Public report — samples, published 29 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 2,952 LoC · 9 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Maturity (39%)
Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
69findings with an exact file:lineof 83 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
50/105dimensions across the health lenses2952 LoC · 9 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
kurrent-io/samples carries serious risk (51%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Event Sourcing (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Maturity (39%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Readiness (43%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge… (Knowledge Freshness); Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately (Folder & project structure); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).
For scale: Small (~2,952 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0056 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0010 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0134 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2025-0023 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2151 Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod
D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2023-2041 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0055 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 39% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — service/app, CQRS, domain model, event sourcing × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 39%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
44
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
13
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
10
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving orphaned files to improve knowledge freshness. Next, reorganize the project structure by grouping production code under a dedicated directory to separate it from tooling. Then, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code and documentation. Finally, enhance HTTP client resilience and update the root README to include testing instructions.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Explicit Debt: Dead code: FakeProductPriceCalculator
CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts/Carts/Cart.cs
8.5
Near-clean
Code Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
Quickstart/Dotnet/esdb-sample-dotnet/Dockerfile
9.3
Near-clean
IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 48 of 50 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 50 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 69 of 83 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
11 test methods: 11 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 17 tests.
Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application.properties (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with InitializeCartTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×12.github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.dotnet.yml:19detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorizationCQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts.Api/Controllers/CartsController.cs:18detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 12 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build.cqrs_flow.java.aggregates.yml (4), build.cqrs_flow.java.simple.yml (4), build.cqrs_flow.dotnet.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with CartsController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×5Quickstart/Dotnet/esdb-sample-dotnet/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
9 of 9 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Core/Core.EventStoreDB/Subscriptions/EventStoreDBSubscriptionToAll.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×18Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0056 · ×3Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3), Cargo.lock (2), requirements.txt (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2), package-lock.json, requirements.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether Apply/When folds reconstruct state purely from the event (no DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random or IO) so replay is reproducible.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
Only 5/9 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 8 use(s) across 2,761 production line(s) (~2.9/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 21/24 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×3) — ApiFixture.cs:43, ResponseExtensions.cs:9, ExceptionHandlingMiddleware.cs:22
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~1.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C2 Access Controls — This is a dotnet-new template — authorization is deferred to the application you build from it. Add [Authorize]/policies (or imperative guards) when you wire up real users; until then there are no real endpoints to protect.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .py, .rs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go, .java, .py, .rs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .go, .java, .py, .rs, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .py, .rs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .py, .rs) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .java, .py, .rs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .java, .py, .rs, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Rust: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every struct-holding-struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — advisory (the Swift/Dart parity)
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Rust: a cross-crate domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel crate, and most repositories ship a single crate — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Rust: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
ES2 Immutable events — no persisted event types detected — immutability check not applicable
ES3 PII in the event store — no persisted event types detected — PII-in-events check not applicable
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.dotnet.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.dotnet.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.aggregates.yml:21— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.aggregates.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.aggregates.yml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: gradle/gradle-build-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `gradle/gradle-build-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/gradle/gradle-build-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.aggregates.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.simple.yml:21— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.simple.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.simple.yml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: gradle/gradle-build-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `gradle/gradle-build-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/gradle/gradle-build-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.cqrs_flow.java.simple.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.crypto_shredding.dotnet.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.crypto_shredding.dotnet.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×7
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— @grpc/grpc-js 1.9.14: [GHSA redacted] — @grpc/grpc-js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @grpc/grpc-js to 1.9.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.9.14, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @grpc/grpc-js 1.9.14 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of body-parser 1.20.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— mio 0.8.10: [GHSA redacted] — mio is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by tokio 1.35.1, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p mio@0.8.10 --precise 0.8.11`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of path-to-regexp 0.1.7 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— protobuf 4.25.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.29.6 One upgrade of protobuf 4.25.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— rustls 0.21.10: [GHSA redacted] — rustls is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by hyper-rustls 0.24.2 and reqwest 0.11.23 and 2 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rustls@0.21.10 --precise 0.21.11`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— werkzeug 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.3. This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against werkzeug 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of werkzeug 3.0.1 clears all 6 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of golang.org/x/crypto 0.14.0 clears all 20 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.59.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/grpc is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.79.3`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of google.golang.org/grpc 1.59.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— protobufjs 7.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 7.5.5 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 11 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 7.2.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of protobufjs 7.2.6 clears all 10 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— waitress 2.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.1 One upgrade of waitress 2.1.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— rustls-webpki 0.101.7: [GHSA redacted] — rustls-webpki is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by rustls 0.21.10, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for rustls-webpki — 0.103.13 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.101.7, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against rustls-webpki 0.101.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.103.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.103.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of rustls-webpki 0.101.7 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], RUSTSEC-2026-0098, RUSTSEC-2026-0099.
Warning — 33 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×18
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— @protobufjs/utf8 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @protobufjs/utf8 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @protobufjs/utf8 to 1.1.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— bytes 1.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — bytes is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by axum 0.6.20 and axum-core 0.3.4 and 13 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p bytes@1.5.0 --precise 1.11.1`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— click 8.1.7: PYSEC-2026-2132 — upgrade to 8.3.3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— dnspython 2.4.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.6.1
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— express 4.18.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.19.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against express 4.18.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.20.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.20.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of express 4.18.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2151 Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— flask 3.0.0: PYSEC-2026-2151 — upgrade to 3.1.3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.17.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.23.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of golang.org/x/net 0.17.0 clears all 14 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.13.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.13.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— google.golang.org/protobuf 1.31.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/protobuf is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get google.golang.org/protobuf@v1.33.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— idna 0.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — idna is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by url 2.5.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for idna — 1.0.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.5.0, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Python/esdb-sample-python/requirements.txt— jinja2 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.6. This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against jinja2 3.1.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of jinja2 3.1.3 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— qs 6.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.11.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.14.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of qs 6.11.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— ring 0.16.20: [GHSA redacted] — ring is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by rustls 0.20.9, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for ring — 0.17.12 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.16.20, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against ring 0.16.20, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.17.12 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.17.12 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone.
Medium CVE: GO-2023-2041 Quickstart/Go/esdb-sample-go/go.mod— stdlib 1.21.0 (html/template): GO-2023-2041 — fixed in Go 1.21.1; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. One upgrade of stdlib 1.21.0 clears all 65 advisories it raises: GO-2023-2041, GO-2023-2043, GO-2023-2044, GO-2023-2045, GO-2023-2102, GO-2023-2185, GO-2023-2186, GO-2023-2382, GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— time 0.3.31: [GHSA redacted] — time is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by cookie 0.18.0 and rocket 0.5.0 and 1 other, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p time@0.3.31 --precise 0.3.47`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2025-0055 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— tracing-subscriber 0.3.18: RUSTSEC-2025-0055 — tracing-subscriber is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by loom 0.5.6, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p tracing-subscriber@0.3.18 --precise 0.3.20`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×3
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0056 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— adler 1.0.2: RUSTSEC-2025-0056 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. adler is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by miniz_oxide 0.7.1, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0010 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— ring 0.16.20: RUSTSEC-2025-0010 — ring is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by rustls 0.20.9, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for ring — 0.17.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.16.20, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against ring 0.16.20, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.17.12 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.17.12 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0134 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— rustls-pemfile 1.0.4: RUSTSEC-2025-0134 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. rustls-pemfile is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by reqwest 0.11.23 and rustls-native-certs 0.6.3 and 1 other, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium advisory (unsound) · ×3
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— anyhow 1.0.79: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 — anyhow is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by prost-derive 0.12.3, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p anyhow@1.0.79 --precise 1.0.103`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— rand 0.8.5: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 — rand is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by eventstore 2.3.0 and rocket 0.5.0 and 1 other, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rand@0.8.5 --precise 0.8.6`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2025-0023 Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— tokio 1.35.1: RUSTSEC-2025-0023 — tokio is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by eventstore 2.3.0 and h2 0.3.24 and 15 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p tokio@1.35.1 --precise 1.38.2`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 9 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
TodoComment CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Core/Core.EventStoreDB/Repository/EventStoreDBRepository.cs:60— // TODO: Add proper optimistic concurrency handling — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Dead code: FakeProductPriceCalculator CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts.Tests/Stubs/Products/FakeProductPriceCalculator.cs:8— NamedType FakeProductPriceCalculator — no references found in solution.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1009.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts.Api/Controllers/CartsController.cs:18— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.2.3 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.2.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.3.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Rust/esdb-sample-rust/Cargo.lock— h2 0.3.24: [GHSA redacted] — h2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by hyper 0.14.28 and reqwest 0.11.23 and 1 other, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p h2@0.3.24 --precise 0.3.26`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts/Carts/Cart.cs:133— CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts/Carts/Cart.cs:133-151 | CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts/Carts/GettingCartById/CartDetails.cs:77-95 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run this repository's test suite, whose production source is .go, .java, .py, .rs. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`, or JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task, or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored and real coverage will be read.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— cookie 0.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cookie to 0.7.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— send 0.18.0: [GHSA redacted] — send is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin send to 0.19.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] Quickstart/Nodejs/esdb-sample-nodejs/package-lock.json— serve-static 1.15.0: [GHSA redacted] — serve-static is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin serve-static to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry).
complexity unreadable for .go, .java, .py, .rs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .go, .java, .py, .rs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 2341 LoC across 9 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts.Api.Tests/Carts/InitializingCart/InitializeCartTests.cs:43— "get created record id" — trim - 'created record id' is the same as the repository's returned value
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 9 of 9 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Core/Core.EventStoreDB/Subscriptions/EventStoreDBSubscriptionToAll.cs, CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts/Carts/Cart.cs, CQRS_Flow/Dotnet/Carts/Carts.Api/Controllers/CartsController.cs (and 6 more).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet — Dependency hygiene is currently assessed for .NET (NuGet) dependencies only, and this repository's production source is .go, .java, .py, .rs. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for other ecosystems (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), an OSGi MANIFEST.MF/target platform, a Maven POM, a Gradle version catalogue, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) are not read yet.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019faffe-9a07-782d-a55b-226e623d15be · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 34 · Warnings: 33 · Recommendations: 12 · Info: 4 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 22:28 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.