TradingStation — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

lanit-students/TradingStation carries serious risk (40%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

The area that most needs attention is Security (34%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (40%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); Store passwords with a salted KDF (Web-Security Posture); policy-based authorization (Access Controls).

For scale: Small (~8,482 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 49% Weak · gated by X5 Architecture 65% Adequate · gated by D35 Maturity 40% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 55% Adequate · gated by D13, P3 Security 34% Weak · gated by C1, S1 Accessibility 45% Weak · gated by AC2, AC4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 34% · 46% weightMaturity 40% · 25% weightAccessibility 45% · 14% weightCode Health 49% · 8% weightReadiness 55% · 4% weightArchitecture 65% · 2% weight

Raise Security 34 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 40 → ~46.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 12%Plumbing 63%Tests 22%Generated 4%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,500–€17,000

Cost to rebuild	€3,500–€17,000 (0.1 person-years (58–182 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 40% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 50% boilerplate · 35% straight-line · 16% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€10,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 34% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.3) — microservices × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 5 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with BotRunning.razor, Bots.razor, InstrumentInfo.razor.

+5.1 pts · Low effort · Secrets (history)

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

+6.4 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection

Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Common/DTO/PasswordHashChangeRequest.cs:6`.

+6.4 pts · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 34%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (8,482 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 34%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory

The headline is improving steadily (+1.8 pts/run over 16 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.

Evidence: trajectory: +1.8 pts/run over 16 runs

Trajectory

The Ugly

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 3.1 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	11	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, secure sensitive data by encrypting it at rest and managing keys in a vault, while ensuring passwords are stored using a salted key derivation function rather than simple hashing. Next, implement policy-based authorization to enforce access controls across the application. Then, resolve the five identified secrets in the codebase, focusing on the specified Razor components. Finally, expand the README to include a project map, architecture overview, and getting-started instructions to improve documentation.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 5 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with BotRunning.razor, Bots.razor, InstrumentInfo.razor.	+5.1 pts	Low	Secrets (history)
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+6.4 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Common/DTO/PasswordHashChangeRequest.cs:6`.	+6.4 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+2.9 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.	+2.9 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.	+5.5 pts	Medium	Access Controls
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history).	+1.9 pts	Low	Secrets (history)
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.	+3.5 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 25 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 40% mixed · 56% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor	2.2	Slop	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
Clients/GUI/Pages/Portfolio.razor	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
Clients/GUI/Pages/InstrumentInfo.razor	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
Clients/GUI/Pages/Bots.razor	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
Clients/GUI/Pages/BotRunning.razor	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs	6.5	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: LogMessage.cs ↔ LoginCommand.cs
Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs	6.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
Tests/AuthServiceTests/Validators/UserEmailPasswordValidatorTests.cs	6.9	Mixed	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
GUITests/Core/Engine.cs	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
Services/OperationService/Bots/BotRules/BotRule.cs	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)
Integrations/CentralBankIntegrationLib/RussianCBInfo.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: RussianCBInfo.cs ↔ GetCurrenciesCommand.cs
Clients/GUI/Scripts/UserGetter.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: UserGetter.cs ↔ IGetUserByIdCommand.cs
Common/DTO/ErrorResponse.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: ErrorResponse.cs ↔ Startup.cs
Common/DTO/BrokerRequests/InternalCreateUserRequest.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: InternalCreateUserRequest.cs ↔ IUserRepository.cs
Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: UserInfoViewModel.cs ↔ IGetUserByIdCommand.cs
Integrations/TinkoffIntegrationLib/TinkoffBankBroker.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: TinkoffBankBroker.cs ↔ CandleHub.cs
LogReader/LogReader/Models/Node.cs	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: Node.cs ↔ CreateUserCommand.cs
Services/DataBaseService/Repositories/BotRepository.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
Services/DataBaseService/Startup.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 55 of 57 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 57 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D26D28D29D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 53 of 69 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1556-7b54-7873-9829-afb4def5eb24.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UserRepository.EditUser at 18.

UserRepository.EditUser (cognitive 18)Services/DataBaseService/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:120

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (25 lines × 2)Clients/GUI/Pages/BotEdition.razor:140

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:518

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:262

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:495

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:213

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

21 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: DTO · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 59 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

114 test methods: 111 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 3 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 3 mock references across 116 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 3 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); e2e: measured (0 flaky); other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret · ×5Clients/GUI/Pages/Portfolio.razor:232

What to do

Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with BotRunning.razor, Bots.razor, InstrumentInfo.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 35 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 8314 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.3.

EmptyCatchBlock · ×2GUITests/Core/Engine.cs:63

CommentedOutCode · ×5Services/DataBaseService/Startup.cs:145

TodoComment · ×3Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:123

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 projects, 287 .cs files, 10750 hand-written lines of code (8314 production / 2436 test), plus 444 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 34 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Shell project: OperationServiceTestsTests/OperationServiceTests/OperationServiceTests.csproj

Thin analysable surface across projects

Build status unknown

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The TradingStation README is a solid one-line description of the app purpose and data source but lacks any architecture or usage detail. The clients/GUI/wwwroot/css/open-iconic/README.md is an excellent Open Iconic reference covering what's in the set, getting started with both SVGs and the sprite, and the outline (including license sections) is fully present; it is the only visible documentation besides the single README. The TinkoffIntegrationLib/DTO/Interfaces/DataBaseService/OperationService/UserService/BrokerService/AuthenticationService/NewsService/Kernel/GUI/RssIntegrationLib/GUITests/LogReader namespaces are all covered by XML docs but not shown in the clipped body, so any outline gap is not flagged.

XML-doc coverage: TinkoffIntegrationLib · ×15Integrations/TinkoffIntegrationLib/TinkoffIntegrationLib.csproj

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The TradingStation README is a solid one-line description of the app purpose and data source but lacks any architecture or usage detail. The clients/GUI/wwwroot/css/open-iconic/README.md is an excellent Open Iconic reference covering what's in the set, getting started with both SVGs and the sprite, and the outline (including license sections) is fully present; it is the only visible documentation besides the single README. The TinkoffIntegrationLib/DTO/Interfaces/DataBaseService/OperationService/UserService/BrokerService/AuthenticationService/NewsService/Kernel/GUI/RssIntegrationLib/GUITests/LogReader namespaces are all covered by XML docs but not shown in the clipped body, so any outline gap is not flagged.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent entity naming for Bot-related database models. 'DbBot' is used in one place, while 'DbBotRule' is used in another, suggesting a potential naming inconsistency or lack of standardization for Bot entities.

Inconsistent naming for internal broker requests. Some use 'Internal' prefix (e.g., InternalCreateUserRequest), while others do not (e.g., GetUserBalanceRequest, GetInstrumentFromPortfolioRequest).

What to do

Resolve the 1 Inconsistent entity naming for Bot-related database models. 'DbBot' is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for internal broker requests. Some use 'Internal'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 21 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×5Clients/GUI/Pages/Bots.razor:74detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 5 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with BotRunning.razor, Bots.razor, InstrumentInfo.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 of 26 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs.

Dormant codebase

What to do

Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: RussianCBInfo.cs↔GetCurrenciesCommand.cs 90%; LogMessage.cs↔LoggerProvider.cs 85%; UserRepository.cs↔IGetUserByIdCommand.cs 82%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: RussianCBInfo.cs ↔ GetCurrenciesCommand.cs · ×10Integrations/CentralBankIntegrationLib/RussianCBInfo.cs

What to do

Resolve the 10 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with LogMessage.cs (3), ErrorResponse.cs, InternalCreateUserRequest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels3.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×25) — RunBotModal.razor:14, RunBotModal.razor:20, BotCreation.razor:28, …

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — _Host.cshtml:0

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

An <a href="#"> (or javascript:) with a click handler is a button dressed as a link — it announces the wrong role and stops working without JS. Use a <button> for an action. — Wizard.razor:7
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×8) — SignIn.razor:17, SignIn.razor:18, UserInfo.razor:32, …

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX1 · Captive dependencies4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

`LogsWindow` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `LogViewModel logViewModel`, which is registered as Scoped. The singleton captures one instance of the scoped dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `LogViewModel` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — LogsWindow.xaml.cs:6

What to do

Don't inject scoped/transient services into singletons; resolve them per-use via IServiceScopeFactory or a factory delegate, or align the lifetimes.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

`SecretTokenEngine` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (secretTokens; e.g. `secretTokens` at line 22). — SecretTokenEngine.cs:10

What to do

Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.

What to do

Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — BotManager.cs:60

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`GetBot` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — BotManager.cs:58
`BeginScope` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — Logger.cs:29
`ConvertBack`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. — LevelColorSelector.cs:27
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) — Startup.cs:147, Startup.cs:118, Startup.cs:103, …

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

The root README is 74 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 21 of 21 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
Only 1/21 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 6/9 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

Identifier 'OldPasswordHash' looks like a password-hash field/property, but no KDF (PBKDF2 / Argon2 / BCrypt / PasswordHasher) was found anywhere in the source — so passwords aren't protected by a salted key-derivation function (whether a fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim). Password storage needs a salted KDF and a constant-time compare. — PasswordHashChangeRequest.cs:6
Password-hash field compared with `==` — use a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles (CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals). — LoginCommand.cs:38
MD5/SHA1 is broken for security purposes (collision-vulnerable). Use SHA-256+ for content integrity; for password storage, use a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt). — ShaHash.cs:15
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Common/DTO/PasswordHashChangeRequest.cs:6`.
Replace MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing; switch to a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — TimeDifferenceTrigger.cs:47

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/119 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — BotInfoConsumer.cs:42, ConfirmUserConsumer.cs:26, CreateBotConsumer.cs:55, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×2) — BotRule.cs:121, Engine.cs:63
`throw e;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. — RunBotCommand.cs:77

What to do

Swallowed exception (empty catch)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. (×21) — TradeRepository.cs:45, TradeRepository.cs:73, TradeRepository.cs:106, …

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

0/15 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	49%	Weak — gated by X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	65%	Adequate — gated by D35	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	40%	Weak — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	55%	Adequate — gated by D13, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	34%	Weak — gated by C1, S1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	45%	Weak — gated by AC2, AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 39 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — no data
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 27 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
X8 JS interop contract — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 22 finding(s)

D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×10

Boundary-crossing change coupling: RussianCBInfo.cs ↔ GetCurrenciesCommand.cs Integrations/CentralBankIntegrationLib/RussianCBInfo.cs — `Integrations/CentralBankIntegrationLib/RussianCBInfo.cs` (context Integrations) and `Services/NewsService/Commands/GetCurrenciesCommand.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 90% of the time (9 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: UserGetter.cs ↔ IGetUserByIdCommand.cs Clients/GUI/Scripts/UserGetter.cs — `Clients/GUI/Scripts/UserGetter.cs` (context Clients) and `Services/UserService/Interfaces/IGetUserByIdCommand.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 82% of the time (9 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: ErrorResponse.cs ↔ Startup.cs Common/DTO/ErrorResponse.cs — `Common/DTO/ErrorResponse.cs` (context Common) and `Services/UserService/Startup.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 81% of the time (13 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: LogMessage.cs ↔ LoginCommand.cs Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs — `Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs` (context Common) and `Services/AuthenticationService/Commands/LoginCommand.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 77% of the time (10 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: LogMessage.cs ↔ AuthenticationController.cs Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs — `Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs` (context Common) and `Services/AuthenticationService/Controllers/AuthenticationController.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 77% of the time (10 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: InternalCreateUserRequest.cs ↔ IUserRepository.cs Common/DTO/BrokerRequests/InternalCreateUserRequest.cs — `Common/DTO/BrokerRequests/InternalCreateUserRequest.cs` (context Common) and `Services/DataBaseService/Repositories/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 73% of the time (11 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: UserInfoViewModel.cs ↔ IGetUserByIdCommand.cs Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs — `Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs` (context Clients) and `Services/UserService/Interfaces/IGetUserByIdCommand.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 73% of the time (8 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: TinkoffBankBroker.cs ↔ CandleHub.cs Integrations/TinkoffIntegrationLib/TinkoffBankBroker.cs — `Integrations/TinkoffIntegrationLib/TinkoffBankBroker.cs` (context Integrations) and `Services/OperationService/Hubs/CandleHub.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 71% of the time (15 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: Node.cs ↔ CreateUserCommand.cs LogReader/LogReader/Models/Node.cs — `LogReader/LogReader/Models/Node.cs` (context LogReader) and `Services/UserService/Commands/CreateUserCommand.cs` (context Services) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: LogMessage.cs ↔ App.xaml.cs Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs — `Common/Kernel/LoggingEngine/LogMessage.cs` (context Common) and `LogReader/LogReader/App.xaml.cs` (context LogReader) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×5

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Clients/GUI/Pages/Portfolio.razor:232 — high-entropy-secret detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:133 — high-entropy-secret detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Clients/GUI/Pages/InstrumentInfo.razor:102 — high-entropy-secret detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Clients/GUI/Pages/Bots.razor:74 — high-entropy-secret detected.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Clients/GUI/Pages/BotRunning.razor:128 — high-entropy-secret detected.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×5

Secret: generic-api-key Clients/GUI/Pages/Bots.razor:74 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key Clients/GUI/Pages/BotRunning.razor:128 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key Clients/GUI/Pages/Portfolio.razor:232 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:251 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key Clients/GUI/Pages/InstrumentInfo.razor:102 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×2

EmptyCatchBlock GUITests/Core/Engine.cs:63 — empty catch block
EmptyCatchBlock Services/OperationService/Bots/BotRules/BotRule.cs:121 — empty catch block

Warning — 19 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×5

CommentedOutCode Services/DataBaseService/Startup.cs:145 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Services/OperationService/Startup.cs:116 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Tests/AuthServiceTests/Validators/UserEmailPasswordValidatorTests.cs:22 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Tests/AuthServiceTests/Validators/UserEmailPasswordValidatorTests.cs:28 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Services/UserService/Startup.cs:101 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×3

TodoComment Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:123 — // TODO add logs for executed script — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Services/DataBaseService/Repositories/BotRepository.cs:49 — // TODO: remove records from bot rules table also (task for one who implements rules) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Tests/AuthServiceTests/Validators/UserEmailPasswordValidatorTests.cs:5 — // TODO return all logic — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2

Off the main sequence: DTO — DTO: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Kernel — Kernel: abstractness 0.06, instability 0.09, distance 0.85 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · UserRepository.EditUser (cognitive 18) · ×1

UserRepository.EditUser (cognitive 18) Services/DataBaseService/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:120 — UserRepository.EditUser has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).

D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1

LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].verdict | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1000.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) Clients/GUI/Pages/BotEdition.razor:140 — Clients/GUI/Pages/BotEdition.razor:140-164 | Clients/GUI/Pages/BotCreation.razor:116-139

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:518 — Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:518-537 | Clients/GUI/Pages/Balance.razor:103-122

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:262 — Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:262-278 | Clients/GUI/Pages/BotRunning.razor:268-284

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:495 — Clients/GUI/Pages/UserInfo.razor:495-510 | Clients/GUI/Pages/Balance.razor:80-95

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:213 — Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:213-227 | Services/DataBaseService/Database/Migrations/MigrationEngine.cs:238-252

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:156 — Clients/GUI/Pages/Instruments.razor:156-167 | Clients/GUI/Pages/BotRunning.razor:157-168

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1

Shell project: OperationServiceTests Tests/OperationServiceTests/OperationServiceTests.csproj — `OperationServiceTests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.

D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1

Thin analysable surface across projects — 3 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `RssIntegrationLib` with 26 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 89 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.9 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent entity naming for Bot-related database models. 'DbBot' is used in one place, while 'DbBotRule' is used in another, suggesting a potential naming inconsistency or lack of standardization for Bot entities. · ×1

Inconsistent entity naming for Bot-related database models. 'DbBot' is used in one place, while 'DbBotRule' is used in another, suggesting a potential naming inconsistency or lack of standardization for Bot entities. — Standardize Bot entity naming, e.g., always use 'DbBot' or 'DbBotEntity'. (symbols: DataBaseService.Database.Models.DbBotRule, DataBaseService.Database.Models.DbBot)

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for internal broker requests. Some use 'Internal' prefix (e.g., InternalCreateUserRequest), while others do not (e.g., GetUserBalanceRequest, GetInstrumentFromPortfolioRequest). · ×1

Inconsistent naming for internal broker requests. Some use 'Internal' prefix (e.g., InternalCreateUserRequest), while others do not (e.g., GetUserBalanceRequest, GetInstrumentFromPortfolioRequest). — Consistently apply the 'Internal' prefix to all internal broker requests or remove it entirely. (symbols: DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalGetUserByIdRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalGetBotsRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalSaveRuleRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalEditUserInfoRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalEditBotRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalDeleteUserRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalCreateUserRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalGetBotRulesRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.InternalTradeRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.GetUserBalanceRequest, DTO.BrokerRequests.GetInstrumentFromPortfolioRequest)

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 8314 LoC across 21 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1

Dormant codebase — 26 of 26 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 26 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.

Info — 20 finding(s)

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×15

XML-doc coverage: TinkoffIntegrationLib Integrations/TinkoffIntegrationLib/TinkoffIntegrationLib.csproj — TinkoffIntegrationLib: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/23).
XML-doc coverage: DTO Common/DTO/DTO.csproj — DTO: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/244).
XML-doc coverage: Interfaces Common/Interfaces/Interfaces.csproj — Interfaces: 20 % XML-doc coverage (1/5).
XML-doc coverage: DataBaseService Services/DataBaseService/DataBaseService.csproj — DataBaseService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (1/243).
XML-doc coverage: OperationService Services/OperationService/OperationService.csproj — OperationService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/93).
XML-doc coverage: UserService Services/UserService/UserService.csproj — UserService: 37 % XML-doc coverage (34/91).
XML-doc coverage: BrokerService Services/BrokerService/BrokerService.csproj — BrokerService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/20).
XML-doc coverage: CentralBankIntegrationLib Integrations/CentralBankIntegrationLib/CentralBankIntegrationLib.csproj — CentralBankIntegrationLib: 17 % XML-doc coverage (3/18).
XML-doc coverage: AuthenticationService Services/AuthenticationService/AuthenticationService.csproj — AuthenticationService: 19 % XML-doc coverage (6/32).
XML-doc coverage: NewsService Services/NewsService/NewsService.csproj — NewsService: 4 % XML-doc coverage (1/26).
XML-doc coverage: Kernel Common/Kernel/Kernel.csproj — Kernel: 21 % XML-doc coverage (15/73).
XML-doc coverage: GUI Clients/GUI/GUI.csproj — GUI: 17 % XML-doc coverage (17/103).
XML-doc coverage: RssIntegrationLib Integrations/RssIntegrationLib/RssIntegrationLib.csproj — RssIntegrationLib: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
XML-doc coverage: GUITests GUITests/GUITests.csproj — GUITests: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/25).
XML-doc coverage: LogReader LogReader/LogReader/LogReader.csproj — LogReader: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/20).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×3

Mock framework: Moq — UserServiceTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — AuthenticationServiceTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — DatabaseServiceTests references Moq.

D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1

Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	5	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.	0	—

Run 019f1556-7b54-7873-9829-afb4def5eb24 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 26 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 13 field(s)

SetUserDataViewModel.Surname Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SetUserDataViewModel.cs:12
SignUpViewModel.FirstName Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SignUpViewModel.cs:15
SignUpViewModel.LastName Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SignUpViewModel.cs:20
UserInfoViewModel.FirstName Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs:9
UserInfoViewModel.LastName Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs:12
CreateUserRequest.FirstName Common/DTO/RestRequests/CreateUserRequest.cs:9
CreateUserRequest.LastName Common/DTO/RestRequests/CreateUserRequest.cs:10
UserInfoRequest.FirstName Common/DTO/RestRequests/UserInfoRequest.cs:9
UserInfoRequest.LastName Common/DTO/RestRequests/UserInfoRequest.cs:10
User.FirstName Common/DTO/User.cs:9
User.LastName Common/DTO/User.cs:10
DbUser.FirstName Services/DataBaseService/Database/Models/DbUser.cs:10
DbUser.LastName Services/DataBaseService/Database/Models/DbUser.cs:11

Email — 12 field(s)

SignInViewModel.Email Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SignInViewModel.cs:12
SignUpViewModel.Email Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SignUpViewModel.cs:28
UserInfoViewModel.Email Clients/GUI/ViewModels/UserInfoViewModel.cs:14
InternalConfirmUserRequest.UserEmail Common/DTO/BrokerRequests/InternalConfirmUserRequest.cs:5
InternalLoginRequest.Email Common/DTO/BrokerRequests/InternalLoginRequest.cs:5
CreateUserRequest.Email Common/DTO/RestRequests/CreateUserRequest.cs:7
LoginRequest.Email Common/DTO/RestRequests/LoginRequest.cs:5
UserInfoRequest.Email Common/DTO/RestRequests/UserInfoRequest.cs:8
User.Email Common/DTO/User.cs:8
UserCredential.Email Common/DTO/UserCredential.cs:9
DbUserCredential.Email Services/DataBaseService/Database/Models/DbUserCredential.cs:12
CreateUserCommand.emailSender Services/UserService/Commands/CreateUserCommand.cs:22

Date of birth — 1 field(s)

SetUserDataViewModel.DateOfBirth Clients/GUI/ViewModels/SetUserDataViewModel.cs:15

Lanit-Students/TradingStation

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Trajectory

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

At a glance — Code Health · 49% · Weak · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 65% · Adequate · gated by D35

At a glance — Maturity · 40% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 55% · Adequate · gated by D13, P3

At a glance — Security · 34% · Weak · gated by C1, S1

At a glance — Accessibility · 45% · Weak · gated by AC2, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts