Executive summary
livebook-dev/kino is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram. It scores 62 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged. We judged it as a preview release, against a lower bar.
Maturity, at 53, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 8 points. Having someone learn and document the five files no active contributor knows comes next, worth about 2 points. Raising Maturity to 62 would lift the score to about 66.
Fourteen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Three pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Updating the vulnerable packages and pinning each tool to an exact version would close both risks.
The product code is 8,024 lines, about €12,000 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 53 to 62, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 62 to about 66.
New since the last survey: 7 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 28+ corresponding lines) lib/kino/input.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) lib/kino/control.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) lib/kino.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (2 corresponding lines) lib/kino/debug/default.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (3 corresponding lines) lib/kino/debug/default.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 1+ corresponding lines) lib/kino/control.ex
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €12,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €4,000 to €20,000, for 66 to 210 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.9 at a score of 62. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 8,024 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 Enumerable.Kino | 3 Enumerable.Kino.JS | 4 Kino.FS | 5 Kino.JS | 6 Kino.JS.Live | 7 Kino.Process | 8 Kino.Screen | 9 Kino.SmartCell | 10 assets.packs.data_table | 11 assets.packs.debug_default | 12 assets.packs.debug_pipeline | 13 assets.packs.mermaid | 14 assets.packs.remote_execution_cell | 15 assets.packs.tree | 16 lib.assets.audio | 17 lib.assets.download | 18 lib.assets.html | 19 lib.assets.video | 20 Kino | 21 Kino.Debug | 22 Kino.Render | 23 Kino.Render.Kino | 24 Kino.Render.Kino.JS | 25 Kino.Render.Nx |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 Enumerable.Kino | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 Enumerable.Kino.JS | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 Kino.FS | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 Kino.JS | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 Kino.JS.Live | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 Kino.Process | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 Kino.Screen | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 Kino.SmartCell | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 assets.packs.data_table | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 assets.packs.debug_default | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 assets.packs.debug_pipeline | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 assets.packs.mermaid | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 assets.packs.remote_execution_cell | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 assets.packs.tree | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 lib.assets.audio | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 lib.assets.download | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 lib.assets.html | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 lib.assets.video | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 Kino | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 Kino.Debug | 2 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 Kino.Render | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 Kino.Render.Kino | 9 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 Kino.Render.Kino.JS | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 Kino.Render.Nx | 1 |
20→5 Kino uses Kino.JS✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in Kino uses a type in Kino.JS.
- The types involved
Kino.Audio→Kino.JS.LiveKino.Download→Kino.JS.LiveKino.RemoteExecutionCell→Kino.JS.LiveKino.Table→Kino.JS.LiveKino.Video→Kino.JS.Live
- Direction
- Kino uses Kino.JS, so a change to Kino.JS can break Kino, while a change to Kino can't break Kino.JS.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→5 Kino.Debug uses Kino.JS✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Kino.Debug uses a type in Kino.JS.
- The types involved
Kino.Debug.Default→Kino.JS.LiveKino.Debug.Pipeline→Kino.JS.Live
- Direction
- Kino.Debug uses Kino.JS, so a change to Kino.JS can break Kino.Debug, while a change to Kino.Debug can't break Kino.JS.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Debug uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→20 Kino.Debug uses Kino✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Kino.Debug uses a type in Kino.
- The types involved
Kino.Debug.Default→Kino.JSKino.Debug.Pipeline→Kino.JS
- Direction
- Kino.Debug uses Kino, so a change to Kino can break Kino.Debug, while a change to Kino.Debug can't break Kino.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Debug uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→20 Kino.Render uses Kino✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in Kino.Render uses a type in Kino.
- The types involved
Kino.Render.Any→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Atom→Kino.RenderKino.Render.BitString→Kino.RenderKino.Render.PID→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Reference→Kino.Render
- Direction
- Kino.Render uses Kino, so a change to Kino can break Kino.Render, while a change to Kino.Render can't break Kino.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Render uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→20 Kino.Render.Kino uses Kino✕
- Connections
- 9 pairs of types, where a type in Kino.Render.Kino uses a type in Kino.
