Public report — CleanAdmin, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 15:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Jzwo/CleanAdmin

61% Strong
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Small · 13,831 LoC · 12 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (50%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

59/63dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
43findings with an exact file:lineof 62 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
63/108dimensions across the health lenses13831 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

jzwo/CleanAdmin is in good overall health (61%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (97%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (50%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (66%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback); Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped… (Release Hygiene).

For scale: Small (~13,831 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 50% · 46% weightSecurity 66% · 25% weightMaturity 68% · 14% weightAccessibility 71% · 8% weightArchitecture 80% · 4% weightCode Health 97% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 50 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 61 → ~69.

Code composition — where the lines go Plumbing-heavy — business logic is 7% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 6%Plumbing 79%Tests 6%Generated 9%
New since the last scan (42+)

42 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D5 · Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.Shared
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.Domain
  • D6 · Low cohesion: Menu (LCOM4 4) src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/MenuAggregate/Menu.cs
  • D6 · Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4) src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • D11 · Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
  • D13 · Leaked secret: signing-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json
  • D14 · Banned license: Hangfire.Redis.StackExchange
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Program.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/SharedResource.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.Web/Program.cs
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key src/NcpAdminBlazor.ApiService/appsettings.json
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key src/NcpAdminBlazor.Web/appsettings.Development.json
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.Development.json
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json
  • P5 · No DR/backup evidence
  • S1 · Password hash compared with `==` src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs
  • AC6 · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/Layout/ReconnectModal.razor.css
  • AC7 · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,100–€35,000
Cost to rebuild€7,100–€35,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (119–370 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 61% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 60% boilerplate · 34% straight-line · 7% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€21,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 50% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
+8.6 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+9.8 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
3
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
+9.7 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 50%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (13,831 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 50%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch CleanAdmin.ApiService ApiService CleanAdmin.Domain Domain CleanAdmin.ApiService->CleanAdmin.Domain CleanAdmin.Infrastructure Infrastructure CleanAdmin.ApiService->CleanAdmin.Infrastructure CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults CleanAdmin.ApiService->CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults CleanAdmin.Shared Shared CleanAdmin.ApiService->CleanAdmin.Shared CleanAdmin.AppHost AppHost CleanAdmin.AppHost->CleanAdmin.ApiService CleanAdmin.MigrationService MigrationService CleanAdmin.AppHost->CleanAdmin.MigrationService CleanAdmin.Web Web CleanAdmin.AppHost->CleanAdmin.Web CleanAdmin.Infrastructure->CleanAdmin.Domain CleanAdmin.MigrationService->CleanAdmin.Infrastructure CleanAdmin.MigrationService->CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults CleanAdmin.Template Template CleanAdmin.Web->CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults CleanAdmin.Web.Client Client CleanAdmin.Web->CleanAdmin.Web.Client CleanAdmin.Web.Client->CleanAdmin.Shared

Architecture — module dependency matrix

90 modules, 117 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…sModel.OrderAggregate…anAdmin.Domain.Common….Client.ApiSdk.Api.Ai…lient.ApiSdk.Api.Menu….ApiSdk.Api.User.Item….Client.ApiSdk.Models…egrationEventHandlers…odel.DeliverAggregate…esModel.MenuAggregate…esModel.RoleAggregate…piSdk.Api.Auth.Create…ApiSdk.Api.Auth.Login…Api.Auth.RefreshToken…ApiSdk.Api.Menus.Item…ApiSdk.Api.Roles.Item…iSdk.Api.User.Profile…esModel.UserAggregate…lient.ApiSdk.Api.Auth…ient.ApiSdk.Api.Menus…ient.ApiSdk.Api.Roles…lient.ApiSdk.Api.User…Admin.ApiService.Auth…rvice.Auth.Permission…n.Domain.DomainEvents…nAdmin.Infrastructure….EntityConfigurations…Web.Client.ApiSdk.Api…n.DomainEventHandlers…rationEventConverters…ication.Queries.Menus…ication.Queries.Roles…ication.Queries.Users…rvice.Endpoints.Menus…rvice.Endpoints.Users…tructure.Repositories…min.Web.Client.ApiSdk….Application.Commands…cation.Commands.Menus…cation.Commands.Roles…cation.Commands.Users…sModel.OrderAggregate1…anAdmin.Domain.Common2….Client.ApiSdk.Api.Ai3…lient.ApiSdk.Api.Menu4….ApiSdk.Api.User.Item5….Client.ApiSdk.Models6…egrationEventHandlers7…odel.DeliverAggregate8…esModel.MenuAggregate9…esModel.RoleAggregate10…piSdk.Api.Auth.Create11…ApiSdk.Api.Auth.Login12…Api.Auth.RefreshToken13…ApiSdk.Api.Menus.Item14…ApiSdk.Api.Roles.Item15…iSdk.Api.User.Profile16…esModel.UserAggregate17…lient.ApiSdk.Api.Auth18…ient.ApiSdk.Api.Menus19…ient.ApiSdk.Api.Roles20…lient.ApiSdk.Api.User21…Admin.ApiService.Auth22…rvice.Auth.Permission23…n.Domain.DomainEvents24…nAdmin.Infrastructure25….EntityConfigurations26…Web.Client.ApiSdk.Api27…n.DomainEventHandlers28…rationEventConverters29…ication.Queries.Menus30…ication.Queries.Roles31…ication.Queries.Users32…rvice.Endpoints.Menus33…rvice.Endpoints.Users34…tructure.Repositories35…min.Web.Client.ApiSdk36….Application.Commands37…cation.Commands.Menus38…cation.Commands.Roles39…cation.Commands.Users401111222211131112131112124551111111111111138112310656121181334514123865411129+50 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 97% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 80% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 50% · Adequate · gated by P5

At a glance — Security · 66% · Adequate · gated by D29

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 71% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection15High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures6High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components4High / Critical

Roadmap

First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure-as-code while documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures to ensure true disaster recovery. Next, implement a manual approval gate for releases to prevent bad builds from reaching users, and maintain a changelog to track each release. Then, resolve the single leaked secret found in appsettings.json. Finally, extend structured logging across all operated projects and provide a diagnostics seam for libraries to avoid forcing logging dependencies on consumers.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.+8.6 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+9.8 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+9.7 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+9.7 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance.+4.6 ptsLowLicense Compliance
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+7.5 ptsMediumObservability
Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2), appsettings.Development.json (2).+1.6 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.+2.5 ptsMediumData Protection

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 33% mixed · 67% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
.github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json4.8MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
Directory.Build.props5.8MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/NcpAdminBlazor.ApiService/appsettings.json7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/NcpAdminBlazor.Web/appsettings.Development.json7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.Development.json7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Program.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/SharedResource.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/CleanAdmin.Web/Program.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/MenuAggregate/Menu.cs8.5Near-cleanCohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: Menu (LCOM4 4)
src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs8.5Near-cleanCohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4)
test/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests
src/CleanAdmin.AppHost/Program.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D21D24D26D28D29D33D34D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P4P5P6P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 43 of 62 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc834-888b-79b3-b878-841b97778d93.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

12 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 20 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: Menu (LCOM4 4) · ×2src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/MenuAggregate/Menu.cs:18

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with Menu.cs, User.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

35 test methods: 10 unit, 25 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Inverted test pyramid

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 3 mock references across 35 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keysrc/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json:12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 96 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: Hangfire.Redis.StackExchange

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Program.cs.

Small-team knowledge concentration

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 13183 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.4.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×3Directory.Build.props:18
BarePragmaDisable · ×3src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Program.cs:361

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 projects, 265 source files, 14131 hand-written lines of code (13183 production / 948 test), plus 1504 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 13 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Shell project: CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Teststest/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects
Build status unknown

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

CleanAdmin's documentation is strong and well-structured: the README gives a clear project preview, why choose CleanAdmin, and an outline of every visible section (Architecture/Docs markdown files plus XML docs), while the detailed architecture/design doc CleanDDD Command-Aggregate Rule covers the core DDD rule set with practical landing and code examples. The README is long but thin on prerequisites, quick-start, and testing guidance compared to the design doc; the API surface is mostly described in prose rather than NuGet/restore steps.

XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.AppHost · ×9src/CleanAdmin.AppHost/CleanAdmin.AppHost.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — CleanAdmin's documentation is strong and well-structured: the README gives a clear project preview, why choose CleanAdmin, and an outline of every visible section (Architecture/Docs markdown files plus XML docs), while the detailed architecture/design doc CleanDDD Command-Aggregate Rule covers the core DDD rule set with practical landing and code examples. The README is long but thin on prerequisites, quick-start, and testing guidance compared to the design doc; the API surface is mostly described in prose rather than NuGet/restore steps.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

42 valuable / 1 redundant across 163 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/CleanAdmin.AppHost/Program.cs:33

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split CleanAdmin.ApiService
Split CleanAdmin.Web.Client

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split CleanAdmin.ApiService finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Split CleanAdmin.Web.Client finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×4src/NcpAdminBlazor.ApiService/appsettings.json:10detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2), appsettings.Development.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×15.github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:19detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish-nuget.yml (8), azure-demo-deploy.yml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • `#components-reconnect-modal button` sets color: white on background-color: #6b9ed2 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — ReconnectModal.razor.css:91

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A placeholder string ("admin@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. (×2) — CreateUserEndpoint.cs:89, UpdateUserEndpoint.cs:86
  • A placeholder string ("superadmin@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:25

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — RoleDeletedDomainEventHandler.cs:14

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 12 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability8.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 3 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • Password-hash field compared with `==` — use a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles (CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals). — User.cs:149
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Compare password hashes with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` (constant time, no timing oracle).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 122/134 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×11) — ChatHub.cs:10, CurrentUserMiddleware.cs:11, WebAssemblyHostExtension.cs:14, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — UserPermissionHydrator.cs:54

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 24 suppression(s) across the 66740 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 42 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health97%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture80%StrongSolid.
Maturity68%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness50%Adequate — gated by P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security66%Adequate — gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility71%StrongSolid.
Not included — 45 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget)
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
  • ED3 Event naming — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
  • ED4 Outbox / dual-write — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X8 JS interop contract — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 28 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×15
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:36 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:61 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/azure-demo-deploy.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: azure/webapps-deploy@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `azure/webapps-deploy@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/azure/webapps-deploy/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:57 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:60 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:66 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-nuget.yml:80 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×4
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/NcpAdminBlazor.ApiService/appsettings.json:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/NcpAdminBlazor.Web/appsettings.Development.json:32 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.Development.json:32 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×3
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:18 — CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:18 — NU1507 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:18 — S125 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json — picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/appsettings.json:12 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×1
  • Banned license: Hangfire.Redis.StackExchange — Hangfire.Redis.StackExchange 1.12.0 is licensed LGPL-3.0-or-later (banned by policy).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/CleanAdmin.Web/package-lock.json — svgo 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin svgo to 4.0.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against svgo 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against svgo 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 10 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×3
  • BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Program.cs:361 — #pragma warning disable S1118 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/SharedResource.cs:3 — #pragma warning disable S2094 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/CleanAdmin.Web/Program.cs:81 — #pragma warning disable S6966 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults — CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.Shared — CleanAdmin.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
  • Off the main sequence: CleanAdmin.Domain — CleanAdmin.Domain: abstractness 0.03, instability 0.00, distance 0.97 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×2
  • Low cohesion: Menu (LCOM4 4) src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/MenuAggregate/Menu.cs:18 — Menu's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
  • Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4) src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs:12 — User's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository did not build in our analyzer environment (a C#/MSBuild compiler error), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. We did not read WHERE the failing diagnostic is, so this does not claim the fault is in your test code — a repository written for an older SDK band can compile for you and not for us. Run `dotnet build` on this commit; if it succeeds, the gap is ours. Committing the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces also lets us measure real coverage without building anything.
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget) · ×1
  • Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget) — Dependency Hygiene couldn't be assessed within its 5-minute budget on a solution this large — not included in this run.
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 8 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 8 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests test/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj — `CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests` contributes only 1 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 3 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `CleanAdmin.AppHost` with 35 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 86 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.1 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 13k LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment src/CleanAdmin.AppHost/Program.cs:33 — "Add web project with infrastructure dependencies" — trim - AddWebProjectWithInfrastructureDependencies already says this
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split CleanAdmin.ApiService · ×1
  • Split CleanAdmin.ApiService — A 4k-LoC API surface with 239 types across 22 unrelated namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: CleanAdmin.Api.Serialization, CleanAdmin.Api.Validation, CleanAdmin.Api.Filters
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split CleanAdmin.Web.Client · ×1
  • Split CleanAdmin.Web.Client — A 7k-LoC web client with 148 types across 47 namespaces is a massive sprawling UI that needs to be split. Suggested: by namespace: CleanAdmin.Web.Navigation, CleanAdmin.Web.Presentation, CleanAdmin.Web.StateManagement
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D9 · Test Distribution · Inverted test pyramid · ×1
  • Inverted test pyramid — Only 29 % of tests are unit tests (10 unit vs 25 integration, 0 BDD); a broader unit base gives faster, more localised feedback.
Info — 14 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×9
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.AppHost src/CleanAdmin.AppHost/CleanAdmin.AppHost.csproj — CleanAdmin.AppHost: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.ApiService src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/CleanAdmin.ApiService.csproj — CleanAdmin.ApiService: 15 % XML-doc coverage (72/489).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.Domain src/CleanAdmin.Domain/CleanAdmin.Domain.csproj — CleanAdmin.Domain: 28 % XML-doc coverage (31/110).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.Infrastructure src/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure/CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.csproj — CleanAdmin.Infrastructure: 8 % XML-doc coverage (2/26).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.MigrationService src/CleanAdmin.MigrationService/CleanAdmin.MigrationService.csproj — CleanAdmin.MigrationService: 75 % XML-doc coverage (3/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.Web.Client src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/CleanAdmin.Web.Client.csproj — CleanAdmin.Web.Client: 85 % XML-doc coverage (603/713).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.Web src/CleanAdmin.Web/CleanAdmin.Web.csproj — CleanAdmin.Web: 100 % XML-doc coverage (3/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults src/CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults/CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults.csproj — CleanAdmin.ServiceDefaults: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/4).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanAdmin.Shared src/CleanAdmin.Shared/CleanAdmin.Shared.csproj — CleanAdmin.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×3
  • Mock framework: Moq — CleanAdmin.ApiService.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — CleanAdmin.Domain.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — CleanAdmin.Infrastructure.Tests references Moq.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1
  • Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .6artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .15artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .4artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc834-888b-79b3-b878-841b97778d93 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 36 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 18 field(s)
  • CreateUserCommand.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/CreateUserCommand.cs:13
  • UpdateCurrentUserBasicInfoCommand.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/UpdateCurrentUserBasicInfoCommand.cs:9
  • UpdateUserInfoCommand.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/UpdateUserInfoCommand.cs:12
  • UserInfoDto.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserInfoQuery.cs:12
  • GetUserListQuery.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserListQuery.cs:8
  • UserListItemDto.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserListQuery.cs:17
  • UserDto.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Clients/IUserServiceClient.cs:11
  • CreateUserRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/CreateUserEndpoint.cs:43
  • UpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UpdateCurrentUserProfileEndpoint.cs:31
  • UpdateUserRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UpdateUserEndpoint.cs:45
  • GetUserListRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UserListEndpoint.cs:34
  • User.Email src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs:22
  • ListRequestBuilderGetQueryParameters.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Api/User/List/ListRequestBuilder.cs:98
  • CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserInfoDto.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserInfoDto.cs:18
  • CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserListItemDto.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserListItemDto.cs:20
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersCreateUserRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersCreateUserRequest.cs:26
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.cs:18
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateUserRequest.Email src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateUserRequest.cs:26
Phone — 18 field(s)
  • CreateUserCommand.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/CreateUserCommand.cs:14
  • UpdateCurrentUserBasicInfoCommand.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/UpdateCurrentUserBasicInfoCommand.cs:10
  • UpdateUserInfoCommand.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Commands/Users/UpdateUserInfoCommand.cs:13
  • UserInfoDto.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserInfoQuery.cs:13
  • GetUserListQuery.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserListQuery.cs:9
  • UserListItemDto.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Application/Queries/Users/GetUserListQuery.cs:18
  • UserDto.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Clients/IUserServiceClient.cs:11
  • CreateUserRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/CreateUserEndpoint.cs:44
  • UpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UpdateCurrentUserProfileEndpoint.cs:32
  • UpdateUserRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UpdateUserEndpoint.cs:47
  • GetUserListRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.ApiService/Endpoints/Users/UserListEndpoint.cs:35
  • User.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Domain/AggregatesModel/UserAggregate/User.cs:19
  • ListRequestBuilderGetQueryParameters.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Api/User/List/ListRequestBuilder.cs:111
  • CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserInfoDto.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserInfoDto.cs:34
  • CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserListItemDto.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceApplicationQueriesUsersUserListItemDto.cs:36
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersCreateUserRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersCreateUserRequest.cs:42
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateCurrentUserProfileRequest.cs:26
  • CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateUserRequest.Phone src/CleanAdmin.Web.Client/ApiSdk/Models/CleanAdminApiServiceEndpointsUsersUpdateUserRequest.cs:34

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md