logout/logout.component.ts:93 — login.component.ts:98
  • Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:1247 · Src/WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts:1641 — northwind-traders-api.ts:1247

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files8.7 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage3.5 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — northwind-traders-api.ts, app.module.ts, customers.component.ts, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the package.json wires up test, lint and typecheck scripts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing scripts (eslint, tsc --noEmit) and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 5 tooling and 10 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 5 tooling, 10 test roots considered) (×2) — test.ts, app.server.module.ts
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — environment.prod.ts:1

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene6.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.2 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 32/60 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — UserManagerService.cs:18, UserManagerService.cs:31, UserManagerService.cs:44, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/5 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria — partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health63%Fair — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture73%HealthySolid.
Maturity61%Fair — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness43%Poor — gated by R4, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security44%Poor — gated by D33, D36, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven84%HealthyStrongest area.
Accessibility69%FairAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 29 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — Not applicable
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — npm is not installed — dependency freshness not measured; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 59 finding(s)
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×40
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — @angular/platform-server: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — cross-spawn: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — form-data: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [GHSA redacted]
  • + 15 more in this group — see findings.md.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×10
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — crypto-js: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — form-data: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — handlebars: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — json-schema: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — minimist: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — minimist: [CVE redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [CVE redacted] Src/WebUI/ClientApp/package-lock.json — minimist: [CVE redacted]
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×6
  • No assertions: ReturnsSuccessResult Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Categories/GetCategoryList.cs:16 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
  • No assertions: GivenCreateCustomerCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Create.cs:18 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
  • No assertions: GivenId_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Delete.cs:18 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
  • No assertions: GivenUpdateCustomerCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Customers/Update.cs:19 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
  • No assertions: GivenId_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Products/Delete.cs:18 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
  • No assertions: GivenUpdateProductCommand_ReturnsSuccessStatusCode Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/Controllers/Products/Update.cs:18 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: aws-access-token Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:338 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:449 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential Src/Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:52 — hardcoded-credential detected.
Warning — 22 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · Low XML-doc coverage · ×6
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Common Src/Common/Common.csproj — Common: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Domain Src/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/144).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Application Src/Application/Application.csproj — Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/290).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure Src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/22).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Persistence Src/Persistence/Persistence.csproj — Persistence: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/46).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: WebUI Src/WebUI/WebUI.csproj — WebUI: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/76).
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×5
  • Change coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts ↔ ProductsController.cs Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts — `Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts` and `Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/ProductsController.cs` change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CustomersController.cs ↔ ProductsController.cs Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs — `Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs` and `Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/ProductsController.cs` change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts ↔ CustomersController.cs Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts — `Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts` and `Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CustomersController.cs ↔ Startup.cs Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs — `Northwind.WebUI/Controllers/CustomersController.cs` and `Northwind.WebUI/Startup.cs` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: northwind-traders-api.ts ↔ Startup.cs Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts — `Northwind.WebUI/ClientApp/src/app/northwind-traders-api.ts` and `Northwind.WebUI/Startup.cs` change together 50% of the time (8 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×4
  • TodoComment Src/Application/Employees/Commands/DeleteEmployee/DeleteEmployeeCommand.cs:47 — // TODO: Update this logic, this will only work if the employee has no associated territories or orders.Emp — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment Src/Application/Products/Commands/DeleteProduct/DeleteProductCommandHandler.cs:32 — // TODO: Add functional test for this behaviour. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment Src/Application/Products/Queries/GetProductsList/GetProductsListQueryHandler.cs:33 — // TODO: Set based on user permissions. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:74 — // TODO: Add to manager role — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 15200 lines, 0 methods.
D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1
  • ClassTooLong: SampleDataSeeder Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:0 — ClassTooLong — 15181 lines, 13 methods.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 11) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 11) Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:651 — Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:651-657 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:658-664 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:665-671 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:672-678 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:679-685 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:686-692 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:693-699 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:700-706 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:707-713 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:714-720 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:721-727
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:611 — Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:611-617 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:618-624 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:625-631 | Src/Application/System/Commands/SeedSampleData/SampleDataSeeder.cs:632-638
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandValidator.cs:9 — Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandValidator.cs:9-13 | Src/Application/Customers/Commands/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommandValidator.cs:10-14
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Domain — Domain: abstractness 0.07, instability 0.00, distance 0.93 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. Commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces (anywhere in the repo), or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 19 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment Tests/Application.UnitTests/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandTests.cs:15 — "Arrange" — Remove or rename to be more specific (e.g., 'Arrange: Create mock mediator') if it doesn't add value.
  • redundant comment Tests/Application.UnitTests/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandTests.cs:24 — "Assert" — Remove or rename to be more specific (e.g., 'Assert: Verify notification sent') if it doesn't add value.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: Common Src/Common/Common.csproj — `Common` contributes only 8 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README explicitly states the project is archived and provides no installation or usage instructions, making it unhelpful for new users. · ×1
  • The README explicitly states the project is archived and provides no installation or usage instructions, making it unhelpful for new users. README.md — Add a 'Getting Started' section with prerequisites, build steps, and run instructions, even if the project is archived, to serve as a reference.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The description is vague and lacks specific examples or guidelines on how to implement interfaces. · ×1
  • The description is vague and lacks specific examples or guidelines on how to implement interfaces. Src/Application/README.md — Provide concrete examples of interface definitions and their implementations in the Infrastructure layer.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The mention of Entity Framework and testing providers is confusing and lacks context. · ×1
  • The mention of Entity Framework and testing providers is confusing and lacks context. Src/Domain/README.md — Clarify the role of EF in the domain layer and provide clear instructions for setting up in-memory or SQLite providers for testing.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — The codebase is large and multi-project, indicating multiple distinct concerns that require explicit boundary declarations to assess cross-boundary coupling. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D25 · ADR Conformance · no ADRs to check · ×1
  • no ADRs to check — No ADRs found, so conformance can't be assessed.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split Application · ×1
  • Split Application — The project is large and its types are spread across 27 namespaces, indicating a lack of cohesive responsibility. Suggested: by namespace: group the 27 namespaces into 3-4 logical domains or modules.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1
  • No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.
Info — 19 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: Moq — Application.UnitTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Persistence.IntegrationTests references Moq.
D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1
  • Licenses scanned — 36 packages scanned; 2 distinct SPDX licenses.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1
  • Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
D18 · Solution Shape · Common (Production) · ×1
  • Common (Production) Src/Common/Common.csproj — 1 .cs files, 10 LoC (8 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Domain (Production) · ×1
  • Domain (Production) Src/Domain/Domain.csproj — 15 .cs files, 415 LoC (345 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Application (Production) · ×1
  • Application (Production) Src/Application/Application.csproj — 66 .cs files, 18886 LoC (17588 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Infrastructure (Production) · ×1
  • Infrastructure (Production) Src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — 12 .cs files, 1225 LoC (986 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Persistence (Production) · ×1
  • Persistence (Production) Src/Persistence/Persistence.csproj — 24 .cs files, 4102 LoC (3165 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · WebUI (Production) · ×1
  • WebUI (Production) Src/WebUI/WebUI.csproj — 14 .cs files, 904 LoC (752 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Application.UnitTests (Test) · ×1
  • Application.UnitTests (Test) Tests/Application.UnitTests/Application.UnitTests.csproj — 10 .cs files, 403 LoC (316 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Domain.UnitTests (Test) · ×1
  • Domain.UnitTests (Test) Tests/Domain.UnitTests/Domain.UnitTests.csproj — 3 .cs files, 108 LoC (85 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · WebUI.IntegrationTests (Test) · ×1
  • WebUI.IntegrationTests (Test) Tests/WebUI.IntegrationTests/WebUI.IntegrationTests.csproj — 14 .cs files, 696 LoC (544 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Persistence.IntegrationTests (Test) · ×1
  • Persistence.IntegrationTests (Test) Tests/Persistence.IntegrationTests/Persistence.IntegrationTests.csproj — 2 .cs files, 88 LoC (70 significant)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution · Unit tests · ×1
  • Unit tests — 22 unit test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · Integration tests · ×1
  • Integration tests — 19 integration test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · BDD tests · ×1
  • BDD tests — 0 BDD test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · E2E tests · ×1
  • E2E tests — 0 end-to-end test method(s).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .6artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** .101artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019ee1da-a180-727d-9b06-09c57aa6ff97 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 31 field(s) across 5 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Address — 9 field(s)
  • CreateCustomerCommand.PostalCode Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:29
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.PostalCode Src/Application/Customers/Commands/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:22
  • CustomerDetailVm.PostalCode Src/Application/Customers/Queries/GetCustomerDetail/CustomerDetailVm.cs:18
  • UpsertEmployeeCommand.PostalCode Src/Application/Employees/Commands/UpsertEmployee/UpsertEmployeeCommand.cs:28
  • EmployeeDetailVm.PostalCode Src/Application/Employees/Queries/GetEmployeeDetail/EmployeeDetailVm.cs:27
  • Customer.PostalCode Src/Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:19
  • Employee.PostalCode Src/Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:27
  • Order.ShipPostalCode Src/Domain/Entities/Order.cs:26
  • Supplier.PostalCode Src/Domain/Entities/Supplier.cs:19
Phone — 9 field(s)
  • CreateCustomerCommand.Phone Src/Application/Customers/Commands/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:27
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.Phone Src/Application/Customers/Commands/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:21
  • CustomerDetailVm.Phone Src/Application/Customers/Queries/GetCustomerDetail/CustomerDetailVm.cs:17
  • UpsertEmployeeCommand.HomePhone Src/Application/Employees/Commands/UpsertEmployee/UpsertEmployeeCommand.cs:32
  • EmployeeDetailVm.HomePhone Src/Application/Employees/Queries/GetEmployeeDetail/EmployeeDetailVm.cs:31
  • Customer.Phone Src/Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:21
  • Employee.HomePhone Src/Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:29
  • Shipper.Phone Src/Domain/Entities/Shipper.cs:14
  • Supplier.Phone Src/Domain/Entities/Supplier.cs:21
Name — 6 field(s)
  • UpsertEmployeeCommand.FirstName Src/Application/Employees/Commands/UpsertEmployee/UpsertEmployeeCommand.cs:16
  • UpsertEmployeeCommand.LastName Src/Application/Employees/Commands/UpsertEmployee/UpsertEmployeeCommand.cs:18
  • EmployeeDetailVm.FirstName Src/Application/Employees/Queries/GetEmployeeDetail/EmployeeDetailVm.cs:15
  • EmployeeDetailVm.LastName Src/Application/Employees/Queries/GetEmployeeDetail/EmployeeDetailVm.cs:17
  • Employee.LastName Src/Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:18
  • Employee.FirstName Src/Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:19
Email — 4 field(s)
  • LoginModel._emailSender Src/WebUI/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Login.cshtml.cs:24
  • InputModel.Email Src/WebUI/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Login.cshtml.cs:51
  • RegisterModel._emailSender Src/WebUI/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Register.cshtml.cs:26
  • InputModel.Email Src/WebUI/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Register.cshtml.cs:52
Date of birth — 3 field(s)
  • UpsertEmployeeCommand.BirthDate Src/Application/Employees/Commands/UpsertEmployee/UpsertEmployeeCommand.cs:20
  • EmployeeDetailVm.BirthDate Src/Application/Employees/Queries/GetEmployeeDetail/EmployeeDetailVm.cs:19
  • Employee.BirthDate Src/Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:22

Issues: 59 · Warnings: 22 · Recommendations: 19 · Info: 19 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 19-06-2026 @ 21:47 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif