Public report — KurrentDB-Client-Dotnet, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
124findings with an exact file:lineof 182 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
54/98dimensions across the health lenses11642 LoC · 20 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
kurrent-io/KurrentDB-Client-Dotnet is sound in substance but carries real gaps (56%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (97%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (91%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Maturity (47%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Readiness (50%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: build/run (quick start) section to the root README (Documentation (README)); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Small (~11,642 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
130 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
D17 · Dead code: DefaultRequestVersionHandler src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/DefaultRequestVersionHandler.cs
D17 · Dead code: SingleNodeHttpHandler src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/SingleNodeHttpHandler.cs
D17 · Dead code: EnsureCertificatesExist test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests.Common/Fixtures/CertificatesManager.cs
D17 · Dead code: OnStateChange test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests.Common/FluentDocker/TestBypassService.cs
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€32,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 47% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — library/CLI × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 47%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
22 modules, 19 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
11
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
7
Medium
Roadmap
Begin by adding a quick-start section to the root README to help new users get started immediately. Next, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated folder to preserve context and consequences. Then, integrate a static security analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Finally, ensure every release is versioned and gated behind a manual approval or draft state to prevent accidental deployments.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Test Quality: Skipped test: returns_all_created_users
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 124 of 182 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations: 4 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
5 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings at 45. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.GetFilterOptions at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
Resolve the 1 ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings (cyclomatic 45) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with StreamMetadataJsonConverter.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateInternalAsync (cyclomatic… finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings (cognitive 41) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with StreamMetadataJsonConverter.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PersistentSubscription.Subscribe (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with PersistentSubscription.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1712 test methods: 1712 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
14 skipped (6 with a documented reason), 42 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 428 tests.
No assertions: one_time · ×42test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/ProjectionManagementTests.cs:20
Resolve the 42 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs (16), ReadStreamMetaSecurityTests.cs (8), WriteStreamMetaSecurityTests.cs (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (42 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with ReadAllEventsBackwardTests.cs (3), ReadAllEventsForwardTests.cs (3), ListUserTests.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
6 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Read.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Resolve the 2 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 16 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs (3), KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Update.cs (2), X509Certificates.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Resolve the 12 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with SoftDeleteTests.cs (3), SubscribeToAllObsoleteTests.cs (2), ReportLeaderInterceptor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
3 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 528 exposed types.
Inconsistent naming for synchronous vs asynchronous subscription methods. 'SubscribeToStream' is synchronous (returns result immediately or wraps sync logic) while 'SubscribeToAllAsync' is explicitly async. This breaks the pattern where both should likely be async or both sync.
Ambiguous naming for stream-specific vs. all-streams creation. 'CreateAsync' is ambiguous about whether it targets a specific stream or all streams, whereas 'CreateToStreamAsync' is explicit. This forces users to guess the scope of 'CreateAsync'.
Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix. 'DeleteAsync' is ambiguous, while 'DeleteToStreamAsync' and 'DeleteToAllAsync' are explicit. This creates a confusion point where one method's scope is unclear.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for synchronous vs asynchronous subscription… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Ambiguous naming for stream-specific vs. all-streams creation.… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix. 'DeleteAsync' is ambiguous, while… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
96 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 95 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×11.github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:10detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish.yml (7), cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml (2), dotnet.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
41 of 71 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs.
Concentrated knowledge decay
What to do
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (by imperative guard methods that throw on violation) — this is NOT a claim that the code is unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: the guards encode the access rules inline, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the call sites that apply them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
Name the access rules — give each one a named predicate/policy object your guards consult, so the rule set can be reviewed and unit-tested independently of the call sites that enforce it.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Read`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. — KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.State.cs:162
A test is skipped ("Scavenge on an empty database finishes too quickly") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — ScavengeTests.cs:47
A test is skipped ("Unable to produce same behavior with HTTP fallback!") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×3) — SubscribeToStreamGetInfoObsoleteTests.cs:107, SubscribeToStreamGetInfoTests.cs:109, SubscribeToStreamReplayParkedTests.cs:40
A test is skipped ("Isn't this how it should work?") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — SubscribeToStreamObsoleteTests.cs:594
A test is skipped ("Not Implemented") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×2) — ReadAllEventsBackwardTests.cs:87, ReadAllEventsBackwardTests.cs:90
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
21 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 93 use(s) across 223,258 production line(s) (~0.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 86/93 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×5) — ChannelBaseExtensions.cs:6, ChannelCache.cs:116, ActivitySourceExtensions.cs:12, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×2) — PersistentSubscription.cs:117, StreamSubscription.cs:75
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 40 suppression(s) across the 49866 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 44 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (16 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an event-store package (Marten/EventStore))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:10— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/kurrent-io/Automations/commits/master --jq .sha`. `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label` is hosted INSIDE the `kurrent-io/Automations` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label` path in `uses:` and query only `kurrent-io/Automations`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:19— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/load-configuration.yml:53— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input / an expression value in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input / an expression value is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:61— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish.yml:68— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:82— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/publish.yml:91— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:108— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
NoWarnInCsproj test/Directory.Build.props:6— xUnit1031 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj test/Directory.Build.props:6— NU1903 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
No assertions: one_time test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/ProjectionManagementTests.cs:20— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: continuous test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/ProjectionManagementTests.cs:24— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: transient test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/ProjectionManagementTests.cs:38— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: continuous_v2_engine test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/ProjectionManagementTests.cs:49— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: update_projection test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/ProjectionManagement/UpdateProjectionTests.cs:8— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: reading_and_subscribing_is_allowed_for_admin_user test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/AllStreamWithNoAclSecurityTests.cs:40— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: meta_write_is_allowed_for_admin_user test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/AllStreamWithNoAclSecurityTests.cs:56— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_no_acl_stream_with_no_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:16— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_no_acl_stream_with_existing_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:22— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_no_acl_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:28— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_user_stream_with_authorized_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:50— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_user_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:58— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_admin_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:82— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_all_stream_with_no_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:90— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_all_stream_with_existing_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:98— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_normal_all_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:106— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_no_acl_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:136— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_user_stream_with_authorized_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:166— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_user_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:176— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_admin_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:206— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_all_stream_with_no_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:216— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_all_stream_with_existing_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:226— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: deleting_system_all_stream_with_admin_user_is_allowed test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/DeleteStreamSecurityTests.cs:236— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: multiple_roles_are_handled_correctly_without_authentication test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/MultipleRoleSecurityTests.cs:27— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: reading_all_with_authorized_user_credentials_succeeds test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Security/ReadAllSecurityTests.cs:27— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/Certificates/X509Certificates.cs:5— #pragma warning disable SYSLIB0057 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/ChannelInfo.cs:4— #pragma warning disable 1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/HashCode.cs:5— #pragma warning disable 1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/ServerCapabilities.cs:2— #pragma warning disable 1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/StreamIdentifier.cs:5— #pragma warning disable 1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/FromAll.cs:52— #pragma warning disable CS1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/FromStream.cs:52— #pragma warning disable CS1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/PersistentSubscriptionExtraStatistic.cs:7— #pragma warning disable CS1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/DeadLine.cs:4— #pragma warning disable CS1591 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:216— #pragma warning disable 612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:224— #pragma warning disable 612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:239— #pragma warning disable 612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Update.cs:121— #pragma warning disable 612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Update.cs:128— #pragma warning disable 612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Read.cs:359— #pragma warning disable CS0612 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/Streams/Model/SchemaDataFormat.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8509 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
TodoComment src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/Interceptors/ReportLeaderInterceptor.cs:72— // or StatusCode.Unknown or TODO: use RPC exceptions on server — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Append.cs:304— // TODO: Log? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Subscriptions.cs:254— //TODO SS: Check if `CastAndDispose` is still relevant — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.cs:79— // todo: might be nice to have two different kinds of appenders and we decide which to instantiate according to the server caps. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/Streams/Model/StreamsClientModel.cs:48— // TODO: MultiStreamAppendResponse will be removed in a future version. Use AppendRecordsResponse instead. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToAll/Obsolete/SubscribeToAllObsoleteTests.cs:289— // todo: investigate why this test is flaky without this delay — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToAll/Obsolete/SubscribeToAllObsoleteTests.cs:623— // todo: investigate why this test is flaky without this delay — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Streams/Read/ReadAllEventsBackwardTests.cs:29— // TODO SS: this test must be fixed to deterministically read the expected events regardless of how many already exist. reading all for now... — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Streams/Read/ReadAllEventsForwardTests.cs:28— // TODO SS: this test must be fixed to deterministically read the expected events regardless of how many already exist. reading all for now... — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Streams/SoftDeleteTests.cs:60— //TODO: This is a workaround until github issue #1744 is fixed
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Streams/SoftDeleteTests.cs:102— //TODO: This is a workaround until github issue #1744 is fixed
TodoComment test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Streams/SoftDeleteTests.cs:153— //TODO: This is a workaround until github issue #1744 is fixed
Medium IaC: CKV_GHA_7 .github/workflows/publish.yml:9— The build output cannot be affected by user parameters other than the build entry point and the top-level source location. GitHub Actions workflow_dispatch inputs MUST be empty.
Medium IaC: CKV_GHA_3 .github/workflows/build-docs.yml:13— Suspicious use of curl with secrets
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/publish.yml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/load-configuration.yml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/build-docs.yml:0— Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
Dead code: DefaultRequestVersionHandler src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/DefaultRequestVersionHandler.cs:7— NamedType DefaultRequestVersionHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SingleNodeHttpHandler src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/SingleNodeHttpHandler.cs:7— NamedType SingleNodeHttpHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EnsureCertificatesExist test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests.Common/Fixtures/CertificatesManager.cs:28— Method EnsureCertificatesExist — no references found in solution.
Dead code: OnStateChange test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests.Common/FluentDocker/TestBypassService.cs:51— Method OnStateChange — no references found in solution.
ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings (cyclomatic 45) src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs:122— ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings has cyclomatic complexity 45 (threshold 15). Of this number, 43 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read (cyclomatic 22) src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/StreamMetadataJsonConverter.cs:10— StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateInternalAsync (cyclomatic 20) src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:158— KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateInternalAsync has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
KurrentDBClient.GetFilterOptions (cyclomatic 19) src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.cs:87— KurrentDBClient.GetFilterOptions has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.UpdateToStreamAsync (cyclomatic 17) src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Update.cs:72— KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.UpdateToStreamAsync has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored — This repository contains 2 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `KurrentDB.Client.sln` — the other 1 (`samples/Samples.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1149.
ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings (cognitive 41) src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs:122— ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Of this number, 39 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read (cognitive 29) src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/StreamMetadataJsonConverter.cs:10— StreamMetadataJsonConverter.Read has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
PersistentSubscription.Subscribe (cognitive 19) src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/PersistentSubscription.cs:117— PersistentSubscription.Subscribe has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateInternalAsync (cognitive 17) src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:158— KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateInternalAsync has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for synchronous vs asynchronous subscription methods. 'SubscribeToStream' is synchronous (returns result immediately or wraps sync logic) while 'SubscribeToAllAsync' is explicitly async. This breaks the pattern where both should likely be async or both sync. · ×1
Inconsistent naming for synchronous vs asynchronous subscription methods. 'SubscribeToStream' is synchronous (returns result immediately or wraps sync logic) while 'SubscribeToAllAsync' is explicitly async. This breaks the pattern where both should likely be async or both sync. — Rename 'SubscribeToStream' to 'SubscribeToStreamAsync' or make 'SubscribeToAllAsync' synchronous to align with the rest of the API which heavily favors async/Task methods. (signatures: KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.SubscribeToStream | KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.SubscribeToAllAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Ambiguous naming for stream-specific vs. all-streams creation. 'CreateAsync' is ambiguous about whether it targets a specific stream or all streams, whereas 'CreateToStreamAsync' is explicit. This forces users to guess the scope of 'CreateAsync'. · ×1
Ambiguous naming for stream-specific vs. all-streams creation. 'CreateAsync' is ambiguous about whether it targets a specific stream or all streams, whereas 'CreateToStreamAsync' is explicit. This forces users to guess the scope of 'CreateAsync'. — Rename 'CreateAsync' to 'CreateToAllAsync' to match the explicit naming convention used elsewhere (e.g., 'CreateToStreamAsync'). (signatures: KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateToStreamAsync | KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.CreateAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix. 'DeleteAsync' is ambiguous, while 'DeleteToStreamAsync' and 'DeleteToAllAsync' are explicit. This creates a confusion point where one method's scope is unclear. · ×1
Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix. 'DeleteAsync' is ambiguous, while 'DeleteToStreamAsync' and 'DeleteToAllAsync' are explicit. This creates a confusion point where one method's scope is unclear. — Rename 'DeleteAsync' to 'DeleteToAllAsync' to maintain consistency with the explicit scoping in other methods. (signatures: KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.DeleteAsync | KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.DeleteToStreamAsync | KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.DeleteToAllAsync)
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[6].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 917.
TooManyMethods: KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient src/KurrentDB.Client/PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 542 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 36 methods, declared across 8 files: PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Create.cs (8), PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.List.cs (5), PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Read.cs (5), PersistentSubscriptions/KurrentDBPersistentSubscriptionsClient.Update.cs (5), +4 more file(s). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: KurrentDBClient src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 459 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 28 methods, declared across 7 files: Streams/KurrentDBClient.cs (8), Streams/KurrentDBClient.Read.cs (5), Streams/KurrentDBClient.Append.cs (4), Streams/KurrentDBClient.Subscriptions.cs (4), +3 more file(s). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Change coupling clique: KurrentDBOperationsClientServiceCollectionExtensions.cs, KurrentDBProjectionManagementClientCollectionExtensions.cs, KurrentDBUserManagementClientCollectionExtensions.cs src/KurrentDB.Client/Operations/KurrentDBOperationsClientServiceCollectionExtensions.cs— 3 files — `src/KurrentDB.Client/Operations/KurrentDBOperationsClientServiceCollectionExtensions.cs`, `src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClientCollectionExtensions.cs`, `src/KurrentDB.Client/UserManagement/KurrentDBUserManagementClientCollectionExtensions.cs` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 3 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 12 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (6 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): build-docs.yml: curl -X POST -d {} "${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_BUILD_HOOK }}". Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.State.cs:56— src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.State.cs:56-68 | src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.State.cs:130-143 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.State.cs:56` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Low cohesion: KurrentDBClient (LCOM4 4) src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.cs:14— KurrentDBClient's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the test suite built and its tests PASSED, but the run produced no coverage data — `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` found no data collector, which is what a test project with no `coverlet.collector` PackageReference does. Nothing is wrong with the suite or the build; there is simply no coverage instrumentation wired up. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test reliability not included — no test tier completed within its budget.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Read.cs, src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.Append.cs, src/KurrentDB.Client/ProjectionManagement/KurrentDBProjectionManagementClient.Create.cs, src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/KurrentDBClient.MultiAppend.cs, src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/Common/Diagnostics/EventMetadataExtensions.cs, src/KurrentDB.Client/Streams/Streams/BatchAppendResp.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 11642 LoC across 20 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
Split KurrentDB.Client — A database client library whose type count and namespace spread exceed the size threshold for a grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: KurrentDB.Authentication, KurrentDB.Querying, KurrentDB.Serialization
Concentrated knowledge decay — 41 of 71 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (2 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 41 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs:126— 1 of 2409 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: KurrentDB.Client.KurrentDBClientSettings/ConnectionStringParser.CreateSettings @ src/KurrentDB.Client/Core/KurrentDBClientSettings.ConnectionString.cs:126, 475 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Skipped (documented): stop test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/Operations/ScavengeTests.cs:47— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Scavenge on an empty database finishes too quickly
Skipped (documented): throws_with_non_existing_user test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToStream/Obsolete/SubscribeToStreamGetInfoObsoleteTests.cs:107— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Unable to produce same behavior with HTTP fallback!
Skipped (documented): deleting_existing_with_subscriber_the_subscription_is_dropped_with_not_found test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToStream/Obsolete/SubscribeToStreamObsoleteTests.cs:594— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Isn't this how it should work?
Skipped (documented): throws_with_non_existing_user test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToStream/SubscribeToStreamGetInfoTests.cs:109— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Unable to produce same behavior with HTTP fallback!
Skipped (documented): throws_with_non_existing_user test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/PersistentSubscriptions/SubscribeToStream/SubscribeToStreamReplayParkedTests.cs:40— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Unable to produce same behavior with HTTP fallback!
Skipped (documented): changing_user_password_with_user_with_insufficient_credentials_throws test/KurrentDB.Client.Tests/UserManagement/ChangePasswordTests.cs:26— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: This can't be right
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 019fc84a-e1a2-7944-a6c8-349982245809 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 1 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 13 · Warnings: 115 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 45 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 15:42 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.