- The types involved
Kino.Render.Kino.Control→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Frame→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Image→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Input→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Inspect→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.JS→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Layout→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Markdown→Kino.RenderKino.Render.Kino.Text→Kino.Render
- Direction
- Kino.Render.Kino uses Kino, so a change to Kino can break Kino.Render.Kino, while a change to Kino.Render.Kino can't break Kino.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Render.Kino uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→20 Kino.Render.Kino.JS uses Kino✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Kino.Render.Kino.JS uses a type in Kino.
- The types involved
Kino.Render.Kino.JS.Live→Kino.Render
- Direction
- Kino.Render.Kino.JS uses Kino, so a change to Kino can break Kino.Render.Kino.JS, while a change to Kino.Render.Kino.JS can't break Kino.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Render.Kino.JS uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→20 Kino.Render.Nx uses Kino✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Kino.Render.Nx uses a type in Kino.
- The types involved
Kino.Render.Nx.Heatmap→Kino.Render
- Direction
- Kino.Render.Nx uses Kino, so a change to Kino can break Kino.Render.Nx, while a change to Kino.Render.Nx can't break Kino.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Kino.Render.Nx uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 21 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up; Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with shorts.ex, screen.ex, tree.ex. | +2.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +3.3 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract. | +0.9 pts | Medium | Code Duplication |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +0.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +0.8 pts | Medium | Tooling |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.0 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex | 6.5 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/kino/process.ex | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| assets/packs/data_table/App.js | 7.1 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: App.App (cyclomatic 60) |
| assets/packs/debug_pipeline/App.js | 7.4 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: App.App (cyclomatic 16) |
| lib/kino/control.ex | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) |
| lib/kino/debug/default.ex | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (2 corresponding lines) |
| test/kino/process_test.exs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/kino/js.ex | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/kino/rpc.ex | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/kino/input.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 28+ corresponding lines) |
| lib/kino.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) |
| lib/kino/audio.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) |
| lib/kino/remote_execution_cell.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| lib/kino/render.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 43 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 73 of 82 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (mix.exs), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. (rule: no-root-manifest). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was App.App at 60.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with App.App (cyclomatic 60). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.2 to about 9.0/10.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was App.App at 65.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with App.App (cognitive 65). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.1 to about 9.0/10.
D3 · God Classes
4 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with App.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with process.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with App.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected. 2.4 % of the production lines (195 of 8,024) are in a reported copy. A further 6 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 28+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with input.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with control.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with kino.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 10 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
2 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 0 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 7 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. This repository publishes itself under Apache-2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 29 of the 51 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D17 · Explicit Debt
10 deducted task-comment markers across 8024 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 10 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with server.ex (6), process_test.exs, js.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 2 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
1 of 2 build units (Mix, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 · Navigability
23 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 3 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 3 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
21 finding(s): 1 critical, 13 high, 5 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 13 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (12), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
5 of 29 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/kino/shorts.ex. Counted over 29 of the 51 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with shorts.ex, screen.ex, tree.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:3
- `assets/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — assets/package.json:7
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 31 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/packs/data_table/ActionButton.js, assets/packs/data_table/ActionMenu.js, assets/packs/data_table/App.js, assets/packs/data_table/DataInfo.js, assets/packs/data_table/DownloadExported.js, assets/packs/data_table/HeaderMenu.js (+25 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication
- assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:162 · assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:219 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:162
- assets/packs/debug_default/App.js:25 · assets/packs/debug_pipeline/App.js:204 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — assets/packs/debug_default/App.js:25
- assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:56 · assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:86 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:56
- lib/assets/audio/main.js:19 · lib/assets/video/main.js:9 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — lib/assets/audio/main.js:19
- assets/packs/debug_default/main.js:6 · assets/packs/debug_pipeline/main.js:6 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — assets/packs/debug_default/main.js:6
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 20; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/packs/data_table/App.js:177
R3 · Large Files
- assets/packs/data_table/App.js has 564 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — assets/packs/data_table/App.js:1
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R5 · Dependency Freshness
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`:crypto.hash(:sha256, data)`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. (×2) — lib/kino/js.ex:393, lib/kino/js.ex:443
What to do
- Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key. This repository constructs a collision-broken hash (MD5/SHA1) at 2 sites, not one: `lib/kino/js.ex:393` (:erlang.md5), `lib/kino/js.ex:443` (:erlang.md5). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 61% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 91% | Adequate — gated by D26 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Maturity | 53% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 64% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 88% | Strong | Solid. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 82 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (15 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository starts no server another machine can reach (no Phoenix.Endpoint, Plug.Cowboy or Bandit child). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or OTP application is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (Ecto, Postgrex, MyXQL, Mongo, EventStore, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2710 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (1382 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this OTP build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Elixir source (3 module(s), 195 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — 1 test file(s) reach none of 31 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — X1 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — X16 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — X21 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — X24 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — X29 reached only 23% of this repository's production lines — elixir (8,024 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 17 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 47 finding(s)
- TodoComment test/kino/process_test.exs:161
- TodoComment lib/kino/js.ex:503
- TodoComment lib/kino/process.ex:463
- TodoComment lib/kino/rpc.ex:45
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:21
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:78
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:89
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:207
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:120
- TodoComment lib/kino/smart_cell/server.ex:177
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- FunctionTooLong: App.App assets/packs/data_table/App.js:91
- FunctionTooLong: App.App assets/packs/debug_pipeline/App.js:11
- Weak hash algorithm lib/kino/js.ex:393
- Weak hash algorithm lib/kino/js.ex:443
- App.App (cyclomatic 60) assets/packs/data_table/App.js:91
- App.App (cyclomatic 16) assets/packs/debug_pipeline/App.js:11
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) assets/packs/data_table/App.js:177
- App.App (cognitive 65) assets/packs/data_table/App.js:91
- (anonymous) (cognitive 20) assets/packs/data_table/App.js:177
- App.App (cognitive 16) assets/packs/debug_pipeline/App.js:11
- REDACTED
- FileTooLong: kino/process.ex lib/kino/process.ex
- ClassTooLong: App assets/packs/data_table/App.js:1
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 28+ corresponding lines) lib/kino/input.ex:372
- Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) lib/kino/control.ex:386
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) lib/kino.ex:204
- Edited copy of a member (2 corresponding lines) lib/kino/debug/default.ex:8
- Edited copy of a member (3 corresponding lines) lib/kino/debug/default.ex:38
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 1+ corresponding lines) lib/kino/control.ex:513
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/kino/audio.ex:40
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/kino/remote_execution_cell.ex:289
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/kino/render.ex:194
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:162
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) assets/packs/debug_default/App.js:25
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) assets/packs/remote_execution_cell/App.js:56
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) lib/assets/audio/main.js:19
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) assets/packs/debug_default/main.js:6
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 20) assets/packs/data_table/App.js:177
- assets/packs/data_table/App.js: 564 lines of code assets/packs/data_table/App.js:1
- No typecheck script
Minor — 16 finding(s)
- Orphaned file lib/kino/shorts.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/kino/screen.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/kino/tree.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/kino/proxy.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/kino/audio.ex:1
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated predicate lib/kino/process.ex:464
- Duplicated predicate lib/kino/input.ex:261
- Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST REDACTED:3
- No dependency-update automation assets/package.json:7
Minor — 2 finding(s)
- Outdated: ex_doc
- Outdated: plug
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-8fe447dd1aa047a2b4228e4af0f5773b/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-8fe447dd1aa047a2b4228e4af0f5773b/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 21 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |