Public report — leofs, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 06-08-2026 @ 01:57 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Leo-Project/leofs

dormant codebase
41% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 100% Exemplary Code Health 90% Exemplary Event-Driven 79% Strong Maturity 51% Adequate Security 49% Weak Event Sourcing 49% Weak Readiness 25% Weak

Medium · 33,682 LoC · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (25%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

22/24dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
72findings with an exact file:lineof 83 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
24/95dimensions across the health lenses33682 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

leo-project/leofs carries serious gaps (41%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (90%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (25%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Event Sourcing (49%) is the next concern — the event log can't be trusted to replay, risking corrupt state and lost history.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Medium (~33,682 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 90% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 51% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 25% Weak · gated by D13, P3 Security 49% Weak · gated by D31, D36 Event-Driven 79% Strong Event Sourcing 49% Weak · gated by ES1
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 25% · 46% weightEvent Sourcing 49% · 25% weightSecurity 49% · 14% weightMaturity 51% · 8% weightEvent-Driven 79% · 4% weightCode Health 90% · 2% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 41 → ~53.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (19+)

19 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-release/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€54,000
Cost to rebuild€11,000–€54,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (179–569 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 41% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€32,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 25% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_key.pem (2).
+13.8 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
+13.4 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
3
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
+12.8 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 25%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (33,682 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 25%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_key.pem (2). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_key.pem (2).

At a glance — Code Health · 90% · Exemplary

The Good
D3 · Erlang God Classes 8.0 D4 · Erlang Code Duplication 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Erlang Change Coupling 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 51% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good
D19 · Erlang Documentation Quality 8.3 D21 · Erlang Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D34 · Erlang Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Weak · gated by D13, P3

The Good
P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
D13 · Erlang Secret Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 4.0

At a glance — Security · 49% · Weak · gated by D31, D36

The Good
D28 · Erlang Secrets (history) 8.0 D29 · Erlang Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0
The Ugly
D31 · Erlang IaC & Container Security 1.5 D36 · Erlang Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 79% · Strong

The Good
ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 7.9

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 49% · Weak · gated by ES1

The Good
ES2 · Repo Immutable events 10.0
The Ugly
ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 1.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration46High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures5High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the two leaked secrets, starting with server_key.pem, to secure the codebase. Next, document recovery time and objective targets alongside a tested restore procedure to ensure true disaster recovery. Implement an approval gate or draft release workflow to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Finally, stamp versions in build manifests or tags for traceability, and ensure the event-replay reducer is deterministic by moving clock and random generation to the event raise-time.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_key.pem (2).+13.8 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+13.4 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+12.8 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+12.8 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with leo_gateway_s3_api.erl, leo_manager_api.erl, leo_manager_console.erl.+2.8 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+1.9 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Keep the event-replay reducer pure — move every clock/UUID/random into the event at raise-time and read it back in the fold.+3.2 ptsMediumFold determinism
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+2.8 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 24 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 33% slop · 29% mixed · 38% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile0.6SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile1.1SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile1.1SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile1.6SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile2.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile2.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile2.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfiles/leofs-release/Dockerfile3.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
rel/leo_gateway/files/server_key.pem4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
apps/leo_gateway/rel/files/server_key.pem4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_api.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_api.erl
apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl
apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_console.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_console.erl
apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_http_commons.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_gateway_http_commons.erl
apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_mnesia.erl7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_mnesia.erl
apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_handler_object.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_handler_object.erl
apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_formatter_text.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_formatter_text.erl
apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_mq.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_mq.erl
apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_nfs_proto3_server.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_nfs_proto3_server.erl
apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_nfs_file_handler.erl8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/leo_nfs_file_handler.erl

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 22 of 24 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 24 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D36AX9ED4ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 72 of 83 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd4ca-0cf9-788b-8bae-00b442dc4e62.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

19 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_api.erl · ×14apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_api.erl:0
TooManyMethods: leo_manager_console · ×5apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_console.erl:22

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with leo_manager_api.erl, leo_gateway_s3_api.erl, leo_manager_console.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with leo_manager_console.erl, leo_manager_api.erl, leo_gateway_s3_api.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-key · ×2rel/leo_gateway/files/server_key.pem:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with server_key.pem (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

LeoFS's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single README with an overview section covering multi-protocol support, large-object handling, multi-data-center replication, plus architecture docs for LeoStorage, LeoGateway, and LeoManager; a dedicated monitor guide installing InfluxDB/Grafana/Telegraf; a production checklist enumerating versioning and bug-checkpoint rules; and benchmark documentation including configuration examples and the ls-command tool. The outline is complete across all visible documents. LeoFS documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, a dedicated whats_new.md page, an architecture/leo_gateway.md guide, and a FAQ section. It covers configuration fundamentals (configuration files, *.conf/*.d directories, node-specific paths), release notes for v1.3.x features like Boto3 support, AWS Signature v4, user-defined metadata, and the new S3 multi-part upload limit requirement; it also documents installation via dpkg/rpm on Ubuntu/CentOS, a cluster-ansible guide, and an FAQ section listing operational limits such as KVS storage upgrade restrictions. The outline is visible in each clipped document body (e.g., '## [Release v1.3.2] ... Related Links' for the release notes). LeoFS documentation is clear and complete for its target audience. The README files alone cover the most common client-usage questions (name-resolution, S3 metadata keys, gzip compression), while architecture docs explain the object-storage/metadata-storage model, data-structure layers, large-object support, and the multi-node RING consistency model. A dedicated troubleshooting guide rounds out the set with a short title and an index of leofs-adm commands.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.3/10. — LeoFS's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single README with an overview section covering multi-protocol support, large-object handling, multi-data-center replication, plus architecture docs for LeoStorage, LeoGateway, and LeoManager; a dedicated monitor guide installing InfluxDB/Grafana/Telegraf; a production checklist enumerating versioning and bug-checkpoint rules; and benchmark documentation including configuration examples and the ls-command tool. The outline is complete across all visible documents. LeoFS documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, a dedicated whats_new.md page, an architecture/leo_gateway.md guide, and a FAQ section. It covers configuration fundamentals (configuration files, *.conf/*.d directories, node-specific paths), release notes for v1.3.x features like Boto3 support, AWS Signature v4, user-defined metadata, and the new S3 multi-part upload limit requirement; it also documents installation via dpkg/rpm on Ubuntu/CentOS, a cluster-ansible guide, and an FAQ section listing operational limits such as KVS storage upgrade restrictions. The outline is visible in each clipped document body (e.g., '## [Release v1.3.2] ... Related Links' for the release notes). LeoFS documentation is clear and complete for its target audience. The README files alone cover the most common client-usage questions (name-resolution, S3 metadata keys, gzip compression), while architecture docs explain the object-storage/metadata-storage model, data-structure layers, large-object support, and the multi-node RING consistency model. A dedicated troubleshooting guide rounds out the set with a short title and an index of leofs-adm commands.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×2apps/leo_gateway/rel/files/server_key.pem:1detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with server_key.pem (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

53 finding(s): 0 critical, 18 high, 22 medium, 13 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×16Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0004 · ×21Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0005 · ×9Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 21 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (21). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 16 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (16). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 9 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

59 of 59 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl.

Largest orphaned file · ×3apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl
Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with leo_gateway_s3_api.erl, leo_manager_api.erl, leo_manager_console.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).

No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `leo_manager_mq_client` clause `recover_rebalance/2#203` PERSISTS state AND BROADCASTS a domain event as two independent side effects in the same clause, with no shared transaction (`mnesia:transaction`) or outbox. A crash between the two — or a redelivered message — diverges the store from what subscribers saw (state committed, broadcast lost) or emits a phantom event (broadcast sent, state rolled back). Wrap both in one `mnesia:transaction`, or record the event in the same write and dispatch it afterwards (a transactional outbox). Divergence blast-radius: MEDIUM. — leo_manager_mq_client.erl:210

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ES1 · Fold determinism1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the event-sourcing replay fold reconstructs state purely from the event (no wall clock, UUID or randomness) so replay is reproducible.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

  • `leo_manager_mnesia`'s event-replay reducer reads a wall clock / randomness / a peer process / persistence while reconstructing aggregate state — replaying the same events would rebuild DIFFERENT state each run. A fold must be a pure function of (state, event); stamp the timestamp/id into the event at raise-time and read it back in the fold. — leo_manager_mnesia.erl:507

What to do

  • Keep the event-replay reducer pure — move every clock/UUID/random into the event at raise-time and read it back in the fold.
ES2 · Immutable events10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events stay immutable (never rewritten in place).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

M1 · Documentation (README)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add dialyzer or elvis (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
  • No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health90%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity51%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness25%Weak — gated by D13, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security49%Weak — gated by D31, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven79%StrongSolid.
Event Sourcing49%Weak — gated by ES1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~4391 lines of test source are present (.erl) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .hrl) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .hrl, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.erl) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (608 value object(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 20 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×16
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0015 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile — 'yum clean all' missing
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0015 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile — 'yum clean all' missing
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfiles/leofs-release/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfiles/leofs-release/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2
  • Leaked secret: private-key rel/leo_gateway/files/server_key.pem:1 — private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
  • Leaked secret: private-key apps/leo_gateway/rel/files/server_key.pem:1 — private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: private-key apps/leo_gateway/rel/files/server_key.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key rel/leo_gateway/files/server_key.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
Warning — 41 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×21
  • Medium IaC: DS-0004 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — Port 22 exposed
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile:31 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile:32 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile:32 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu18.04/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile:31 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-release/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile:28 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile:29 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile:33 — Ensure port 22 is not exposed
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile:31 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that sudo isn't used
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that sudo isn't used
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_1 Dockerfiles/leofs-build-deps/Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that sudo isn't used
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×14
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_api.erl apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_api.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2356 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2039 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_console.erl apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_console.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 2012 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_handler_object.erl apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_handler_object.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1440 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_formatter_text.erl apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_formatter_text.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1238 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_gateway_http_commons.erl apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_http_commons.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 1233 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_mq.erl apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_mq.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 889 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_nfs_proto3_server.erl apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_nfs_proto3_server.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 683 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_mnesia.erl apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_mnesia.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 672 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_nfs_file_handler.erl apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_nfs_file_handler.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 654 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_manager_formatter_json.erl apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_formatter_json.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 597 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_handler_del_directory.erl apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_handler_del_directory.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 592 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_storage_api.erl apps/leo_storage/src/leo_storage_api.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 567 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/leo_gateway_app.erl apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_app.erl:0 — FileTooLong — 557 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×5
  • TooManyMethods: leo_manager_console apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_console.erl:22 — TooManyMethods — 60 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: leo_manager_api apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_api.erl:22 — TooManyMethods — 51 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: leo_gateway_s3_api apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl:26 — TooManyMethods — 50 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: leo_manager_mnesia apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_mnesia.erl:22 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: leo_gateway_http_commons apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_http_commons.erl:26 — TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — Every one of the 59 significant source file(s) was last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains, so there is no concentration to measure — the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
Recommendation — 20 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×9
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfiles/leofs-all-in-one/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 22`, so a request to `localhost:22` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
  • Low IaC: DS-0014 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos6/Dockerfile — RUN using 'wget' and 'curl'
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
  • Low IaC: DS-0014 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-centos7/Dockerfile — RUN using 'wget' and 'curl'
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
  • Low IaC: DS-0014 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu14.04/Dockerfile — RUN using 'wget' and 'curl'
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 Dockerfiles/leofs-package-ubuntu16.04/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×3
  • Largest orphaned file apps/leo_gateway/src/leo_gateway_s3_api.erl — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_api.erl — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file apps/leo_manager/src/leo_manager_console.erl — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.erl) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .erl, .hrl, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 59 of 59 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 59 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. Emit one from whichever pipeline releases the artifact — `cosign attest` (keyless or with your release key) records the build inputs against the artifact digest and needs nothing forge-specific; publish the attestation as a release asset alongside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .53artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fd4ca-0cf9-788b-8bae-00b442dc4e62 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 20 · Warnings: 41 · Recommendations: 20 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 01:57 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md