Public report — k3s, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
236findings with an exact file:lineof 248 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
30/95dimensions across the health lenses29492 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
k3s-io/k3s is sound in substance but carries real gaps (66%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (61%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Code Health (64%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement (Network Egress Confinement); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)); Grow the ADR log (currently 25) (Architecture documentation).
For scale: Medium (~29,492 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.4 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.9× (at 66% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€63,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 61% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with snapshot.go (2), local-storage.yaml, metrics-apiservice.yaml.
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 1–3 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 4.1–24.6 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~26,783 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 1–9 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 6–14% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Evidence: D15 churn: 6,604 line(s) changed over a 90-day window ⇒ ~26,783/year · D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 5.5/10 ⇒ a 6–14% drag on each change · top-ranked remediation: Low effort ⇒ about 1–3 engineer-day(s)
→ Do the top-ranked fix now if this code will still be yours in 9 months.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 61%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 5.5/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 6–14% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 5.5/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
98 modules, 94 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 64% · Adequate · gated by D2
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
34
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
15
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
13
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the single network egress confinement finding to improve security posture. Next, enhance project documentation by adding a testing section to the root README and expanding the architecture decision record log to 50 entries. Finally, establish a disaster recovery plan with documented RTO/RPO and tested restore procedures, while also implementing version stamping in build manifests to ensure release traceability.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with snapshot.go (2), local-storage.yaml, metrics-apiservice.yaml.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 27 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 236 of 248 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 33 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 server.run (cyclomatic 103) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with server.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 config.get (cyclomatic 52) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with config.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData (cyclomatic 40) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with snapshot.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 84 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 server.run (cognitive 169) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with server.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 config.get (cognitive 65) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with config.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData (cognitive 64) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with snapshot.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
Of 8 mechanizable ADRs, 6 are prevented by analyzers, 2 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
35 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is pkg/agent/tunnel/tunnel.go.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
K3s has comprehensive documentation covering the project's purpose (lightweight production-ready Kubernetes), its update-automation tool Updatecli, performance/integration tests, release process, and a Git workflow guide. The README is excellent; architecture/design docs are strong with detailed per-project coverage of each doc path. All visible sections exist in the outline: K3s is fully conformant, single-binary, sqlite default storage, Updatecli automation, project organization, local testing, E2E tests, release process, and Git workflows. The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for a Kubernetes project, covering the development guide (non-Linux prerequisites, cloning/building/testing), CI/automation platforms (GitHub Actions, Drone pipelines), code conventions (POSIX shell, Go, directory/file, testing), testing in K3s (unit/integration/some legacy E2E plus performance), and several ADRs on topics like moving containerd out of the multicall bundle, rotating server tokens, and automating security updates. The development guide is clipped mid-setup but its outline sections exist; CI/automation and testing are both fully shown. The documentation is clear and complete for a project that records architecture decisions (ADR) as its main content. The ADR repository holds seven README files plus four design docs, with each document fully outlining the listed sections. The primary documents cover removing the svclb daemonset (not approved), recording architectural decisions, integrating Multus into k3s-charts, and integrating a VPN in k3s; they are well written for their purposes.
The non-Linux prerequisites section recommends Docker with the Dapper build environment but does not state how to run builds locally on a non-WSL2 system, which is critical for contributors who cannot use WSL2.docs/contrib/development.md
The Drone pipeline section mentions the URLs <drone-pr.k3s.io> and <drone-publish.k3s.io>, but there is no guidance on how to test locally against these clusters.docs/contrib/continuous_integration.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 The non-Linux prerequisites section recommends Docker with the Dapper… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with development.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The Drone pipeline section mentions the URLs <drone-pr.k3s.io> and… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with continuous_integration.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 25 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.9/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 3 flagged with a specific gap.
Consequences are only Good and Bad (no trade-offs) with no detail on how much new dependency is addeddocs/adrs/add-auto-import-containerd.md
Context and consequences are boilerplate filler; the body states neither what decisions were recorded nor any trade-offsdocs/adrs/record-architecture-decisions.md
Consequences are thin and trade-offs are not stated (e.g. false positives from non-status changes)docs/adrs/status-for-etcd-node.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 Consequences are only Good and Bad (no trade-offs) with no detail on how… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with add-auto-import-containerd.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Context and consequences are boilerplate filler; the body states neither… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with record-architecture-decisions.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Consequences are thin and trade-offs are not stated (e.g. false… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with status-for-etcd-node.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2load_testing/k3s/cluster-loader/large/secret.yaml:7detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with secret.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×3.github/dependabot.yml:4detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×5manifests/local-storage.yaml:68detected by semgrep finding
Low: grpc-client-insecure-connection · ×7pkg/agent/cri/cri.go:27detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 7 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with token.go (2), s3.go (2), cri.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dependabot.yml, build-k3s.yaml, release.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with snapshot.go (2), local-storage.yaml, metrics-apiservice.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: KSV-0056 · ×5manifests/ccm.yamldetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0031 · ×3Dockerfile.manifestdetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 · ×17manifests/ccm.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: KSV-0003 · ×9manifests/local-storage.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 17 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with local-storage.yaml (7), metrics-server-deployment.yaml (4), Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with local-storage.yaml (2), Dockerfile (2), ccm.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.manifest, ccm.yaml, local-storage.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
5 of 101 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is pkg/untar/untar.go.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High CVE: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: GO-2024-3218 · ×8go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
108 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~22715 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 25 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 2 signals this check looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High IaC: KSV-0056 manifests/ccm.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0014 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: DS-0002 package/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: this image's final stage has no shell, no package manager and no `/etc/passwd`, so there is no account to create and a `USER` naming one would not resolve. Use the numeric form instead — `USER 65532:65532` before the entrypoint (65532 is the conventional nonroot uid) — and give that uid ownership of anything the process writes by copying it in with `COPY --chown=65532:65532` from the build stage, including any `VOLUME` path. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0025 package/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 7 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/build-k3s.yaml:61— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/release.yml:273— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.47.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares golang.org/x/crypto 0.53.0 directly, at or above the fixed 0.52.0; the vulnerable 0.47.0 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or add a `replace` directive for golang.org/x/crypto in go.mod so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.47.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/docker/docker 25.0.15-0.20260325154711-d2dbc0547253+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/docker/docker if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against github.com/docker/docker 25.0.15-0.20260325154711-d2dbc0547253+incompatible: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.79.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares google.golang.org/grpc 1.82.1 directly, at or above the fixed 1.82.1; the vulnerable 1.79.3 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or add a `replace` directive for google.golang.org/grpc in go.mod so only one copy resolves.
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 manifests/ccm.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0037 manifests/local-storage.yaml— User resources should not be placed in kube-system namespace
Medium IaC: KSV-0048 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Manage Kubernetes workloads and pods
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0037 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— User resources should not be placed in kube-system namespace
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0037 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-service.yaml— User resources should not be placed in kube-system namespace
Medium IaC: KSV-0037 manifests/traefik.yaml— User resources should not be placed in kube-system namespace
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 manifests/local-storage.yaml:38— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml:8— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile.manifest:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 package/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Hotspot: pkg/cli/server/server.go pkg/cli/server/server.go— pkg/cli/server/server.go changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 103. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 3 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: pkg/etcd/snapshot.go pkg/etcd/snapshot.go— pkg/etcd/snapshot.go changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 40. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: pkg/agent/config/config.go pkg/agent/config/config.go— pkg/agent/config/config.go changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 52. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: pkg/agent/run.go pkg/agent/run.go— pkg/agent/run.go changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 36. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: pkg/cluster/cluster.go pkg/cluster/cluster.go— pkg/cluster/cluster.go changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 17. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 2 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: pkg/server/server.go pkg/server/server.go— pkg/server/server.go changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 16. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 2 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go— pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 21. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go— pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 20. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: pkg/executor/embed/embed.go pkg/executor/embed/embed.go— pkg/executor/embed/embed.go changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 17. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×8
Medium CVE: GO-2024-3218 go.mod— github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht 0.40.0: GO-2024-3218 — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/pion/dtls/v3 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/pion/dtls/v3 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/pion/dtls/v3@v3.1.4`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/pion/stun/v3 3.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/pion/stun/v3 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/pion/stun/v3@v3.1.5`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/quic-go/webtransport-go 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/quic-go/webtransport-go is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/quic-go/webtransport-go@v0.11.1`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.43.0 (go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage, go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation): GO-2026-5158 — go.opentelemetry.io/otel is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get go.opentelemetry.io/otel@v1.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5942 go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.55.0 (golang.org/x/net/dns/dnsmessage): GO-2026-5942 — upgrade to 0.56.0
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.40.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — this repo already declares golang.org/x/sys 0.46.0 directly, at or above the fixed 0.44.0; the vulnerable 0.40.0 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or add a `replace` directive for golang.org/x/sys in go.mod so only one copy resolves.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.38.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext manifests/local-storage.yaml:68— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: skip-tls-verify-service manifests/metrics-server/metrics-apiservice.yaml:6— Service is disabling TLS certificate verification when communicating with the server. This makes your HTTPS connections insecure. Remove the 'insecureSkipTLSVerify: true' key to secure communication.
Medium: math-random-used pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:10— `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:200— Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: potential-dos-via-decompression-bomb pkg/untar/untar.go:83— Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
FileTooLong: etcd/etcd.go pkg/etcd/etcd.go:0— FileTooLong — 984 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: etcd/snapshot.go pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:0— FileTooLong — 600 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: cmds/server.go pkg/cli/cmds/server.go:0— FileTooLong — 565 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 70% of them inside a single declaration: ServerFlags (191-665). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: deps/deps.go pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:0— FileTooLong — 551 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: config/config.go pkg/agent/config/config.go:0— FileTooLong — 519 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/agent/config/config.go:193— pkg/agent/config/config.go:193-201 | pkg/agent/config/config.go:207-215 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/agent/config/config.go:193` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/agent/run.go:127— pkg/agent/run.go:127-135 | pkg/agent/run.go:282-290 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/agent/run.go:127` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/etcd/member_controller.go:53— pkg/etcd/member_controller.go:53-61 | pkg/etcd/member_controller.go:123-131 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:119— pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:119-127 | pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:314-322 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:119` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:58— pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:58-67 | pkg/cli/server/server.go:224-233 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:126— pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:126-135 | pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:285-294 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/dataverify/dataverify.go:35— pkg/dataverify/dataverify.go:35-44 | pkg/dataverify/dataverify.go:61-70 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/dataverify/dataverify.go:35` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
TooManyMethods: ETCD pkg/etcd/etcd.go:110— TooManyMethods — 63 methods, declared across 3 files: etcd/etcd.go (40), etcd/snapshot.go (16), etcd/snapshot_handler.go (7). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: k3s pkg/cloudprovider/cloudprovider.go:40— TooManyMethods — 41 methods, declared across 4 files: cloudprovider/servicelb.go (24), cloudprovider/cloudprovider.go (9), cloudprovider/loadbalancer.go (5), cloudprovider/instances.go (3). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×2
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/google/cel-go 0.26.1: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/google/cel-go is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/google/cel-go@v0.29.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod— github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.6 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — upgrade to 1.18.7
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) pkg/clientaccess/token.go:452— pkg/clientaccess/token.go:452-466 | pkg/clientaccess/token.go:509-523 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/clientaccess/token.go:452` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:831— pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:831-845 | pkg/secretsencrypt/config.go:190-204 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:831` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) pkg/authenticator/passwordfile/passwordfile.go:55— pkg/authenticator/passwordfile/passwordfile.go:55-66 | pkg/passwd/passwd.go:37-48 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/authenticator/passwordfile/passwordfile.go:55` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) pkg/cli/secretsencrypt/secrets_encrypt.go:32— pkg/cli/secretsencrypt/secrets_encrypt.go:32-43 | pkg/cli/token/token.go:178-189 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/cli/secretsencrypt/secrets_encrypt.go:32` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:174— pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:174-184 | pkg/cli/etcdsnapshot/etcd_snapshot.go:292-302 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) pkg/clientaccess/token.go:315— pkg/clientaccess/token.go:315-325 | pkg/clientaccess/token.go:347-357 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) cmd/server/main.go:58— cmd/server/main.go:58-64 | main.go:36-42 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/server/main.go:58` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:536— pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:536-542 | pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:563-569 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:536` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) pkg/agent/flannel/flannel.go:242— pkg/agent/flannel/flannel.go:242-247 | pkg/agent/flannel/flannel.go:276-281 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/agent/flannel/flannel.go:242` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:356— pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:356-361 | pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:742-747 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:356` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
server.run (cyclomatic 103) pkg/cli/server/server.go:59— server.run has cyclomatic complexity 103 (threshold 15). Of this number, 99 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
config.get (cyclomatic 52) pkg/agent/config/config.go:439— config.get has cyclomatic complexity 52 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData (cyclomatic 40) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:718— ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData has cyclomatic complexity 40 (threshold 15). Of this number, 26 points are the body's own statements and 14 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
agent.run (cyclomatic 36) pkg/agent/run.go:55— agent.run has cyclomatic complexity 36 (threshold 15). Of this number, 33 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Cluster.ReconcileBootstrapData (cyclomatic 34) pkg/cluster/bootstrap.go:248— Cluster.ReconcileBootstrapData has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Config.Start (cyclomatic 33) pkg/spegel/spegel.go:116— Config.Start has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). Of this number, 29 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
etcdSnapshotHandler.reconcile (cyclomatic 32) pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:173— etcdSnapshotHandler.reconcile has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15). Of this number, 26 points are the body's own statements and 6 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ETCD.Reset (cyclomatic 28) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:321— ETCD.Reset has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 13 of the 28 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 324). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
handler.updateCoreDNSConfigMap (cyclomatic 28) pkg/node/controller.go:77— handler.updateCoreDNSConfigMap has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
handlers.encryptionEnable (cyclomatic 27) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:139— handlers.encryptionEnable has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ETCD.snapshot (cyclomatic 26) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:221— ETCD.snapshot has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
deps.genClientCerts (cyclomatic 25) pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:330— deps.genClientCerts has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
main.extract (cyclomatic 24) cmd/k3s/main.go:259— main.extract has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
handlers.encryptionStatus (cyclomatic 24) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:77— handlers.encryptionStatus has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
flannel.createFlannelConf (cyclomatic 23) pkg/agent/flannel/setup.go:173— flannel.createFlannelConf has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
netpol.Run (cyclomatic 23) pkg/agent/netpol/netpol.go:47— netpol.Run has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
cgroups.CheckCgroups (cyclomatic 23) pkg/cgroups/cgroups_linux.go:76— cgroups.CheckCgroups has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ETCD.manageLearners (cyclomatic 23) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1142— ETCD.manageLearners has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 4 of the 23 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 1151). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
agent.kubeletArgsAndConfig (cyclomatic 22) pkg/daemons/agent/agent_linux.go:71— agent.kubeletArgsAndConfig has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Controller.GetClient (cyclomatic 21) pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:124— Controller.GetClient has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
watchqueue.processImageEvent (cyclomatic 20) pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go:114— watchqueue.processImageEvent has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
containerd.getHostConfigs (cyclomatic 19) pkg/agent/containerd/config.go:145— containerd.getHostConfigs has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
k3s.InstanceMetadata (cyclomatic 19) pkg/cloudprovider/instances.go:38— k3s.InstanceMetadata has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ETCD.join (cyclomatic 19) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:564— ETCD.join has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
serverList.recordSuccess (cyclomatic 18) pkg/agent/loadbalancer/servers.go:200— serverList.recordSuccess has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Cluster.storageBootstrap (cyclomatic 18) pkg/cluster/storage.go:149— Cluster.storageBootstrap has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 10 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ETCD.RemovePeer (cyclomatic 18) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1078— ETCD.RemovePeer has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Controller.getConfigFromSecret (cyclomatic 18) pkg/etcd/s3/config_secret.go:32— Controller.getConfigFromSecret has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Cluster.Start (cyclomatic 17) pkg/cluster/cluster.go:46— Cluster.Start has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Of this number, 9 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ETCDConfig.ToConfigFile (cyclomatic 17) pkg/daemons/executor/executor.go:104— ETCDConfig.ToConfigFile has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
embed.New (cyclomatic 17) pkg/executor/embed/embed.go:70— embed.New has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
k3s.podIPs (cyclomatic 16) pkg/cloudprovider/servicelb.go:326— k3s.podIPs has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
configfilearg.readConfigFile (cyclomatic 16) pkg/configfilearg/parser.go:246— configfilearg.readConfigFile has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
etcdSnapshotHandler.sync (cyclomatic 16) pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:71— etcdSnapshotHandler.sync has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
rootless.createParentOpt (cyclomatic 16) pkg/rootless/rootless.go:133— rootless.createParentOpt has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
secretsencrypt.GetEncryptionConfigMetrics (cyclomatic 16) pkg/secretsencrypt/config.go:320— secretsencrypt.GetEncryptionConfigMetrics has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 4 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 338). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
server.printTokens (cyclomatic 16) pkg/server/server.go:360— server.printTokens has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
handlers.reencryptAndRemoveKey (cyclomatic 16) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:394— handlers.reencryptAndRemoveKey has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
server.run (cognitive 169) pkg/cli/server/server.go:59— server.run has cognitive complexity 169 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 146, boolean chains 14, loops 9 (nesting depth added 58). Of this number, 164 points are the body's own statements and 5 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
config.get (cognitive 65) pkg/agent/config/config.go:439— config.get has cognitive complexity 65 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 61, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData (cognitive 64) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:718— ETCD.reconcileSnapshotData has cognitive complexity 64 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 50, loops 9, boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 22). Of this number, 41 points are the body's own statements and 23 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cluster.ReconcileBootstrapData (cognitive 57) pkg/cluster/bootstrap.go:248— Cluster.ReconcileBootstrapData has cognitive complexity 57 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 51, boolean chains 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.snapshot (cognitive 54) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:221— ETCD.snapshot has cognitive complexity 54 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 53, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 25). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agentTunnel.watchPods (cognitive 52) pkg/agent/tunnel/tunnel.go:232— agentTunnel.watchPods has cognitive complexity 52 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 35, loops 15, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 36). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
etcdSnapshotHandler.reconcile (cognitive 52) pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:173— etcdSnapshotHandler.reconcile has cognitive complexity 52 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 42, loops 6, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 20). Of this number, 44 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.Reset (cognitive 50) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:321— ETCD.Reset has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 47, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 24). Of this number, 25 points are the body's own statements and 25 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
cgroups.CheckCgroups (cognitive 47) pkg/cgroups/cgroups_linux.go:76— cgroups.CheckCgroups has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31, loops 10, boolean chains 3, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.RemovePeer (cognitive 44) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1078— ETCD.RemovePeer has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 38, loops 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 27). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Config.Start (cognitive 41) pkg/spegel/spegel.go:116— Config.Start has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 36, boolean chains 3, loops 2 (nesting depth added 6). Of this number, 35 points are the body's own statements and 6 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
containerd.getHostConfigs (cognitive 40) pkg/agent/containerd/config.go:145— containerd.getHostConfigs has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 33, loops 5, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handler.updateCoreDNSConfigMap (cognitive 40) pkg/node/controller.go:77— handler.updateCoreDNSConfigMap has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 35, loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
main.extract (cognitive 39) cmd/k3s/main.go:259— main.extract has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 36, boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
flannel.createFlannelConf (cognitive 38) pkg/agent/flannel/setup.go:173— flannel.createFlannelConf has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 26, loops 8, match/switch 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handlers.encryptionStatus (cognitive 38) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:77— handlers.encryptionStatus has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24, boolean chains 7, loops 7 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agent.run (cognitive 37) pkg/agent/run.go:55— agent.run has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, boolean chains 12 (nesting depth added 4). Of this number, 34 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
server.printTokens (cognitive 37) pkg/server/server.go:360— server.printTokens has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 37 (nesting depth added 22). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.join (cognitive 35) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:564— ETCD.join has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, boolean chains 3, loops 3 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Client.ListSnapshots (cognitive 35) pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:476— Client.ListSnapshots has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 33, loops 2 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cluster.Start (cognitive 34) pkg/cluster/cluster.go:46— Cluster.Start has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 28, match/switch 3, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 19). Most of this is not in the body itself: 10 of the 34 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 80). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
ETCD.manageLearners (cognitive 34) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1142— ETCD.manageLearners has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27, loops 5, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 13). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 34 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 1151). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
embed.New (cognitive 33) pkg/executor/embed/embed.go:70— embed.New has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 28, loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
serverList.recordSuccess (cognitive 31) pkg/agent/loadbalancer/servers.go:200— serverList.recordSuccess has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, match/switch 4, loops 2 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cluster.storageBootstrap (cognitive 31) pkg/cluster/storage.go:149— Cluster.storageBootstrap has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31 (nesting depth added 12). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 15 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TunnelServer.onChangePod (cognitive 31) pkg/daemons/control/tunnel.go:143— TunnelServer.onChangePod has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 26, loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 21). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Controller.getConfigFromSecret (cognitive 31) pkg/etcd/s3/config_secret.go:32— Controller.getConfigFromSecret has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, loops 6 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
handlers.encryptionEnable (cognitive 31) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:139— handlers.encryptionEnable has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 8, loops 2 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
configfilearg.readConfigFile (cognitive 30) pkg/configfilearg/parser.go:246— configfilearg.readConfigFile has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 7, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agent.kubeletArgsAndConfig (cognitive 30) pkg/daemons/agent/agent_linux.go:71— agent.kubeletArgsAndConfig has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
deps.genClientCerts (cognitive 30) pkg/daemons/control/deps/deps.go:330— deps.genClientCerts has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 30 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
Controller.GetClient (cognitive 30) pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:124— Controller.GetClient has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handler.toBindPorts (cognitive 30) pkg/rootlessports/controller.go:128— handler.toBindPorts has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, loops 10 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
netpol.Run (cognitive 28) pkg/agent/netpol/netpol.go:47— netpol.Run has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 6). Of this number, 19 points are the body's own statements and 9 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TunnelServer.dialBackend (cognitive 27) pkg/daemons/control/tunnel.go:206— TunnelServer.dialBackend has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
util.GetArgs (cognitive 27) pkg/util/args.go:27— util.GetArgs has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 6 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCDConfig.ToConfigFile (cognitive 26) pkg/daemons/executor/executor.go:104— ETCDConfig.ToConfigFile has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, match/switch 5, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.DeleteSnapshots (cognitive 26) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:554— ETCD.DeleteSnapshots has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, loops 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
watchqueue.processImageEvent (cognitive 25) pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go:114— watchqueue.processImageEvent has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agentTunnel.startWatches (cognitive 24) pkg/agent/tunnel/tunnel.go:110— agentTunnel.startWatches has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 10). Of this number, 23 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
k3s.InstanceMetadata (cognitive 24) pkg/cloudprovider/instances.go:38— k3s.InstanceMetadata has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 8, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Parser.findStart (cognitive 24) pkg/configfilearg/parser.go:189— Parser.findStart has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
etcdSnapshotHandler.sync (cognitive 24) pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go:71— etcdSnapshotHandler.sync has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 11 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
rootless.createParentOpt (cognitive 24) pkg/rootless/rootless.go:133— rootless.createParentOpt has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
serverBootstrapper.Get (cognitive 24) pkg/spegel/bootstrap.go:192— serverBootstrapper.Get has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
containerd.prePullImages (cognitive 23) pkg/agent/containerd/containerd.go:432— containerd.prePullImages has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
cert.rotate (cognitive 23) pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:258— cert.rotate has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 4 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
k3s.podIPs (cognitive 23) pkg/cloudprovider/servicelb.go:326— k3s.podIPs has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 3, loops 3 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cluster.Bootstrap (cognitive 22) pkg/cluster/bootstrap.go:37— Cluster.Bootstrap has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
containerd.watchImages (cognitive 21) pkg/agent/containerd/watcher.go:288— containerd.watchImages has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, match/switch 10, loops 1 (nesting depth added 13). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 21 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 312). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
cluster.Save (cognitive 21) pkg/cluster/storage.go:65— cluster.Save has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Parser.FindString (cognitive 21) pkg/configfilearg/parser.go:106— Parser.FindString has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 3 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
etcd.ClientURLs (cognitive 21) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1460— etcd.ClientURLs has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 4, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
etcdMemberHandler.sync (cognitive 21) pkg/etcd/member_controller.go:41— etcdMemberHandler.sync has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
watcher.listFilesIn (cognitive 20) pkg/deploy/controller.go:121— watcher.listFilesIn has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
File.ToETCDSnapshotFile (cognitive 20) pkg/etcd/snapshot/types.go:182— File.ToETCDSnapshotFile has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
server.writeKubeConfig (cognitive 20) pkg/server/server.go:416— server.writeKubeConfig has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
flannel.LookupExtInterface (cognitive 19) pkg/agent/flannel/flannel.go:133— flannel.LookupExtInterface has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agentTunnel.authorized (cognitive 19) pkg/agent/tunnel/tunnel.go:340— agentTunnel.authorized has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agent.extractConfigArgs (cognitive 19) pkg/daemons/agent/agent.go:103— agent.extractConfigArgs has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.Register (cognitive 19) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:651— ETCD.Register has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (nesting depth added 10). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handler.serviceChanged (cognitive 19) pkg/rootlessports/controller.go:69— handler.serviceChanged has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 7 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
util.getIPFromInterface (cognitive 19) pkg/util/net.go:269— util.getIPFromInterface has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agent.waitForAPIServerAddresses (cognitive 18) pkg/agent/run.go:493— agent.waitForAPIServerAddresses has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, loops 4, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
agent.Run (cognitive 18) pkg/cli/agent/agent.go:31— agent.Run has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 3). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
secretsencrypt.Status (cognitive 18) pkg/cli/secretsencrypt/secrets_encrypt.go:88— secretsencrypt.Status has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
k3s.getStatus (cognitive 18) pkg/cloudprovider/servicelb.go:258— k3s.getStatus has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, loops 6, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
etcd.backupDirWithRetention (cognitive 18) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:1559— etcd.backupDirWithRetention has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.Test (cognitive 18) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:199— ETCD.Test has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
handlers.reencryptAndRemoveKey (cognitive 18) pkg/server/handlers/secrets-encrypt.go:394— handlers.reencryptAndRemoveKey has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, boolean chains 4, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
containerd.labelContent (cognitive 17) pkg/agent/containerd/containerd.go:340— containerd.labelContent has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 6 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
flannel.syncAnnotations (cognitive 17) pkg/agent/flannel/setup.go:285— flannel.syncAnnotations has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Cluster.shouldBootstrapLoad (cognitive 17) pkg/cluster/bootstrap.go:91— Cluster.shouldBootstrapLoad has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TunnelServer.onChangeNode (cognitive 17) pkg/daemons/control/tunnel.go:118— TunnelServer.onChangeNode has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
deploy.Stage (cognitive 17) pkg/deploy/stage.go:22— deploy.Stage has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, loops 5, jumps 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ETCD.Start (cognitive 17) pkg/etcd/etcd.go:435— ETCD.Start has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 6). Of this number, 14 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
File.FromETCDSnapshotFile (cognitive 17) pkg/etcd/snapshot/types.go:118— File.FromETCDSnapshotFile has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
secretsencrypt.GetEncryptionConfigMetrics (cognitive 17) pkg/secretsencrypt/config.go:320— secretsencrypt.GetEncryptionConfigMetrics has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 3). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 338). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
containerd.getDigests (cognitive 16) pkg/agent/containerd/containerd.go:378— containerd.getDigests has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 4 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
serverList.setAddresses (cognitive 16) pkg/agent/loadbalancer/servers.go:39— serverList.setAddresses has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 4). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
cert.backupCertificates (cognitive 16) pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:324— cert.backupCertificates has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 3 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
token.list (cognitive 16) pkg/cli/token/token.go:199— token.list has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
k3s.newDaemonSet (cognitive 16) pkg/cloudprovider/servicelb.go:431— k3s.newDaemonSet has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 2, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
deploy.walkFiles (cognitive 16) pkg/deploy/controller.go:172— deploy.walkFiles has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (nesting depth added 8). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 16 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 174). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
watcher.delete (cognitive 16) pkg/deploy/controller.go:294— watcher.delete has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Embedded.Bootstrap (cognitive 16) pkg/executor/embed/embed.go:137— Embedded.Bootstrap has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handlers.validateBootstrap (cognitive 16) pkg/server/handlers/cert.go:134— handlers.validateBootstrap has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
handlers.validateCA (cognitive 16) pkg/server/handlers/cert.go:172— handlers.validateCA has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
util.GetAddressesFromSlices (cognitive 16) pkg/util/api.go:55— util.GetAddressesFromSlices has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7, loops 7, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D20 · ADR Quality· Consequences are only Good and Bad (no trade-offs) with no detail on how much new dependency is added · ×1
Consequences are only Good and Bad (no trade-offs) with no detail on how much new dependency is added docs/adrs/add-auto-import-containerd.md— Add a Consequences section noting the exact new dependency name and its version so the trade-off is clear
D20 · ADR Quality· Context and consequences are boilerplate filler; the body states neither what decisions were recorded nor any trade-offs · ×1
Context and consequences are boilerplate filler; the body states neither what decisions were recorded nor any trade-offs docs/adrs/record-architecture-decisions.md— Replace Context with a real problem (e.g. lack of centralized decision archive) and Consequences with actual trade-offs (e.g. maintenance burden, linking overhead) plus an adoption path
D20 · ADR Quality· Consequences are thin and trade-offs are not stated (e.g. false positives from non-status changes) · ×1
Consequences are thin and trade-offs are not stated (e.g. false positives from non-status changes) docs/adrs/status-for-etcd-node.md— Add a Consequences section noting any negative risks such as falsely assuming a node is healthy when it isn't
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) cmd/server/main.go:81— cmd/server/main.go:81-99 | main.go:51-69 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `cmd/server/main.go:81` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:113— pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:113-128 | pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:164-179 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/etcd/snapshot.go:113` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:203— pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:203-216 | pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:262-275 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/cli/cert/cert.go:203` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) pkg/agent/config/config.go:250— pkg/agent/config/config.go:250-262 | pkg/agent/config/config.go:355-367 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/agent/config/config.go:250` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) pkg/etcd/snapshot_handler.go:71— pkg/etcd/snapshot_handler.go:71-78 | pkg/etcd/snapshot_handler.go:88-95 | pkg/etcd/snapshot_handler.go:105-112 | pkg/etcd/snapshot_handler.go:122-129 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) pkg/util/patch.go:68— pkg/util/patch.go:68-75 | pkg/util/patch.go:86-93 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `pkg/util/patch.go:68` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:450— pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:450-454 | pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:462-466 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 manifests/local-storage.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 manifests/local-storage.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 manifests/local-storage.yaml— Memory not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0003 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0018 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— Memory not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0020 manifests/metrics-server/metrics-server-deployment.yaml— Runs with UID <= 10000 One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Low: grpc-client-insecure-connection pkg/agent/cri/cri.go:27— Found an insecure gRPC connection using 'grpc.WithInsecure()'. This creates a connection without encryption to a gRPC server. A malicious attacker could tamper with the gRPC message, which could compromise the machine. Instead, establish a secure connection with an SSL certificate using the 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials()' function. You can create a create credentials using a 'tls.Config{}' struct with 'credentials.NewTLS()'. The final fix looks like this: 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(<config>))'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/clientaccess/token.go:41— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/clientaccess/token.go:272— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/etcd/etcd.go:878— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/etcd/etcdproxy.go:23— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:183— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/etcd/s3/s3.go:585— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 35 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: pkg/agent/tunnel/tunnel.go, pkg/cluster/bootstrap.go, pkg/daemons/control/server.go, pkg/agent/containerd/containerd.go, pkg/agent/loadbalancer/servers.go, pkg/etcd/snapshot_controller.go, pkg/spegel/spegel.go, pkg/util/net.go (+27 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The non-Linux prerequisites section recommends Docker with the Dapper build environment but does not state how to run builds locally on a non-WSL2 system, which is critical for contributors who cannot use WSL2. · ×1
The non-Linux prerequisites section recommends Docker with the Dapper build environment but does not state how to run builds locally on a non-WSL2 system, which is critical for contributors who cannot use WSL2. docs/contrib/development.md— Add a brief note under Windows Setup or macOS Setup about local builds on non-WSL2 environments.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The Drone pipeline section mentions the URLs <drone-pr.k3s.io> and <drone-publish.k3s.io>, but there is no guidance on how to test locally against these clusters. · ×1
The Drone pipeline section mentions the URLs <drone-pr.k3s.io> and <drone-publish.k3s.io>, but there is no guidance on how to test locally against these clusters. docs/contrib/continuous_integration.md— Add a short 'Running locally' subsection noting that PR builds can be triggered against drone-pr.k3s.io without cluster access.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 5 of 101 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: pkg/untar/untar.go, pkg/dataverify/dataverify.go, pkg/authenticator/passwordfile/passwordfile.go (and 2 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (.github/.codecov.yml) and a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
—
Run 019fd5ef-a972-719b-996d-150aabf71499 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 16 · Warnings: 202 · Recommendations: 28 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 07:18 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.