memento — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

mandel-macaque/memento is sound in substance but carries real gaps (58%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (77%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (50%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (55%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Small (~3,007 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 77% Adequate · gated by D2 Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 55% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 50% Weak · gated by P3 Security 66% Adequate · gated by D29, D36

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 50% · 47% weightMaturity 55% · 26% weightSecurity 66% · 14% weightCode Health 77% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 50 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 58 → ~64.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,500–€7,600

Cost to rebuild	€1,500–€7,600 (0.1 person-years (25–80 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.8× (at 58% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 50% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 7 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CommitWorkflow.fs, AmendWorkflow.fs, AuditWorkflow.fs.

+4.7 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).

+8.7 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

+8.7 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 50%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,007 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 50%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).

A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics

The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 6.9/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 3–6% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)

Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 6.9/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured

→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

2 modules, 1 dependency — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Adequate · gated by D2

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 7.8 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 8.9

The Ugly

D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 4.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 9.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 7.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 50% · Weak · gated by P3

The Good

D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 8.6 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 9.2 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 4.0

At a glance — Security · 66% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.2

The Ugly

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.2 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	24	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a tested disaster recovery plan with clear RTO and RPO targets, ensuring backups are validated beyond simple configuration files. Second, implement a manual approval gate for releases to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Third, document significant architectural decisions in a centralized location to preserve institutional knowledge. Fourth, correct the README to accurately reflect the project's capabilities and current state. Finally, add a high-level 'Architecture' or 'How it works' section to the root README to improve discoverability.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 7 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CommitWorkflow.fs, AmendWorkflow.fs, AuditWorkflow.fs.	+4.7 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).	+8.7 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.	+8.7 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).	+6.2 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+3.1 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims git-memento is a Git extension recording AI coding sessions as notes but the evidence shows no such feature.	+5.0 pts	Medium	Documentation accuracy
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.	+4.8 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Resolve the 1 The README's Getting Started section lists 'First-time setup' under… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md.	+1.3 pts	Low	Documentation Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 28 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 53% mixed · 43% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
.github/workflows/release.yml	2.3	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
action.yml	4.5	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
package-lock.json	5.1	Mixed	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs	7.0	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: Parsing.parseAmend (cyclomatic 25)
src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs	7.1	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 26)
src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs	7.2	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: Program.main (cyclomatic 56)
src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs	7.2	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
.github/workflows/memento-note-comments.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/memento-note-gate.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/memento-notes-merge-carry.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs	7.4	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 31)
src/GitMemento.Cli/DoctorWorkflow.fs	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 34)
src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesCarryWorkflow.fs	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 23)
src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesSyncWorkflow.fs	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 21)
src/GitMemento.Cli/MementoConfig.fs	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings (cyclomatic 18)
src/GitMemento.Cli/InitWorkflow.fs	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: InitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27)
src/GitMemento.Cli/AuditWorkflow.fs	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: AuditWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27)
src/GitMemento.Cli/AuditCore.fs	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: AuditCore.validateNote (cognitive 22)
src/GitMemento.Cli/SessionNotes.fs	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: SessionNotes.parseEnvelopeEntries (cognitive 17)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 24 of 26 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 26 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D8D12D13D15D19D21D28D29D30D33D35D36D38M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 71 of 85 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd532-7d20-7592-8cd7-f56352dfe853.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Program.main at 56.

Program.main (cyclomatic 56)src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:49

DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 34)src/GitMemento.Cli/DoctorWorkflow.fs:52

AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 31)src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:118

CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 26)src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:78

Parsing.parseAmend (cyclomatic 25)src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:120

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Program.main (cyclomatic 56) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Program.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 34) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with DoctorWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 31) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with AmendWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync at 129.

AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 129)src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:118

NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 88)src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesCarryWorkflow.fs:57

Program.main (cognitive 74)src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:49

Parsing.parseCommit (cognitive 68)src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:55

CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 58)src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:78

+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 129) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with AmendWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 88) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with NotesCarryWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Program.main (cognitive 74) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Program.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

11 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×7src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:107

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:110

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:258

Duplicated block (7 lines × 3)src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:79

What to do

Resolve the 7 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with CommitWorkflow.fs (2), Program.fs (2), CliArgs.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with GitService.fs, CommitWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with GitService.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 49.9% — 7 file(s) below 50%.

Low coverage: CommitWorkflow.fs · ×7CommitWorkflow.fs

What to do

Resolve the 7 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CommitWorkflow.fs, AmendWorkflow.fs, AuditWorkflow.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit

Outdated: Serilog · ×5

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

git-memento's documentation is clear, complete, and well-structured across three cohesive documents: a main README covering What is git-memento?, Getting Started (prerequisites, installation, first setup), Core Commands, Advanced Features, CI/CD Integration, Testing, Contributing, and License; a team adoption guide explaining how to set up for multiple team members working on the same repository; and an AI Session Recording in Git comparisons document surveying the landscape and positioning git-memento relative to dedicated recording tools. All three are clipped by the scanner but carry full outlines (all sections named), so no section is flagged as missing.

The README's Getting Started section lists 'First-time setup' under Installation, which is a subsection of Installation and should appear before First-time setup.README.md

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 finding(s): 0 critical, 23 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×23.github/workflows/ci.yml:19detected by semgrep finding

Medium: workflow-run-target-code-checkout.github/workflows/release.yml:22detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 23 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (7), release.yml (7), action.yml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable NuGet packages (direct or transitive).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions

No build provenance

No artifact signing

No SBOM

What to do

Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README claims git-memento is a Git extension recording AI coding sessions as notes but the evidence shows no such feature

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README claims git-memento is a Git extension recording AI coding sessions as notes but the evidence shows no such feature.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	77%	Adequate — gated by D2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	55%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	50%	Weak — gated by P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	66%	Adequate — gated by D29, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1414 lines of test source are present (.fs, .ps1, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution; this repository's .NET projects are all F# (.fsproj), which the C#/VB workspace does not load, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.fs, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — No first-party assembly was produced by the build.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .fs, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.fs, .ps1, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 9 value object(s); 1 domain event(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 24 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×23

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:113 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:124 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/github-script@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/github-script@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/github-script/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:171 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:202 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/memento-note-comments.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/memento-note-gate.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/memento-notes-merge-carry.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:66 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:100 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:113 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:119 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: softprops/action-gh-release@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `softprops/action-gh-release@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/softprops/action-gh-release/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection action.yml:65 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: run-shell-injection action.yml:70 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: run-shell-injection action.yml:93 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag action.yml:139 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/github-script@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/github-script@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/github-script/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection action.yml:180 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag action.yml:258 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/github-script@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/github-script@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/github-script/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — linkify-it 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — linkify-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin linkify-it to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against linkify-it 5.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against linkify-it 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

Warning — 48 finding(s)

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×7

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:107 — src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:107-118 | src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:165-176 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:56 — src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:56-67 | src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:214-225 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:56` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:26 — src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:26-37 | src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:17-28 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:26` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:42 — src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:42-53 | src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:36-47 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:198 — src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:198-209 | src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesCarryWorkflow.fs:97-108 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:144 — src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:144-155 | src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:156-167 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:168 — src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:168-179 | src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:192-203 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×7

Low coverage: CommitWorkflow.fs CommitWorkflow.fs — 32.8% line coverage (40/122).
Low coverage: AmendWorkflow.fs AmendWorkflow.fs — 46.1% line coverage (71/154).
Low coverage: AuditWorkflow.fs AuditWorkflow.fs — 0.0% line coverage (0/65).
Low coverage: DoctorWorkflow.fs DoctorWorkflow.fs — 0.0% line coverage (0/93).
Low coverage: Program.fs Program.fs — 0.0% line coverage (0/147).
Low coverage: MementoConfig.fs MementoConfig.fs — 0.0% line coverage (0/30).
Low coverage: Markdown.fs Markdown.fs — 47.7% line coverage (41/86).

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:110 — src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:110-118 | src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:130-138 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:119 — src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:119-127 | src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:83-91 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Program.main (cyclomatic 56) · ×1

Program.main (cyclomatic 56) src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:49 — Program.main has cyclomatic complexity 56 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 34) · ×1

DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 34) src/GitMemento.Cli/DoctorWorkflow.fs:52 — DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 31) · ×1

AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 31) src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:118 — AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 26) · ×1

CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 26) src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:78 — CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Parsing.parseAmend (cyclomatic 25) · ×1

Parsing.parseAmend (cyclomatic 25) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:120 — Parsing.parseAmend has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 23) · ×1

NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 23) src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesCarryWorkflow.fs:57 — NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Parsing.parseCommit (cyclomatic 23) · ×1

Parsing.parseCommit (cyclomatic 23) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:55 — Parsing.parseCommit has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 21) · ×1

NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cyclomatic 21) src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesSyncWorkflow.fs:84 — NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings (cyclomatic 18) · ×1

MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings (cyclomatic 18) src/GitMemento.Cli/MementoConfig.fs:11 — MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1

Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 129) · ×1

AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 129) src/GitMemento.Cli/AmendWorkflow.fs:118 — AmendWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 129 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 70, if/else 58, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 104). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 88) · ×1

NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 88) src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesCarryWorkflow.fs:57 — NotesCarryWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 88 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 49, match/switch 38, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 68). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Program.main (cognitive 74) · ×1

Program.main (cognitive 74) src/GitMemento.Cli/Program.fs:49 — Program.main has cognitive complexity 74 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 74 (nesting depth added 52). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseCommit (cognitive 68) · ×1

Parsing.parseCommit (cognitive 68) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:55 — Parsing.parseCommit has cognitive complexity 68 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 51, match/switch 16, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 40). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 58) · ×1

CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 58) src/GitMemento.Cli/CommitWorkflow.fs:78 — CommitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 58 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 53, if/else 5 (nesting depth added 44). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseAmend (cognitive 56) · ×1

Parsing.parseAmend (cognitive 56) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:120 — Parsing.parseAmend has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 45, match/switch 10, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 50) · ×1

NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 50) src/GitMemento.Cli/NotesSyncWorkflow.fs:84 — NotesSyncWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 40, if/else 5, loops 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 39). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseNotesCarry (cognitive 36) · ×1

Parsing.parseNotesCarry (cognitive 36) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:324 — Parsing.parseNotesCarry has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 34, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseAudit (cognitive 33) · ×1

Parsing.parseAudit (cognitive 33) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:204 — Parsing.parseAudit has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 26, match/switch 7 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings (cognitive 31) · ×1

MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings (cognitive 31) src/GitMemento.Cli/MementoConfig.fs:11 — MementoConfig.loadProviderSettings has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 31 (nesting depth added 23). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 29) · ×1

DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 29) src/GitMemento.Cli/DoctorWorkflow.fs:52 — DoctorWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 20, if/else 5, loops 4 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · InitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27) · ×1

InitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27) src/GitMemento.Cli/InitWorkflow.fs:21 — InitWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 18, if/else 5, loops 4 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AuditWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27) · ×1

AuditWorkflow.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 27) src/GitMemento.Cli/AuditWorkflow.fs:50 — AuditWorkflow.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 15, if/else 9, loops 3 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseNotesSync (cognitive 25) · ×1

Parsing.parseNotesSync (cognitive 25) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:284 — Parsing.parseNotesSync has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Parsing.parseDoctor (cognitive 23) · ×1

Parsing.parseDoctor (cognitive 23) src/GitMemento.Cli/CliArgs.fs:248 — Parsing.parseDoctor has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, match/switch 7 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AuditCore.validateNote (cognitive 22) · ×1

AuditCore.validateNote (cognitive 22) src/GitMemento.Cli/AuditCore.fs:29 — AuditCore.validateNote has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 3 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SessionNotes.parseEnvelopeEntries (cognitive 17) · ×1

SessionNotes.parseEnvelopeEntries (cognitive 17) src/GitMemento.Cli/SessionNotes.fs:47 — SessionNotes.parseEnvelopeEntries has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 10). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1

Medium: workflow-run-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/release.yml:22 — This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `workflow_run` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `workflow_run`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1

Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 17 floating ref(s) across 5 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — markdown-it 14.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares markdown-it ^14.1.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 14.2.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so markdown-it moves onto 14.2.0 or later; if the flagged 14.1.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin markdown-it with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:258 — src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:258-267 | src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:285-294 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:258` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:79 — src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:79-85 | src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:256-262 | src/GitMemento.Cli/GitService.fs:283-289 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

Recommendation — 7 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.fs, .ps1, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (3 author(s) across 35 commit(s) sampled).

D19 · Documentation Quality · The README's Getting Started section lists 'First-time setup' under Installation, which is a subsection of Installation and should appear before First-time setup. · ×1

The README's Getting Started section lists 'First-time setup' under Installation, which is a subsection of Installation and should appear before First-time setup. README.md — Reorder the installation sub-sections so First-time setup comes immediately after prerequisites.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (35 commit(s) sampled).

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1

No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1

No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1

No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `npm sbom --sbom-format cyclonedx` (npm 9+) or `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` over the lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.

Info — 6 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×5

Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.3.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by GitMemento.Cli).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 6.0.0 → 6.1.1 available (referenced by GitMemento.Cli).
Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.4 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by GitMemento.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.14.1 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by GitMemento.Tests).
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 3.1.4 → 3.1.5 available (referenced by GitMemento.Tests).

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	24	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list GitMemento.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	0	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	2	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fd532-7d20-7592-8cd7-f56352dfe853 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Mandel-Macaque/memento

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Adequate · gated by D2

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 50% · Weak · gated by P3

At a glance — Security · 66% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts