Public report — web-api-project, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 3,408 LoC · 4 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (35%)
Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (1 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'memoryCache' of 'ProductController.ProductController(ILogger<ProductController>, IProductService, IMemoryCache)'
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
7findings with an exact file:lineof 56 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
50/97dimensions across the health lenses3408 LoC · 4 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
kawser2133/web-api-project carries serious risk (46%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (35%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (45%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Extend structured logging across the projects you operate (Observability); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning).
For scale: Small (~3,408 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×1.0) — service/app, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'memoryCache' of 'ProductController.ProductController(ILogger<ProductController>, IProductService, IMemoryCache)'.
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'memoryCache' of 'ProductController.ProductController(ILogger<ProductController>, IProductService, IMemoryCache)'.
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
17 modules, 22 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Adequate · gated by D18
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
12
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build and test every code change. Next, improve observability by implementing structured logging and diagnostic hooks across all services. Then, immediately remove a leaked secret from the configuration files. Finally, update one deprecated dependency and patch one vulnerable package to ensure security and stability.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 2 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 50% slop · 0% mixed · 50% near-clean.
File
Score
Band
Worst signal
Project.API/appsettings.json
3.0
Slop
Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
Project.API/Program.cs
9.5
Near-clean
Comment Value: redundant comment
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 47 of 50 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 50 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 7 of 56 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
3 test methods: 3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2876 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The single README is a solid project description for an ASP.NET Core API with clear structure (src/Core/Infrastructure/API directories), a direct reference to the author's blog post, and a step-by-step getting-started guide. It begins well but clips mid-sentence in 'This' before covering features, usage, authors/contributing, and license — all present in the outline — so those sections are not yet visible. The structure is consistent with the referenced architecture docs; the visible content is adequate for a one-file README.
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The single README is a solid project description for an ASP.NET Core API with clear structure (src/Core/Infrastructure/API directories), a direct reference to the author's blog post, and a step-by-step getting-started guide. It begins well but clips mid-sentence in 'This' before covering features, usage, authors/contributing, and license — all present in the outline — so those sections are not yet visible. The structure is consistent with the referenced architecture docs; the visible content is adequate for a one-file README.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The interface `IBaseRepository<T>` contains methods with inconsistent naming conventions. Specifically, `IsExists` is used for existence checks, while `GetAll`, `GetById`, `CreateRange`, and `GetPaginatedData` follow a 'Get/Create' pattern. However, `Update` and `PriceCheck` do not follow the 'Get/Create/Update' pattern consistently (e.g., `Update` vs `CreateRange`). More importantly, the method `IsExists` is a non-standard name for a repository query method, whereas `GetAll` and `GetById` are standard. A more consistent approach would be to use `Exists` or `GetBy...` for all query methods, or `Find`/`Get` for all. The mix of `IsExists` with `Get...` methods is inconsistent.
The `IUserService` interface uses a mix of naming conventions for its methods. It uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete` which is a standard CRUD pattern. However, it also includes `ResetPassword` which is a specific action, not a standard CRUD operation. While not strictly an inconsistency in the CRUD verbs, the interface mixes standard repository-like verbs (`Get`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`) with domain-specific actions (`ResetPassword`). A more consistent approach might be to separate domain actions from generic CRUD operations, or ensure all methods follow a similar naming pattern (e.g., `ResetPassword` is fine, but `GetAll` and `GetById` are also fine. The real inconsistency is between `IUserService` and `IProductService`/`IRoleService` which might have different patterns. Let's look at `IProductService`.
The `IProductService` interface uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. This is consistent with `IUserService`. However, `IProductService` also has `PriceCheck` and `GetPaginatedData`. `IUserService` has `GetPaginatedData` as well. The inconsistency is not within the interface but potentially between `IUserService` and `IRoleService`. Let's check `IRoleService`.
The `IRoleService` interface is missing `GetAll` and `GetById` methods, or they are not listed in the sample. If `IRoleService` does not have `GetAll`/`GetById` while `IUserService` and `IProductService` do, this is an inconsistency in the service layer's public API. Additionally, `IRoleService` has `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. It lacks `Get...` methods in the provided list, which might be a missing implementation or a different naming convention (e.g., `Find` vs `Get`).
What to do
Resolve the 1 The interface `IBaseRepository<T>` contains methods with inconsistent… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The `IUserService` interface uses a mix of naming conventions for its… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The `IProductService` interface uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`,… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
12 valuable / 1 redundant across 69 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
redundant commentProject.API/Program.cs:121
What to do
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
99 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2Project.API/appsettings.json:14detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
[AllowAnonymous] (4) outweighs [Authorize] (3) — review whether the open surface is intended.
What to do
Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — SecurityExtension.cs:28
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 3, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 54/58 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×4) — ApplicationDbContextSeed.cs:11, AuthController.cs:37, AuthController.cs:89, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×4) — RequestResponseLoggingMiddleware.cs:40, RequestResponseLoggingMiddleware.cs:41, RequestResponseLoggingMiddleware.cs:46, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 47 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — test suite did not build
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 2876 LoC the codebase is tiny and single-purpose despite four projects, so explicit boundaries are unnecessary.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.1 — AutoMapper 12.0.1 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.2 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Npgsql 7.0.4 — Npgsql 7.0.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Leaked secret: signing-key Project.API/appsettings.json:21— signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not measured · ×1
Test reliability not measured — test suite did not build — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: this repository did not build in our analyzer environment (a C#/MSBuild compiler error), so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a defect. We did not read WHERE the failing diagnostic is, so this does not claim the fault is in your test code — a repository written for an older SDK band can compile for you and not for us. Run `dotnet build` on this commit: if it succeeds, the gap is ours and nothing here is a defect in your code.
Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 1), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'memoryCache' of 'ProductController.ProductController(ILogger<ProductController>, IProductService, IMemoryCache)'.
Off the main sequence: Project.Core — Project.Core: abstractness 0.27, instability 0.00, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository did not build in our analyzer environment (a C#/MSBuild compiler error), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. We did not read WHERE the failing diagnostic is, so this does not claim the fault is in your test code — a repository written for an older SDK band can compile for you and not for us. Run `dotnet build` on this commit; if it succeeds, the gap is ours. Committing the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces also lets us measure real coverage without building anything.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The interface `IBaseRepository<T>` contains methods with inconsistent naming conventions. Specifically, `IsExists` is used for existence checks, while `GetAll`, `GetById`, `CreateRange`, and `GetPaginatedData` follow a 'Get/Create' pattern. However, `Update` and `PriceCheck` do not follow the 'Get/Create/Update' pattern consistently (e.g., `Update` vs `CreateRange`). More importantly, the method `IsExists` is a non-standard name for a repository query method, whereas `GetAll` and `GetById` are standard. A more consistent approach would be to use `Exists` or `GetBy...` for all query methods, or `Find`/`Get` for all. The mix of `IsExists` with `Get...` methods is inconsistent. · ×1
The interface `IBaseRepository<T>` contains methods with inconsistent naming conventions. Specifically, `IsExists` is used for existence checks, while `GetAll`, `GetById`, `CreateRange`, and `GetPaginatedData` follow a 'Get/Create' pattern. However, `Update` and `PriceCheck` do not follow the 'Get/Create/Update' pattern consistently (e.g., `Update` vs `CreateRange`). More importantly, the method `IsExists` is a non-standard name for a repository query method, whereas `GetAll` and `GetById` are standard. A more consistent approach would be to use `Exists` or `GetBy...` for all query methods, or `Find`/`Get` for all. The mix of `IsExists` with `Get...` methods is inconsistent. — Standardize query methods to use `Get...` or `Find...` pattern (e.g., `Exists` or `GetBy...`) and update `IsExists` to `Exists` or `GetBy...` to match the rest of the repository interface. (symbols: Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.IsExists<Tvalue>(string, Tvalue, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.GetAll(System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.GetAll(System.Collections.Generic.List<System.Linq.Expressions.Expression<System.Func<T, object>>>, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.GetById<Tid>(Tid, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.CreateRange(System.Collections.Generic.List<T>, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.GetPaginatedData(int, int, System.Collections.Generic.List<Project.Core.Common.ExpressionFilter>, string, string, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.GetOrderByExpression<T>(string), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.Update(Project.Core.Entities.Business.UserUpdateViewModel), Project.Core.Interfaces.IRepositories.IBaseRepository<T>.PriceCheck(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken))
D21 · Naming Consistency· The `IUserService` interface uses a mix of naming conventions for its methods. It uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete` which is a standard CRUD pattern. However, it also includes `ResetPassword` which is a specific action, not a standard CRUD operation. While not strictly an inconsistency in the CRUD verbs, the interface mixes standard repository-like verbs (`Get`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`) with domain-specific actions (`ResetPassword`). A more consistent approach might be to separate domain actions from generic CRUD operations, or ensure all methods follow a similar naming pattern (e.g., `ResetPassword` is fine, but `GetAll` and `GetById` are also fine. The real inconsistency is between `IUserService` and `IProductService`/`IRoleService` which might have different patterns. Let's look at `IProductService`. · ×1
The `IUserService` interface uses a mix of naming conventions for its methods. It uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete` which is a standard CRUD pattern. However, it also includes `ResetPassword` which is a specific action, not a standard CRUD operation. While not strictly an inconsistency in the CRUD verbs, the interface mixes standard repository-like verbs (`Get`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`) with domain-specific actions (`ResetPassword`). A more consistent approach might be to separate domain actions from generic CRUD operations, or ensure all methods follow a similar naming pattern (e.g., `ResetPassword` is fine, but `GetAll` and `GetById` are also fine. The real inconsistency is between `IUserService` and `IProductService`/`IRoleService` which might have different patterns. Let's look at `IProductService`. — Ensure all service interfaces follow the same CRUD pattern. If `IUserService` has `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`, then `IProductService` and `IRoleService` should also follow this pattern. Check if `IProductService` uses `GetAll`/`GetById` or `Find`/`Get`. If `IProductService` uses `GetAll`/`GetById`, then it is consistent. If it uses `FindAll`/`FindById`, then there is an inconsistency between services. (symbols: Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.GetAll(System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.GetById(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.Create(Project.Core.Entities.Business.UserCreateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.Update(Project.Core.Entities.Business.UserUpdateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.Delete(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.ResetPassword(Project.Core.Entities.Business.ResetPasswordViewModel), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IUserService.GetPaginatedData(int, int, System.Collections.Generic.List<Project.Core.Common.ExpressionFilter>, string, string, System.Threading.CancellationToken))
D21 · Naming Consistency· The `IProductService` interface uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. This is consistent with `IUserService`. However, `IProductService` also has `PriceCheck` and `GetPaginatedData`. `IUserService` has `GetPaginatedData` as well. The inconsistency is not within the interface but potentially between `IUserService` and `IRoleService`. Let's check `IRoleService`. · ×1
The `IProductService` interface uses `GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. This is consistent with `IUserService`. However, `IProductService` also has `PriceCheck` and `GetPaginatedData`. `IUserService` has `GetPaginatedData` as well. The inconsistency is not within the interface but potentially between `IUserService` and `IRoleService`. Let's check `IRoleService`. — Ensure all service interfaces (`IUserService`, `IProductService`, `IRoleService`) use the same set of CRUD verbs (`GetAll`, `GetById`, `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`). If `IRoleService` uses `FindAll` or `Get` instead of `GetAll`/`GetById`, that is an inconsistency. (symbols: Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.GetAll(System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.GetById(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.Create(Project.Core.Entities.Business.ProductCreateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.Update(Project.Core.Entities.Business.ProductUpdateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.Delete(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.PriceCheck(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IProductService.GetPaginatedData(int, int, System.Collections.Generic.List<Project.Core.Common.ExpressionFilter>, string, string, System.Threading.CancellationToken))
D21 · Naming Consistency· The `IRoleService` interface is missing `GetAll` and `GetById` methods, or they are not listed in the sample. If `IRoleService` does not have `GetAll`/`GetById` while `IUserService` and `IProductService` do, this is an inconsistency in the service layer's public API. Additionally, `IRoleService` has `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. It lacks `Get...` methods in the provided list, which might be a missing implementation or a different naming convention (e.g., `Find` vs `Get`). · ×1
The `IRoleService` interface is missing `GetAll` and `GetById` methods, or they are not listed in the sample. If `IRoleService` does not have `GetAll`/`GetById` while `IUserService` and `IProductService` do, this is an inconsistency in the service layer's public API. Additionally, `IRoleService` has `Create`, `Update`, `Delete`. It lacks `Get...` methods in the provided list, which might be a missing implementation or a different naming convention (e.g., `Find` vs `Get`). — Add `GetAll` and `GetById` (or `FindAll`/`FindById`) to `IRoleService` to match `IUserService` and `IProductService`. Ensure the naming convention for retrieval methods is consistent across all service interfaces. (symbols: Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IRoleService.Create(Project.Core.Entities.Business.RoleCreateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IRoleService.Delete(int, System.Threading.CancellationToken), Project.Core.Interfaces.IServices.IRoleService.Update(Project.Core.Entities.Business.RoleUpdateViewModel, System.Threading.CancellationToken))
redundant comment Project.API/Program.cs:121— "Add this line to configure routing" — delete - the Configure/UseEndpoints call is self-describing
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (39 commit(s) sampled).
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fc8af-dd74-75f2-98ed-eca24aaefb9e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 7 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 11 · Warnings: 11 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 26 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 17:33 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.