Public report — Learning.EventStore, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-07-2026 @ 19:36 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Learningcom/Learning.EventStore

dormant codebasebounded contexts not declared
44% Provisional
Architecture 93% Exemplary Code Health 69% Adequate Security 65% Adequate Performance 61% Adequate Maturity 43% Weak Readiness 31% Weak

Small · 3,625 LoC · 7 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (31%)

Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (10 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Logging' does not exist in the namespace 'Learning.MessageQueue' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'ILog' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

48/50dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
13findings with an exact file:lineof 76 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
50/98dimensions across the health lenses3625 LoC · 7 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

learningcom/Learning.EventStore carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (93%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (31%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (43%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make retry-prone mutations idempotent (Idempotency); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Small (~3,625 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (93%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 69% Adequate · gated by D18 Architecture 93% ★ Exemplary Maturity 43% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 31% Weak · gated by D12, P1, P3 Security 65% Adequate · gated by D30 Performance 61% Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 31% · 46% weightMaturity 43% · 25% weightPerformance 61% · 14% weightSecurity 65% · 8% weightCode Health 69% · 4% weightArchitecture 93% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 31 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 15%Plumbing 42%Tests 43%
New since the last scan (3+)

3 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — analyzer environment

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,400–€12,000
Cost to rebuild€2,400–€12,000 (0.1 person-years (40–127 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 44% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 47% boilerplate · 27% straight-line · 26% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,200 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 31% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.3) — library/CLI, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+11.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+9.8 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+6.5 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Logging' does not exist in the namespace 'Learning.MessageQueue' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'ILog' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Logging' does not exist in the namespace 'Learning.MessageQueue' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'ILog' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 31%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,625 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 31%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Learning.Cqrs Cqrs Learning.EventStore EventStore Learning.EventStore.Common Common Learning.EventStore->Learning.EventStore.Common Learning.MessageQueue MessageQueue Learning.EventStore->Learning.MessageQueue Learning.MessageQueue->Learning.EventStore.Common

At a glance — Code Health · 69% · Adequate · gated by D18

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.1 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.6 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.9 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.9 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0
The Bad
X1 · Repo Async correctness 5.5 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 5.5 X4 · Repo Structured logging 6.1
The Ugly
D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 3.0

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.1 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 7.5 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.9 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 43% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7
The Ugly
D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 31% · Weak · gated by D12, P1, P3

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.9 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 10.0
The Bad
P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 2.1 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 3.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 65% · Adequate · gated by D30

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 9.5
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Performance · 61% · Adequate

The Bad
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.0 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 6.5

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components29High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection1Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply; Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+11.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+9.8 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+6.5 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.+12.4 ptsMediumIdempotency
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+12.4 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+12.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+11.7 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 5 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Learning.EventStore.csproj, Learning.MessageQueue.csproj, Learning.EventStore.Common.csproj.+3.8 ptsLowDocumentation Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 11 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 18% mixed · 82% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Controllers/HomeController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
test/Learning.EventStore.Test/Mocks/TestSnapshotAggregate.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: Apply
src/Learning.EventStore.Common/Redis/RedisClient.cs8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: RedisClient
sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)
test/Learning.EventStore.Test/Domain/AddAggregateToRepositoryTEst.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: DoesNotThrowIfObjectAlreadyTracked
src/Learning.EventStore/Learning.EventStore.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore
src/Learning.MessageQueue/Learning.MessageQueue.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.MessageQueue
src/Learning.EventStore.Common/Learning.EventStore.Common.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore.Common
src/Learning.Cqrs/Learning.Cqrs.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.Cqrs
sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 48 of 50 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 50 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P10P3P6PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 13 of 76 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf60-e9b6-74fb-a427-d18c8d2234ef.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, ED5 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: RedisClientsrc/Learning.EventStore.Common/Redis/RedisClient.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:106
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:39
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:132
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs:110

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Learning.EventStore.Common

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 21 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

121 test methods: 121 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 121 tests.

No assertions: DoesNotThrowIfObjectAlreadyTrackedtest/Learning.EventStore.Test/Domain/AddAggregateToRepositoryTEst.cs:37
Mock framework: FakeItEasy · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene2.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 outdated, 4 vulnerable, 7 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: Npgsql · ×4
Deprecated: LibLog · ×7
Outdated: Dapper · ×12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 16 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 3625 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.

Dead code: Applytest/Learning.EventStore.Test/Mocks/TestSnapshotAggregate.cs:28

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 projects, 149 source files, 6413 hand-written lines of code (3625 production / 2788 test), 11 inter-project edges (build failed).

Build failed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README for Learning.EventStore is a solid overview of the framework's purpose, features, installation, and an outline that promises clarity. It names CQRSLite as the reference, states supported .NET targets, and lists all three libraries with NuGet install commands. The Features section covers message publishing, eventsourcing, persistence options, optimistic concurrency, CQRS, dead-lettering, and distributed locking; Installation gives a clear breakdown of each package. However, the document is clipped mid-Installation, so the outline sections (Getting Started, Configuration, Usage, Creating an Event, Contributing) are present but not shown in the visible text, leaving some detail unverifiable from this single file.

Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore · ×5src/Learning.EventStore/Learning.EventStore.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Learning.EventStore.csproj, Learning.MessageQueue.csproj, Learning.EventStore.Common.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 7 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

83 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

Medium: missing-or-broken-authorizationsample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Controllers/HomeController.cs:15detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

29 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 14 high, 13 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Npgsql 4.1.2 · ×14detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.6.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 · ×13detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 13 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 of 16 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Learning.MessageQueue/RedisEventSubscriber.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 of 692 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IRedisClient` declares 31 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRedisClient.cs:7

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

ED5 · Idempotency3.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Commands.CreateInventoryItemHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateInventoryItem.cs:28

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.

What to do

  • On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 2 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
X1 · Async correctness5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×2) — Session.cs:23, MessageQueueRepository.cs:57

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 5/20 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×15) — Repository.cs:35, SnapshotRepository.cs:57, SnapshotRepository.cs:74, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×8) — InventoryItemCreatedSubscription.cs:29, InventoryItemCreatedSubscription.cs:32, InventoryItemRenamedSubscription.cs:27, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health69%Adequate — gated by D18Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture93%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity43%Weak — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness31%Weak — gated by D12, P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security65%Adequate — gated by D30Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance61%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 48 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 2 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): a message-bus package; 6 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds; an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events)
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM accuracy check did not return a usable verdict.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 20 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×14
  • High CVE: Npgsql 4.1.2 — Npgsql 4.1.2 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.13
  • High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.6
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.1
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.1
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.1
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebSockets 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebSockets 2.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.4
  • High CVE: System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol 4.5.1 — System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol 4.5.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×4
  • Vulnerable: Npgsql — Npgsql 4.1.2 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: System.Data.SqlClient — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.1.0, — ) severity. 2.1.0
  • Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App [2.2.0, — ) severity. 2.2.0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.6.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.6.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.2
  • Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.6
Warning — 38 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×13
  • Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.5
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.2
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.6
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.2
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IIS 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IIS 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.2.7
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.3.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.7.0
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.3.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.1
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×7
  • Deprecated: LibLog — LibLog 5.0.8 — Legacy Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.1.0, — ) 2.1.0 Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: MSTest.TestAdapter — MSTest.TestAdapter 2.0.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: MSTest.TestFramework — MSTest.TestFramework 2.0.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App [2.2.0, — ) 2.2.0 Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
D19 · Documentation Quality · Low XML-doc coverage · ×5
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore src/Learning.EventStore/Learning.EventStore.csproj — Learning.EventStore: 10 % XML-doc coverage (10/96).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.MessageQueue src/Learning.MessageQueue/Learning.MessageQueue.csproj — Learning.MessageQueue: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/54).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore.Common src/Learning.EventStore.Common/Learning.EventStore.Common.csproj — Learning.EventStore.Common: 22 % XML-doc coverage (20/90).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.Cqrs src/Learning.Cqrs/Learning.Cqrs.csproj — Learning.Cqrs: 25 % XML-doc coverage (5/20).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web.csproj — Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/115).
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×1
  • No assertions: DoesNotThrowIfObjectAlreadyTracked test/Learning.EventStore.Test/Domain/AddAggregateToRepositoryTEst.cs:37 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 7 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: Apply test/Learning.EventStore.Test/Mocks/TestSnapshotAggregate.cs:28 — Method Apply — no references found in solution.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build failed · ×1
  • Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 10), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Logging' does not exist in the namespace 'Learning.MessageQueue' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'ILog' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].comment | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1014.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Controllers/HomeController.cs:15 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: RedisClient src/Learning.EventStore.Common/Redis/RedisClient.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 109 lines, 36 methods.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:106 — src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:106-124 | src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableRedisSubscription.cs:109-127
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:39 — src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:39-49 | src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableRedisSubscription.cs:39-49
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:132 — src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableAsyncRedisSubscription.cs:132-141 | src/Learning.MessageQueue/Messages/RetryableRedisSubscription.cs:135-144
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs:110 — sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs:110-116 | sample/Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web/Startup.cs:125-130
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Learning.EventStore.Common — Learning.EventStore.Common: abstractness 0.24, instability 0.00, distance 0.76 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces and real coverage will be read.
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test runner surfaced no tests · ×1
  • Test runner surfaced no tests — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 121 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 3625 LoC across 7 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 16 of 16 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: src/Learning.MessageQueue/RedisEventSubscriber.cs, src/Learning.EventStore.Common/Redis/RedisClient.cs, src/Learning.MessageQueue/Repository/MessageQueueRepository.cs (and 13 more).
Info — 15 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×12
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.0.30 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 2.2.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: Npgsql — Npgsql 4.1.2 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: Polly — Polly 7.2.0 → 8.7.0 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: StackExchange.Redis — StackExchange.Redis 2.6.70 → 3.0.17 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: System.Data.SqlClient — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.0 → 4.9.1 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore).
  • Outdated: FakeItEasy — FakeItEasy 5.5.0 → 9.0.1 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore.Test).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 16.9.4 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore.Test).
  • Outdated: MSTest.TestAdapter — MSTest.TestAdapter 2.0.0 → 4.3.3 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore.Test).
  • Outdated: MSTest.TestFramework — MSTest.TestFramework 2.0.0 → 4.3.3 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore.Test).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design 2.2.0 → 2.3.0 available (referenced by Learning.EventStore.Sample.Web).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: FakeItEasy — Learning.EventStore.Test references FakeItEasy.
  • Mock framework: FakeItEasy — Learning.Cqrs.Test references FakeItEasy.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list Learning.EventStore.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json29artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019faf60-e9b6-74fb-a427-d18c8d2234ef · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 20 · Warnings: 38 · Recommendations: 3 · Info: 15 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 19:36 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md