Public report — partisan, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 06-08-2026 @ 02:07 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Lasp-Lang/partisan

57% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 100% Exemplary Event Sourcing 100% Exemplary Code Health 89% Strong Security 73% Strong Readiness 61% Adequate Event-Driven 56% Adequate Maturity 48% Weak

Medium · 38,131 LoC · rebuild ~0.4 person-years · weakest lens: Maturity (48%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

22/26dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
47findings with an exact file:lineof 54 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
26/95dimensions across the health lenses38131 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

lasp-lang/partisan is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Event Sourcing (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Maturity (48%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Event-Driven (56%) is the next concern — services couple through their messages, so they can't evolve or deploy independently.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Reconcile the README with reality (Documentation accuracy); Grow the ADR log (currently 7) (Architecture documentation); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)).

For scale: Medium (~38,131 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.4 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 89% Strong Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 48% Weak · gated by M4 Readiness 61% Adequate · gated by P3 Security 73% Strong Event-Driven 56% Adequate Event Sourcing 100% ★ Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Maturity 48% · 46% weightEvent-Driven 56% · 25% weightReadiness 61% · 14% weightSecurity 73% · 8% weightCode Health 89% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight

Raise Maturity 48 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 57 → ~64.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (4+)

4 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 partisan-base.Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 partisan-base.Dockerfile

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €20,000–€100,000
Cost to rebuild€20,000–€100,000 (0.2–0.6 person-years (340–1,078 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 57% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€61,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 48% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
+6.3 pts · Low effort · Bus Factor
2
Resolve the 2 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with skeen_3pc.erl, bernstein_ctp.erl.
+4.2 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
3
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present); README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
+8.3 pts · Medium effort · Documentation accuracy

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 48%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.4 person-years rebuild (38,131 LoC) · weakest lens: Maturity 48%
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present); README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present); README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.

At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Strong

The Good
D3 · Erlang God Classes 7.8 D4 · Erlang Code Duplication 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D7 · Erlang Architectural Integrity 10.0 D35 · Erlang Change Coupling 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 48% · Weak · gated by M4

The Good
D19 · Erlang Documentation Quality 8.0 D20 · Erlang ADR Quality 9.1 D21 · Erlang Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Erlang Knowledge Freshness 8.6 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
D16 · Erlang Bus Factor 5.5 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D25 · Erlang ADR Conformance 0.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 1.0

At a glance — Readiness · 61% · Adequate · gated by P3

The Good
D13 · Erlang Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0
The Bad
P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0

At a glance — Security · 73% · Strong

The Good
D29 · Erlang Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · Erlang IaC & Container Security 8.0
The Ugly
D28 · Erlang Secrets (history) 4.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 56% · Adequate

The Bad
ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 5.6

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 10.0 ES2 · Repo Immutable events 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration11High / Critical

Roadmap

First, reconcile the README with reality by removing claims about a runtime system and ML/RAG capabilities that do not exist. Next, expand the architecture decision records to eight entries and add a testing section to the README. Then, address the single off-boarding risk to improve the bus factor. Finally, refactor OTP message handlers to remove synchronous calls and blocking sleeps, ensuring processes remain temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.+6.3 ptsLowBus Factor
Resolve the 2 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with skeen_3pc.erl, bernstein_ctp.erl.+4.2 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present); README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.+8.3 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy
Grow the ADR log (currently 7) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.+8.2 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+7.2 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.+4.6 ptsMediumHandler temporal coupling
Resolve the 1 ADR not followed finding(s) in ADR Conformance — start with ADR-000003.md.+2.1 ptsLowADR Conformance
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.+3.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 21 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 10% slop · 71% mixed · 19% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Dockerfile1.9SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
partisan-base.Dockerfile2.1SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0022
src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl
src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl
src/partisan.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan.erl
src/partisan_peer_connections.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_peer_connections.erl
src/partisan_analysis.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_analysis
src/partisan_erpc.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_erpc.erl
src/partisan_thicket_engine.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_thicket_engine
src/partisan_otp_patches.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_otp_patches.erl
src/partisan_monitor.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_monitor
src/partisan_plumtree_broadcast.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_plumtree_broadcast
src/partisan_interval_sets.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_interval_sets
src/partisan_trace_orchestrator.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_trace_orchestrator.erl
src/acceptor_pool.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: acceptor_pool
src/partisan_remote_ref.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_remote_ref.erl
src/partisan_config.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/partisan_config.erl
doc_extras/adrs/ADR-000003.md8.0Near-cleanADR Conformance: ADR not followed: ADR-000003: Retire the partisan_peer_service_events Bus — Membership as a Snapshot with Async Push
src/partisan_client_server_peer_service_manager.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_client_server_peer_service_manager
src/partisan_static_peer_service_manager.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: partisan_static_peer_service_manager

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 22 of 26 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 26 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D7D13D16D19D20D21D25D28D29D31D34D35AX9ED1ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 47 of 54 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd4d3-ab01-71f3-bba9-812a43708d97.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

33 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager · ×18src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl:21
FileTooLong: src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl · ×15src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 18 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl, partisan.erl, partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 15 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl, partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl, partisan.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 4 mechanizable ADRs, 4 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

33 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The partisan project has strong documentation: a single README covering the runtime purpose, four features, and an exhaustive test guide for running the heavy Fly.io test suite. The README is well written with bulleted feature lists (scalability via specialized overlay, lower latency from predominately automatic optimizations, Bring Your Own Overlay API), a full outline (Getting started; mix.exs; Why do we need Partisan?; Partisan features; Requirements; Who is using Partisan; Projects; Organizations and People; Reference; Academic Papers; Presentations) clipped mid-sentence, and an accompanying fly/README.md test guide covering one-time setup, run commands, a registry-initialisation rationale (fly deploy vs. fly machine run), sizing/cost defaults, and troubleshooting. The two READMEs are well matched in content.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The partisan project has strong documentation: a single README covering the runtime purpose, four features, and an exhaustive test guide for running the heavy Fly.io test suite. The README is well written with bulleted feature lists (scalability via specialized overlay, lower latency from predominately automatic optimizations, Bring Your Own Overlay API), a full outline (Getting started; mix.exs; Why do we need Partisan?; Partisan features; Requirements; Who is using Partisan; Projects; Organizations and People; Reference; Academic Papers; Presentations) clipped mid-sentence, and an accompanying fly/README.md test guide covering one-time setup, run commands, a registry-initialisation rationale (fly deploy vs. fly machine run), sizing/cost defaults, and troubleshooting. The two READMEs are well matched in content.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 7 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 9.1/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 conform / 1 violate across 7 ADRs.

ADR not followed: ADR-000003: Retire the partisan_peer_service_events Bus — Membership as a Snapshot with Async Pushdoc_extras/adrs/ADR-000003.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 ADR not followed finding(s) in ADR Conformance — start with ADR-000003.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce ADR Conformance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

What to do

  1. Improve Secrets (history) — currently 4.0/10. — 6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 7 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×7Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), partisan-base.Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), partisan-base.Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 of 73 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is protocols/skeen_3pc.erl.

Orphaned knowledge · ×2protocols/skeen_3pc.erl
Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with skeen_3pc.erl, bernstein_ctp.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `partisan_hbbft_worker` clause `handle_call/3#121` makes a synchronous `gen_server`/`gen_statem:call` round-trip to a peer process while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, react by casting a follow-up message (fire-and-forget), or resolve the needed state locally. — partisan_hbbft_worker.erl:129

What to do

  • Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the event-sourcing replay fold reconstructs state purely from the event (no wall clock, UUID or randomness) so replay is reproducible.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

ES2 · Immutable events10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events stay immutable (never rewritten in place).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 7) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy1.0 / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present)
  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Partisan is a runtime system but the evidence shows no runtime component (only OTP module re-implementations are present); README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health89%StrongSolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity48%Weak — gated by M4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness61%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security73%StrongSolid.
Event-Driven56%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Event Sourcing100%ExemplarySolid.
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~21346 lines of test source are present (.erl) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .hrl) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .hrl, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.erl) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (152 value object(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 7 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0022 Dockerfile — Deprecated MAINTAINER used
  • High IaC: DS-0022 partisan-base.Dockerfile — Deprecated MAINTAINER used
  • High IaC: DS-0029 partisan-base.Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×2
  • Orphaned knowledge protocols/skeen_3pc.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge protocols/bernstein_ctp.erl — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D25 · ADR Conformance · ADR not followed · ×1
  • ADR not followed: ADR-000003: Retire the partisan_peer_service_events Bus — Membership as a Snapshot with Async Push doc_extras/adrs/ADR-000003.md — The decision explicitly removes the synchronous gen_event fan-out bus `partisan_peer_service_events` in favor of a non-blocking push API, but the summary shows no partisan_membership or add_sup_callback type to reflect this change. (doc_extras/adrs/ADR-000003.md)
Warning — 40 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×18
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl:21 — TooManyMethods — 93 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan src/partisan.erl:23 — TooManyMethods — 78 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl:40 — TooManyMethods — 78 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_analysis src/partisan_analysis.erl:24 — TooManyMethods — 74 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_erpc src/partisan_erpc.erl:23 — TooManyMethods — 68 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_thicket_engine src/partisan_thicket_engine.erl:5 — TooManyMethods — 64 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_monitor src/partisan_monitor.erl:52 — TooManyMethods — 58 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_plumtree_broadcast src/partisan_plumtree_broadcast.erl:20 — TooManyMethods — 57 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_otp_patches src/partisan_otp_patches.erl:31 — TooManyMethods — 55 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_peer_connections src/partisan_peer_connections.erl:26 — TooManyMethods — 52 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_client_server_peer_service_manager src/partisan_client_server_peer_service_manager.erl:44 — TooManyMethods — 51 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_interval_sets src/partisan_interval_sets.erl:22 — TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: acceptor_pool src/acceptor_pool.erl:54 — TooManyMethods — 45 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_remote_ref src/partisan_remote_ref.erl:90 — TooManyMethods — 41 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_static_peer_service_manager src/partisan_static_peer_service_manager.erl:21 — TooManyMethods — 40 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_config src/partisan_config.erl:21 — TooManyMethods — 35 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_trace_orchestrator src/partisan_trace_orchestrator.erl:26 — TooManyMethods — 35 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: partisan_plumtree_engine src/partisan_plumtree_engine.erl:5 — TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×15
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1973 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1518 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan.erl src/partisan.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1353 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_peer_connections.erl src/partisan_peer_connections.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1330 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_erpc.erl src/partisan_erpc.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1169 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_otp_patches.erl src/partisan_otp_patches.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1006 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_analysis.erl src/partisan_analysis.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 945 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_monitor.erl src/partisan_monitor.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 783 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_trace_orchestrator.erl src/partisan_trace_orchestrator.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 766 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_remote_ref.erl src/partisan_remote_ref.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 731 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_config.erl src/partisan_config.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 719 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_plumtree_broadcast.erl src/partisan_plumtree_broadcast.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 717 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_thicket_engine.erl src/partisan_thicket_engine.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 676 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/partisan_interval_sets.erl src/partisan_interval_sets.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 559 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/acceptor_pool.erl src/acceptor_pool.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 547 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×7
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 partisan-base.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that LABEL maintainer is used instead of MAINTAINER (deprecated)
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Dockerfile:1 — Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 partisan-base.Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that LABEL maintainer is used instead of MAINTAINER (deprecated)
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 partisan-base.Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.erl) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (46053 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .erl, .hrl, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 33 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/partisan_hyparview_peer_service_manager.erl, src/partisan_pluggable_peer_service_manager.erl, src/partisan_peer_connections.erl, src/partisan_otp_patches.erl, src/partisan.erl, src/partisan_erpc.erl, src/partisan_config.erl, src/partisan_plumtree_broadcast.erl (+25 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 8 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (10 orphaned of 73 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .6artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .11artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fd4d3-ab01-71f3-bba9-812a43708d97 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 7 · Warnings: 40 · Recommendations: 5 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 02:07 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md