Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
juicycleff/ultimate-backend carries serious gaps (43%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Architecture (43%) is the next concern — the code resists change, so features cost more over time.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI (Tooling).
For scale: Medium (~36,448 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
70%
Strong
Architecture
43%
Adequate · gated by R9
Maturity
66%
Adequate · gated by D34
Readiness
32%
Adequate · gated by D13, R8
Security
45%
Weak · gated by D28, D36, D38
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% · 46% weightArchitecture 43% · 25% weightSecurity 45% · 14% weightMaturity 66% · 8% weightCode Health 70% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 43 → ~51.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (31+)
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/billing.ts libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/tenant.ts libs/proto-schema/src/tenant.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/account.ts libs/proto-schema/src/account.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/role.ts libs/proto-schema/src/role.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/webhook.ts libs/proto-schema/src/webhook.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/access.ts libs/proto-schema/src/access.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: src/project.ts libs/proto-schema/src/project.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: repository/base-arango.repository.ts libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts
- D3 · FileTooLong: repository/base-mongo.repository.ts libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/repository/base-mongo.repository.ts
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- R10 · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2 locations) libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango.module.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2 locations) libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/decorators/entity-repository.decorator.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2 locations) libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2 locations) libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€54,000
| Cost to rebuild | €11,000–€54,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 43% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€32,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with bootstrap-production.yaml, bootstrap-development.yaml.
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
3
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with bootstrap-production.yaml, bootstrap-development.yaml. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Ugly
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 28 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 6 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the two leaked secrets in the bootstrap configuration files to address immediate security risks. Next, improve dependency hygiene by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports. Then, enforce type checking in CI by adding a TypeScript compilation check. After that, implement readiness and liveness probes with a rolling update strategy to ensure safe deployments. Finally, break the six identified circular import cycles by extracting shared logic into separate modules.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with bootstrap-production.yaml, bootstrap-development.yaml. | +9.9 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +9.9 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +7.8 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import. | +5.0 pts | Medium | Circular Imports |
| Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with billing.ts, tenant.ts, account.ts. | +1.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with social-config.provider.ts, bootstrap-development.yaml, bootstrap-production.yaml. | +1.4 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +0.8 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-production.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret |
| apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-development.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret |
| yarn.lock | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| apps/service-project/Dockerfile | 4.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: DS-0008 |
| apps/api-admin/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-access/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-account/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-billing/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-notification/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-role/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-tenant/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| apps/service-webhook/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| libs/common/src/utils/crypto.utils.ts | 6.9 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: hardcoded-jwt-secret |
| apps/api-admin/src/accounts/providers/social-config.provider.ts | 7.2 | Near-clean | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts | 7.8 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: BaseArangoRepository |
| libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/billing.ts |
| libs/proto-schema/src/tenant.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/tenant.ts |
| libs/proto-schema/src/account.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/account.ts |
| libs/proto-schema/src/role.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/role.ts |
| libs/proto-schema/src/webhook.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/webhook.ts |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38DM6M1M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 98 of 108 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
10 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: src/billing.ts libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts:0
TooManyMethods: BaseArangoRepositorylibs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:28
What to do
- Resolve the 9 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with billing.ts, tenant.ts, account.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with base-arango.repository.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
2 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-production.yaml:57
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with bootstrap-production.yaml, bootstrap-development.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The README gives a strong enterprise-level overview (WIP status, DDD/CQRS pattern, Slack invite link, sponsor badge, license/Snyk/codacy grades, and links to package-json/version/top-language badges) plus an onboarding GraphQL workflow for new users that is accurate and complete. The visible content is clear and well-structured; the visible outline (Description, Features, Software stack, Folder Structure, Installation, Configuration, Usage, With Docker locally, Without Docker locally, Running the microservices, Generate protobuf typescript definitions and please fix the path for timestamps import, build the proto-scheme lib, configuration(config.example files) to consul K/V registry, You need jq and yq programs to use it, Start the account service, Start the access service, Start the role service, Start the graphql api, Alternative method of running services, Get started by registering a user on the admin gateway, Quick Tips, Generating dynamic mongo filter GraphQL type., Multi-tenant Database for services., Access token with scopes, More docs updates coming, Test; unit tests; e2e tests; test coverage) is fully present in the visible text. The two documents are well matched and both serve distinct but complementary purposes.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The README gives a strong enterprise-level overview (WIP status, DDD/CQRS pattern, Slack invite link, sponsor badge, license/Snyk/codacy grades, and links to package-json/version/top-language badges) plus an onboarding GraphQL workflow for new users that is accurate and complete. The visible content is clear and well-structured; the visible outline (Description, Features, Software stack, Folder Structure, Installation, Configuration, Usage, With Docker locally, Without Docker locally, Running the microservices, Generate protobuf typescript definitions and please fix the path for timestamps import, build the proto-scheme lib, configuration(config.example files) to consul K/V registry, You need jq and yq programs to use it, Start the account service, Start the access service, Start the role service, Start the graphql api, Alternative method of running services, Get started by registering a user on the admin gateway, Quick Tips, Generating dynamic mongo filter GraphQL type., Multi-tenant Database for services., Access token with scopes, More docs updates coming, Test; unit tests; e2e tests; test coverage) is fully present in the visible text. The two documents are well matched and both serve distinct but complementary purposes.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key apps/api-admin/src/accounts/providers/social-config.provider.ts:10
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with social-config.provider.ts, bootstrap-development.yaml, bootstrap-production.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
Medium: hardcoded-jwt-secret libs/common/src/utils/crypto.utils.ts:7
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
28 finding(s): 1 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 18 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 apps/api-admin/Dockerfile
Critical IaC: DS-0008apps/service-project/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/api-admin/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 18 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 9 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
60 of 60 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts.
Largest orphaned file libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts
Dormant codebase
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with billing.ts, tenant.ts, account.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
129 finding(s): 20 critical, 59 high, 38 medium, 12 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lock
What to do
- Resolve the 30 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (30). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 issue-level).
- Resolve the 19 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (19). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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M1 · Documentation (README)
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims a Rust microservice framework while the evidence is a Node/TS NestJS boilerplate repo
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a Rust microservice framework while the evidence is a Node/TS NestJS boilerplate repo.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
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R1 · Type Safety
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R10 · Code Duplication
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/database.util.ts:1 · libs/repo-orm/src/utils/database.util.ts:1 — database.util.ts:1
- libs/repo-orm/src/utils/database.util.ts:8 · libs/repo-orm/src/utils/database.util.ts:38 — database.util.ts:8
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/interfaces/arango-options.interface.ts:12 · libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/interfaces/mongo-options.interface.ts:12 — arango-options.interface.ts:12
- libs/repo-orm/src/decorators/hooks.decorator.ts:2 · libs/repo-orm/src/decorators/hooks.decorator.ts:33 — hooks.decorator.ts:2
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango.module.ts:26 · libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/mongo.module.ts:22 — arango.module.ts:26
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/decorators/entity-repository.decorator.ts:2 · libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/decorators/entity-repository.decorator.ts:2 — entity-repository.decorator.ts:2
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:56 · libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/repository/base-mongo.repository.ts:55 — base-arango.repository.ts:56
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:170 · libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:317 — base-arango.repository.ts:170
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — billing.ts:2522, billing.ts:2673, billing.ts:1216, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — t.ts, timestamp.ts, invite-member.handler.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- 787 file(s) (~40815 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×7) — card.input.ts:32, card.input.ts:41, app.constants.ts:1, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — headers.datasource.ts:1, email.service.ts:3, gql-context.interface.ts:13
- Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
- apps/api-admin/src/accounts/accounts-mutation.resolver.ts → apps/api-admin/src/accounts/types/index.ts → apps/api-admin/src/accounts/types/accounts.type.ts → apps/api-admin/src/accounts/accounts-mutation.resolver.ts — accounts-mutation.resolver.ts
- apps/api-admin/src/tenant-members/types/index.ts → apps/api-admin/src/tenant-members/types/tenant-member.type.ts → apps/api-admin/src/tenants/types/index.ts → apps/api-admin/src/tenants/types/tenant.input.ts → apps/api-admin/src/tenants/types/tenant.type.ts → apps/api-admin/src/tenant-members/types/index.ts — index.ts
- apps/service-access/src/access-token/cqrs/commands/handlers/access-token/create-access.handler.ts → apps/service-access/src/access-token/cqrs/commands/index.ts → apps/service-access/src/access-token/cqrs/commands/handlers/index.ts → apps/service-access/src/access-token/cqrs/commands/handlers/access-token/index.ts → apps/service-access/src/access-token/cqrs/commands/handlers/access-token/create-access.handler.ts — create-access.handler.ts
- apps/service-webhook/src/cqrs/commands/handlers/index.ts → apps/service-webhook/src/cqrs/commands/handlers/webhook/index.ts → apps/service-webhook/src/cqrs/commands/handlers/webhook/create-webhook.handler.ts → apps/service-webhook/src/cqrs/commands/index.ts → apps/service-webhook/src/cqrs/commands/handlers/index.ts — index.ts
- libs/contracts/src/index.ts → libs/contracts/src/inputs/index.ts → libs/contracts/src/inputs/base.filter.ts → libs/contracts/src/index.ts — index.ts
- libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango-core.module.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango.client.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango.constants.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/interfaces/index.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/interfaces/arango-options.interface.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/index.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/index.ts → libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/arango-core.module.ts — arango-core.module.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 70% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 43% | Adequate — gated by R9 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Maturity | 66% | Adequate — gated by D34 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 32% | Adequate — gated by D13, R8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 45% | Weak — gated by D28, D36, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 82 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~915 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 65 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/api-admin/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-access/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-account/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-billing/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-notification/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-project/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-role/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-tenant/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 apps/service-webhook/Dockerfile
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key apps/api-admin/src/accounts/providers/social-config.provider.ts:10
- Secret: generic-api-key apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-development.yaml:21
- Secret: generic-api-key apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-production.yaml:57
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-production.yaml:57
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret apps/api-admin/src/bootstrap-development.yaml:21
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Critical IaC: DS-0008 apps/service-project/Dockerfile
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
Warning — 13 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: src/billing.ts libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/tenant.ts libs/proto-schema/src/tenant.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/account.ts libs/proto-schema/src/account.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/role.ts libs/proto-schema/src/role.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/webhook.ts libs/proto-schema/src/webhook.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/access.ts libs/proto-schema/src/access.ts:0
- FileTooLong: src/project.ts libs/proto-schema/src/project.ts:0
- FileTooLong: repository/base-arango.repository.ts libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:0
- FileTooLong: repository/base-mongo.repository.ts libs/repo-orm/src/database/mongo/repository/base-mongo.repository.ts:0
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: hardcoded-jwt-secret libs/common/src/utils/crypto.utils.ts:7
- Medium: hardcoded-jwt-secret libs/common/src/utils/crypto.utils.ts:23
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: BaseArangoRepository libs/repo-orm/src/database/arango/repository/base-arango.repository.ts:28
Recommendation — 28 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/api-admin/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/api-admin/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-access/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-access/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-account/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-account/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-billing/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-billing/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-notification/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-notification/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-project/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-project/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-role/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-role/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-tenant/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-tenant/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0005 apps/service-webhook/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/service-webhook/Dockerfile
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Largest orphaned file libs/proto-schema/src/billing.ts
- Largest orphaned file libs/proto-schema/src/tenant.ts
- Largest orphaned file libs/proto-schema/src/account.ts
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Dormant codebase
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 8 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 28 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 129 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |