KurrentDB-Client-NodeJS — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

kurrent-io/KurrentDB-Client-NodeJS is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (89%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (50%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (54%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Small (~17,952 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 83% Strong Architecture 89% Strong Maturity 54% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 54% Adequate · gated by P3 Security 50% Weak · gated by D29, D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 50% · 46% weightReadiness 54% · 25% weightMaturity 54% · 14% weightCode Health 83% · 8% weightArchitecture 89% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (29+)

29 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D3 · FileTooLong: utils/CommandError.ts packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) packages/db-client/src/utils/convertGrpcEvent.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/getPersistentSubscriptionToStreamInfo.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 4 locations) packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToAll.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/utils/mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts
R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts
R9 · Import cycle (2 files) packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€55,000

Cost to rebuild	€11,000–€55,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (184–582 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.8× (at 57% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code	~84 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€33,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 50% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+5.0 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

+5.0 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

+5.0 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 50%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (17,952 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 50%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong

The Good

D3 · TypeScript God Classes 9.5 D4 · TypeScript Code Duplication 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 9.3 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 9.3 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 9.6 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.9

The Bad

R3 · React / TS Large Files 5.7

At a glance — Architecture · 89% · Strong

The Good

D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 9.9 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 8.2

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good

D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.7 D16 · TypeScript Bus Factor 8.3 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0

The Bad

D34 · TypeScript Knowledge Freshness 6.5 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 54% · Adequate · gated by P3

The Good

D13 · TypeScript Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 9.9 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 7.5

The Bad

P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 50% · Weak · gated by D29, D38

The Good

D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 9.0 D33 · TypeScript JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

The Ugly

D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 0.9 D38 · TypeScript OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	50	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	14	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate a SAST step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions, and resolve the 14 high-priority static analysis findings, particularly in the main workflow files. Next, stamp a version number in the build or package manifest to ensure all releases are traceable. Then, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated ADR folder to capture context and consequences. Finally, add a 'Testing' section to the root README to clarify how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+5.0 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.	+5.0 pts	Medium	Release Hygiene
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).	+5.0 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with main.yml (7), benchmark.yml (3), cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml (2).	+4.6 pts	Medium	Static Analysis (SAST)
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.	+4.4 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2).	+2.1 pts	Low	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (6).	+2.1 pts	Low	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.	+3.5 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 8 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 12% slop · 63% mixed · 25% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
yarn.lock	0.0	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/main.yml	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/benchmark.yml	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/load-configuration.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.yarnrc.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: yarn-missing-minimal-age-gate
packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: FileTooLong: utils/CommandError.ts
packages/db-client/src/events/binaryEvent.ts	8.5	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Change coupling: binaryEvent.ts ↔ jsonEvent.ts

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 29 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses

D3D4D13D15D16D21D28D29D33D34D35D38DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 68 of 75 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc9c9-0a66-725f-8eb0-ab5ff1a58076.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 16 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: utils/CommandError.tspackages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts (2×21=42); packages/db-client/src/Client/index.ts (2×19=38)

Hotspot: packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts · ×2packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×14.github/workflows/benchmark.yml:16detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with main.yml (7), benchmark.yml (3), cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 of 41 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/utils/mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: binaryEvent.ts↔jsonEvent.ts 58%

Change coupling: binaryEvent.ts ↔ jsonEvent.tspackages/db-client/src/events/binaryEvent.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

51 finding(s): 6 critical, 24 high, 19 medium, 2 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×22yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×19yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

31 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.5 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.

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M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

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R1 · Type Safety9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.

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R10 · Code Duplication9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

packages/db-client/src/utils/convertGrpcEvent.ts:165 · packages/db-client/src/utils/convertRustEvent.ts:73 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — convertGrpcEvent.ts:165
packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts:452 · packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts:504 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — instrumentation.ts:452
packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/getPersistentSubscriptionToStreamInfo.ts:46 · packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/replayParkedMessagesToStream.ts:47 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — getPersistentSubscriptionToStreamInfo.ts:46
packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToAll.ts:28 · packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/replayParkedMessagesToStream.ts:22 · packages/db-client/src/projections/createProjection.ts:36 · packages/db-client/src/projections/updateProjection.ts:15 — the 4 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — createPersistentSubscriptionToAll.ts:28
packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/utils/mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts:162 · packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/utils/mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts:186 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts:162
packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts:76 · packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts:91 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — instrumentation.ts:76
packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:11 · packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/updatePersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:10 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:11
packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:61 · packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/updatePersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:46 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — createPersistentSubscriptionToStream.ts:61

What to do

Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — CommandError.ts:580, matchServerVersion.ts:74, events.ts:1, …

What to do

Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.

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R3 · Large Files5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

11 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: packages/db-client/generated/kurrentdb/protocols/v2/streams/streams_pb.js (2010), packages/db-client/generated/kurrentdb/protocols/v2/streams/errors_pb.js (1792), packages/db-client/generated/kurrentdb/protocols/v2/features/service_pb.js (1512), packages/db-client/generated/kurrentdb/protocols/v2/streams/shared_pb.js (1346), packages/db-client/generated/kurrentdb/protocols/v2/core_pb.js (1115), packages/db-client/src/Client/index.ts (682) (+5 more).

What to do

Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.

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R4 · Test Coverage9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. — ReadStream.ts

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

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R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

1 file(s) (~24 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
110 file(s) (~17168 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — test
Unreachable from the 7 application, 28 tooling and 110 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (7 application, 28 tooling, 110 test roots considered) — ReadStream.ts

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — FlakeFinder.js:1
Declared in packages/test/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts → packages/db-client/src/utils/index.ts → packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 3 files) — CommandError.ts

What to do

Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	83%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	89%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	54%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	54%	Adequate — gated by P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	50%	Weak — gated by D29, D38	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not included — 82 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~14358 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 44 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×22

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @grpc/grpc-js ^1.14.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.14.4, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @grpc/grpc-js moves onto 1.14.4 or later; if the flagged 1.14.3 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @grpc/grpc-js with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger 1.30.1: [GHSA redacted] — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.9.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.30.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.30.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — axios 1.15.1: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 18 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.15.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 18 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.15.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — flatted 3.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — glob 10.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ip-address 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — ip-address is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 10.3.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.0.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.0.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ip-address 9.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.3.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.3.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip-address 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.1.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.1.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimatch 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — postcss 8.5.2: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — protobufjs 7.5.5: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 7.5.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 11 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against protobufjs 7.5.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 11 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 7.5.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tmp 0.0.33: [GHSA redacted] — tmp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tmp to 0.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tmp 0.0.33, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against tmp 0.0.33: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tmp 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — tmp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tmp to 0.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tmp 0.2.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against tmp 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×14

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/benchmark.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/benchmark.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/benchmark.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:10 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cherry-pick-pr-for-label.yml:12 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/kurrent-io/Automations/commits/master --jq .sha`. `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label` is hosted INSIDE the `kurrent-io/Automations` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `kurrent-io/Automations/cherry-pick-pr-for-label` path in `uses:` and query only `kurrent-io/Automations`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/load-configuration.yml:53 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input / an expression value in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input / an expression value is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/main.yml:79 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:97 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:99 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:110 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: yarn-missing-minimal-age-gate .yarnrc.yml:1 — This .yarnrc.yml does not set a minimal age gate or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `npmMinimalAgeGate: "7d"` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: 4.10 Reference: https://yarnpkg.com/configuration/yarnrc#npmMinimalAgeGate. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×6

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — handlebars 4.7.7: [GHSA redacted] — handlebars is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin handlebars to 4.7.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against handlebars 4.7.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — shell-quote 1.8.2: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tar 7.5.12: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tar to 7.5.19 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 7.5.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against tar 7.5.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — d3-color 1.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — d3-color is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.1.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.4.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.4.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — d3-color 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — d3-color is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.1.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).

Warning — 24 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×19

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @babel/helpers 7.26.9: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @opentelemetry/core 1.24.1: [GHSA redacted] — @opentelemetry/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.24.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.24.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @opentelemetry/core 1.30.1: [GHSA redacted] — @opentelemetry/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.30.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.30.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @opentelemetry/core 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — @opentelemetry/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @opentelemetry/core to 2.8.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @protobufjs/utf8 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @protobufjs/utf8 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @protobufjs/utf8 to 1.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ajv 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — bn.js 4.12.1: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 4.12.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — bn.js 5.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 5.2.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — got 9.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — got is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.8.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.6.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.6.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — nx 20.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 22.7.2
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — qs 6.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — request 2.88.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; request is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — showdown 1.9.1: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; showdown is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tough-cookie 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — tough-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.1.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.5.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.5.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — uuid 3.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.4.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.4.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — yaml 2.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×2

Hotspot: packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts — packages/db-client/src/Client/parseConnectionString.ts changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 21. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: packages/db-client/src/Client/index.ts packages/db-client/src/Client/index.ts — packages/db-client/src/Client/index.ts changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 19. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.

D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1

LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1234.

D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1

FileTooLong: utils/CommandError.ts packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts:0 — FileTooLong — 528 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1

Change coupling: binaryEvent.ts ↔ jsonEvent.ts packages/db-client/src/events/binaryEvent.ts — `packages/db-client/src/events/binaryEvent.ts` and `packages/db-client/src/events/jsonEvent.ts` change together 58% of the time (7 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.

Recommendation — 5 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: packages/db-client/src/utils/CommandError.ts, packages/db-client/src/types/index.ts, packages/opentelemetry/src/instrumentation.ts, packages/db-client/src/projections/createProjection.ts, packages/db-client/src/streams/appendToStream/multiStreamAppend.ts, packages/db-client/src/streams/appendToStream/index.ts, packages/db-client/src/streams/readStream.ts. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 14 of 41 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: packages/db-client/src/persistentSubscription/utils/mapPersistentSubscriptionInfo.ts, packages/db-client/src/Client/discovery.ts, packages/db-client/src/utils/convertGrpcEvent.ts (and 11 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1

Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @babel/core 7.26.9: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^7.24.9 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	14	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	51	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc9c9-0a66-725f-8eb0-ab5ff1a58076 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Kurrent-Io/KurrentDB-Client-NodeJS

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 89% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 54% · Adequate · gated by P3

At a glance — Security · 50% · Weak · gated by D29, D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts