Public report — magic-bottle, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
123findings with an exact file:lineof 132 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
31/102dimensions across the health lenses14629 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
kellen0903/magic-bottle carries serious gaps (35%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (29%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives).
For scale: Small (~14,629 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
192 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 35% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€14,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
58 modules, 75 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
Medium
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
50
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
6
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test every change, which will also serve as the foundation for automated security scanning. Integrate static analysis tools to fail the build on security regressions, ensuring vulnerabilities are caught early. Next, improve accessibility by adding text alternatives for media and ensuring all custom controls are keyboard-operable. Finally, correct page structure and semantic markup to ensure proper document hierarchy and navigation.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 29 of 31 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 123 of 132 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 8 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×5bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/jpush/JpushMessageUtil.java:38detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 5 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with JpushMessageUtil.java (2), user.js (2), application.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping · ×50bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/count/ChatGoupByCountController.java:26detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 50 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with TagController.java (8), ChatController.java (5), MessageController.java (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×29web-admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×18web-admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2web-admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]web-admin/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 29 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (29). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (29 issue-level).
Resolve the 18 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — post-info.vue:20, screen-add-or-update.vue:17, emotion.html:32
A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. — scrawl.html:14
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×14) — anchor.html:16, insertframe.html:21, insertframe.html:25, …
The fieldset's <legend> has no text, so the control group has no name. Put descriptive text in the <legend>. (×5) — charts.html:17, charts.html:31, charts.html:48, …
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×5) — charts.html:77, charts.html:78, gmap.html:22, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. — main-content.vue:25
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×8) — anchor.html:3, attachment.html:2, background.html:2, …
An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>. (×3) — anchor.html:3, emotion.html:2, gmap.html:3
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×8) — anchor.html:3, attachment.html:2, background.html:2, …
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — background.html:2
An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. (×3) — charts.html:12, charts.html:14, charts.html:71
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — gmap.html:18
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — login.vue:24, main-navbar.vue:4
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`#search #searchBtn` sets color: white on background-color: #3b97d7 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — image.css:786
`.el-date-table td.disabled div` sets color: #c0c4cc on background-color: #f5f7fa — 1.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. This is a MINIFIED, build-generated sheet — editing the literal here is undone by the next vendor drop or rebuild, so override the rule in your own stylesheet (or fix it upstream / in the source the bundle is built from). (×12) — index.css:1, index.css:1, index.css:1, …
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
The root README is 104 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~49 lines of test source are present (.java, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (7 event handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): an Axon event-sourcing framework (@Aggregate/@CommandHandler/@EventSourcingHandler annotations); 7 type(s) with @CommandHandler methods
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— babel-traverse 6.26.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; babel-traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— cipher-base 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— ejs 0.8.8: [GHSA redacted] — ejs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.5.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.8.8, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.8.8; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ejs 0.8.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against ejs 0.8.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— ejs 2.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — ejs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.1.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.7.4, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.7.4; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ejs 2.7.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ejs 2.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— eventsource 1.0.7: [GHSA redacted] — eventsource is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin eventsource to 1.1.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— form-data 2.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.1.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.1.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— fsevents 1.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — fsevents is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fsevents to 1.2.11 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against fsevents 1.2.4: [GHSA redacted], MAL-2023-462.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— growl 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — growl is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin growl to 1.10.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— handlebars 4.0.11: [GHSA redacted] — handlebars is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin handlebars to 4.7.9 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 17 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against handlebars 4.0.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.7.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.7.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 17 advisories this scan raises against handlebars 4.0.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— json-schema 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — json-schema is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json-schema to 0.4.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— loader-utils 0.2.17: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.4.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.2.17, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.2.17; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— loader-utils 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— lodash 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares lodash 4.17.13 directly, at or above the fixed 4.17.12; the vulnerable 1.0.2 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or pin lodash with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 1.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against lodash 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— lodash.defaultsdeep 4.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — lodash.defaultsdeep is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash.defaultsdeep to 4.6.1 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against lodash.defaultsdeep 4.6.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— macaddress 0.2.8: [GHSA redacted] — macaddress is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin macaddress to 0.2.9 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— merge-options 0.0.64: [GHSA redacted] — merge-options is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.0.64, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.0.64; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— minimist 0.0.10: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 0.2.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 0.0.10, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 0.0.10: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— minimist 0.0.8: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 0.2.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 0.0.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 0.0.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— minimist 1.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 1.2.6 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimist 1.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 1.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— mixin-deep 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — mixin-deep is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin mixin-deep to 1.3.2 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— netmask 1.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — netmask is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin netmask to 1.1.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against netmask 1.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— pbkdf2 3.0.16: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against pbkdf2 3.0.16: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— set-value 0.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — set-value is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.4.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.4.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against set-value 0.4.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— set-value 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — set-value is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin set-value to 2.0.1 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against set-value 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry).
+ 4 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×18
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— adm-zip 0.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — adm-zip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin adm-zip to 0.6.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— ansi-html 0.0.7: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-html is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-html to 0.0.8 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— ansi-regex 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-regex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-regex to 3.0.1 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— async 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — async is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin async to 2.6.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— axios 0.18.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.30.3. This is 1 of 24 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 0.18.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 24 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.18.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.18.2: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.18.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.18.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— braces 1.8.5: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.8.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.8.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— browserify-sign 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — browserify-sign is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin browserify-sign to 4.2.2 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares cross-spawn 5.0.1, but the vulnerable 3.0.1 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own cross-spawn entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (— 6.0.6 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 5.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.0.6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 5.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.0.6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 6.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares cross-spawn 5.0.1, but the vulnerable 6.0.5 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own cross-spawn entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin cross-spawn to 6.0.6 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— css-what 2.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — css-what is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin css-what to 2.1.3 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— debug 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — debug is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin debug to 2.6.9 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against debug 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— degenerator 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — degenerator is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.4, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.4; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×2
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— acorn 5.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — acorn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin acorn to 5.7.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— diff 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.5.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.4.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.4.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against diff 1.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.5.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.5.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against diff 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web-admin/package-lock.json— elliptic 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against elliptic 6.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 9 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/count/ChatGoupByCountController.java:26— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/count/PostGouyByCountController.java:26— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/count/UserGoupByCountController.java:28— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/ChatController.java:26— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/ChatController.java:38— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/ChatController.java:49— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/ChatController.java:60— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/ChatController.java:71— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/MessageController.java:34— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/MessageController.java:46— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/MessageController.java:57— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/MessageController.java:68— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/MessageController.java:79— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostController.java:45— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostController.java:57— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostController.java:70— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostController.java:90— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostController.java:101— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostReplyController.java:36— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostReplyController.java:48— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostReplyController.java:59— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostReplyController.java:70— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/PostReplyController.java:81— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/TagController.java:48— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/post/TagController.java:60— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/task/TestTask.java:121— bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/task/TestTask.java:121-125 | bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/task/TestTask.java:131-135 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/service/PostService.java:42— bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/service/PostService.java:42-46 | bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/service/PostService.java:103-107 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:159— bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:159-163 | bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/MessageController.java:98-102 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/utils/HttpRequestUtil.java:208— bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/utils/HttpRequestUtil.java:208-219 | bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/utils/HttpRequestUtil.java:385-396 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/utils/HttpRequestUtil.java:208` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:153— bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:153-164 | bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:208-219 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:153` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/config/ShiroConfig.java:58— bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/config/ShiroConfig.java:58-64 | bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/job/config/ScheduleConfig.java:41-50 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/oss/controller/SysOssController.java:122— bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/oss/controller/SysOssController.java:122-130 | bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/UploadController.java:45-51 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
WordFilter.doFilter (cognitive 23) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:130— WordFilter.doFilter has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 6 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WordFilter.isContains (cognitive 20) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:183— WordFilter.isContains has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 3 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WordFilter.addSensitiveWord (cognitive 19) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:97— WordFilter.addSensitiveWord has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 5, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
PostController.addBlack (cognitive 17) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/PostController.java:401— PostController.addBlack has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
StringUtil.getIpAddr (cognitive 16) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/utils/StringUtil.java:193— StringUtil.getIpAddr has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8, boolean chains 5, error handling 3 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TooManyMethods: CloudStorageConfig bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/oss/cloud/CloudStorageConfig.java:37— TooManyMethods — 39 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:98— bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:98-108 | bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:110-120 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/ChatController.java:98` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:133— bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:133-142 | bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:188-197 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `bottle-api/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/api/plugins/wordfilter/WordFilter.java:133` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/CommentController.java:99— bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/CommentController.java:99-107 | bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/web/TagController.java:33-41 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/query/handler/PostEventHandler.java:90— bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/query/handler/PostEventHandler.java:90-97 | bottle-command/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/command/query/handler/ReplyEventHandler.java:60-67 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/user/MagicUserController.java:121— bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/user/MagicUserController.java:121-126 | bottle-admin/src/main/java/com/teorange/magic/bottle/admin/modules/user/MagicUserController.java:135-140 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (3 author(s) across 20 commit(s) sampled).
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (20 commit(s) sampled).
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 4 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Maven POM and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D35 · Change Coupling· git history depth insufficient · ×1
git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fc985-f43b-72a5-8622-be73fd30b0e2 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 55 · Warnings: 68 · Recommendations: 5 · Info: 4 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 21:27 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.